WAPO Op-ed on airpower

[SethB]

Her previous work was published in SWJ.

Despite the acknowledged shortcomings of air attacks within the current framework of U.S. counterinsurgency, for the time being air power in general and close air support operations in particular will continue to be indispensable components of the Afghan war. Constrained by a shortage of troops, vast and dispersed areas of operations, limited human intelligence, and proximate insurgent sanctuaries, CAS is a lifeline for coalition troops. Yet with the exception of nuclear weapons, arguably no military has used a weapon of war more judiciously than the American military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, even remarkable restraint has proven insufficient. While the physical and psychological toll of air strikes on the civilian population is undisputable, the American military’s hesitating use of CAS not only runs the risk of putting the lives of its troops in danger and affecting their willingness to patrol larger AO, but of encouraging insurgents to fight under the literal aegis civilian human shields. Frank acknowledgement of civilian deaths and timely distribution of reparations might marginally mitigate public outrage, but neither are not long-term solutions. Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will.

Lara M. Dadkhah is a graduate student in Security Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She has worked as an open source analyst covering biodefense issues in Iran and Afghanistan, and as a data analyst for current coalition information operations in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Entropy:

Waiting 90 minutes to receive air support has nothing to do with Gen. McChrystal's directive restricting use of kinetic air operations. The restrictions are meant to caution against the use of ordnance, not the use of aircraft. If it takes the Marines 90 minutes to receive Cobra support (an organic asset) then that means they were probably supporting another unit or were delayed because of some operational factor. As I understand it, there's nothing in the guidance that restricts getting an aircraft overhead - in fact that is typically encouraged because aircraft provide additional situational awareness for the ground forces in addition to being ready to employ munitions if needed.

Perhaps true but I suspect the lack of trust factor plays into it quite strongly -- someone in the chain decides unilaterally that the Troops on the Ground are being over reactive and deliberatley slows the process by asking "Are you sure you need Air..." Add the FSC into the mix with FA assets or even the parent unit's Mortars and you get a rather bureaucratic process that all revolves around a certain lack of trust of the unit in contact to do what the observers (and if they aren't involved, directly and on the ground, in the contact that's what they are -- observers and not helpful ones at that...) think should be done...

The author is assuming, wrongly, that aircraft are performing shows of force because they were denied authority to drop ordnance, which is almost never the case.

Just as a point of discussion, the so-called show of force is a bad technique. It is a bluff, pure and simple, a smart opponent will figure that out and will call it or, more likely, subvert it. It, IMO, should not be allowed if for no other reason than it builds very bad habits for a real war.

One of the author's supporting anecdotes is wrong. There's now nothing in the op-ed to support the author's claims.

I believe that article, if accurate, supports my contention that a lot of second guessing by people who should not be doing that -- indeed, have no right or actually responsibility to do that -- is a significant problem in providing support. I'd be willing to bet big bucks it is THE significant problem. From that linked article:

"One of the majors told the investigators that he denied further requests for fire support “for various reasons including: lack of situational awareness of locations of friendly elements; proximity to the village; garbled communications; or inaccurate or incomplete calls for fire.”

Some of my best friends are Majors. However, I submit that a request from a Commander in contact got effectively turned down by a Staff Officer who had absolutely no business doing that based on his perceptions. I wasn't there and he may have been correct in doing so but I'd be willing to bet even more money that he erred. I've seen that kind of ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear occur way too many times..

More troops should equal less need for stand-off fires, because you should have greater freedom of action (more resources) in planning operations...Moreover stupid ROE poorly applied will always lead to trouble.

The latter statement is true and I totally agree. The former statement is correct but does not allow for the extremely risk averse US Army. While what you say is true, we as a Force are entirely too dependent on supporting fires and are reluctant to let Infantry do its job without the availability of massive supporting fires of some or all types. Totally dumb, tactically incompetent and will not hold up in war of more but it's reality...

...while I think saying "hearts and minds" in baby talk, this kid comprehensively undermines, all the argument against the H&M policy by saying stupid stuff... if you do not study warfare or have never been taught about, do not comment on it.

Perhaps. However, I see a lot of people who have ostensibly studied warfare and who have in theory been taught about it make a lot of even far more ignorant statements...

This quote provided by SethB from the author of the originally linked article makes up for any ignorance shown elsewhere:

"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."

Exactly.

[Schmedlap]

I found the fundamental error in this piece. It's at the very bottom...

Lara M. Dadkhah is an intelligence analyst.

One of the better S-2's that I had said, more than once, that it was inappropriate for him to comment on operations because it would cloud his judgment on analyzing intelligence (I'm paraphrasing). His job was to inform the commander about the enemy situation. The author seems to have strayed for beyond that - making hasty assessments of operations, getting most of them wrong, and then publishing them in the NY Times.

FAIL.

[Pete]

The purpose of fire support coordination measures and fire support officers is to prevent friendly fire incidents from happening when artillery engages targets in an adjacent unit's area of operations. I believe the coordination measures came into being during the First World War and are based on the assumption of a linear battlefield in which friendly forces are usually on one's flanks. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive in 1918 Captain Harry Truman of the 35th Infantry Division was threatened with relief by his regimental commander for ordering his battery of 75s to fire into the 28th Division's sector when he saw a German battery setting up there only a few hundred yards from his position.

[Entropy]

Ken,

All good points but it seems to me those are, ultimately, leadership issues and not ROE issues. But I do think it's probably reasonable to assume the new ROE, when combined with bureaucracy, poor leadership and risk aversion, inappropriately prevented the use of fires in some cases. Even so, it seems to me the allegations in the op-ed are still completely wrong.

[Ken White]

She's saying what we're doing doesn't work but gets the details wrong. You're saying the system works. Not the same thing.

No way of knowing the specifics for cases of presumed or alleged lack of support. My point was that the system does work but that over caution and people problems intrude too often. IIRC, you also elsewhere have acknowledged what we're doing isn't working...

Our tendency for ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear has been around for years; it long pre-dates ROE in general and certainly the Afghan theater ROE of today. I experienced it in two long ago wars -- it is not a new phenomenon. My son has a couple of classics from Desert Storm as well as more from his current tours.

I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing).

Both points based on long observation...

Oh -- and you're correct, they certainly are leadership issues. They're also even more so very much training and policy / doctrine issues...

[William F. Owen]

I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing).

All excellent points Ken, and yes, the old "stupid things done badly" seems to be a constant challenge!

My point is that the article concerned does not merit being published as an OP-ED in the NY Times, purely because it lacks credible evidence and data. I want informed opinion, not mere opinion.

There is almost certainly a debate to be had about the effective implementation of ROE concerning CAS and Stand-off fires, but the article concerned does not form part of that argument, other than to show the current debate is being particularly intelligently conducted.

I just do not see any problem with using Air Power, IF it can be intelligently applied. If the evidence is that it cannot be intelligently applied, then stop using it - AND - point out the reason there is no CAS is because of the poor standards of training and leadership (risk averse?) does not makes its use supportable as a policy.