WAPO Op-ed on airpower

[Entropy]

This op-ed came out today and it's generating a lot of controversy.

There are so many problems with this essay it's difficult to know where to begin. It's not just the opinion itself, but also the supporting facts which are almost completely without merit.

The author's penchant for hyperbole is striking. She cites Pentagon numbers that kinetic strikes decreased from 6% to 5.4% of sorties. From that small number she concludes:

- We are "avoiding the death of innocents at all cost"
- We have "all but grounded" air support
- We have "largely relinquished the strategic advantage of American air dominance."

Such claims apparently appeal to the editors at the NYT but are obviously bogus to anyone with minimal knowledge of the topic.

Some excerpts and commentary:

But news reports indicate that our troops under heavy attack have had to wait an hour or more for air support, so that insurgents could be positively identified. “We didn’t come to Marja to destroy it, or to hurt civilians,” a Marine officer told reporters after waiting 90 minutes before the Cobra helicopters he had requested showed up with their Hellfire missiles.

Waiting 90 minutes to receive air support has nothing to do with Gen. McChrystal's directive restricting use of kinetic air operations. The restrictions are meant to caution against the use of ordnance, not the use of aircraft. If it takes the Marines 90 minutes to receive Cobra support (an organic asset) then that means they were probably supporting another unit or were delayed because of some operational factor. As I understand it, there's nothing in the guidance that restricts getting an aircraft overhead - in fact that is typically encouraged because aircraft provide additional situational awareness for the ground forces in addition to being ready to employ munitions if needed.

While the number of American forces in Afghanistan has more than doubled since 2008, to nearly 70,000 today, the critical air support they get has not kept pace. According to my analysis of data compiled by the United States military, close air support sorties, which in Afghanistan are almost always unplanned and in aid of troops on the ground who are under intense fire, increased by just 27 percent during that same period.

Correlation =/= causation. Why would anyone expect the number of CAS air sorties to rise in lock-step with troop levels? Regardless, the author subsequently cites data which directly contradicts this argument:

Pentagon data show that the percentage of sorties sent out that resulted in air strikes has also declined, albeit modestly, to 5.6 percent from 6 percent.

And then:

According to the military’s own air-power summaries, often when the planes or helicopters arrive, they simply perform shows of force, or drop flares rather than munitions. It is only a matter of time before the Taliban see flares and flyovers for what they are: empty threats.

I last deployed to Afghanistan in 2005. Shows-of-force were very common then and their continued use is nothing unusual. Enemy forces do not typically see them as empty threats particularly since munition employment is only somewhat more restricted under Gen. McChrystal's guidance and not banned outright. The author is assuming, wrongly, that aircraft are performing shows of force because they were denied authority to drop ordnance, which is almost never the case. Typically, a ground unit will requests a show of force for its own sake and not because weapons employment was denied.

Perhaps the directive against civilian casualties could be justified if one could show that Afghan lives were truly being saved, but that’s not the case. According to the latest report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the number of civilian deaths caused by Western and Afghan government forces decreased to 596 in 2009, from 828 the year before. But the overall number of civilian deaths in the country increased by 14 percent, to 2,412, and the number killed by Taliban troops and other insurgents rose by 41 percent. For Afghan civilians who are dying in greater numbers every year, the fact that fewer deaths are caused by pro-government forces is cold comfort.

This is one reason the Taliban is so unpopular in Afghanistan, but the argument that Afghans will cut us some slack for only killing one civilian for every five the Taliban kill is particularly egregious and uninformed.

Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.

For the author some irrelevant and contradictory statistics along with cherry-picked anecdotes count as clarity. I could not disagree more.

[Entropy]

That's from the New York Times.

Thanks, I edited the post. Not sure how I screwed that up!

[Entropy]

One of the author's supporting anecdotes is wrong. There's now nothing in the op-ed to support the author's claims.

[Danny]

I could have filled in the blanks for the commentary with other examples and cite specific sources. They may or may not have done a good job of sourcing their objections. Leaving that aside, you don't really believe that an AR 15-6 investigation is going to disparage a tactical directive of a four star general, do you?

I had predicted on my blog a weeks back that the field grade officers who were at the helm when the Kunar incident occurred had better find another line of work ... and soon.

[William F. Owen]

This got published in the NY Times?? It's rubbish. This kid knows very little about military operations. While I defer very little to rank, age, title or experience, but this is an object lesson in the truism, that if you want to show your ignorance, start talking.

Yet again, someone who cannot tell the difference between, war, warfare, plans, policy, strategy and tactics!

More troops should equal less need for stand-off fires, because you should have greater freedom of action (more resources) in planning operations.
Moreover stupid ROE poorly applied will always lead to trouble.

This actually annoys me, because while I think saying "hearts and minds" in baby talk, this kid comprehensively undermines, all the argument against the H&M policy by saying stupid stuff.

.... if you do not study warfare or have never been taught about, do not comment on it.

[SethB]

Her previous work was published in SWJ.

Despite the acknowledged shortcomings of air attacks within the current framework of U.S. counterinsurgency, for the time being air power in general and close air support operations in particular will continue to be indispensable components of the Afghan war. Constrained by a shortage of troops, vast and dispersed areas of operations, limited human intelligence, and proximate insurgent sanctuaries, CAS is a lifeline for coalition troops. Yet with the exception of nuclear weapons, arguably no military has used a weapon of war more judiciously than the American military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, even remarkable restraint has proven insufficient. While the physical and psychological toll of air strikes on the civilian population is undisputable, the American military’s hesitating use of CAS not only runs the risk of putting the lives of its troops in danger and affecting their willingness to patrol larger AO, but of encouraging insurgents to fight under the literal aegis civilian human shields. Frank acknowledgement of civilian deaths and timely distribution of reparations might marginally mitigate public outrage, but neither are not long-term solutions. Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will.

Lara M. Dadkhah is a graduate student in Security Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She has worked as an open source analyst covering biodefense issues in Iran and Afghanistan, and as a data analyst for current coalition information operations in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Entropy:

Waiting 90 minutes to receive air support has nothing to do with Gen. McChrystal's directive restricting use of kinetic air operations. The restrictions are meant to caution against the use of ordnance, not the use of aircraft. If it takes the Marines 90 minutes to receive Cobra support (an organic asset) then that means they were probably supporting another unit or were delayed because of some operational factor. As I understand it, there's nothing in the guidance that restricts getting an aircraft overhead - in fact that is typically encouraged because aircraft provide additional situational awareness for the ground forces in addition to being ready to employ munitions if needed.

Perhaps true but I suspect the lack of trust factor plays into it quite strongly -- someone in the chain decides unilaterally that the Troops on the Ground are being over reactive and deliberatley slows the process by asking "Are you sure you need Air..." Add the FSC into the mix with FA assets or even the parent unit's Mortars and you get a rather bureaucratic process that all revolves around a certain lack of trust of the unit in contact to do what the observers (and if they aren't involved, directly and on the ground, in the contact that's what they are -- observers and not helpful ones at that...) think should be done...

The author is assuming, wrongly, that aircraft are performing shows of force because they were denied authority to drop ordnance, which is almost never the case.

Just as a point of discussion, the so-called show of force is a bad technique. It is a bluff, pure and simple, a smart opponent will figure that out and will call it or, more likely, subvert it. It, IMO, should not be allowed if for no other reason than it builds very bad habits for a real war.

One of the author's supporting anecdotes is wrong. There's now nothing in the op-ed to support the author's claims.

I believe that article, if accurate, supports my contention that a lot of second guessing by people who should not be doing that -- indeed, have no right or actually responsibility to do that -- is a significant problem in providing support. I'd be willing to bet big bucks it is THE significant problem. From that linked article:

"One of the majors told the investigators that he denied further requests for fire support “for various reasons including: lack of situational awareness of locations of friendly elements; proximity to the village; garbled communications; or inaccurate or incomplete calls for fire.”

Some of my best friends are Majors. However, I submit that a request from a Commander in contact got effectively turned down by a Staff Officer who had absolutely no business doing that based on his perceptions. I wasn't there and he may have been correct in doing so but I'd be willing to bet even more money that he erred. I've seen that kind of ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear occur way too many times..

More troops should equal less need for stand-off fires, because you should have greater freedom of action (more resources) in planning operations...Moreover stupid ROE poorly applied will always lead to trouble.

The latter statement is true and I totally agree. The former statement is correct but does not allow for the extremely risk averse US Army. While what you say is true, we as a Force are entirely too dependent on supporting fires and are reluctant to let Infantry do its job without the availability of massive supporting fires of some or all types. Totally dumb, tactically incompetent and will not hold up in war of more but it's reality...

...while I think saying "hearts and minds" in baby talk, this kid comprehensively undermines, all the argument against the H&M policy by saying stupid stuff... if you do not study warfare or have never been taught about, do not comment on it.

Perhaps. However, I see a lot of people who have ostensibly studied warfare and who have in theory been taught about it make a lot of even far more ignorant statements...

This quote provided by SethB from the author of the originally linked article makes up for any ignorance shown elsewhere:

"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."

Exactly.

[Schmedlap]

I found the fundamental error in this piece. It's at the very bottom...

Lara M. Dadkhah is an intelligence analyst.

One of the better S-2's that I had said, more than once, that it was inappropriate for him to comment on operations because it would cloud his judgment on analyzing intelligence (I'm paraphrasing). His job was to inform the commander about the enemy situation. The author seems to have strayed for beyond that - making hasty assessments of operations, getting most of them wrong, and then publishing them in the NY Times.

FAIL.

[Pete]

The purpose of fire support coordination measures and fire support officers is to prevent friendly fire incidents from happening when artillery engages targets in an adjacent unit's area of operations. I believe the coordination measures came into being during the First World War and are based on the assumption of a linear battlefield in which friendly forces are usually on one's flanks. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive in 1918 Captain Harry Truman of the 35th Infantry Division was threatened with relief by his regimental commander for ordering his battery of 75s to fire into the 28th Division's sector when he saw a German battery setting up there only a few hundred yards from his position.

[Entropy]

Ken,

All good points but it seems to me those are, ultimately, leadership issues and not ROE issues. But I do think it's probably reasonable to assume the new ROE, when combined with bureaucracy, poor leadership and risk aversion, inappropriately prevented the use of fires in some cases. Even so, it seems to me the allegations in the op-ed are still completely wrong.

[Ken White]

She's saying what we're doing doesn't work but gets the details wrong. You're saying the system works. Not the same thing.

No way of knowing the specifics for cases of presumed or alleged lack of support. My point was that the system does work but that over caution and people problems intrude too often. IIRC, you also elsewhere have acknowledged what we're doing isn't working...

Our tendency for ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear has been around for years; it long pre-dates ROE in general and certainly the Afghan theater ROE of today. I experienced it in two long ago wars -- it is not a new phenomenon. My son has a couple of classics from Desert Storm as well as more from his current tours.

I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing).

Both points based on long observation...

Oh -- and you're correct, they certainly are leadership issues. They're also even more so very much training and policy / doctrine issues...

[William F. Owen]

I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing).

All excellent points Ken, and yes, the old "stupid things done badly" seems to be a constant challenge!

My point is that the article concerned does not merit being published as an OP-ED in the NY Times, purely because it lacks credible evidence and data. I want informed opinion, not mere opinion.

There is almost certainly a debate to be had about the effective implementation of ROE concerning CAS and Stand-off fires, but the article concerned does not form part of that argument, other than to show the current debate is being particularly intelligently conducted.

I just do not see any problem with using Air Power, IF it can be intelligently applied. If the evidence is that it cannot be intelligently applied, then stop using it - AND - point out the reason there is no CAS is because of the poor standards of training and leadership (risk averse?) does not makes its use supportable as a policy.

[Van]

The article is fallacious from the beginning.

Firepower is least among the things Airpower brings to COIN.
What Airpower does bring to the fight;

• Logistic support - specifically transportation both of people and supplies

• Intelligence collection - both air and space collection assets across the spectrum of intelligence discipline; an incredible suppliment to scouts

• Fire support - doesn't replace ground based fires, but does reduce the need for ground based artillery when the minimum 'in country' footprint is needed

With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.

And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this?

[William F. Owen]

Firepower is least among the things Airpower brings to COIN.
What Airpower does bring to the fight;

• Logistic support - specifically transportation both of people and supplies

• Intelligence collection - both air and space collection assets across the spectrum of intelligence discipline; an incredible suppliment to scouts

• Fire support - doesn't replace ground based fires, but does reduce the need for ground based artillery when the minimum 'in country' footprint is needed

Good point and well made... and I have no excuse. I'm saying exactly that at a conference some time soon!!

[Ken White]

The article is fallacious from the beginning.

However, it is absolutely correct at the ending...

" Of course, all this is not to say that we should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage “total” war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.

Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a “long war” should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have."

Truer words were never spake...

With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.

Perhaps true. Also perhaps like me she simply does not believe a COIN strategy is at all wise, effective or efficient (in my case, most anywhere at most anytime and particularly now and in Afghanistan). She may even share my belief and that of others that COIN theory is fallacious and was predicated on wars of choice most of which were in the end proven to be a huge waste and that it evolved as a practice mostly due to lack of perceived options. That COIN efforts are not wise and to be avoided if at all possible is true for any nation and it is particularly true for the US -- we have historical examples out the ying yang of not doing it at all well.

I repeated an earlier quote of hers but it occurs to me it bears yet another repetition -- this time emphasizing the key point:

"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."

Emphasis added / KW. My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.

And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this?

Well, somebody's gotta do it...

I'll defend it also and your comments on what it brings to the fight are of course quite accurate. The real question, to me, is should we be in such a fight? If so, why?

Time again for my Stonewall Jackson quote:

"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."

Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson

Maybe the article authoress read that somewhere...

[Bill Moore]

Van, I second WILF's comments, a very concise and accurate summary.

Posted by Ken,

My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.

We discussed this previously and are in agreement that using infantry maneuver to close with and kill the enemy is rarely practiced due to risk adversion. As we know, we're now fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan instead of conducting strictly offensive operations against Al Qaeda, and we know that insurgents conduct acts to prompt the counterinsurgent to over react, thus isolating the counterinsurgent from the populace. We all know this, but we disregard this knowledge in practice! GEN McCrystal has it right, kill the enemy, not the Afghan people.

The other issue you addressed is tying the hands of junior leaders at the tactical level. These leaders should be given a piece of turf (AO), a mission and commander's intent (with ROE, etc.), and anything that falls under this mandate they should be allowed to execute without sending a request for permission to a higher hqs that doesn't know ground truth. At no time shold staff officers be allowed to say to no to a subordinate commander (they can share their opinion and advice). That is a commander's call period, and to the extent possible it should be delegated to the lowest level. Simply need to get back to the basics, a lot of the so called complexity is a stew of our own making.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, here's no-one from the "peace!" faction, so let me fill this role.

Civilians should be treated as humans, not different from your own fellow citizens.

There's no need for dedicated COIN doctrine or strategic insights to find the right path in this case. Simply don't treat foreign civilians as sub-humans and you'll avoid stupid mistakes.

- - - - -

About the high level of carefulness in infantry actions:
Infantry is not meant to fight in open terrain. It's not the infantry's element. I think that should have been understood by the late 19th century.

ISAF/OEF-A are using infantry in open terrain because of logistical restrictions. I'm sure everyone there would be happy to use IFVs for almost everything.
The infantry may be more risk-averse than appropriate for the mission, but that's in my opinion just an emulation of the degree of necessary carefulness in conflicts against enemies with proper firing range training.

We better don't expect the infantry to show more aggressiveness and daring in future conflicts - it would in my opinion be inappropriate.
Support has taken over most personnel slots in modern armies - for a reason. It's there and it will stay. Such a force structure would be insane if support wasn't important.*

I remember the discussions of 2002. It wasn't air power or nothing. The discussion was about the neglect of artillery and mortars. This aspect has strangely lost attention. Sure, there are mortars and there is artillery, but it seems as if the log problems still keep these assets from becoming the primary source for FS.
Or maybe the infantry doesn't place much emphasis on mortars because higher HQs want to have control over support fires and thus keep mortars relatively unimportant?




*: I'm in favour of a greater infantry share, but not so much that it would alter the argument.

[Ken White]

Check the LINK. Note IFV friendly terrain.

Those mountains are why there's infantry, walking infantry, there. IFVs are useful but they also impose limitations...

As for Infantry in future wars -- METT-TC. Depends on where and who among other things. Always use the right tool for the job.

[Fuchs]

The people mostly live in valleys and flat ground, not on mountains. The mountains make good photos, but the maps and satellite imagery is quite devoid of houses or even settlements on mountains.

Besides; I know people who would prefer IFVs even in such terrains (not my opinion).

[Ken White]

The people mostly live in valleys and flat ground, not on mountains. The mountains make good photos, but the maps and satellite imagery is quite devoid of houses or even settlements on mountains.

Yep -- but those mountains are where the opposition frequently goes to hang out. Don't know about you but I'd prefer to not let them have any safe areas...

Many Armies have experienced a foe who fights among the people on level ground or outside the jungle and then retires to the hills or trees to recoup. Those who have allowed their enemy to develop sanctuaries elsewhere have suffered.

Besides; I know people who would prefer IFVs even in such terrains (not my opinion).

So do I. Know some who'd prefer to use all mech, that is. As I said, time and place; METT-TC. There's a place for the mech force and for walking infantry. What has been proven to not work so well is to rely on mech forces to do walking work -- they won't do it, won't leave their vehicles if they can avoid it -- only if they have no vehicles will they work as foot mobile troops. The skills are not totally transferable (even if the US Army foolishly thinks they are... ).