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Thread: British COIN (merged thread)

  1. #1
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
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    Default British Brigadier slams U.S. Army on counterinsurgency

    "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" (PDF)

    To paraphrase one of the Scottish lairds in Braveheart, " A bit less cordial than we're used to"

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    Default Brit C-DICT

    Moderator's Note

    I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)


    Is anyone familiar with the British C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism) Theory/Doctrine? If anyone has this document or is familiar with the idea, please help.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-28-2012 at 07:20 PM. Reason: Add note

  3. #3
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default

    Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Adam,

    I have a full CD on Brit OPTAG materials on COIN including the N. Ireland Bluebook I can send to you snal mail: need a military address sent by email (you have mine)

    we have also uused some of this in our company level SOSO series of handbooks you can see on the CALL gateway.

    Tom

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    Default Brit COIN material

    I have the Brit Bluebook for N. Ireland, but was of the impression that this C-DICT was something new. Is it the same?

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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9
    Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.
    Thank you.

    oneknievelfan@msn.com
    adam.strickland@usmc.mil

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    Default British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent?

    British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent? Ashley Jackson British Army Review

    Accurate assessment of British counter-insurgency successes requires abandonment of certain myths relating to military prowess in the application of 'minimum force' and recognition of essential contributions made by non-military agencies using unorthodox means to intimidate insurgents.

    "In particular, it is argued that past counter-insurgency campaigns were won not by the British Army on its own, but by an array of security organizations, and that the threat of maximum force and methods of dubious legality were the keys to counter-insurgency success" (p12).

    It is essential not to let such myths (for example, that COIN policy aimed to achieve an orderly path to independence rather than to resist decolonization altogether) shape current doctrine: "doctrinal publications must guard against elevating contested historical interpretations to the status of base-line truths" (p13).

    From: http://www.mpr.co.uk/archive/schedule/BAR.HTM

    This is an excellent article. Highly recommended and refreshing research which goes deeper than "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Good Post

    Very good post and one with a lesson that I try and pass on: Brit COIN TTPs are the result of trial, successes, and ERRORS over quite a span of colonial and post-colonial episodes. Brit officers I have worked with are generally quite intellectually honest in stating the same thing.

    Bottom line: yes, Brit COIN lessons are useful as are Brit COIN TTPs, as long as one goes beyond as Wagram says,
    "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".
    Best

    Tom

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    Council Member CR6's Avatar
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    Default It's not a slam if it's true

    I read this with much interest, and I found Aylwin-Foster's criticism to be accurate and credible, given his time with coalition. We are still grappling with the problems of centralized control of operations, separating ourselves from the population we seek to aid, and the woes of a shallow bench when it comes to personnel. He is also dead-on with his criticism that the Army's ethos of "can-do" sometimes overshadows critical thinking and judgement regarding situations in theater. Somehow I don't think that is what Powell had in mind when he wrote "optimism is a force multiplier." Great article!
    "Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

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    Council Member SSG Rock's Avatar
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    Default I agree, unfortunately.....

    We sit back here and see the changes that should occur in order to acheive any measure of success and I don't know about you guys but I am extremely frustrated at the almost pondering manner in which we seem to move in reaction to the adversary in Iraq. We know what we need to do, the changes that we need to make but we don't. Now, I know that there isn't much we can do to initiate change on the political side of the equation, but on the military/tactical where is the bottleneck? Why do we seem to insist on being predictable? Why are we still using pretty much the same playbook? Or, are we dramtically changing our TTP and I'm just not aware of it? Certainly, the news coming out of Iraq doesn't seem to do anything but get worse. Is it really worse? Rock confused.....
    Don't taze me bro!

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    From my turret there is significant resistance to change in war prosecution at the Bn and above level. Obvious examples to the contrary are evident in the past three years, but if you look at Ann Scott Tyson's article in the Washington Post this morning, there are shining examples of BN level leadership that just doesn't get it.

    Fighting COIN is a tactial, small unit endeavor. This takes Majors and Lieutenant Colonels out of the common, everyday decision making posture and they don't like it. It certainly isn't the same as a large, Bn sized frontal attack.

    Changes are made daily in theater but they're made at the lowest levels. We are very good at tactically adapting to the enemy. We are very poor at capturing tactical keys to success through our professional development periodicals. We're having tough times finding anyone to even submit articles to professional magazines. Why? Because the guys and gals smartest on the subject right now are getting deployed and redeployed every 14 months or so. The last thing most of them want to do is write a bloody article on redeployment.

    We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Your Singing My Song

    RTK

    Thanks for this:

    We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.
    I have been singing that song as loudly as possibe for nearly 6 years. Please join me in another chorus.

    Seriously, it is hard for brigade and battalion commanders to accept they in essence facilitate the fight. Some get it. Many don't.

    Best
    Tom

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    And this will continue to be a problem, I'm afraid. The Army never quite figured it out during 10+ years in Vietnam.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    I brought this issue up recently with some higher ups in CALL. The response was essentially "good idea, when are you going to write a tactical lessons learned book."

    I'm working on one in my free time, but I think it would be a subject worthy of someone's full time job right now, especially since we haven't put one out as an army after God knows how many tactical units have gone through twice.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Let's get started

    RTK

    Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

    Best

    Tom

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    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    RTK

    Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

    Best

    Tom

    If you had the data and structure writing it wouldn't take that long.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    RTK

    Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

    Best

    Tom

    Not an issue.

    I believe you know Lester Grau, if I remember correctly from a previous post. I think a great idea is a book much like "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" with historical vignettes and AAR's on real world tactical scenarios. This would take time, I know. I'd like to entertain his audience as someone who has done this type of book before to see what he thinks.

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    Default Looking for Links to UK Doctrine

    I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

    Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jim Rodgers View Post
    I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

    Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?
    Alex Alderson has been participating here; I'm sure he'll fix you up. I'll send him an email on it.

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    Default Revising the British Army's COIN Doctrine

    The reference is slightly off the mark but it matters not. You are looking for Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10, published in July 2001. Written by Brig (Retd) Gavin Bulloch, the British Army's pre-eminent doctrine writer, it served its purpose and held out until a full review was put in place nearly a year ago. That review is nearly complete and has hit the mark with the internal market, taking on the problems of interventionist COIN, raising the issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, reassessing principles and establishing a new view of the Thompson approach of Engage-Secure-Develop. There are one or two final hurdles to clear and no doubt the challenging views of the Small Wars cogniscenti will hit on things we'd wished we had included but... One of the most obvious and important points I have made is to pick up on Steve Metz's view, again obvious, that insurgency is a strategy. Why important? If you are to counter it, you also need a strategy, not just a presence: being there is not a strategy. And military prowess is, as many contributors have made clear, not enough. If you have access to the Royal United Services Institute website or its August 2007 journal, you can read more about what my team has been up to.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 10-20-2007 at 03:13 AM. Reason: Added links.

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