Page 1 of 3 123 LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 125

Thread: British COIN (merged thread)

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Chicago
    Posts
    262

    Default British Brigadier slams U.S. Army on counterinsurgency

    "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" (PDF)

    To paraphrase one of the Scottish lairds in Braveheart, " A bit less cordial than we're used to"

  2. #2
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Stafford, VA
    Posts
    262

    Default Brit C-DICT

    Moderator's Note

    I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)


    Is anyone familiar with the British C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism) Theory/Doctrine? If anyone has this document or is familiar with the idea, please help.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-28-2012 at 07:20 PM. Reason: Add note

  3. #3
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

  4. #4
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    Adam,

    I have a full CD on Brit OPTAG materials on COIN including the N. Ireland Bluebook I can send to you snal mail: need a military address sent by email (you have mine)

    we have also uused some of this in our company level SOSO series of handbooks you can see on the CALL gateway.

    Tom

  5. #5
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Stafford, VA
    Posts
    262

    Default Brit COIN material

    I have the Brit Bluebook for N. Ireland, but was of the impression that this C-DICT was something new. Is it the same?

  6. #6
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Stafford, VA
    Posts
    262

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9
    Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.
    Thank you.

    oneknievelfan@msn.com
    adam.strickland@usmc.mil

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jun 2006
    Posts
    17

    Default British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent?

    British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent? Ashley Jackson British Army Review

    Accurate assessment of British counter-insurgency successes requires abandonment of certain myths relating to military prowess in the application of 'minimum force' and recognition of essential contributions made by non-military agencies using unorthodox means to intimidate insurgents.

    "In particular, it is argued that past counter-insurgency campaigns were won not by the British Army on its own, but by an array of security organizations, and that the threat of maximum force and methods of dubious legality were the keys to counter-insurgency success" (p12).

    It is essential not to let such myths (for example, that COIN policy aimed to achieve an orderly path to independence rather than to resist decolonization altogether) shape current doctrine: "doctrinal publications must guard against elevating contested historical interpretations to the status of base-line truths" (p13).

    From: http://www.mpr.co.uk/archive/schedule/BAR.HTM

    This is an excellent article. Highly recommended and refreshing research which goes deeper than "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

  8. #8
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default Good Post

    Very good post and one with a lesson that I try and pass on: Brit COIN TTPs are the result of trial, successes, and ERRORS over quite a span of colonial and post-colonial episodes. Brit officers I have worked with are generally quite intellectually honest in stating the same thing.

    Bottom line: yes, Brit COIN lessons are useful as are Brit COIN TTPs, as long as one goes beyond as Wagram says,
    "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".
    Best

    Tom

  9. #9
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2007
    Posts
    717

    Default

    Zombie Thread...Arise!

    The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges, by I.A. Rigden (USAWC Strategy Research Project, 15 March, 2008):

    Modern British doctrine is founded on both myth and historical collective and regimental experience. Considered in the broader context of the total imperial experience a more comprehensive appreciation of counter-insurgency emerges. The realities of the British experience therefore become the premises for a counterinsurgency theory. What the study of the literature and experience suggest is a more general and inclusive list of realties that better define the basis for a comprehensive approach for the twenty-first century. It reveals at least 16 overarching premises that validate the current British principles and highlight areas not currently addressed in the AFM. Taken together these 16 premises constitute a British theory of counterinsurgency.
    Most of what this paper has to offer is not news to many students, let alone practioners, of COIN. But it is a good read, clear and concise, and we speed readers can digest it in about half an hour without missing anything. If one does not have to time or inclination to read Galula, Trinquiere, et al., this paper might be a worthwhile semi-substitute.

    Colonel Rigden's 16 Premises for COIN (abbreviated extracts):

    1. The first premise is that insurgency is war. War is a political act that requires an active decision to initiate it and a clear declaration of intent.

    2. The second premise is that every campaign is unique and the nature of the conflict must be understood. It takes time to fully understand the nature of the problem faced and to develop the lines of operation to deal with it.

    3. The third first premise is envisioning the long-term post-conflict end-state. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote: “The object of the counter-insurgency war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”

    4. The fourth premise is that geography matters. World geography and the geography of a particular region is one of the most important factors when trying to understand the nature of the conflict and how to conduct a counter-insurgency. Geography does affect the mindset of the insurgent and the population.

    5. The fifth premise is do not fight a war or campaign that you cannot win. There is a potential decision point in the planning or conduct of every war or campaign in which the astute leader may conclude that the costs of success or risks of failure far outweighs the benefits of any success.

    6. The sixth premise is the requirement for a clear plan. This is one of Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles and is based on his experience in helping to formulate the Briggs Plan.41 It is an essential factor for success. The plan must, however, be tailored to the peculiar and unique circumstances of the insurgency.

    7. The seventh premise is that there is always a learning stage at the beginning of each campaign and that it is vitally important to learn from mistakes quickly. It takes time to understand the nature of each campaign and, in the process of doing so, it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made. [Note: I would not agree with the invocation of Boyd's OODA Loop here].


    8. The eighth premise is that politics is the focal point. Politics and war are social phenomena. One key to countering insurgency is therefore to understand the context and nature of the social environment. It is essential to understand what the people’s issues are and what can make them better.

    9. The ninth premise is that hearts follow minds in counter-insurgency. In Hanoi in 1956, paraphrasing Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh stated that “The people are like the fish in the sea, they swim with the current.”
    Making the people swim in the right direction, the legitimate authority’s current, is the key to winning in counter-insurgency. It is essential to alter their minds to reject the insurgents and accept the justness and legitimacy of the counter-insurgent’s cause and to concurrently win their hearts.

    10. The tenth premise is that the requirement for a coordinated multi-agency government approach is paramount to success. This is true for governments externally intervening and for existing internal governments. The overall strategy and ensuing plans must be collaborative and involve multi-agencies and actors using all of the elements of national power of both the supported and supporting governments. In doing this the activities have to be coordinated and synchronized so that they work together and not against one another.

    11. The eleventh premise is that it is essential to work within the rule of law. Rule of law is the visible symbol of moral justification. The aim must be to restore the civilian authority and police primacy if it does not already exist. Where it does not exist, the military must shoulder the burden until such time as the relevant civilian and police capabilities can be trained to fulfil their role.


    12. The twelfth premise is that counter-insurgents must only use the appropriate force necessary for the situation faced. The appropriate use of force is the minimum amount of force required to achieve a particular legitimate objective. This can range from full scale warfighting against an insurgent base deep in the jungle to the single arrest of an insurgent in an urban area. The British military has relied heavily on flexible Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that only the minimum force necessary is used for each situation. Force must be proportionate and justified and the intent to use force clearly understood.


    13. The thirteenth premise is that campaigns must be appropriately resourced to be truly effective. Like all conflicts where fighting is likely, counter-insurgency campaigns are expensive in term of “blood and treasure.” It is, however, the “treasure” element of this equation that is often the most lacking in counter-insurgency campaigns. Such campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and they generally take longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude.


    14. The fourteenth premise is that accurate and timely information and intelligence are essential to success. Insurgency and counter-insurgency both work in the same strategic environment and the currency is intelligence that can be used to act.


    15. The fifteenth premise is that the use of indigenous forces is essential to building a an enduring peace for the country concerned. In all British campaigns local indigenous forces have played an important role. They have acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering, police forces and the local military.


    16. The sixteenth premise is that every new campaign will face increasing constraints and less freedom in the conduct of operations. The world of the twenty-first century is very different from fifty years ago. The Malayan campaign and Kenya were fought largely out of the glare of the media whereas Iraq and Afghanistan have twenty-four hour news coverage. Conflicts in the nineteenth century were reported weeks later. If history is our guide, this will only become worse and is a significant factor when considering undertaking a counter-insurgency or conducting a counter-insurgency campaign.
    Last edited by Norfolk; 06-16-2008 at 10:25 PM. Reason: For format.

  10. #10
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,209

    Thumbs up Zombie thread: learning the lessons

    Excellent find. A light reading over breakfast and maybe read again later - when printed. Interesting that this article by a British Army officer, studying in the USA and published in the USA. I wonder if it will be re-printed here, perhaps in British Army Review?

    I cannot think of an equivalent review of the British experience in counter-terrorism, where the police / law enforcement / intelligence agencies have primacy. An experience with several different strands: Northern Ireland, domestic or mainland (not exclusively Irish) and overseas (e.g. Greece).

    Perhaps others (Slap ?) know of a review of the American (inc. Canadian) CT experience?

    From my armchair and not being a soldier I cannot comment on whether the military will gain from this. Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

    davidbfpo

    PS Not sure if Wagram still visits SWC, so will email him to look again.

  11. #11
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2007
    Location
    Europe
    Posts
    26

    Default Looking for Links to UK Doctrine

    I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

    Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

  12. #12
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Jim Rodgers View Post
    I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

    Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?
    Alex Alderson has been participating here; I'm sure he'll fix you up. I'll send him an email on it.

  13. #13
    Registered User
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Oxford
    Posts
    5

    Default Revising the British Army's COIN Doctrine

    The reference is slightly off the mark but it matters not. You are looking for Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10, published in July 2001. Written by Brig (Retd) Gavin Bulloch, the British Army's pre-eminent doctrine writer, it served its purpose and held out until a full review was put in place nearly a year ago. That review is nearly complete and has hit the mark with the internal market, taking on the problems of interventionist COIN, raising the issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, reassessing principles and establishing a new view of the Thompson approach of Engage-Secure-Develop. There are one or two final hurdles to clear and no doubt the challenging views of the Small Wars cogniscenti will hit on things we'd wished we had included but... One of the most obvious and important points I have made is to pick up on Steve Metz's view, again obvious, that insurgency is a strategy. Why important? If you are to counter it, you also need a strategy, not just a presence: being there is not a strategy. And military prowess is, as many contributors have made clear, not enough. If you have access to the Royal United Services Institute website or its August 2007 journal, you can read more about what my team has been up to.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 10-20-2007 at 03:13 AM. Reason: Added links.

  14. #14
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,209

    Default British COIN Manual 2009

    Post Ten refers to the 2001 edition being updated and in May 2012 a link was found on the BBC News website to the 2009 edition, but has now disappeared.

    This was the link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/h...rmy_manual.pdf

    I did note the document has no official markers and was found on a BBC website, so I assumed it is for public use. Today May 12th 2012 a SWC member has drawn attention to the copyright notice, which also proclaims it was an official document and not for public use. Maybe someone noticed thirty months later it was in the public domain?

    Moderator's Note

    I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-12-2012 at 05:01 PM. Reason: Add Note and updated may 12th 2012
    davidbfpo

  15. #15
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default CATOM and Templer

    I have just acquired an original 1958 copy of the "Conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya."

    It's brilliantly written and complete antidote to the sort of FM3-24 stuff we see today.

    What is more, stuffed in the back of the manual was 4 pages of a typed interview with FM Gerald Templer, hand corrected by someone unknown. I have no idea of how authentic it is, but it is extremely interesting and concerns his view pertaining to the US in Vietnam. It may well be un-published.

    I think the interview date is about 1966/7, and it rather stresses the differences, rather than the similarities between Malaya and Vietnam.

    He also refers to "hearts and Minds" as a "nauseating phrase"
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  16. #16
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default Developments

    The CATOM manual bears the name of "Lt Col P.G. Fleming, MA Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry"

    Doing some "Googling" I found this,

    http://koyli.com/remembrance/ltcolfleming.htm

    This seems to be the man, who owned the manual. He only died recently.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  17. #17
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    Great find, Wilf! Beyond the inherent value of the content itself and the added value of the enclosed interview, the provenance of previous ownership is very interesting.

  18. #18
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Wasn't the insurgency in Malaya a very unique case with little to tell about other small wars?

    The population situation, the de-colonialization context, the ideological dimension - it looks to me as if that war is only good for good anecdotes (like that the CVR/T) family was allegedly designed to be not too wide to pass the natural rubber plantation's trees in Malaya - those trees were planted orderly in a specific spacing).

  19. #19
    Council Member Chris jM's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2009
    Location
    New Zealand
    Posts
    176

    Default The Empire’s New Clothes: Maj Collin's Review of British COIN

    I was sent this by a friend, and while it isn't new information I found it to be a very well done presentation.

    It's a ppt presentation that is 7MB in size, so you have been warned. Available here: http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/co...w-clothes.aspx

    I didn't see anything controversial or novel about it (which isn't a bad thing), and it kept me engrossed in it for a good 15 minutes. Very slick slideshow balanced by well reasoned content.

    Of greatest interest to me was the 'periodic table' of COIN comparing the re-occurrence of COIN principles in British doctrine over the last fifty years+. Also, his 'COIN equation' seemed to be bang-on the mark with regards to reflecting modern COIN thinking. No reactionary or revisionism thoughts here, rather just solid thinking and a few robust models.

    For quick reference, his conclusions were as follows:
    The British military had an enviable COIN reputation
    The Empire’s clothes are not entirely new
    The Insurgent Equation has changed
    The ‘British COIN Model’ is not the panacea
    Must use extant resources to counter insurgency
    '...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
    Donald Kagan

  20. #20
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Just run through it once, but there are so many things wrong with this, I just do not know where to begin - Sorry to sound harsh, and if the author is out there PM me!

    I know this is .ppt and not a Thesis, so I can only react to the slides.

    a.) COIN principles? Why just accept they exist? They clearly do not - and there is no such thing as "COIN theory."
    b.) Definitions of COIN? - If you cannot get a clear and useful definition, that may tell you something - which is why current UK "COIN" Doctrine is poor.
    c.) The delineation of "Classical", ""re-classical," etc adds nothing and is without evidence. It's also highly selective. Irregular warfare has not changed! We have changed, for reasons that never get touched upon. - Context, context and context.
    d.) Instead of this "Purity of the text approach," - quotes from manuals and books - why was there no analysis of why UK "COIN" has previously succeeded and why it now seems less effective? - The UK used to solve the problem and there is no evidence the problem has changed in a way that makes it tactically unfeasible to render a strategic end state.

    The UK is not being operationally effective because it simply is not allocating the resources it needs to get the desired strategic end state.

    If the UK is screwing up, it's far more likely to be a problem with Commanders, than Doctrine - as no one actually seems to read the doctrine anyway - because it is mostly rubbish... with the exception of Theatre Specific guidance like the CATOM - which I could find no reference to?

    Yes the UK has lost it's way, because they gave up being good, not because the problem has changed.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 02-23-2010 at 07:11 AM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Similar Threads

  1. The British In Iraq (merged thread)
    By SWJED in forum Middle East
    Replies: 62
    Last Post: 05-08-2019, 03:24 PM
  2. Aviation in COIN (merged thread)
    By SWJED in forum Catch-All, Military Art & Science
    Replies: 399
    Last Post: 11-28-2017, 07:42 PM
  3. French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)
    By Jedburgh in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 49
    Last Post: 09-18-2016, 09:54 PM
  4. Replies: 0
    Last Post: 04-21-2009, 03:00 PM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •