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  1. #61
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

    LINK

    Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

    Pity.
    Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

    Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

    The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

    Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife. The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

    Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

    Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

    Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

    Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

    Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

    Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

    Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

    Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

    Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

    All in all a disappointing read.
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

  2. #62
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thanks for that.

    Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

    This from you:
    One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.
    Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-11-2011 at 02:58 PM.

  3. #63
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...
    Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.
    I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

  4. #64
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Did that here for years...

    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

    I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens
    Yes, to the first. On the second, some failures but some successes also, most after much time when they could become someone else's idea. That was and is okay...

    So do not stop...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.
    To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

    But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.
    That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

    The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.
    OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

    Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...
    Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

    The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:

    Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
    effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

    The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
    information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
    is as much a matter of perception as fact.

    I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.
    And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

    One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

  6. #66
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Sigh. The gospel according to JMA...

    The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.
    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry...that of short tours...One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.
    What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

    In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious.
    That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.
    Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...

    There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

    Everyone seem to understand that but you.
    OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?
    I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...
    ... the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.
    That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.
    You are correct he needs no help from anyone but go ahead... jump in.

    What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

    In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...
    'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

    There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...
    Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

    Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

    Everyone seem to understand that but you. I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...
    I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

  8. #68
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.
    It doesn't irritate, longer tours are militarily sound but politically infeasible given current organization and training -- and family matters... -- that simple.
    Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?
    It doesn't take all of 'em that long to scope it out but the tour length's a problem, no question -- it, however, is not going to change.
    Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.
    Been identified, long before anyone here heard from you or me. Also been fought and lost so you're in effect preaching to the old choir. You continue to surface it and continue to be told (not just by me...) that you're right -- but! Politics hold sway. One can view little of what happens on these kinds of deployments today through the lens of other wars just one generation ago. The changes in the last forty years have been huge and few have been beneficial. Today's focus is not military, it's political, pure and simple.
    I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.
    Yes, it is sad.

    It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

    May I suggest your view might be colored by serving in an existential war, where the rules are vastly different (and will be again for anyone involved in such). Having served in a couple of far from existential efforts, the focus is different for everyone involved. Perhaps it should not be but it is. You see deterioration in many areas from your war and day to these expeditions. So do I -- but I'm a bit more sanguine because I'm quite confident that an existential effort, should one come, will cure a lot of current ills real quickly.

    Until it's over, then everyone will go back to business as usual...

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    This from you:

    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.
    Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.
    I enthusiastically second that.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.
    Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

    To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

    Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

    So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

    (The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

    What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:

    ... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...
    So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:

    One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.
    ... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

  11. #71
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.
    TTPs evolve week by week, month by month and are different according to which AO you are in and the threat faced. What is seen on TV is a combination of tactical good practice and bad practice. Details on UKSF Ops are extremely hard to come by so it is hard to state how effectively they have evolved. The use of SF has evolved considerably - but that was not necessarily an SF decision.
    What most media coverage cannot show is the whole picture; the planning, the ISTAR coverage, the intelligence. I am not saying that mistakes have not been made, they have, especially in the early years, but the army now is different from the army then. The equipment and TTPs have changed out of all recognition.

    There are problems with short tours and I agree that we should be on longer tours. Ledwidges comment (Losing Small Wars) on 'militarism' is both accurate and damning. Should we change things? Yes? Can we? No; it is not politically possible; we are already in drawdown.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.
    Au contraire my South African sparring partner! Our key intelligence and civilian affairs staff are on 12 month tours. Within our patch we generally know who the key players are, their families, their enemies, their friends, their rivals, their business partners, their business interests, their schools, what they thought yesterday, last week, and last year. What their aspirations are in public and quite possibly what their aspirations are in private; it is a very sophisticated knowledge of the human terrain. We know what weapons are favoured in what areas and at what times. Our knowledge of the terrain, human and physical is, I suspect, as good in many ways as what we had in N Ireland.
    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post

    OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?
    Well British troops don't have that problem. There are always people who do not understand the ROE; this sounds like one of them.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.
    NI was policing for most of the campaign. We enabled the police to carry out their duties and provided niche capabilities; N Ireland at its worst is probably what we would like Afghanistan to become. We realised in N Ireland that everytime we killed someone we were exacerbating the political problem, it caused a greater sense of political grievance, made martyrs out of volunteers and resulted in more even more volunteers; that is why from the mid to late 1980s we tried very hard to capture and not kill. Capturing them and sending them to prison stopped attacks, criminalised the struggle and discouraged others. Very few volunteers who served time in prion re-offended. Mark Urban's book Big Boys' Rules is a good account of the nuanced use of force in N Ireland while Kevin Toolis' book
    Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within The IRA's Soul is a very good look at the impact of violence and how it fed the struggle.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.
    Already at the strategic level the army is planning for life 2015+. The size and shape of the army in 2020 will be decided in the next 12 months or else 2020 will be come 2021, 2022, 2023...

    As to having no answers, no country is prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to win the conflict in Afghanistan; I suspect they never were. Early on in the UK's engagement in Afghanistan the MOD stated that the engagement would have to be at least 25 years in order to achieve what the stated aims were; 10 years in and we are leaving.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).
    WW2 and the Rhodesian Conflict were both existentialist conflicts where there is eveything to play for. In such circumstances it is adapt or survive. Iraq and Afghanistan were discretionary wars of choice where the imperative is to evolve so as not to be seen to
    a) Fail
    or
    b) Be culpable

    Plus society has changed considerably; we are softer and more liberal now.
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

  12. #72
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).
    Agreed.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.
    Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.
    I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:

    What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

    It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

    Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.
    So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


    As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.
    Last edited by Red Rat; 10-12-2011 at 12:23 PM. Reason: typo
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...
    Yet it is really the historical norm in both the US and UK. Pining for the days of a massive draft-based force is really silly (note that I'm not saying you are, Ken). Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.
    Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

    Reminds of the story out of John Masters' wonderful book The Road Past Mandalay. Here is the extract from page 139 in my paperback:

    … And I lured Bill out and to his tent. He collapsed on his camp bed and glared moodily at me. ‘You're all the same,’ he said. ‘Goddam British. Worse than Goldwyn. US, for Christ's sake.’

    My own head was firm on my shoulders, but the little muzzy. ‘What?’ I asked.

    ‘US,’he repeated. ‘No goddam good. I ought to puch you all in the nose'.

    At last I understood. Bill had been with us about two months. All that time he had been brooding about our army's habit of describing any article of equipment that had become useless as US. That's what it sounded like though in fact it was written u/s and stood for unserviceable. I had no time to explain. …
    OK, so don't pull a 'Bill' on me now please.

    I came from a unit which had; pommies (Brits), Aussies (Australians), Kiwis (New Zealanders), yanks (Americans), Cannucks (Canadians), porras (Portuguese), slopies (South Africans), frogs (French), krauts (Germans) etc etc... and of course 2/3 Rhodesians.

    Each nationality displayed some or other obvious national characteristic which was seized upon by the rest and used to rib them. Boys will be boys.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN.
    OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

    Consequently, a reliance on training maneuvers is rendered largely irrelevant.
    OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

    So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

    All this said I do believe that you cant mix COIN with other training and expect unit to switch on demand.

    This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

    If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

    Fuchs is correct (in his blog post) that warfare against poor/incompetent enemies leads to a loss of skills which will be paid for in blood if they ever come up against a competent enemy. But then again all raw units learn the hard way when they are inserted into a war. Think of those raw US divisions fed into the Pacific and Europe in WW2 who had to adapt along the way. And they learned quickly.

    I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

    The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

    What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required. It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

    Where is a Cromwell when you need him?

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    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

    OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

    So given all that I stick by my interpretation.
    Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine. The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

    But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.
    Works for big armies.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.
    Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.
    Sigh.. I know!

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.
    Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).



    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required.
    Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

    The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.
    Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.
    RR

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine.
    Agreed

    The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

    But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...
    Remember Mumford is a civvie (or at least talks like one).

    So the difference (not so subtle to us) between large scale exercises and field training like 'battle camps' is probably lost on him.

    With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)

    Works for big armies.
    True. And for smaller armies it requires smart thinking to make a little go a long way.

    Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?
    Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that

    Sigh.. I know!
    Well yes so I say again... it is all about continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus... did you copy over?

    Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).
    Well that is bound to take sufficient time to effectively kick the problem into next year.

    Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.
    Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No? Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

    For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

    I could go on...

    The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.
    It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

    But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it.

    Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.
    Oh dear, just when I thought it could not get worse. Now don't try to rope the yanks in on this (they have their own problems with those clowns in their congress) which makes your Brit problems seem like a mere sideshow.

    Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)
    Last edited by JMA; 10-13-2011 at 01:51 PM.

  18. #78
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post

    With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)
    The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that
    Armour and Mech both have their use in Afghanistan. The only reason the UK has not deployed them is that generally the Canadians and now the Americans had enough to go round (heavy armour). Warthog and Jackal in terms of firepower, mobility and protection are effectively a mech capability.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No?
    No, but neither does the SF out there for the most part...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)
    Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)
    But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)
    It is reported as having dropped off, to be honest I do not know if that is the case and if it is, why.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it.
    They are.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)
    No! No! No! The military take it very seriously, the government takes it seriously, the nation takes it seriously, but it is not a nation at war. The nation's priority and focus is probably: the economy, the health service, the education system and then who is winning on X Factor. The war in Afghanistan just is not an issue; it is background noise. The UK has a population of 60.2 million and an Armed Forces of less then 200,000 (.3%). By the time you take immediate family involved you are lucky if 2% of the population knows someone who has been to Afghanistan. It is less to do with peacetime soldiering and more to do with the fact that most people just do not care. Because of this it gets the political and capital resources you would expect - minimal.
    Last edited by Red Rat; 10-13-2011 at 04:22 PM. Reason: Typo, insert link
    RR

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.
    Sideswipes, mis statements, erroneous assumptions, casual asides -- all deserve correction if in error. All part of the service, no thanks necessary...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.
    No I don't think that is the correct approach.

    The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

    Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

    Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

    Then what if any is the mobile reserve? The reserve section? Some vehicles with mounted MMGs which will drive on mined roads to support the patrol in contact?

    Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling. From page 72:

    During the campaign, 18 Platoon carried out three types of patrols: reconnaissance, standing and fighting. The first two were invariably useful because they provided information, if only negative. Fighting patrols, of which I led many, were a different and contentious proposition. Unlike the German and American armies, we had a vigorous policy regarding fighting patrols, particularly at night and when things were static with both sides on the defence. The thinking behind this policy seemed to me, at times, be superficial and probably left over from the Great War. If, when detailed for a fighting patrol, young officers queried the wisdom of this given object, there was always the standard reply: “I quite agree with you, but it all helps to dominate no man's land.” There is undoubtedly a certain validity to this argument but was it worth the consequent loss of good young officers and NCOs? I doubt it.
    Note: for any young officers reading this you must read this book. For senior officers reading this make it available and required reading for your subbies.

    I/we went through this period of (aimless) patrolling in Mozambique (1973-76) following Brit Malaya practice with fan patrols, base line patrols and river-line patrols etc etc where the large area and the low density of troops together with the lack of intelligence made the whole business very much a hit and miss affair. Sure we had chance contacts where they would shoot and scoot and we would drop our packs and give chase with generally low results - normally reported as a fleeting contact with no casualties either side.

    Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

    I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

    Hint: Read Skeens Passing it On - it proves that the Brits once knew what they were doing in Afghanistan. and sums up his paper as follows:

    To Sum up
    That is all of use I can tell you. But I think I have said enough to show that, as the Manual says, while the principles of war remain
    unchanged, “The tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and the nature of the theater of operations may necessitate considerable modification in the method” of their application to warfare on the North-West Frontier of India. And that unless a good working knowledge of the methods indicated by experience is acquired in peace and applied in war, trouble if not disaster is bound to be the outcome. But I also hope I have made it clear that previous training, energetic and common-sense application, and unrelaxing care will give you and your men complete ascendency over an enemy whose great natural advantages at first sight may seem to be unchallengeable. And I trust what I been able to pass on of my own experience and of my observation of others will help you in this. If so I have discharged my debt to those who taught me and to those who taught them, and to those, my comrades in war, with whom I proved the truth of those teachings.
    Last edited by JMA; 10-14-2011 at 09:57 AM.

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