British COIN (merged thread)

[Compost]

When I hear "COIN vs CT" in general it sets my teeth on edge; for certainly that dichotomy of choices is no way to look at a foreign intervention and hope to attain a comprehensive, successful scheme of engagement.

However, that IS how we approached Iraq and Afghanistan, so to drill into how those terms were defined during the course of those operations, what types of operations were conducted under those banners; what types of effects were achieved, etc is indeed something worth laying open for inspection.

The above is from another thread but the real problem was and is the setting of viable goals and objective conops.

A military organization that has COIN as a concept of operation has taken a long step toward poor performance and unwanted outcomes. (CT is fought in a different arena and is not further discussed here.)

Most people probably agree that military power is essentially coercive. Its effective employment is based upon taking the initiative: applying or threatening to apply force where it is damaging or difficult for an opponent to defend. To voluntarily adopt a defensive posture is – regardless of any subsequent pre-emption – to concede initiative to that opponent. Of course ‘counter’ in a name does not necessarily mean an entire doctrine given over to defence. However, ‘anti-insurgency’ as in ‘anti-submarine’ would be preferable. But why insurgency ?

In a dictionary and in thought the term insurgent means ‘ rebel. That is an opponent who is indigenous and whose concerns and activities could be entirely homegrown as in “rebel with a cause”. Insurgent/insurgency does not extend to include foreign nationals, sanctuaries in other countries, weapons suppliers, fund raising or other materiel and propaganda support provided by outsiders. To concede a point, give away a pawn, thoughtlessly or thoughtfully employ inappropriate words is to move closer to failure.

A lot of words to state the obvious. Mindset is important and poor choice of terminology is corrosive. COIN is a malapropism to be avoided like a highly infectious disease.

There was a time when the US military was more aware . For example when use of PAVN/Peoples Army of Vietnam was banned and replaced by NVA/North Vietnamese Army. But despite such overdue corrective action, the USA went down to defeat in Vietnam and the flawed conop of that era’s COIN was only a contributing factor.

The primary cause was the political goal imposed on the military. That goal was seemingly fixated on creating a state which was in large part an image of the USA: a functioning democracy that had obtained internal peace.

A person does not have to read Michael Howard to realize that a state or society can have either of two kinds of peace. In an orderly society, peace can be upheld anywhere by a single policeman (or woman) with a sidearm and radio. That individual has of course to be supported by others with weapons such as shotguns, and backed up by an infrequently needed riot squad.

In a disorderly society, open conflict is suspended and peace exists when a single policeman with sidearm and radio closely supported by a heavily armed police/infantry team can function and survive anywhere. Typically the coercive power of that team has to be supported by an on-call force of infantry/engineers/armour augmented in some instances by artillery/rifled mortars and a few helicopters.

Afghanistan is a disorderly society. It is divided by geography, tribal and religious history and beliefs. The Taliban are alleged to include a large number of religious and societal fanatics. But how can one describe the apparent zeal of the US administration in seeking to rapidly create a functioning democracy and orderly peace ? That administration was either affected by group think/collective stupidity or evangelism which is much the same thing.

To create a functional democracy in Afghanistan would require decades. So instead of COIN fixated on creating a mini-USA, a reset of the political objective and the military conop is long overdue. A major revision would be to focus on the second form of peace and hence peace-making operations in a disorderly society. The debased currency of COIN replaced by PMOPS.

Is there sufficient scope and time to redirect the distribution of sizable proportions of funds and resources directly to the village, district and whatever canton levels exist ? The pre-requisite for such arrangements would be the application of coercion to the autocracy in Kabul. The result would likely be an expanded form of plutocracy but at least that would be moving in the right direction toward what seems to be the eventual target.

There could be other ways in which to revise and realign political and military objectives. Some of those might be more realistic than that outlined above.

What is clear is that the USA and ISAF have to make a binary choice in the near term: ‘get real, or get out’. The pity is that after heavy loss of life and gross material expenditure the present US administration seems intent on getting out.

[Bob's World]

Well, for my money, "getting real" is very possible, but not very likely.

Getting real demands:

1. Recognition and understanding of the distinction of the revolutionary insurgency between the GIRoA leadership and their dedication to sustaining a Northern Alliance monopoly on the governance of Afghanistan and the former Taliban government in exile in Pakistan, (the primary, political, issue that must be addressed first); and the resistance insurgency among the people of Afghanistan that is primarily a function of the presence of ISAF and ISAF's efforts to push GIRoA "governance" out into the largely self-governed populaces of the country.

2. Recognizing that AQ draws their "sanctuary" not from any particular plot of dirt, but rather from the support of the revolutionary Taliban leadership, and the populace that that revolutionary leadership represents and draws their support from.

Once we accept that, we can pull back from the outrageously expensive (and offensive) "COIN" practices we wage across Afghanistan; and can also radically narrow and focus the CT activities we conduct vs AQ. We can then shift focus to hard political pressure on GIRoA to evolve to represent all Afghans and to disassemble the patronage Ponzi scheme that the current Constitution is. We can get serious about talks with the Taliban leadership as to what we can offer them in exchange for them withdrawing the sanctuary they grant AQ.

New Tactics, or new generals, or switching from a conventional lead to a SOF lead are not the answers. More COIN or More CT are not the answers. First we must re-frame the problem, and then focus on the fundamental aspects of the problem. I believe we will find that less is indeed more.

Or, we go home. Either way, the US and our allies will be more secure than they are due to the higher order effects of our current approaches.

[Surferbeetle]

Compost,

Western military power is indeed the expression of coercive power in support of the institution of the state, both physical and conceptual.

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

[JMA]

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

We need at this point to refer to Fd Marshall Slim an his thoughts on Special Forces (page 546 in my book):

Special Forces

The British Army in the last war spawned a surprising number of special units and formations, that is forces of varying sizes, each trained, equipped, and prepared for some particular type of operation. We had commandos, assault brigades, amphibious division, mountain divisions, long-range penetration forces, airborne formations, desert groups, and an extraordinary variety of cloak and dagger parties. The equipment of the special units was more generous than that of normal formations, and many of them went so far as to have their own bases in administrative organisations. We employed most of them in Burma, and some, notably the Chindits, gave splendid examples of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped, and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation only, were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed. To begin with they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favourable corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them. ...

That said we see the cap fits today as much as it did then.

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

So when one looks at the work the 'black army' does its probably better we don't hear publicly what they are doing because if we did we would probably identify much of it as being work properly trained normal infantry should be or could be doing.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they fan out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

[Compost]

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it.

Generally yes but probably not with NV equipment.

Here’s an anecdote heard so long ago that OPSEC no longer applies. A member of the ADF serving as a peace keeper in the Middle East in the 1960s had early use of one of the first type of US starlight scope. He commented that he was very impressed because it enabled him to both see and recognise an Israeli liaison officer helping to lay a mine under a UN inspection track along a fenceline.

SF commonly stretch the limits of what is practicable for and with equipment.

The general case is that SF routinely operate all types of vehicles from ATVs to helicopters aggressively and with heavy loads yet appear surprised when vehicles fail. That cutting of corners carries through to obtaining new model equipment regardless of obvious design flaws. A recent example was procurement of a novel type of forward control light truck whose enclosed and reinforced wheel stations are apparently expected to provide protection rather than channelling mine blast.

[Sigaba]

Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).

FWIW, I respectfully disagree with this assessment.

The inability of the American army to achieve its policy aims was more due to the tone of specific reformers--specifically Emory Upton and like minded soldiers-- in the army than to civilian indifference/hostility/disinterest in military affairs. As one historian of the Old Army put it.

By proposing a military policy that the country could not accept, Emory Upton helped ensure that the country would continue to limp along with virtually no military policy at all.*

Many soldiers and civilians made potentially viable suggestions for the reform and modernization of the army but, time and again, the Uptonians either shouted them down or refused to help build the kind of intellectual and political momentum that might have led to change.

By contrast, American navalists articulated a multi-faceted argument that made an intellectual, strategic, historiographical, political, cultural, and economic case for the a new vision of American maritime power.

Granted, given the realities of international and domestic politics as well as the vastly different traditional views of the army and the navy in American culture, the army had a bigger hill to climb than the navy. However, I am of the view that the army's "lack of clout" was more the result of miscalculations within its leadership than of external factors.

This distinction is crucially important today because contemporaneous discussions of military policy are still shaped by the ongoing acceptance of a trajectory of American military historiography. This trajectory accepts uncritically the views of Emory Upton, Peter Michie (his biographer), and William Ganoe (his advocate).

My $0.02

</hijack>
__________________________________________________ _____
*R. F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), p. 281.

[Bob's World]

The difference between the Army and the Navy is due primarily to the difference in their peacetime roles. The US will always be a nation that benefits from a lack of peacetime ground threats (so no need for a large standing peacetime army to secure the homeland), and the requirement for unhindered access to global markets and resources, that demands a robust Navy in both peace and war.

This is not a matter of policy so much as a matter of geostrategic realities and common sense. Any policy or effort to somehow treat or view these two services as "equals" in times of peace is not well thought out at best, and at worst subjugated the needs of the nation to the desires of the individuals and organizations advocating for an excessive peacetime ground force.

Oh, and while we are currently a nation with troops in combat, we are not a nation at war, so to play the "we're at war" card every time one wants to justify more deficit spending on ground force capabilities is growing wearisome as well. Current "COIN" definitions and doctrine accentuate this problem.

[Fuchs]

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO).

British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

[JMA]

British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

Yes, I should have made it more clear. The American led warfighting concept of maneuver warfare in its current form is relatively new. The term certainly was not in use (with its current meaning) in Brit doctrine back in the 60s and 70s.

[Fuchs]

The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

[JMA]

The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

Yes, this use or misuse of terminology is problematic IMHO. Old terms and concepts are redefined and reworked to the extent that from a military history point of view one needs to learn that for a specific word the meaning prior to a specific date would be x and thereafter the meaning y. Can be confusing as Mumford shows.

[Fuchs]

Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

[JMA]

Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

One accepts that new developments and refinements of old concepts take place. All I suggest is that they create new words for the new stuff and not bastardise the old terminology and definitions. I really don't think that is too much to ask.

[Fuchs]

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....f-gravity.html

[JMA]

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....f-gravity.html

You said in your blog post:

It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it.

Good we agree on something at last

[JMA]

But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.

I keep posting stuff from the distant past (not my past) but from the past from which I learned and from which the modern soldier should learn (rather than copying how he thinks special forces operate and of course wearing all the kit).

The break contact drills came from the time Vietnam and Borneo. You can argue with the yanks who developed what.

The question is whether the line infantry need this drill other than for when conducting a three or four man recce patrol. I don't think so.

Now here is some advice from 1756 which I suggest if followed by the lads in Afghanistan would lead to a marked and instant improvement:

Rogers' Rangers Standing Orders
1. Don't forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.
3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
10. If we take prisoners, we keep'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.

Numbers #1 and #19 are my favourites

But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

Yes I know, this old stuff is not sexy, one does not get to wear fashion grade shades, designer body armour and webbing and a personal weapon different to the standard issue.

[Red Rat]

No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

Poor wording on my part. I think that the British approach is that the size of the grouping depends on the military capability of the opponent and by military capability I mean the effective combat power he is likely to bring to bear in any given engagement.

Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

IEDs have increased the equipment load, both with ECM equipment and differing sets of detection equipment for differing types of IED threats. I think one of the most significant impacts on the load carried is the appetite for risk. As the appetite for risk has decreased the personal load has increased. The appetite for risk is largely articulated by politicians and is related closely to the public support for the conflict.

Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling.

I know the book well. Patrolling for the sake of patrolling is bad. It does not feature in British doctrine or training at any level; I am not aware of it happening in practice. All the post operational reports and post incident reports that cross my desk indicate that this is not happening.

Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

That is the normal procedure. Of course very often the response team comes in the form of a precision guided munition.

I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

That's been done and still happens. Like anything though do it too often and you set a pattern which makes you vulnerable, possible HLSs, fire support locations, interdiction points and overwatch positions are all very often mined or covered by fire. We found that placing snipers out before sending CallSign Tethered Goat out the front gate is highly effective as well.

PS - I have read Skeen's Passing It On, it sits next to Operations In Waziristan 1919-1920 and The Frontier Scouts on my bookshelves

[Red Rat]

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they san out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

[Red Rat]

Compost,

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

I find myself in violent agreement here

Not only is the societal and social contruct different, it is based on a different style of logic and a different cocept of time. It is not just that we do things differently, we do things differently because we are fundamentally different.

In practical terms this may limit us to two options:

- Imposing our construct on them (unlikely to be acceptable to them, likely to be messy, unlikely to be acceptable to large parts of our liberal western society which dislikes imposing anything on anyone)

- Working within their construct (likely to be impalatable at home as the public is only likely to understand it and less likely to accept it as many parts of their construct are taboo in our current societal construct (ie: patronage, treatment of women, use of violence).

Messy either way!

[ganulv]

But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

I spent a couple of hours at Rogers Island as part of a day trip early this summer and was a bit taken aback to find the monument which includes the Rules of Ranging to be in a generally unkempt status (below, after a bit of brushing up). The associated and recently refurbished museum on the grounds was quite nice, on the other hand: http://www.rogersisland.org/.



A fun article about the raid on Saint-Francis—which ended up going almost as badly for Rogers’s men as it did for the Abenakis—should anyone be interested.