The Ratio of Forces to Insurgents

[Telecompark]

Thank you to all those that have responded to my request and especially to “Infanteer” for the source on Forces to Population ratio and to “Jedburgh” who led me to the “Tie down ratio”:

Much nonsense is heard on the subject of tie-down ratios in guerrilla warfare--that 10 to 12 government troops are needed to tie down a single guerrilla, for instance. This is a dangerous illusion, arising from a disregard of the facts.[4]

I understand completely that it is a crude measure to use in arguing that troop deployment is inadequate in Afghanistan. I was planning on using a few different measures to get a handle on what the number should be versus what a politician may or may not want to defend.

Another crude measure is the forces the Soviet Union had available only to loose. But my main focus on the article I intend to write is “Lessons learned from Vietnam” and in particular McNamara’s lessons list:

1. We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4. Our judgments of friend and foe, alike, reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
5. We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine.
6. We failed, as well, to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
7. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action.
8. After the action got under way, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening, and why we were doing what we did.
9. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.
10. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

I would argue that almost every single item on his list is once more being forgotten in Afghanistan, the main item being “winning the hearts and minds”. In our quest to kill the insurgent leaders we destroy villages and kill the locals. So just like Vietnam we win all the battles but lose the war. It boggles my mind that we are once again being driven by politicians who have no clue about winning the war and feed us propaganda on how we are apparently winning “the just cause”.

The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.

Memo from Robert McNamara to US President Lyndon Johnson, May 1967[/I]

Don’t get me wrong, I think we should be in Afghanistan. That said, we shouldn’t be there if we don’t try really hard to actually win it. That requires a different strategy than trying a technology fix (e.g. sending predators into Pakistan), troop surges and propping up a corrupt government.

Why aren’t we using some of the lessons learned in previous wars? Why are we not living with the locals in their communities (like a model from the Vietnam war)? Why are we trying to shove our version of “Democracy” on them when it just doesn’t resonate. Why are we expecting the local police and militia to work for less money than the Taliban offers? And on and on…

TJ

[Infanteer]

You may want to check your facts before jumping to some of the big conclusions you make.

[davidbfpo]

This old, closed thread has been re-opened after a request from 'Red Rat' who cannot currently access SWJ / SWC.

His RFI:

We are citing the (below) paper as best practice and using the maths, but I am less confident. I have yet to delve into the weeds, but my understanding is that the science (the maths) was soft at best in this area. I have not seen any more recent thinking/doctrine with regards to force ratios for security forces in a COIN scenario.

He has found a 2008 SAMS paper 'Boots on the Ground: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Force Levels for Counterinsurgency Operations' by Major Glenn E Kozelka:http://www.cgsc.edu/sams/media/monog...ag-21may09.pdf

From the Abstract:

To determine a historical gauge for planning force levels in a COIN environment, this study provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of two successful COIN case studies, the British-led Malaya Emergency and the US-led Operation in Iraq. Quantitative analysis of the case studies is used to compare the security force size employed to the population size. The qualitative analysis of the case studies is used to identify and assess the implications of specific operational environment factors on the force density used. Through applying a holistic approach of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, planners can more accurately determine the force density to meet the needs of a specific situation.

I cannot find any previous reference to this paper or the author. This thread appears to fit!

Anyone got any thoughts please?

[Azor]

The Iraq War was a success?

As for force ratios, I recall the Russians had 1 soldier for every 6 Chechens during the 1994-1996 war.

Historically, higher force ratios have led to defeat. Remember South Armagh, where some 40 PIRA members killed 4X their number of security forces.

Yet special forces/intelligence operations in Northern Ireland (SAS, MRF, MI5, etc.), Vietnam (Operation Phoenix) and Malaya were highly successful.