The Ratio of Forces to Insurgents

[davidbfpo]

This old, closed thread has been re-opened after a request from 'Red Rat' who cannot currently access SWJ / SWC.

His RFI:

We are citing the (below) paper as best practice and using the maths, but I am less confident. I have yet to delve into the weeds, but my understanding is that the science (the maths) was soft at best in this area. I have not seen any more recent thinking/doctrine with regards to force ratios for security forces in a COIN scenario.

He has found a 2008 SAMS paper 'Boots on the Ground: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Force Levels for Counterinsurgency Operations' by Major Glenn E Kozelka:http://www.cgsc.edu/sams/media/monog...ag-21may09.pdf

From the Abstract:

To determine a historical gauge for planning force levels in a COIN environment, this study provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of two successful COIN case studies, the British-led Malaya Emergency and the US-led Operation in Iraq. Quantitative analysis of the case studies is used to compare the security force size employed to the population size. The qualitative analysis of the case studies is used to identify and assess the implications of specific operational environment factors on the force density used. Through applying a holistic approach of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, planners can more accurately determine the force density to meet the needs of a specific situation.

I cannot find any previous reference to this paper or the author. This thread appears to fit!

Anyone got any thoughts please?