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  1. #1
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

    The answer, as I'm sure everyone realizes, is rooted in the willingness of the Ba'th to use force in certain ways, and the balance of terror that it was thereby able to establish. Don't get me wrong--I'm not suggesting the "Roman" (or Ba'thist) model as an appropriate approach for post-Cold War Western COIN and stability operations. I am suggesting that what has changed here is not so much the rise of the "swarm" but the very much greater importance of the changing social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place.
    Well put Rex, but I suspect that the answer is not quite as simple as tipping "the balance of terror." Neither the Ba'athists nor their opponents were fighting with home field advantage (or both were). As natives, they could be very effective because they shared the language and culture of their opposition. In contrast to that, while its opponents were able to follow Mao's precept of swimming ln the ocean of the people, the Coalition, consisting of outsiders, was not quite as lucky . The Baathists, being locals, knew what kind of bait to use to catch the fish. The coalition forces were much more like tourists on a fishing trip far from home. They weren't even sure which pools were stocked, much less what kind of tackle to use.

    Furthermore, I doubt that the "importance of the . . social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place" has changed much since when Titus finished up the work of his father Vespasian and quashed the Jewish Revolt in 70 AD or when Marius and Sulla won the Social War of 91-88 BC. What may be different is how well various forces involved in fighting against insurgencies, insurrections, and revolts recognize and apply those parts of METT-TC (or whatever fancy acronym du jour one wishes to apply) which reflect that milieu.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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  2. #2
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
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    WM wrote:

    I don't think I ruled out case studies a priori. In certain circumstances, case studies would be an excellent approach. In fact I suspect that a properly constructed and presented case study approach is germane in the present analysis
    No, you arbitrarily ruled out the most germane case study available a priori is all, because it was favorable to small units and of immediate relevance to the current conflict. However, we are in agreement that properly constructed case study approach is a useful methodology. Good, this is progress. We can come back to case studies in a bit.

    I was also not proposing that we use a double blind test in combat. What I was suggesting is that an appeal to consequences as a means of comparing the goodness of alternatives is not likely to be an appropriate methodological approach for the current subject.
    I never said that you proposed it, WM. What you suggested was that a double-blind test was an appropriate standard of proof for my proposition to have to meet in order to be accepted as valid:

    Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario?
    I agree that a double-blind test could provide some convincing evidence to help support or alternatively, to falsify, my proposition that there are some scenarios where small units are better tactical choice than large ones. What I asked of you was that you in turn explain how such a double-blind test of combat operations might be constructed.

    I appreciate all the effort you are expending in attempting to school me in basic logic, but along the way, it might be more helpful if you practiced some yourself. Either answer the question and demonstrate how a double-blind test of combat operations might be conducted (the experimental ethics alone should prove to be fascinating explanation) or admit that it was never an appropriate standard of proof to apply in the first place.

    Oh, and speaking of non sequiturs.....

    Unlike World War II, the current conflicts, OIF (soon to be Operation New Dawn or OND) and OEF, will not really matter much in the great scheme of things should the coalition's efforts be less than successful. The magnitude of evil being confronted there pales in comparison to that manifested by the opposition during WWII

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