I enjoyed the article, but not nearly as much as the SWJ debate.

Leave it to Ken to point out that swarming has been around since before written history.

Funny to me is that the "big picture" discussion in the article misses the big point. Sure, swarming can be an effective attacking strategy, but, IMO, so much of the mission (right or wrong) has moved far beyond attacking (clearing), and into that magical "Hold" and "Build" place against which swarming can be effectively employed.

If only the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan was "defeat the bad guys and go home." But how do you unscramble the actual mission from the easy win?

How do you effectively apply swarming to hold and build? Decentralized cells? Free standing mini-districts?

One of my pet notions about Afghanistan is that we did a quick easy swarm in 2001, and keep trying (unsuccessfully) to apply that "winning" temporary strategy (over and over again), despite that it's limitations are so profound that it condemns us to winning the battles but lo9sing the war (Cordesman's critique).

Converting "win" to sustainable success requires something that we are just trying to think through without either the words or tools. An underlying administrative capability, able to apply to and reasonably hold and positively alter vast areas is remarkably different than the quick hits that, when added up, create nothing.

Isn't that the essence of the "Fixing Intel" debate? The White House was asking about deep background admin/operation/social structure issues which nobody on the US side had ever seriously contemplated, let alone collected to contemplate.

To PBOM's Query (If a swarm takes a long time, do you call it a surge?): I think you call it hold and build, or occupation, or the next obvious and necessary element of success.