New Rules of War

[William F. Owen]

I should have worded my question better - do you see any good points being able to arise from this? Not only are the 'rules' nonsense, the premise and reasoning on which they are founded is flawed.

I concur. It was a massive missed opportunity. There are some really critical debates to be had, but the US (and pretty much the UK) seem incapable conducting it in a useful way. Why that is might also be worth asking!

[Fuchs]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

[William F. Owen]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

Mongols did not "swarm." Nor did Panzer Regiments. I keep hearing about Swarming, but no one actually seems to know what it is. If it just means simultaneous attacks from multiple directions, then its hardly a useful characterisation.

[Fuchs]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

Wolfpacks were quite complicated. Aerial recce played a minor role, there were never more than two aerial recce squadrons with sufficient range available and their aircraft were quite suboptimal.

First Phase:
Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).

Second Phase:
One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy and radios its position and movement.
A central station receives the radio message and transmits necessary info, not the least to make sure that every sub gets the message with minimum radiation from the shadowing sub.

Third Phase:
The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time.
This was a saturation approach to overcome the defences.

Fourth Phase:
Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night, proceed to phase 3 again.



It's vastly different from the more understood tactics of battlefleets and army units/formations from battalion up to corps (the big arrows on maps).
This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.
Conventional tactics don't include an all-round pulse attack - not even during the annihilation of a pocket.
The German army would never have developed wolfpack tactics - their mode of attack was too much opposed to the Schwerpunkt idea. The difference is huge.


@marct:
"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

[marct]

Hi Fuchs,

"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

Hmmm, I would include "enemy identification" under the heading "finding" myself, as in finding the moles . And I agree, for the Germans it was definitely politics and logistics.

[Ken White]

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not. Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

What most miss is the human dimension. Too many leaders are not up to the theoretical level of performance. A good example is the above mentioned Viet Nam experience that Tukhachevskii posted:

"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units..."

The good Perfesser fails to note -- or notice -- that the Organization was totally capable of morphing into small units and Checkerboarding and many units did just that and did it successfully but USARV / MACV did not do so in toto because the leadership and the too powerful Staffs at high echelons were comprised of people whose experience was predominately in northwestern Europe and thus they tried to force the fight in the paddies to be conducted the same way they would have on the north German plain.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

(ask Arminius !)

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not.

I remember reading some years back, that a science becomes a science when it drops static typologies and looks at change over time. Swarming, checkerboards, etc - any tactic really - can work if the factors limiting the situation are right. No tactic, however, is a Holy Grail; they will all fail if the situational limits are against them.

Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

Hey, I resemble that remark !

More seriously, cherry picking historical examples of the success of a tactic (or strategy) is fine as long as it is designed to highlight the limiting factors. Unfortunately, the author in this article appears to be doing it for another reason. Swarming, as a tactic, seems to work best when there is limited capability for opponent identification and when immediately available defensive technologies can be breached quickly. It also seems to work really nicely when you have both of those conditions and the aim is actually to attack in some other area, usually moral via logistics (i.e. force the non-swarming group to invest heavily in infrastructure and logistical support). Probably the classic campaign along these lines, which, BTW, Arquilla does not mention, was Crassus' expedition against the Parthians.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

Yup! That is the lesson he should have drawn from the legions.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

[William F. Owen]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

Cool! Where?

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

1. First Phase:
   Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).
2. Second Phase:
   One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy ....
3. Third Phase:
   The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time....
4. Fourth Phase:
   Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night....

OK, how does that qualify as "Swarming?" Did the Kriegsmarine ever call it swarming? Sounds like U-boat specific "Wolfpack," to me.

This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.

So who else has used "Swarming" tactics?

[Fuchs]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311/

My position is that RAND pretty much defined this term for military theory by publishing that work. That was a legitimate move because they identified a group of tactics that were sufficiently different from more common tactics to deserve a group name.


edit: Slightly related text http://redteamjournal.com/2009/12/interposing-tactics/

[Fuchs]

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

Not really. The response to wolfpack tactics was a huge set of efforts.

- dispersed aerial sub hunter patrols over the whole ocean
- suppressing the shadowing by pressing the subs below water using carrier-borne aerial cover for the convoy
- sub hunter groups (equivalent of combat air patrols) near their bases
- naval minelaying (especially in training areas and coastal regions)
- bombardment of bases, shipyards and industry
- more escorts per convoy
- more efficient convoys (area of a square grows faster than its borders - bigger convoy allows for more freighters per escort)
- technological innovation
- intelligence efforts
- industrial effort (a much, much larger ship production output)
...and of course a higher tolerance for losses than some 'experts' had expected.