New Rules of War

[Fuchs]

Most articles on military matters are quite devoid of thought, the bar "average" is quite low.

Most military writing is about technicalities and superficial stuff. In fact, about 90% of military writing should be considered to be poorly done PR texting.

[Tukhachevskii]

Regarding Arquilla's "Rule No. 1" this statement irks me no end:

"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units. The final result: 500,000-plus troops deployed, countless billions spent, and a war lost. The iconic images were the insurgents' AK-47 individual assault rifles, of which there were hundreds of thousands in use at any moment, juxtaposed against the U.S. Air Force's B-52s, of which just a hundred or so massed together in fruitless attempts to bomb Hanoi into submission".

This statement neither proves that smaller and more numerous is better than larger and fewer nor does it provide evidence of the need for a paradigm shift in the organisation of armies. Why?

The US Army in Vietnam fought numerous engagements with both the NVA and the Viet Cong both of which were organised and fought differently (the former as conventional units fighting "set-piece" battles and the latter as "insurgents"). Yet, in all cases the US Army and USMC fought succesful engagements (take the battle of Hue city for instane or the Tet Offensive). Both the US Army and the USMC adapted their units to fit METT-T considerations without needing to tweek TOEs (take the firebase concept for instance). The reasons for the US "losing" the war (when in fact they actually lost the peace, or rather, South Vietnam did) were geopolitical, grand strategic and domestic with regards to the overly restrictive ROE imposed on the forces by both Congress and the President and were not solely due to the armed forces having failed to "transform". The author is not deploying a ceteris paribus (all things being equal) chain of reasoning. Furthermore, he later compares the forward deployment of platoon sized units in conjunction with allied tribes in Iraq as evidence of the force-multipling effects of "networked" systems after mentinong the surge, the surge, firthermore, which was finally responsibile for beinging order I might add. I don't know what particular axe Arquilla has to grind or from which corporation he recieves his consultants cheque but this article, IMO, made even William Lind's turgid "4th Generation Warfare" article seem like an exercise in historical erudition.

[J Wolfsberger]

I got as far as page three, and read this: "For many centuries, legionary maniples (Latin for "handfuls") marched out -- in their flexible checkerboard formations -- and beat the massive, balky phalanxes of traditional foes, while dealing just as skillfully with loose bands of tribal fighters."

So, that explains the stunning Roman victory at Teutoburger Wald.

Oh, wait ...

Poor mastery of history, poorly reasoned, not much use.

[marct]

I don't know what particular axe Arquilla has to grind or from which corporation he recieves his consultants cheque but this article, IMO, made even William Lind's turgid "4th Generation Warfare" article seem like an exercise in historical erudition.

LOL!

What truly got my goat was this statement

Then again, perhaps the best example of a many-and-small military that worked against foes of all sizes was the Roman legion. For many centuries, legionary maniples (Latin for "handfuls") marched out -- in their flexible checkerboard formations -- and beat the massive, balky phalanxes of traditional foes, while dealing just as skillfully with loose bands of tribal fighters.

[rant]
Sure, maniples were a key tactical unit: as part of a cohort. In no Roman campaigns I'm aware of were maniples used as a basic unit separate from their cohorts. Cohorts, along with ala, would be detached for independent operations, but not maniples. And if he wants an example of ancient "swarming", and how effective it was, he should take a look at the final battle of the Boadicean revolt! And, as far as those "flexible checkerboard formations" are concerned, he really should consider that tactics are effected by technology as, for example, when my ancestors stomped the legions at Adrianople. As for the Teutonberg Wald, well, what can I say? It's all the fault of that nasty Arminius (aka Herman) who was waging an unconventional campaign !
[/rant]

Honestly, there are a few good ideas in the article but, to my mind at least, they are buried in an overpowering morass of poor historical scholarship and an even poorer ability to abstract the essential factors. For example, as Wilf quite correctly points out, "finding" has always been important (ask Arminius !). Smaller units and increased segmentation can work and be incredibly effective, but they are dependent upon the technologies involved, especially the defensive, mobility and logistics technologies, and the use to which they are put.