Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not. Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

What most miss is the human dimension. Too many leaders are not up to the theoretical level of performance. A good example is the above mentioned Viet Nam experience that Tukhachevskii posted:
"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units..."
The good Perfesser fails to note -- or notice -- that the Organization was totally capable of morphing into small units and Checkerboarding and many units did just that and did it successfully but USARV / MACV did not do so in toto because the leadership and the too powerful Staffs at high echelons were comprised of people whose experience was predominately in northwestern Europe and thus they tried to force the fight in the paddies to be conducted the same way they would have on the north German plain.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:
(ask Arminius !)