Late is always better than never!

It might be worth comparing apples to apples. The two efforts are of completely different kinds in oh so many fundamental ways. As a simple example consider constancy of purpose in the two conflicts (and that is problematic because OIF and OEF are, and were, not one conflict.) From the Allies’ perspective, World War II had a fairly constant scope
Actually there's no more logical reason to keep WWII conceptually aggregated than the War on Terror. There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Were it not for Hitler's gratuitous stupidity in declaring war on the US, FDR would have faced a serious political obstacle in linking the war in Europe to America's war with Japan.

Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario? Comparing the effort from the initial days of OEF in Afghanistan with how things happen to be proceeding on the ground today is another example of comparing apples to oranges.
Having a priori ruled out using case studies, even those occurring in the same battlespace conducted by the same military within a short period of time, what is your proposal for conducting such a double-blind test of combat operations?