New Rules of War

[William F. Owen]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

Cool! Where?

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

1. First Phase:
   Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).
2. Second Phase:
   One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy ....
3. Third Phase:
   The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time....
4. Fourth Phase:
   Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night....

OK, how does that qualify as "Swarming?" Did the Kriegsmarine ever call it swarming? Sounds like U-boat specific "Wolfpack," to me.

This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.

So who else has used "Swarming" tactics?

[Fuchs]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311/

My position is that RAND pretty much defined this term for military theory by publishing that work. That was a legitimate move because they identified a group of tactics that were sufficiently different from more common tactics to deserve a group name.


edit: Slightly related text http://redteamjournal.com/2009/12/interposing-tactics/

[Fuchs]

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

Not really. The response to wolfpack tactics was a huge set of efforts.

- dispersed aerial sub hunter patrols over the whole ocean
- suppressing the shadowing by pressing the subs below water using carrier-borne aerial cover for the convoy
- sub hunter groups (equivalent of combat air patrols) near their bases
- naval minelaying (especially in training areas and coastal regions)
- bombardment of bases, shipyards and industry
- more escorts per convoy
- more efficient convoys (area of a square grows faster than its borders - bigger convoy allows for more freighters per escort)
- technological innovation
- intelligence efforts
- industrial effort (a much, much larger ship production output)
...and of course a higher tolerance for losses than some 'experts' had expected.

[William F. Owen]

Not really. The response to wolfpack tactics was a huge set of efforts.

....so basically enhancing and supporting the convoy system? No convoys, no point.

I think the question could be, did the Wolfpacks require a disproportionate allocation of resources to defeat, balanced by was the Wolfpack the best use of the U-boat - which I do not think it was!

[Fuchs]

....so basically enhancing and supporting the convoy system? No convoys, no point.

I think the question could be, did the Wolfpacks require a disproportionate allocation of resources to defeat, balanced by was the Wolfpack the best use of the U-boat - which I do not think it was!

The subs weren't the best use for the resources spent on the sub force (should have gone into the army), but the wolfpack tactic was a great use for the subs as long as the sub tech was competitive.

The disproportionate allocation of resources happened on the allied side; their production of new ships made the German sub effort look tiny by 1943.

Eighteen American shipyards built 2,751 Liberty ships between 1941 and 1945, many more other freighters and tankers were built, the new escorts (destroyers, destroyer escorts, corvettes) already outnumbered the subs. The allied air power dedicated to the Battle of the Atlantic exceeded the total German bomber force since 1942.

Industrial dissimilarity and very special technological factors (the wolfpack tactic required the subs to cruise faster than the convoy, which was impossible for the late-war early SSKs) defeated the sub wolfpacks, not some tactic in itself (although new tactics helped to reduce cargo ship losses and caused greater sub losses).

[Firn]

But the principles of networking don't have to help only the bad guys. If fully embraced, they can lead to a new kind of military -- and even a new kind of war. The conflicts of the future should and could be less costly and destructive, with armed forces more able to protect the innocent and deter or defend against aggression.

Vast tank armies may no longer battle it out across the steppes, but modern warfare has indeed become exceedingly fast-paced and complex. Still, there is a way to reduce this complexity to just three simple rules that can save untold amounts of blood and treasure in the netwar age

So there is hope in this dark world, may netwar deliver us.


After that cheap shot let us look at this swarming thing.

Swarm describes a behaviour of an aggregate of animals of similar size and body orientation, often moving en masse in the same direction. "Swarming" is a general term that can be applied to any animal that swarms. The term can be applied to insects, birds, fish, various microorganisms such as bacteria, and people. The term applies particularly to insects. "Flocking" is the term usually used for swarming behaviour in birds, while "shoaling or schooling" refers to swarming behaviour in fish. The swarm size is a major parameter of a swarm.

According to this definition all armed forces swarm. Or better all the armed forces are swarms, be it on the battlefield or when in search of food.

It gets even better. According to this article we are also swarms, or at least have them in us!

Even brain cells may follow the same rules for collective behavior seen in locusts or fish.

“One of the really fun things that we’re doing now is understanding how the type of feedbacks in these groups is like the ones in the brain that allows humans to make decisions,” Dr. Couzin said. Those decisions are not just about what to order for lunch, but about basic perception — making sense, for example, of the flood of signals coming from the eyes. “How does your brain take this information and come to a collective decision about what you’re seeing?” Dr. Couzin said. The answer, he suspects, may lie in our inner swarm

I will continue later...


Firn

[shloky]

Firn:

According to this definition all armed forces swarm.

Yes. Yes they do.

I keep hearing about Swarming, but no one actually seems to know what it is. If it just means simultaneous attacks from multiple directions, then its hardly a useful characterisation.

Actually, that's precisely what it is.

To quote Sean J. A. Edwards in his work on the topic, swarming is:

a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Not sure why defining and understanding the past, present, and future of a core component of warfare isn't useful.

Moving on, here's what Ronfeldt and Arquilla wrote in 2000:

Examples of swarming can be found throughout history, but it is only now able to emerge as a doctrine in its own right. That is largely because swarming depends on a devolution of power to small units and a capacity to interconnect those units that has only recently become feasible, due to the information revolution.

Which is very much in tune with what Marc wrote:

Smaller units and increased segmentation can work and be incredibly effective, but they are dependent upon the technologies involved, especially the defensive, mobility and logistics technologies, and the use to which they are put.

Arquilla's basic point is that the world has changed - we've entered an era of unprecedented connectivity and, logically, military structure should reflect that shift.

Swarming is a useful approach to understanding how to do so, and the rules Arquilla outlines are useful in thinking how to accomplish that task - smaller units (#1) wielding sophisticated information flows (#2) are able to accomplish complex and varied tasks as the need arises(#3).