New Rules of War
Take a look. The article uses very poor evidence to make some not very good points, thus loosing the good points that may have been made.
Anyone wants to defend the use of history or facts here, I'm all ears.
New Rules of War
Take a look. The article uses very poor evidence to make some not very good points, thus loosing the good points that may have been made.
Anyone wants to defend the use of history or facts here, I'm all ears.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Are you being kind here Wilf, are do you genuinely see some good points in this? I'm normally very cautious of trashing someone's work without reflection and secondary sources/ opinions to put it into perspective (or, from another perspective, I'm an easily persuaded sell-out...)
However I failed to see anything of relevance or utility here at all.
Rule 2: Finding is the new flanking is flawed, albeit the least flawed of the three. If you can't find the enemy then flanking, attacking by fire or even an all-out up-the-guts assault will simply not be possible. As to portraying 'finding' rising to prominence over the 'strike, exploit' (the flank) I'd suggest this is rather a part of fighting an enemy who seeks to employ guerrilla/ unconventional tactics. Alexander's forces in Bactria would empathise with the difficulty in finding an enemy who seeks to avoid pitched battle - and history could provide countless more examples. If the author wanted to say that finding the enemy in the COE/ any COIN-type undertaking is more important as a tactical function than striking him then I would agree. We enjoy a huge advantage in terms of technology and firepower (most counter-insurgents do) so delivering death and destruction isn't the problem, but finding him is. But to portray a grand narrative of battle whereby flanking was once being a dominant form of manoeuvre and is now replaced by that of finding? Uh, no.
Rule 1: "Many and Small" Beats "Few and Large." Nice idea I'd like to subscribe to, but god does tend to be on the sides of the big battalions that are backed by overwhelming firepower supported by solid doctrine and led by competent leaders... all of which is outside the simplistic rendering of the above. After all, a big battalion can split into the 'small and many' when required.
Rule 3 - Swarming is the New Surging I'll admit that I struggle to create a solid argument against the concept of swarming, but it has always struck me as being infeasible. My gut feeling is that swarm tactics lack operational mobility once deployed, they are too difficult to resupply/ their logistic chain is simultaneously too fragile and too inefficient and the individual part of the swarm is too easily suppressed, fixed and defeated in detail by a competent enemy.
As to the concept of netwar, I don't think too much needs to be said as I doubt anyone will argue in support of it.
At the practical level I see it as inevitable that increased technology will be pushed down to the lowest level. I hate the term 'Network Centric Warfare' as it seems to replace the concept of warfare with the concept of a network - better perhaps is work towards a 'Warfare Centric Network'. Much like the concept of recon pull/ push we need to think of technology as being a network push, not a network pull. The core concepts of close combat won't dramatically change, so best support the core combat functions as we know them rather than trying to change.
In my capacity as a student of war/history, I'm seeing military progress as evolution rather than revolution. Along with that reading comes the caveat that anyone peddling revolution or the silver bullet ought to be treated with great suspicion.
Last edited by Chris jM; 02-25-2010 at 08:43 AM. Reason: fixing poor sentence construction
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Thus my statement, "thus loosing the good points that may have been made."
Finding is good. Always has been. = Good.
Nothing to do with flanking. Flanking fulfils a completely and utterly different function, which is found in "Fixing." = Does not understand the Core Functions, thus undermines his understanding that Finding is good. He merely states it, and does not demonstrate he understand why. - and this is the high point!!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The author wasn't accurate in his use of military terms and examples. The level of thought is nevertheless above average.
I should have worded my question better - do you see any good points being able to arise from this? Not only are the 'rules' nonsense, the premise and reasoning on which they are founded is flawed.
And Fuchs, where is the level of thought above average? I fail to see any indications of above average thought. Claiming that it's original thinking I can agree with, but as to the quality of thought?
Last edited by Chris jM; 02-25-2010 at 10:21 AM.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Most articles on military matters are quite devoid of thought, the bar "average" is quite low.
Most military writing is about technicalities and superficial stuff. In fact, about 90% of military writing should be considered to be poorly done PR texting.
Regarding Arquilla's "Rule No. 1" this statement irks me no end:
"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units. The final result: 500,000-plus troops deployed, countless billions spent, and a war lost. The iconic images were the insurgents' AK-47 individual assault rifles, of which there were hundreds of thousands in use at any moment, juxtaposed against the U.S. Air Force's B-52s, of which just a hundred or so massed together in fruitless attempts to bomb Hanoi into submission".
This statement neither proves that smaller and more numerous is better than larger and fewer nor does it provide evidence of the need for a paradigm shift in the organisation of armies. Why?
The US Army in Vietnam fought numerous engagements with both the NVA and the Viet Cong both of which were organised and fought differently (the former as conventional units fighting "set-piece" battles and the latter as "insurgents"). Yet, in all cases the US Army and USMC fought succesful engagements (take the battle of Hue city for instane or the Tet Offensive). Both the US Army and the USMC adapted their units to fit METT-T considerations without needing to tweek TOEs (take the firebase concept for instance). The reasons for the US "losing" the war (when in fact they actually lost the peace, or rather, South Vietnam did) were geopolitical, grand strategic and domestic with regards to the overly restrictive ROE imposed on the forces by both Congress and the President and were not solely due to the armed forces having failed to "transform". The author is not deploying a ceteris paribus (all things being equal) chain of reasoning. Furthermore, he later compares the forward deployment of platoon sized units in conjunction with allied tribes in Iraq as evidence of the force-multipling effects of "networked" systems after mentinong the surge, the surge, firthermore, which was finally responsibile for beinging order I might add. I don't know what particular axe Arquilla has to grind or from which corporation he recieves his consultants cheque but this article, IMO, made even William Lind's turgid "4th Generation Warfare" article seem like an exercise in historical erudition.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 02-25-2010 at 11:01 AM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.
(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)
Foreign Policy has an interesting article: The New Rules of War.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...f_war?page=0,0
Lots of little interconnected, high-energy teams vs. big army.
Steve
LINK.
Lengthy thread on the article...
Well welcome to the world of "open source warfare" OSW---was wondering when the rest of the world would catch up.
Love this---finally someone is talking about swarming attacks which have been the bread and butter of the Sunni insurgency since 2007 and which now has transitioned to the Taliban via internet battle videos.
Read "Swarming on the Battlefield" a 2000 RAND study by Sean Edwards.
Why are we doomed to literally recreate the wheel--this study was commissioned by the Army, swarm attacks have been discussed in open source warfare since 2004, and the Sunni insurgents have shown us their battle videos complete with mission briefs since 2007.
But hey all those videos were deemed to be enemy propoganda!
A lot of folks have swarmed over the years. That article is not on the cutting edge of anything as a lot of folks pointed out above...
NOTE: Thread merged to preclude redundancy.
Last edited by Ken White; 03-23-2010 at 04:42 AM. Reason: Added Note on Merge
If that's the study I re-read recently it's a very contestable piece of work.
Sorry, I do not understand "open source warfare." Like Ken White says the imaginary tactic of "swarming" has been around a long time. It's a perception. It's not a doctrine.Why are we doomed to literally recreate the wheel--this study was commissioned by the Army, swarm attacks have been discussed in open source warfare since 2004, and the Sunni insurgents have shown us their battle videos complete with mission briefs since 2007.
Once you boil it down saying "Swarming" is like saying "Choo-choo train." It's OK when you're 8. It's not OK if you're a locomotive engineer.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Uncommon Knowledge
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Foreign Policy: The New Rules of War
The visionary who first saw the age of "netwar" coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here's his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.
JOHN ARQUILLA
MARCH/APRIL 2010
Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future..........(Snip)
Well I tried. I watched Part 1 and it was like listening to 8-year-olds talk about
the social sciences. I actually have quite a lot of time for Hanson, so I really do not get where this all goes. Based on what Arquilla said, Napoleon's Armies and Nelson's Navy were "networked."
Twaddle!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
... at least if you’re a well trained Aussie. Apart from the colloquial use of the term swarm (as opposed to the conceptual status it has acquired in the hands of some) the following comments may be of interest from “Taking Tactics From The Taliban: Tactical Principles For Commanders” from the Australian Army Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, Autumn, 2009 ...
The ‘swarm’ is the Taliban offensive tactic [my emphasis], usually employed against dismounted elements in the ‘green zone’ that remain static for too long (two to three hours) and defensive positions such as overwatch and patrol bases. Some warning of a swarm is often—but not always—provided by the exodus of local Afghans from the area some ten to twenty minutes prior to the attack and an increase in intelligence warning of an offensive. During a swarm, Taliban fighters will manoeuvre on two to four flanks using fire teams of three to six men armed with medium machine-guns and RPGs who attack simultaneously. This was a tactic with which CT Spear became very familiar and tactically equipped to confront. I developed my seventh tactical principle as a response to the Taliban fire pocket and swarm: dismounted patrols must always operate within mortar range.
CT Spear countered the Taliban’s major tactics with carefully planned tactics of its own. The team defeated the fire pocket by fighting into one side while suppressing the other firing points and then rolling them up from the flank. The Taliban fighters would occasionally withdraw to alternate firing points as the team advanced and the commander would then decide how far he wanted to pursue them given his existing boundaries and task.
The team used the same tactic to counter the swarm, although a platoon was unlikely to be able to handle a larger force on its own and such a confrontation would usually turn into a fully-fledged combat team engagement. The element in contact would go into, or remain in, all round defence and allow its JTAC or JFO to call in indirect fire and close air support to buy time for the combat team commander to manoeuvre his cavalry and infantry to support. My eighth and ninth principles supported this and carried the necessary corollaries: any force must contain at least three elements that can support one another while patrolling deep in the ‘greenzone’.
Dismounted sections must operate within 500 metres of one another and platoons within 1000 metres of one another, particularly if they are operating away from the protection of overwatch. Use of this tactic facilitated rapid offensive manoeuvre in support of an element in contact. In essence, we aimed to ‘swarm the swarm’ [my emphasis], in keeping with my tenth principle: fight the most likely course of action, but be postured for the most dangerous.(culled from pp.31-38)
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