New Rules of War

[William F. Owen]

Are you being kind here Wilf, are do you genuinely see some good points in this?

Thus my statement, "thus loosing the good points that may have been made."

Finding is good. Always has been. = Good.
Nothing to do with flanking. Flanking fulfils a completely and utterly different function, which is found in "Fixing." = Does not understand the Core Functions, thus undermines his understanding that Finding is good. He merely states it, and does not demonstrate he understand why. - and this is the high point!!

[Fuchs]

The author wasn't accurate in his use of military terms and examples. The level of thought is nevertheless above average.

[Chris jM]

Thus my statement, "thus loosing the good points that may have been made."

I should have worded my question better - do you see any good points being able to arise from this? Not only are the 'rules' nonsense, the premise and reasoning on which they are founded is flawed.

And Fuchs, where is the level of thought above average? I fail to see any indications of above average thought. Claiming that it's original thinking I can agree with, but as to the quality of thought?

[Fuchs]

Most articles on military matters are quite devoid of thought, the bar "average" is quite low.

Most military writing is about technicalities and superficial stuff. In fact, about 90% of military writing should be considered to be poorly done PR texting.

[Tukhachevskii]

Regarding Arquilla's "Rule No. 1" this statement irks me no end:

"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units. The final result: 500,000-plus troops deployed, countless billions spent, and a war lost. The iconic images were the insurgents' AK-47 individual assault rifles, of which there were hundreds of thousands in use at any moment, juxtaposed against the U.S. Air Force's B-52s, of which just a hundred or so massed together in fruitless attempts to bomb Hanoi into submission".

This statement neither proves that smaller and more numerous is better than larger and fewer nor does it provide evidence of the need for a paradigm shift in the organisation of armies. Why?

The US Army in Vietnam fought numerous engagements with both the NVA and the Viet Cong both of which were organised and fought differently (the former as conventional units fighting "set-piece" battles and the latter as "insurgents"). Yet, in all cases the US Army and USMC fought succesful engagements (take the battle of Hue city for instane or the Tet Offensive). Both the US Army and the USMC adapted their units to fit METT-T considerations without needing to tweek TOEs (take the firebase concept for instance). The reasons for the US "losing" the war (when in fact they actually lost the peace, or rather, South Vietnam did) were geopolitical, grand strategic and domestic with regards to the overly restrictive ROE imposed on the forces by both Congress and the President and were not solely due to the armed forces having failed to "transform". The author is not deploying a ceteris paribus (all things being equal) chain of reasoning. Furthermore, he later compares the forward deployment of platoon sized units in conjunction with allied tribes in Iraq as evidence of the force-multipling effects of "networked" systems after mentinong the surge, the surge, firthermore, which was finally responsibile for beinging order I might add. I don't know what particular axe Arquilla has to grind or from which corporation he recieves his consultants cheque but this article, IMO, made even William Lind's turgid "4th Generation Warfare" article seem like an exercise in historical erudition.

[J Wolfsberger]

I got as far as page three, and read this: "For many centuries, legionary maniples (Latin for "handfuls") marched out -- in their flexible checkerboard formations -- and beat the massive, balky phalanxes of traditional foes, while dealing just as skillfully with loose bands of tribal fighters."

So, that explains the stunning Roman victory at Teutoburger Wald.

Oh, wait ...

Poor mastery of history, poorly reasoned, not much use.

[marct]

I don't know what particular axe Arquilla has to grind or from which corporation he recieves his consultants cheque but this article, IMO, made even William Lind's turgid "4th Generation Warfare" article seem like an exercise in historical erudition.

LOL!

What truly got my goat was this statement

Then again, perhaps the best example of a many-and-small military that worked against foes of all sizes was the Roman legion. For many centuries, legionary maniples (Latin for "handfuls") marched out -- in their flexible checkerboard formations -- and beat the massive, balky phalanxes of traditional foes, while dealing just as skillfully with loose bands of tribal fighters.

[rant]
Sure, maniples were a key tactical unit: as part of a cohort. In no Roman campaigns I'm aware of were maniples used as a basic unit separate from their cohorts. Cohorts, along with ala, would be detached for independent operations, but not maniples. And if he wants an example of ancient "swarming", and how effective it was, he should take a look at the final battle of the Boadicean revolt! And, as far as those "flexible checkerboard formations" are concerned, he really should consider that tactics are effected by technology as, for example, when my ancestors stomped the legions at Adrianople. As for the Teutonberg Wald, well, what can I say? It's all the fault of that nasty Arminius (aka Herman) who was waging an unconventional campaign !
[/rant]

Honestly, there are a few good ideas in the article but, to my mind at least, they are buried in an overpowering morass of poor historical scholarship and an even poorer ability to abstract the essential factors. For example, as Wilf quite correctly points out, "finding" has always been important (ask Arminius !). Smaller units and increased segmentation can work and be incredibly effective, but they are dependent upon the technologies involved, especially the defensive, mobility and logistics technologies, and the use to which they are put.

[William F. Owen]

I should have worded my question better - do you see any good points being able to arise from this? Not only are the 'rules' nonsense, the premise and reasoning on which they are founded is flawed.

I concur. It was a massive missed opportunity. There are some really critical debates to be had, but the US (and pretty much the UK) seem incapable conducting it in a useful way. Why that is might also be worth asking!

[Fuchs]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

[William F. Owen]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

Mongols did not "swarm." Nor did Panzer Regiments. I keep hearing about Swarming, but no one actually seems to know what it is. If it just means simultaneous attacks from multiple directions, then its hardly a useful characterisation.

[Fuchs]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

Wolfpacks were quite complicated. Aerial recce played a minor role, there were never more than two aerial recce squadrons with sufficient range available and their aircraft were quite suboptimal.

First Phase:
Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).

Second Phase:
One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy and radios its position and movement.
A central station receives the radio message and transmits necessary info, not the least to make sure that every sub gets the message with minimum radiation from the shadowing sub.

Third Phase:
The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time.
This was a saturation approach to overcome the defences.

Fourth Phase:
Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night, proceed to phase 3 again.



It's vastly different from the more understood tactics of battlefleets and army units/formations from battalion up to corps (the big arrows on maps).
This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.
Conventional tactics don't include an all-round pulse attack - not even during the annihilation of a pocket.
The German army would never have developed wolfpack tactics - their mode of attack was too much opposed to the Schwerpunkt idea. The difference is huge.


@marct:
"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

[marct]

Hi Fuchs,

"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

Hmmm, I would include "enemy identification" under the heading "finding" myself, as in finding the moles . And I agree, for the Germans it was definitely politics and logistics.

[William F. Owen]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

Cool! Where?

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

1. First Phase:
   Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).
2. Second Phase:
   One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy ....
3. Third Phase:
   The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time....
4. Fourth Phase:
   Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night....

OK, how does that qualify as "Swarming?" Did the Kriegsmarine ever call it swarming? Sounds like U-boat specific "Wolfpack," to me.

This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.

So who else has used "Swarming" tactics?