New Rules of War

[Ken White]

Long and short
Is it too "simplistic" to say that the key strength in swarming might be found in its ability to recognize and act on any vacuum afforded in a given path

I believe it to be accurate at any rate. However, militarily, problems arise in several areas:

- Recognizing. The really big one...

- Getting the massive numbers available to a swarm of bees is problematical; add getting most much less all the actors in a swarm of humans, unlike bees, to do the correct thing at the right time...

- Rocks are tough and durable but they are also static and rarely react to, evade, withdraw temporarily or counterattack the water that erodes them over considerable time -- time which may not be available to a military force...

That's not to say that swarms won't work, just that the fates must be kind and the reliability of effective action is unlikely to be adequate to satisfy most commanders or politicians -- the human factor (on the part of the Swarmers, the Swarmees and their respective bosses... ).

[Fuchs]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

They failed to defeat the Kurds and they had it easy with the Shi'ite rising just as the MC had it easy at Fallujah.

The Iraqi army did furthermore not do the job (that it did) alone. Saddam had powerful intelligence service(s?). That was crucial for the suppression of the kind of low level resistance that the foreigners faced since 2003.

----------------

About swarming: I'm beyond the typical age for it (I'm 33), but let's out myself as someone who played a bit online, mostly in pvp (player vs player) battles.
The example is very useful in regard to swarming.

#1
The basic mode of pvp is that everyone "fights" as an individual, merely taking into account what others do. A team without voice communication acts often like an animal swarm, pack, herd. They move into position and suddenly one decides to attack and all attack. This sudden decision can also define what target will be attacked or the route or direction of attack.

#2
This becomes much more effective when voice communication is being added. Targets are called, one calls for patience, help is being requested, reports are made and the attack is usually timed.

#3
A team with voice comm and a leader becomes more effective, quicker and less wasteful (in regard to time, firepower, opportunities).

#4
There's also the possibility of a very leader-controlled encounter with a great degree of control. This mode is extremely slow, but it's very capable in predictable, complex situations. It's rarely used in pvp, but very common in pve (player versus environment, that is: against computer-controlled opponents).

#5
Then again a team that has played together for a while can be very different again; voice comm loses relevance because they know what to do, when and how. They can again approach the basic mode of operation; keep eyes open and try to do what's necessary to win. Central control can be reduced to three or fire commands with a total of less than 20 words - in a "fight" of 10-30 minutes.
The effect is usually superior to all previous modes despite the similarity with the first one.



Swarming can be seen as simply "keep eyes open and use your brain" and nothing special. It's quite different from orthodox tactics, though.

Let's call #1 incompetent swarming, #2 leaderless cooperation, #3 mission tactics, #4 order tactics and #5 competent swarming.

I assure you that #3 is superior to #5 in a crisis, but that's the only exception to the otherwise universal superiority of #5 in PvP.


I observed these patterns and results in different games, with German and international (English-speaking) players, over years and with very different game mechanics. Teams were 5 to 40 players strong.

I'm convinced that I observed universal, natural human behaviour patterns (at least for males, age group 16-45).

#5 works usually best. Do not take it lightly, and don't despise it for a superficial similarity to #1. Incompetence is possible in any system.

It may be difficult to extrapolate this stuff to the behaviour of small units or units instead of individuals. Nevertheless, "swarming" is something that we should look at.
History (a trend away from authoritarian control in the Western world) suggests that we probably know enough about leadership by exogenously enforced authority, but probably not enough about decentralized, independent yet cooperative forms of coordination.

A modern military is a bureaucracy. I served long enough in the Bundeswehr to know what this means. Such a bureaucracy has a tendence to develop according to the preferences of the bureaucratic hive mind. That does not need to be optimal, it's certainly averse to self-organisation ("disorder") and there's pretty much a technological lock-in in favour of what we know as orthodox military doctrine, command & control.
Others who do not get "educated" by such a bureaucratic can revert to more "natural" modes of operation. They do not need to break through a technological lock-in barrier. They may actually use methods that are superior in sizeable niches.

[jmm99]

and MAJ Shannon's thesis. The FP article by Arquilla, The New Rules of War, mentioned the Mongol "Crow Swarm":

Simultaneous attack from several directions might be at the very cutting edge in conflict, but its lineage is quite old. Traditional tribal warfare, whether by nomadic horse archers or bush fighters, always featured some elements of swarms. The zenith of this kind of fighting probably came with the 13th-century Mongols, who had a name for this doctrine: "Crow Swarm." When the attack was not carried out at close quarters by charging horsemen, but was instead conducted via arrows raining down on massed targets, the khans called it "Falling Stars."

Classing the highly organized Mongol forces under Subodai (I'd call them conventional light and heavy cavalry) as "traditional tribal warriors" seemed a bit suspect to me, so I Googled up "Crow Swarm" and "Mongol". I found a master's thesis by MAJ William D. Shannon (USMC), Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void: Lessons from the Chechen Wars (June 2008), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (John Arquilla was a thesis advisor).

MAJ Shannon's issues (pp.16-17 pdf):

Is there potential to turn swarming concepts into doctrine for U.S. forces? In order to answer this question, this thesis will ask the following questions:

• Are there relevant historical precedents that provide sufficient analysis to explore development of swarming concepts?

• Does the concept of swarming address any gaps in military doctrine?

• Can we [U.S. forces, and more specifically, Marines] incorporate swarm tactics into our doctrine for use in the offense and defense without drastic changes to organization, command, control and communications (C3), training, and logistics?

and Conclusion (pp.91-92 pdf):

G. CONCLUSION

The research conducted here and in other scholarly and professional publications, coupled with military doctrine and experimentation, all but leads to the conclusion that there is potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts. This is based on developing answers to the three research questions posed in Chapter I.

First, that the Chechen Wars did provide additional information and lessons learned in relation to not only the war in general, but to this thesis’ independent variables, regarding the use of swarm tactics.

Second, reviewing doctrine and warfighting experiments has confirmed the existence of doctrinal void in the area of swarm tactics, which implies a need to construct doctrinal swarming concepts, engage in experimentation, and promulgate swarm TTPs in doctrine and training.

Finally, with the implementation of the DO concept, our knowledge from the first two research questions and previous scholarly research on swarming, a potential future swarming doctrine concept foundation is set. This would allow Marines and other forces to employ swarm tactics offensively and defend against and repulse enemy swarms. The only thing left for us to do is “do it.”

So, tossing out another piece of red meat to be swarmed on ....

Regards

Mike

PS: MAJ Shannon presents four "swarming" examples from history (pp. 18-23 pdf)

1. The Mongol Swarm ....

2. Napoleon’s Retreat from Russia ....

3. The Winter War ....

4. The Soviet Afghan War ....

I expect there will be some controversy about those examples.

[Ken White]

#5
Then again a team that has played together for a while can be very different again; voice comm loses relevance because they know what to do, when and how. They can again approach the basic mode of operation; keep eyes open and try to do what's necessary to win. Central control can be reduced to three or fire commands with a total of less than 20 words - in a "fight" of 10-30 minutes. The effect is usually superior to all previous modes despite the similarity with the first one.
...
#5 works usually best. Do not take it lightly, and don't despise it for a superficial similarity to #1. Incompetence is possible in any system.

Totally agree. However, you also said:

I assure you that #3 is superior to #5 in a crisis, but that's the only exception to the otherwise universal superiority of #5 in PvP

and I can also agree with that

Thus my constant contentions that (a) we do not train as well as we should; and (b) METT-TC is the ultimate ruler of all things...

[zenpundit]

WM wrote:

I don't think I ruled out case studies a priori. In certain circumstances, case studies would be an excellent approach. In fact I suspect that a properly constructed and presented case study approach is germane in the present analysis

No, you arbitrarily ruled out the most germane case study available a priori is all, because it was favorable to small units and of immediate relevance to the current conflict. However, we are in agreement that properly constructed case study approach is a useful methodology. Good, this is progress. We can come back to case studies in a bit.

I was also not proposing that we use a double blind test in combat. What I was suggesting is that an appeal to consequences as a means of comparing the goodness of alternatives is not likely to be an appropriate methodological approach for the current subject.

I never said that you proposed it, WM. What you suggested was that a double-blind test was an appropriate standard of proof for my proposition to have to meet in order to be accepted as valid:

Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario?

I agree that a double-blind test could provide some convincing evidence to help support or alternatively, to falsify, my proposition that there are some scenarios where small units are better tactical choice than large ones. What I asked of you was that you in turn explain how such a double-blind test of combat operations might be constructed.

I appreciate all the effort you are expending in attempting to school me in basic logic, but along the way, it might be more helpful if you practiced some yourself. Either answer the question and demonstrate how a double-blind test of combat operations might be conducted (the experimental ethics alone should prove to be fascinating explanation) or admit that it was never an appropriate standard of proof to apply in the first place.

Oh, and speaking of non sequiturs.....

Unlike World War II, the current conflicts, OIF (soon to be Operation New Dawn or OND) and OEF, will not really matter much in the great scheme of things should the coalition's efforts be less than successful. The magnitude of evil being confronted there pales in comparison to that manifested by the opposition during WWII

[Rex Brynen]

They failed to defeat the Kurds and they had it easy with the Shi'ite rising just as the MC had it easy at Fallujah.

The sole reason, of course, that they failed to defeat the Kurds was de facto US protection of northern Iraq--hardly a fair test. They did, however, effectively suppress them in 1975 (following the withdrawal of Iranian support) and again at the end of the Iran-Iraq War (ditto).

[wm]

I agree that a double-blind test could provide some convincing evidence to help support or alternatively, to falsify, my proposition that there are some scenarios where small units are better tactical choice than large ones. What I asked of you was that you in turn explain how such a double-blind test of combat operations might be constructed.

I appreciate all the effort you are expending in attempting to school me in basic logic, but along the way, it might be more helpful if you practiced some yourself. Either answer the question and demonstrate how a double-blind test of combat operations might be conducted (the experimental ethics alone should prove to be fascinating explanation) or admit that it was never an appropriate standard of proof to apply in the first place.

We seem to be talking past each other (or are in violent agreement in some regards). I am more than willing to accept that there are tactical scenarios where one organizational construct is more likely to achieve the desired results than another. (See here for instance.) My position is not that the double blind test is the appropriate standard of proof for such claims. Rather I hold that an appeal to the principle of utility is an inappropriate form of justification because to prove its claims, one must use a double blind test that cannot (and should not) be applied in the case at hand. Therefore, I will not grab either horn of the false dilemma presented in the quotation above.

You previously professed an hypothesis (although it seemed to be expressed more as an axiom)--using small units sometimes produces more utility (a greater balance of good--economic good in your case) than operating with "the big battalions." I believe that your hypothesis was unproven. I asserted that the appropriate method for proving it would be a double blind test. My suggestion about the double blind test was the conclusion of an enthymeme based on an unstated premise: a double blind test is the way to prove assertions about choosing options based on a comparison of their relative costs and benefits.

I take it from your parenthetic remark about the experimental ethics, that you find conducting such a test to be unethical. So do I. I further suggest that the conduct of such a double blind test is not practically possible--one cannot control for the extremely large number of situational variables. To make the experiment a true double blind, as a minimum the conditions of METT-TC would have to be identical. Two concurrent operations would need both to occupy the same battle space and to engage the same opponents under identical environmental conditions. The experiment would also require the same leadership on each side. I don't think we can perform the cloning and experiential replication needed to meet the leadership requirement in order to conduct the two operations simultaneously. Allowing for the possibility to reset the situation (with the non-human variables replicated and controlled for) and rerun with the alternative force package, one would still need to ensure the leadership "bracketed" out the experiences of the prior operation. How likely is that?

To sum up, my argument is as follows:
1. The truth of the claim you made was undemonstrated;
2. The method of demonstration for the claim's truth is a double blind test;
3. A double blind test of the claim is not feasible, either ethically or practically;
4. If a method of demonstration is not feasible, then the truth of claims that require that demonstration are unknowable;
5. Claims whose truth is unknowable are hand waving.
6. The claim you made was hand waving.

1 is an observation; I presented arguments for the truth of 2 and 3; 4 is a methodological assumption; 5 is a definition; and 6 is the conclusion of the deductive argument.

[Ken White]

I suggest that 4 is not an assumption, it is rather a fact that is dictated by the infinite number of variables probable and that is in addition to the premises stated in 3.

[Infanteer]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

Was it? Or was it the Ba'athist political system that was more effective.

US forces seemed just as adept at crushing flare ups (Fallujah) as the Republican Guard. The Ba'athist Regime dealt with the day-to-day stuff and Paul Bremer and CPA Law simply could not.

Juxtapose the two - would the ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military be effective at suppressing irregular opponents in Texas? They would probably be aiming to "modularize" and gasping for a "population-centric" solution by now as well....

As for the swarming bit, I'm having trouble following it - is an area ambush a swarm? Satellite patrols? What's new about "spreading out"?

[Firn]

As for the swarming bit, I'm having trouble following it - is an area ambush a swarm? Satellite patrols? What's new about "spreading out"?

I think it means something different to a lot of people. Having read a bit about biological swarms, swarm intelligence and self organization I would argue that you can use it for a lot of things. For example:

Fish derive many benefits from shoaling behaviour including defense against predators (through better predator detection and by diluting the chance of capture), enhanced foraging success, and higher success in finding a mate. It is also likely that fish benefit from shoal membership through increased hydrodynamic efficiency.

Fish use many traits to choose shoalmates. Generally they prefer larger shoals, shoalmates of their own species, shoalmates similar in size and appearance to themselves, healthy fish, and kin (when recognized).

On the other hand:

The nasute soldiers of the neotropical termite Nasutitermes costalis function as scouts by exploring new terrain for food in advance of the worker caste and regulate foraging activity by laying trails composed of sternal gland pheromone. Additional soldiers are at first recruited in large numbers, and subsequently workers appear as the pheromone concentration increases. The role of the nasutes in the organization of foraging is extremely unusual for the soldier caste in social insects and appears to be a component of a foraging/defense system that controls the recruitment of foragers and effectively deters attacks by ants, the most fierce and important predators of termites.

In this swarms the self organization makes sure that termite soldiers get recruited through sophisticated communication, told the objective (food), the intent and to observe METT. By using a combination of stealth and saber they reach the objective, recruit immediatly huge reinforcements "to get there first with most", use the stronger form (defense) and chemical shots to fend off attacking ants, exploit their success and mount after the successful action a fighting retreat.

Only half-joking
Firn

[wm]

In this swarms the self organization makes sure that termite soldiers get recruited through sophisticated communication, told the objective (food), the intent and to observe METT. By using a combination of stealth and saber they reach the objective, recruit immediatly huge reinforcements "to get there first with most", use the stronger form (defense) and chemical shots to fend off attacking ants, exploit their success and mount after the successful action a fighting retreat.

Only half-joking
Firn

We can problably anthropomorphize almost any description of a phenomenon to make it easier for us to understand it. However, such an anthropomorphic description does not necessarily describe what is actually going on. For example, we could say that a thermostat turns on the air conditioner because it feels too hot, but I doubt that most folks really believe that a mechanical device has any feelings at all. Using gods and spirits as operative elements in describing how and why things work went out of fashion about the same time as phlogiston theory, didn't it?

Once we are able to take Humpty Dumpty's advice and make sure that we, not the word, is the master, I suspect we will find "swarming" is just some old wine in a new bottle. And as we know, no one wine is good for every occasion.

[Dayuhan]

Was it? Or was it the Ba'athist political system that was more effective.

US forces seemed just as adept at crushing flare ups (Fallujah) as the Republican Guard. The Ba'athist Regime dealt with the day-to-day stuff and Paul Bremer and CPA Law simply could not.

Juxtapose the two - would the ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military be effective at suppressing irregular opponents in Texas? They would probably be aiming to "modularize" and gasping for a "population-centric" solution by now as well....

I'm not sure Saddam's effective suppression of internal dissent can be attributed purely to his "ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style military". Did he not also employ a quite ruthless internal security police, supported by an extensive network of informants? It would seem to me that the function of Saddam's military in suppressing actual regionally distinct instances of rebellion could be duplicated or improved by an effective occupying force, but that it would be difficult or impossible for a foreign power to replicate Saddam's internal security police, a considerable difference.

[Rex Brynen]

I'm not sure Saddam's effective suppression of internal dissent can be attributed purely to his "ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style military". Did he not also employ a quite ruthless internal security police, supported by an extensive network of informants? It would seem to me that the function of Saddam's military in suppressing actual regionally distinct instances of rebellion could be duplicated or improved by an effective occupying force, but that it would be difficult or impossible for a foreign power to replicate Saddam's internal security police, a considerable difference.

In many ways, that was precisely my point: the what matters most in successful COIN is not the networked decentralization of the counter-insurgents, but a host of other things.

The Iraqi mukhabarat, it might be added, was also a very old fashion hierarchical organization... but one that was both cross-cut by other patterns of loyalty, and counterbalanced by multiple overlapping systems of internal security and social control. It was also able to use terror in a way that US forces would never use (having spent some time myself in Iraq in the Saddam days, I know well that the level of fear that the regime could create was quite remarkable.)

Platoon for platoon, I would certainly prefer to have lithe and flexible forces over the Iraqi Army (indeed, that accounts for some of the IDF's successes over its Arab neighbours). However, to reduce the ability to respond to contemporary irregular threats to this alone, as the original article does, I think is placing far, far too much weight on a single variable.

[Firn]

Once we are able to take Humpty Dumpty's advice and make sure that we, not the word, is the master, I suspect we will find "swarming" is just some old wine in a new bottle. And as we know, no one wine is good for every occasion.

Agreed. However the new bottles can greatly influence our perception of the old wine and our wine experience. Just as a beautiful glass beats plastic in a classy dinner and drives important businesses.

"The finest glasses for both technical and hedonistic purposes are those made by Riedel. The effect of these glasses on fine wine is profound. I cannot emphasize enough what a difference they make." (Quelle: Robert M. Parker, Jr. The Wine Advocate)

We can problably anthropomorphize almost any description of a phenomenon to make it easier for us to understand it. However, such an anthropomorphic description does not necessarily describe what is actually going on. For example, we could say that a thermostat turns on the air conditioner because it feels too hot, but I doubt that most folks really believe that a mechanical device has any feelings at all. Using gods and spirits as operative elements in describing how and why things work went out of fashion about the same time as phlogiston theory, didn't it?

Also agreed and in my post I tried to point out the muddy nature of this "swarm" business, a word which can be seemingly used and abused almost everywhere. However we do know increasingly more and more on how for example social insects are able to build grand buildings with brilliant thermoregulation, to rely on douleia (greek for slave) labour or to organize complex activities like fungiculture to feed large colonies. There is no magic in that even if it looks like it. The principles which allow such tiny insects to tackle together such tasks are the fascinating part of the story.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

"The finest glasses for both technical and hedonistic purposes are those made by Riedel. The effect of these glasses on fine wine is profound. I cannot emphasize enough what a difference they make." (Quelle: Robert M. Parker, Jr. The Wine Advocate)

...and my wife would argue that only "pu**ies" drink beer from glasses - and it should be drunk from the bottle or can.

...am I missing the point?

[Firn]

...and my wife would argue that only "pu**ies" drink beer from glasses - and it should be drunk from the bottle or can.

...am I missing the point?

Perhaps, if you look at the first post of this thread.

Packaging, labeling, marketing are all part of the game, be it a wine (-glass) or idea business thus the phrase of the old wine in new bottles. The author of the article relies greatly on the shiny wordbottles to reinforce some of his better ideas and to create attention for them, but he sadly fails to support his arguments. He still benefits through this article, but not so the target audience, as he may harm the good ideas.


Firn

P.S: Wine or beer, can or glass, it all depends on the METT-T.

[marct]

Hi Firn,

Packaging, labeling, marketing are all part of the game, be it a wine (-glass) or idea business thus the phrase of the old wine in new bottles. The author of the article relies greatly on the shiny wordbottles to reinforce some of his better ideas and to create attention for them, but he sadly fails to support his arguments. He still benefits through this article, but not so the target audience, as he may harm the good ideas.

Okay, I going to play scholarly pissant here, the but best translation of the phrase (meme actually) is "old wine in new skins" *not bottles). The reference, IMO, goes back to the absolute stupidity of anyone who would take something good (old wine) and put it into a new container that will make it less good, especially since the new wine skin will change the flavour and, quite possibly, split. It's not a reference to the presentation of the wine, it's a reference to the storage of the wine .

Now, on the presentation front, I am all in favour of crystal, especially for good reds. You can ruin the taste of a good wine by using a presentation vessel that changes / destroys its taste; like using a silver goblet for anything but a very sweet red or mead .

P.S: Wine or beer, can or glass, it all depends on the METT-T.

Nah, never drink beer from a can unless it's already in the making love in a canoe category !

[wm]

Okay, I going to play scholarly pissant here, the but best translation of the phrase (meme actually) is "old wine in new skins" *not bottles). The reference, IMO, goes back to the absolute stupidity of anyone who would take something good (old wine) and put it into a new container that will make it less good, especially since the new wine skin will change the flavour and, quite possibly, split. It's not a reference to the presentation of the wine, it's a reference to the storage of the wine

From one pedantic pissant to another--
I think the original reference is at Mark 2:22:

And no one pours new wine into old wineskins. If he does, the wine will burst the skins, and both the wine and the wineskins will be ruined. No, he pours new wine into new wineskins.

The problem is that new wine has not yet finished fermenting. Thus, it could give off more gas, causing the wineskin to expand. An old wineskin, having dried out, is less likely to be able to expand. To relieve the additional pressure, it will split instead.

Maybe, on this analysis, my difficulty with design is that I am indeed trying to put new wine in an old skin--my old conceptual framework (the old wineskin) may be unable to grok the material that is expressed in FM 5.0 under the rubric of design (the new wine).

[marct]

From one pedantic pissant to another--
I think the original reference is at Mark 2:22:

Drat, knew I should have tracked the reference down rather than rely on insufficiently caffeinated memory! Thanks for the correction, WM.

Maybe, on this analysis, my difficulty with design is that I am indeed trying to put new wine in an old skin--my old conceptual framework (the old wineskin) may be unable to grok the material that is expressed in FM 5.0 under the rubric of design (the new wine).

Maybe, but from what I am seeing, it's not "new wine" at all. I'm still slogging through on a line by line read right now....

[William F. Owen]

It took an e-mail of a lurker to remind me of a central point I made recently while speaking in the UK, in reference to Tet.

The flow down effects of the Tet Offensive were because they really happened, not because they got reported and photographed on TV. Media cannot make decisive events "more decisive," in any way that it can make irrelevant events decisive. Media is NOT instrumental. It's merely illustrative.

The only way it can be instrumental to policy is when it actually misleads the policy maker, as the relevance of an event. - something policy makers should not let happen. Accurate reporting can only report real events with real effects.