Being able to range either by making an educated guess or milling the target is great, but the accuracy required makes an LRF a very good thing to have.
The following is from Zak Smith of Demigod LLC:
Obviously he is discussing small arms and not crew serveds/rockets/grenades, but the principles of trajectory stand.Knowing the range of the target is critical to making long-range hits. Between 500 and 1000 yards, the best .308 Winchester loads are dropping at one inch every four yards forward travel, up to one inch every yard forward travel. For example, at 700 yards, it drops at about 1/2" per yard. If a target is 16" in diameter (a pretty large target) and the shooter aims at the center, he has 8" of vertical error margin.
This margin is used up by rifle and shooter accuracy, accuracy of "data book" drop values compared to current real conditions and load, and ranging error. If we look only at ranging error, that 8" of error margin translates into 16 yards. In other words, the estimated range which is used to look up the drop value, must be within plus or minus 16 yards of the real value. If his range estimate is 25 yards short, the bullet will be 12.5" low, and it will miss the target.
The far lower muzzle/flight velocity of the grenades and rockets in question magnifies the error derived from bad range estimation compared to the .308.Originally Posted by SethB
A LRF and good tables can greatly increase the hit probability at long ranges, wind permitting. However there are times and places where there will no time to consult the range finder, and chances are high that especially in this situations you need quickly a lot of HE on target.
Firn
I think that's a bit like saying we shouldn't have 120s because 155mm artillery can do the job, and can do it farther.Next the old question; why have an organic mortar when the battalion can support you with 120mm mortars over 7-13 km?
If we are to presume that platoons are going to be dispersed, and then that companies are going to be dispersed, then by advocating a consolidation of fires to the battalion level, we also restrict the timeliness of fire support in turn, because the company commander has to potentially compete with at least 3-5 other maneuver elements for HE fires when he might be able to resolve the situation with his organic support.
Add to this the factor of deconflicting gun-target lines from a distant fire support agency, when rotary-wing or fixed-wing CAS is being called in, and the 60mm mortar may be just the ticket to establish suppression and marking.
As for the concern about getting at 81mm or smaller mortar into action, the standard for the gunner to get one mounted is 90 seconds or less. It can take about that same length of time for the FDC to completely process the call-for-fire from the FO, so I don't see where timeliness is at all an issue since we trained to a standard and meet it routinely.
If I follow the argument correctly, it seems as though the weight of HE fires from a 60mm section are deemed to be not worth the trouble, but I would have to totally disagree. I recognize the 120s bring a big punch, and would not disagree that they are a substantial enabler, but they can't be taken at face value when so many employment considerations are at issue.
Deconfliction is ridiculous nonsense. The chance of one mortar bomb hitting an aircraft is marginal. There's a lot of nonsense happening around the topic of "deconfliction". Present-day deconfliction is a bureaucratic overreaction to a marginal problem and hurts more than it helps.
About the difference between 120 and 155mm; indeed, you could do many jobs with 155mm instead. The problem is human behaviour; you need a low performance, low-range asset that's not much worth to higher commands to ensure that you have the support at all. Artillery can too easily be occupied with other tasks than supporting you.
This works for 60mm vs 120mm as well - and is at the same time a completely different story due to many factors (especially the fact that the Bn depends on the success of its Coys while Art doesn't depend on some Inf Bn 20 km away).
About setting up a 60mm mortar:
- the ground may be rather unsuitable (slope or too soft)
- GPS jamming may prevent a quick set up
- the team may be suppressed because it's relatively close to the action
- they may be below foliage
Again, my point is that everything that can be substituted for at Bn level should not be in a Coy - similar with Coy and Plt.
I would want the infantry to be as nimble as possible - the acceptable weight limit can too easily be reached with its line of sight hardware alone.
Have you ever used a 60mm mortar Fuchs? No need for GPS to set up, patrol baseplate will fire on darn near any surface, and no foliage is going to detonate a 60mm mortar round. As far as being close to the action, ta-da, trigger fire mode!
Reed
former 60mm gunner.
US has suffered mortar-plane intersections in the past. In peacetime, even.
You do realize that the max ord of a 120MM mortar is very high? It's not a low angle weapon.
Problems?
Not a problem.Not a problem; shovels and sandbags can fix that (lacking sandbags, just use a folded poncho full of slammed down dirt).- the ground may be rather unsuitable (slope or too soft)Should not be a problem; need not be a problem other than very, very rarely.- the team may be suppressed because it's relatively close to the actionOr the batteries on the GPS may be depleted...- GPS jamming may prevent a quick set up
Where's a map reader when you need one...
De-confliction is a very real problem. I can think of 3 occasions I know of where field artillery has downed aircraft accidently, and while it may be an acceptable risk in some circumstances you need to practice some form of de-confliction for a whole range of reasons.
EG: As an MFC you cannot call in fires if your LOS is blocked by dust from a an air strike. - and you want make sure the correction your calling is actually being called on you guns and not someone else's.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The max. altitude of a 120mm mortar bomb is about 3,500 m for a 7,000 m shot. Longer-ranged shots are the exception even for those mortars that are capable of reaching farther.
Modern combat aircraft in a ManPADS environment prefer to fly above 15,000 ft for their safety = about 4,500 m Add the max. altitude of nearby mountain tops to this and subtract the altitude of the mortar for comparison with the previous figure.
Helicopters hovering over the mortar need no deconfliction to avoid being shot by the mortar crew. Helicopters hovering over the target area need no mortar bomb to crash.
So how exactly is there a need for deconfliction of mortars/aviation?
I didn't even make a probability calculation (too difficult for being made for free anyway) and it already looks ridiculous.
The deconfliction craze has even limited the use of 5 kg hand-launched UAVs. It's a bureaucratic overreaction.
OK, some aircraft were downed somewhere, sometime by artillery (!= mortars).
Fine, now can you also tell me how many troops on the ground were killed due to lack of fire support or UAV recce because of deconfliction? It's simply wrong to ignore the other side of the coin, after all!
Also keep in mind that those who are kept busy by deconfliction and similarly excessively practiced bureaucratic procedures could be removed and their funds be allocated to the infantry. What would you prefer? 200 more infantrymen in AFG and 200 support personnel less or to keep deconfliction in a country that's almost devoid of aircraft?
Now tell me again that the present deconfliction regime is appropriate.
You know what? Sometime in WW2 RAF operational researchers meant that losses of bombers would drop considerably if they arrived in a shorter time window over the defended target. They developed a plan how to achieve that. Pilots feared that there would be collisions in such a hazardous plan. The OR people told them that on average only two aircraft would collide, but several more would be saved from Flak. It turned out they were right.
You can maximize safety procedures and make sure that no avoidable accident becomes a burden on the CO's career. Alternatively you could do the job as well as possible.
In November-December 1983 when I was the Fire Support Officer for the 1/32 Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, I took my Forward Observers to Arctic Weather Training with 1/32 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. During a live fire exercise one of my FOs was in an OH-58 helicopter directing mortar fire--81mm or 4.2-inch, I don't remember which but we fired both--when the FO and pilot decided to go down to take a look at what the rounds had done to the tundra. The mortars were only supposed to fire "At my command," or when they had been specifically told to do so. As they were hovering 30 feet over the ground looking down at the craters--which on the frozen ground were pretty negligible--the words "Splash, over" came over the radio. That is, rounds were on the way using the same firing data as the previous rounds. Needless to say, the pilot wasted no time flying away, and we had a polite word with the mortar section.
So basically they had disobeyed orders or not behaved according to agreement.
That kind of behaviour could also have lead to accidents in a battle if deconfliction is required.
Yet again, in actual war you wouldn't have been interested enough in those craters because you would have expected a lethal OPFOR at the place. Helicopter OVER the target is simply a poor idea.
First of all, what does GPS have to do with setting up the 60MM? OUr guys have been doing it for years with out GPS for immediate suppression missions. If you are talking about precision fires at range then yes, a GPS would be nice but for immediate suppression missions our mortar guys just needed a general location. They would put it intentionally long and then let the element in contact walk it back, and they would do so much faster than battalion ever could, even assuming that they weren't already busy engaging another target.
Second, I would submit that anyone who thinks that 60MM is an ineffective mortar caliber has never had 60MM fired at them.
Third, in my experience, if you do not have control of an asset, you will not have it when you need it most. If you only have mortars at battalion level then you will find that you have a lot of situations where Bco deparately needs suppressive fires but the battalion mortars are already committed to firing for Aco who made contact five minutes earlier or you will have instances where 3rd Platoon Bco needs immediate suppressive fires but they are outside of the range of battalion mortars.
Also in my experience, instances of a mortar team coming under direct fire were rare and were most often due to one of two things, either the command screwed up and left the mortars without protection or the company was already badly depleted of manpower.
Onto another subject, large caliber rifles like the Barret may look cool on TV and all but they do not live up to the hype. They are heavy and awkward to carry, their rounds are heavy and either you have to give the gunner another long gun to carry, such as an M4, or hope that he does not get into a fire fight as he can neither suppress effectively at closer ranges nor move particular fast to break contact and all that so that you can take the odd 1000+ meter shot, which even with the Barret is by no means a guarenteed hit especially if you are taking effective fire. 7.62X54 and .300 Win Mag are more than adequate for the overwhelming majority of engagements that you will find. The best use for a Barret is in a static defensive position and even then I would rather have an M2.
SFC W
Very, true, because Kg of kg they are the most efficient HE Projectors you can find. - they are also highly effective. The UK had the 2inch/51mm for nearly 70 years. Excellent weapon, if correctly used in a sensible way. The hand-held 60mm should provide much the same capability.
....all dear to my heart as i did several presentations in 2003-4 telling folk that getting rid of the 51mm was madness, and got told I was wrong. In 2006, they bring in the 60mm!!! - for exactly the reasons I said the 51mm should stay!
The key quality of the 60 mm mortar is the ability to deliver responsive and effective indirect firesupport. It can also be a good stepping stone to get the breathing space and time to ease the employment of heavier assets. To have always two tubes covering the company you need three independent sections and enough bombs spread out over many nearby backs. Could this be achieved for dismounted infantry by having sections armed with commando mortars attached to rifle platoons or concentrated in the coy?
Another question regarding the original topic. I recently looked at the Hirtenberger c-mortar (M6-895) used by the British which is said to be able to deliver "direct" fire due to the trigger mechanism and, I suppose, an "arresting" device in the barrel, which keeps the bomb in place. Could it not be used to bust with direct fire and standard bombs and the right fuse setting light "bunkers"? The ammunition to do so is already transported and used. As I never fired a c-mortar I might be confused.
Firn
Last edited by Firn; 03-07-2010 at 12:57 PM.
There's no need for an arresting device because it's never fired with depression.
A triggered firing pin is standard with all "Commando" mortars (bipod-less light mortars).
The greatest problem with low elevation firing is the recoil. You could do it if you have something to rest it against.
Yes, it might be an interesting, yet superfluous option.
The lowest possible charge will of course mitigate the problem with the recoil. Perhaps the military should issue a specially protected "c-mortar gunner direct-fire boot" for the guy putting his foot behind the mortar at those low elevationsThe greatest problem with low elevation firing is the recoil. You could do it if you have something to rest it against.
Firn
A very low charge produces only a low V0. That requires a relatively high angle to reach beyond 40x46mm range.
And then again - why not simply fire in the upper elevation group ~(43-80°)?
40x46 shoots quite nicely through windows and Panzerfaust/Bazooka/RPG category weapons project explosives nicely at low elevation.
At Rusi (following another link from Wilf here) I came across High Explosive:Shock Effect in Dismounted Combat by Dr Jim Storr. I find this article a bit disappointing after his more thoughtful The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat.
He states (correctly and in line with what many on this board preach) that HE is the main killer. He then uses two historical examples of infantry guns to suggest reintroducing a modern equivalent so that an inf-coy in contact can immediately saturate the enemy position with rapid, aimed HE. His example scenario appears to me a bit simplistic by assuming that a coy level gun section with light vehicles will always and immediately be available for direct-fire support. Many patrols in A-stan are section and platoon level. Also, I should think that we have a good range of infantry carried HE projectors already in our repertoire; we just need to think about how to get better effect from them.
What do others think about reintroducing something like 90 or 106 recoilless rifles? Perhaps on a Wiesel? Or even something like Ontos?That would make a nice little RPG and IED magnet. Anything like this would most likely be at coy level or above, but it might still affect the platoon org.
Mini-Spike is looking better than ever.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
The role of infantry guns has been taken over already.
In closed terrain: Bazooka / RPG / Panzerfaust type weapons, mostly using HEAT warheads with weak fragmentation effect
In open terrain: assault guns, tanks, "mobile gun systems", in part also IFVs
In the indirect fire role: 98 - 120 mm mortars
Maybe some recoilless gun might justify itself in a niche even today. I wouldn't go back to the M40A2, though. Americans love it - because it's apparently the only large calibre RL gun they know. Nevertheless, there are much better ones on offer.
The Italians had/have their crew-portable Folgore - superficially a Bazooka, but in reality a Bazooka with an unusually high velocity of its round and thus a good potential for relatively long-ranged shots.
The Swedish had/have their Pvjs 1110, a 90mm RL gun with a great muzzle velocity (700 m/s).
As can be seen from the article, myself and Dermot Rooney commented on a draft of this article, while it was still being written.
Point being:
Dr Storr's (former Infantry Lt Col) reasoning as to what creates the desired effects are founded on what weight of high explosive filling needs (0.67kg) to be delivered at what rate (1 rnd per 3 secs), and what consistency (accuracy) to cause shock. If you can find a better way to do that, then you answer the exam question he asks.This article does not pretend that lightweight 75mm field guns
are the answer to every battlefield problem, but it does suggest
a clear, simple way of linking tactical movement and weapons
effect to tactical success. The path lies through surprise,
suppression, neutralisation and destruction; and then via shock
and surprise. It enables us to clarify what kinds of weapons we
need, and why.
Now I'm not sure about those assumptions, for a number of reasons.
Single RRLs have not got the rate of fire. An M67 90mm can fire 10 rounds in a minute and then needs 15 mins cooling off.What do others think about reintroducing something like 90 or 106 recoilless rifles? Perhaps on a Wiesel? Or even something like
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
A Pl with a 60mm mortar and a couple GPMGs is good to go; hard to fix it if it is marching properly.
60mm with spade baseplate is simple to carry, deploy, and fire - after a little experience, guys get pretty good with kentucky windage with a bomb with 0 or 1 increment.
As for delivering HE, it's hard to beat a mix of frange and HEI-T from an M-242 Bushmaster....
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