Full Circle: Military Theory Vs. Practice in Iraq
Our fellow Council mate Mark Safranski, AKA ZenPundit, guest blogs on the Democracy Project blog - Military Theory Vs. Practice in Iraq.
Read all of this most excellent post - you guys did the "grunt" work...... My friend Mark Safranski, the explicator at ZenPundit blog, focuses on academic theorists’ discussions of strategy. I asked him to write about this problem of theory vs. tactics...
Curious, I wanted to find out what professional soldiers thought of all this intellectual effort on their behalf. The Small Wars Council is a superb discussion board associated with The Small Wars Journal, edited and published by two Marine veterans, Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle. Most of the participants in discussions are active duty personnel or experienced veterans, though diplomats, journalists, scholars and interested amateurs are also welcome. I posed a question to the board:
“How, if at all, have these theoretical exercises impacted what you do? Do you value these intellectual paradigms relative to your personal experiences?”
The answers I received were as profound as they were extensive...
Last edited by SWJED; 07-10-2006 at 01:07 AM.
More to come...
Their answers were more than excellent; and Bruce Kesler, who also writes op-eds in both old and new media and has a mile wide range of contacts, has arranged for a link by a much larger venue in a day or two
Should send some good traffic to SWC, hopefully.
Originally Posted by SWJED
Also picked by MilBlogs
Posted by Eddie - Theory vs. Practice
Military.com
Dave,
Thanks for the support at the Milblog ! Much appreciated !
Military.com is also running Bruce's post as a column or op-ed.
Military.com-Kesler
theory and doctrine vs real world applications
War is war.
There are many new concepts out there and many are inter related (4GW, OODA) and there are some that seem to be new ways of saying the same old thing (Distributed Ops) and then there are some that are just ridiculous given the current conflict (EBO).
What works on the battefield should be reflected in doctrine otherwise the doctrine must change. Problem is someone on the battlefield (having been there myself) can develop a myopic view of it. In Iraq there is a tendency to think that what works in Najaf will work in Mosul, not so. There is a difference between doctrine and techniques. Understanding the difference is where effective doctrine comes from. When all this intellectual effort reflects the difference between doctrine and techniques, that is when it will be worth it.
IMHO the Marine Corps Warfighting Doctrine doesn't need to be changed. Warfighting is centered around decision making, analytical & intuitive. Having a faster decision making cycle then the enemy's is the key to success. It doesn't matter if it is in Iraq or the an inner city in the USA.
I think the doctrinal problem comes up when people try to make TTPs into doctrine or think that a TTP is doctrine.
I would agree, while also noting that basic Warfighting as put forward in the core manuals isn't really prescriptive doctine per se, but rather a series of analytical tools and methods for thinking about war. This by its nature doesn't tie it to a specific place or time (like Central Europe, for example). It leaves a great deal of room for local innovation and development, something that is often not seen in more massive versions of doctrine (the Air Force stuff springs to mind simply because I encounter it daily now).
Last edited by Steve Blair; 08-01-2006 at 01:44 PM.
This is what I love about the MCDP series, once I understand and can articulate the Commander's Intent I am free from the shackles of micro-management.
Simplistic.....yes but the mind set that "I am in charge of my destiny within the Commander's Intent" is extremely powerful. My decisions resulted in success or failure of the mission, I can no longer use the security blanket of blame it on the Commanding Officer.
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