MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Sylvan]

Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

The envelopment of a target area was often not quite that. If the Fire Force comprised a K-Car and 3 G-Cars (3 x 4 man sticks) with 20 paras (5 x sticks) following the a Dak (Dakota-DC3) one could rarely seal off an area. The trick was to get a complete and detailed briefing from the call-sign on the ground and select the likely escape routes given the line of approach of the aircraft. The troops in the para-Dak would then be dropped in a cultivated field somewhere close by and ferried in closer by chopper. The Allouette III was great as it could get into a tight LZ and you had to get the pilot, the fuel line or the tail rotor to really put it on its ass.

There was a lot of skill required by the Airborne Commander and the K-Car pilot (the senior pilot) to work the deployment to its best tactically.

I never heard of the paras being dropped in a stop line on the ground where they stayed. It always required movement or ferrying to get into position. And the need for paras was only there because there were not enough choppers to lift enough troops in.

Later in the war there was a increase in the number of choppers through South Africa sending in (I think) 27 choppers and crews so the 'Jumbo' Fire Forces were established (jumbo only in the Rhodesian context) with two k-Cars and 5 G-Cars each with a para Dak (DC3) and two Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) aircraft. The second K-Car was normally what was termed and alpha-fit where insted of the 20mm cannon there were four .30 Browning MGs side mounted. The alpha-fit was actually more lethal than the 20mm cannon because when there was tree cover the rounds would explode on contact with very little resulting penetration and when the ground was soft the rounds would penetrate fractionally before exploding with the resultant limited shrapnel spread. (A 7.62mm minigun would be similar to the alpha-fit)

30mm is the soft sand is having the same problem. While wonderful for top attack on armored vehicles, a M134 would be much better for what we find ourselves doing now.

[JMA]

30mm is the soft sand is having the same problem. While wonderful for top attack on armored vehicles, a M134 would be much better for what we find ourselves doing now.

What incidence of stoppages are found with the M134?

With the Alpha-fit (4 x .30 Brownings) if one gun had a stoppage it was not the end of the world as the remaining three were still pretty good. With the 20mm if it had a stoppage then you had nothing.

[Ken White]

Manufacturer's claims: (LINK).

More detailed figures, data from the Federation of American Scientists, generally cross checked, fairly objective and reliable:(LINK).

[sapperfitz82]

The 400m and 600m ranges for Afghan ambushes seems to originate from the max effective range of the PG / MG they are using while allowing them to break contact after the engagement. Their fire is not what we would consider particularly accurate, but in most ambushes the killzone is restrictive and so it funnels the fire any way.

Reasons why their fire is in accurate - I have found in Astan particularly the men have horrible eyesight. They are malnourished from a very young age and develop cataracts early. Few have glasses. Also their is a primitive belief that Allah will guide their bullets, so much so that they feel aiming is questioning his omnipotence. Broad generalities - but then again that is what we are talking in.

Given that we generally want to kill the enemy and avoid over-kill as a principle - why would we not improve the effectiveness of rifles? The argument should be a cost - benefit one. It seems here to have devolved into one about whether we should just call CAS or roll up in our IFV.

If the individual soldier can be made much more lethal through a series of improvements (SA, survivability, ballistics, etc.) and the cost is worth the gain (mobility, financial, etc.) why would one not improve the soldier?

5.56mm has its benefits, soldier's today are not impressed with them (claims the paper [me too by the way]). Ballistics have vastly improved since the 5.56mm's inception and adoption. The Army in general does not believe the gain is worth the cost.

What the hell does a Laotian machine gun have to do with it?!

Yes, give the infantryman a better bullet. No do not adopt a radically different weapon now unless it provides x percentage of benefit over the current platform (think pulse rifle). Hell, improve the artillery and CAS and everything else too.

Also, where is the cost/gain argument with Javelin vs Dragon and Copperhead vs Dumb Hellfire and 155mm vs Excalibur? Is it just me or does it sound as if the Acquisition guys never fought as Infantry?

[Pete]

Yes, give the infantryman a better bullet. No do not adopt a radically different weapon now unless it provides x percentage of benefit over the current platform (think pulse rifle). Hell, improve the artillery and CAS and everything else too.

Also, where is the cost/gain argument with Javelin vs Dragon and Copperhead vs Dumb Hellfire and 155mm vs Excalibur? Is it just me or does it sound as if the Acquisition guys never fought as Infantry?

The Trade-Off Analysis or Analysis of Alternatives has long been part of the documentation required to justify a new materiel system for DoD. The recommended format for trade-off studies can be found in the DoD 5000 series of publications.

As with almost everything DoD does, trade-off analyses generally reflect the biases of the organization that produces them--often these analyses will show that the preferred alternative is the one that will increase the funding of the organization producing the study. One of the greatests strengths of DoD, as well as one of its greatest weaknesses, is that regardless of the evidence a general officer will think about something for about five seconds before he makes a decision. In the Army a standing joke among officers with alternate specialties in operations research is that once given an assignment to prepare an in-depth study they will politic around to find out what answer the powers that be want to hear.

As I understand it Secretary of Defense Gates turned the whole Army acquisition system upside-down when he ordered procurement of the MRAP. The tank-automotive guys were unresponsive to the idea of doing something in a hurry. If I understand Gates' point of view, the question wasn't what was the best armored vehicle for the mission, it was what could be done now to save lives while he is secretary of defense. It was a bit like the adoption of the M1 Carbine in 1942--with all of its faults, there was a war going on and the best was the enemy of the good. Left to their own devices the DoD acquisition community might come up with a suitable system in 10 to 12 years.

[kaur]

Members of the 3rd and 7th Commandos assisted by Special Forces move to their objective while receiving enemy gunfire Feb. 25 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.03.04.2010

SCAR-H, 7,62x51