MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Ken White]

Well one would have thought that with the IED death rate of 61% of all casualities http://www.icasualties.org and from the Brits side at 80% of all casualties (quoted on TV in "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan") that alternatives to non-vital road and predictable foot movement would have been implemented by now.

It borders on rank incompetence across the board.

You assume that nothing has been or is being done and you cite that percentage yet seem unaware of the total casualty rate from all causes. That's quite low, compared to the wars of even the 70s...

The system is not working... soldiers are dying needlessly because their commanders don't have the smarts to out think the IED threat to both vehicles and foot patrols. 62% of all Afghanistan casualties are largely preventable. Incompetence never 'works'.

You're entitled to your opinion. Forgive me if I listen to people who've been and are there in lieu of relying on uninformed media reports and thus believe your statement is a major oversimplification.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

I agree. Where we differ is that I also think it counter productive to allege incompetence based on flawed assumptions. I say that as one who routinely castigates senior officers for dumb mistakes...

Well if you don't mind we need to get some better stats than that. The reports of chaotic fire fights does not indicate widespread previous combat experience... or worse still enough tactical nous.

If you're gullible enough to accept news reports without a little probing, I suppose that's correct.

...I use the Brit system.

Yeah, I'd noticed...

Not sure mediocrity should ever become acceptable... under any circumstances.

Probably not -- however, the existence of mediocrity in all fields of human endeavor is reality. To deny it seems to wish for the unattainable; a better solution is to identify it and try to work around it IMO.

So it is then agreed (subject to confirmation through sight of the US doctrine) that the 'every man for himself' any time he likes is generally not a good idea. We on the same page now?

Nope. Not at all. We're not even close. In a big fire fight every man 'has to be for himself' as you put it -- My version is they have to know what to do. Leaders often cannot be heard or seen, they get killed, units become separated -- the Troops have to KNOW what to do -- that's the goal of training; not control...

I believe you're stuck on a page based on partial information and experience in one war that does not seem to translate well to other situations. Here are two links for you. This one (LINK {.pdf}) is FM 21-75, a manual for individual soldiers. For movement under fire -- It says indirect but applies to direct fire as well; it also says to move away from the fire but, situation dependent, troops are told and trained to move toward it -- you can see Page 3-4 of the Manual / page 49 of the .pdf. The manual is old and is being revised, unfortunately, this edition was produced at a time when civilian academics were used to write and revise manuals and they had a bad tendency to 'dumb down' the content not having much faith in Joe who didn't have their educational attainments. Newer manuals are better, still excessively wordy but a slight improvement. In many cases, the hard won knowledge of WW II and other wars has been elided as not politically correct. As I said , ALL Armies have problems.

The second LINK {.pdf} is for Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. Movement is covered in Chapter 3.

I could go on here Ken but I do believe that it is you who is out of step with the doctrine.

Nah, not really -- I'm not in agreement with some doctrine; I know it, just know it was written by guys who were sitting in air conditioned offices so it is a bit suspect. I am in step with what actually happens and while I sure do not have all the answers, I've been in enough wars and fire fights in enough different countries and terrain types that I know what works under most circumstances. I also know American troops who differ from their foreign counterparts in several ways -- and I've fought with the Australians, Belgiques (in both Korea and the Congo in that order), Brits, Canadians, French, Korean, Thais, Turks and Viet Namese among others. Also trained with a host of others including in the ME and south Asia. Doctrine is simply a start point to combat effectiveness, it is never the be all and end all.

You're entitled to your opinions, we're obviously going to differ on all this so best we let it go and stop boring the others.

[Kiwigrunt]

It appears that the disconnect in the last number of posts is indeed here:

JMA:

…we were indeed lucky we probably faced the most incompetent enemy possible…

As Ken, Wilf and others have said, all wars, foes and terrain are different.

To this:

The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst.

Wilf said:

Context. Yes that worked then against those folks. That might have failed badly against the NVA in Laos. It may also not be suited to conditions found elsewhere on the planet.

Ters allowing a sweep-line to roll them up like that is of course every infantrymen’s dream. I’d like to think that if I was the wearer of that patch of clothing, I wouldn’t be waiting for the sweepline to shoot first. And once that sweep-line becomes established SOP, more competent ters will come up with appropriate ambush techniques.

Also, continuous air support with choppers overhead (and low) is probably not something that many other foes would passively endure, even ignoring availability. Blackhawk Down anyone?

That’s not to devalue your/Rhodesian experiences and tactics. I think I can safely say that most here are fairly impressed with it; I know I am. And there is bound to be a lot that can still be learned from it. But again…..context.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

Agree, and added to what Ken and Wilf said, I don’t think that plain incompetence is really the issue in A-stan. There are many complicating factors like ROE, risk adversity (which appears to have become cultural almost more than it is a choice), presence of media and associated (and perhaps skewed) ‘proximity’ and involvement of the home front, and other largely politics driven issues.

And also, it is counter productive to assume incompetence among the enemy based on experienced incompetence with a previous foe. Sure, the TB are not always the most competent, but they are not stupid either.

[JMA]

Ters allowing a sweep-line to roll them up like that is of course every infantrymen’s dream. I’d like to think that if I was the wearer of that patch of clothing, I wouldn’t be waiting for the sweepline to shoot first. And once that sweep-line becomes established SOP, more competent ters will come up with appropriate ambush techniques.

Also, continuous air support with choppers overhead (and low) is probably not something that many other foes would passively endure, even ignoring availability. Blackhawk Down anyone?

That’s not to devalue your/Rhodesian experiences and tactics. I think I can safely say that most here are fairly impressed with it; I know I am. And there is bound to be a lot that can still be learned from it. But again…..context.

Yes and no. The simple point of departure is that the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.

Only the K-Car overflew the contact area at a height of 800-1,000 ft. Sure it was fired on often and often hit but because of the green tracer one was able to get a good idea from where the fire was coming from (or the ground troops could assist with the location). Once located the ‘brave’ man who fired on the aircraft was history in seconds (the 20mm HE saw to that). So by a process of natural selection the ‘brave’ died first and the fleetest of foot and the ones who crawled into a hole and hid there survived. After the initial contact sweeps of the area would locate those hiding away and then it was not always a simple ‘turkey shoot’ if he was seen he was dead. If he fired from very close range when he realised he was about to be found he was dead too, but could take one of us with him. The third possibility was that they just lay there. Dead already from the gunship? Paralysed by fear? I don’t know. All I know is that a desperate man with an AK at 2-5 metres can be pretty lethal.

We tried to keep the trooping-choppers away from overflying the contact area. Where that failed and they overflew a group they would get seriously shot up. One chopper got 56 hits, the tech/gunner took three bullets as did the one other passenger and the pilot protected by his armoured seat got minor Perspex fragments in his face and just made a 'hard' landing back at base.

Often the initial contact was ferocious. With the K-Car engaging opportunity targets and the first callsigns on the ground getting into punch-ups straight away. As I said once all the ‘brave’ guys had been accounted for the sweeps were often merely mopping up the contact area to find those not yet accounted for.

If you listen to that Fire Force tape you will see in part 6 almost two hours into the scene the group is finally cornered by the sweep line and they bolt into a stop group with predictable results. Up to that point the concern was that they had got away.

On Op Dingo (the attack on the Chimoio base housing 4,000) the ten K-cars all had hits from small arms and some from anti-aircraft gunfire with one pilot being shot through his helmet and having his forehead grazed. The pilots stayed on station some joisting with the AAA and others having a turkey shoot. One troop carrying chopper was damaged and limped back to the admin base and the 6 para Dakota aircraft were taken on by AAA while running in for the drop. The book by Group Captain Petter-Bowyer “Winds of Destruction” is essential reading. We got 1,200 kills that day for 2 KIA and six wounded. While in any mans language that is a turkey shoot there were moments when things got pretty hairy.

The bottom line is that the Allouette III chopper could take hits so the crews donned flak jackets, stayed overhead and did the business. We had good days when we had a turkey shoot and then we had bad days when we had to earn our pay and sadly lost some friends along the way.

The other important factor was that we accounted for some 84% of insurgents contacted on fire force. These included virtually all the ‘brave’ guys and didn't leave too many ‘leaders’ left to figure out what to do next time.

[Chris jM]

...the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.

Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?

[JMA]

Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?

Yes Chris' book is a good troopies eye view of matters.

But this article with a view diagrams will help you to understand things a lot clearer.

http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp

Also once read download this MP3 file and listen to a recording of part of a fire force call out. Only the commander (c/s 39) and the aircraft transmissions can be heard.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

Enjoy

[AdamG]

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...nship_040410w/

The Army will replace its Cold War marksmanship strategy this summer with one that has basic trainees shooting more rounds, fixing jams and changing magazines — key skills all soldiers need in today’s combat.

“What we’ve learned through eight years of war is that’s now how our soldiers are having to shoot in combat,” Brig. Gen. Richard C. Longo, director of training for the Army’s deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, told Army Times. He described the current program, which is geared toward passing a single, live-fire test, as a “very sterile environment and a very predictable marksmanship qualification process.”

Initial Military Training Marksmanship, a program that draws lessons from the war zone, will become the Army standard for teaching new soldiers how to shoot in all five initial entry training centers beginning July 1.

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the epiphany in the Army Times piece... holy crap. We're "learning" this???

[JMA]

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...nship_040410w/

The quote said:

"... , fixing jams and changing magazines — key skills all soldiers need in today’s combat."

Was there ever a time when these were not key skills?

Can someone direct me to the current training please.

[JMA]

Yes Chris' book is a good troopies eye view of matters.

But this article with a view diagrams will help you to understand things a lot clearer.

http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp

Also once read download this MP3 file and listen to a recording of part of a fire force call out. Only the commander (c/s 39) and the aircraft transmissions can be heard.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

Enjoy

Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

The envelopment of a target area was often not quite that. If the Fire Force comprised a K-Car and 3 G-Cars (3 x 4 man sticks) with 20 paras (5 x sticks) following the a Dak (Dakota-DC3) one could rarely seal off an area. The trick was to get a complete and detailed briefing from the call-sign on the ground and select the likely escape routes given the line of approach of the aircraft. The troops in the para-Dak would then be dropped in a cultivated field somewhere close by and ferried in closer by chopper. The Allouette III was great as it could get into a tight LZ and you had to get the pilot, the fuel line or the tail rotor to really put it on its ass.

There was a lot of skill required by the Airborne Commander and the K-Car pilot (the senior pilot) to work the deployment to its best tactically.

I never heard of the paras being dropped in a stop line on the ground where they stayed. It always required movement or ferrying to get into position. And the need for paras was only there because there were not enough choppers to lift enough troops in.

Later in the war there was a increase in the number of choppers through South Africa sending in (I think) 27 choppers and crews so the 'Jumbo' Fire Forces were established (jumbo only in the Rhodesian context) with two k-Cars and 5 G-Cars each with a para Dak (DC3) and two Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) aircraft. The second K-Car was normally what was termed and alpha-fit where insted of the 20mm cannon there were four .30 Browning MGs side mounted. The alpha-fit was actually more lethal than the 20mm cannon because when there was tree cover the rounds would explode on contact with very little resulting penetration and when the ground was soft the rounds would penetrate fractionally before exploding with the resultant limited shrapnel spread. (A 7.62mm minigun would be similar to the alpha-fit)

[Chris jM]

Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

Thanks for the link/s JMA - that and the content on the related RLI thread provides a lot of good info. I need to read more about the entire period to get an understanding of it though - I still am very ignorant of the guerrilla situation, tactics, aims etc so my current knowledge of fire-force tactics is rather flimsy. It will require a few more books for me to make get to grips with the how's and why's of the war.

[Sylvan]

Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

The envelopment of a target area was often not quite that. If the Fire Force comprised a K-Car and 3 G-Cars (3 x 4 man sticks) with 20 paras (5 x sticks) following the a Dak (Dakota-DC3) one could rarely seal off an area. The trick was to get a complete and detailed briefing from the call-sign on the ground and select the likely escape routes given the line of approach of the aircraft. The troops in the para-Dak would then be dropped in a cultivated field somewhere close by and ferried in closer by chopper. The Allouette III was great as it could get into a tight LZ and you had to get the pilot, the fuel line or the tail rotor to really put it on its ass.

There was a lot of skill required by the Airborne Commander and the K-Car pilot (the senior pilot) to work the deployment to its best tactically.

I never heard of the paras being dropped in a stop line on the ground where they stayed. It always required movement or ferrying to get into position. And the need for paras was only there because there were not enough choppers to lift enough troops in.

Later in the war there was a increase in the number of choppers through South Africa sending in (I think) 27 choppers and crews so the 'Jumbo' Fire Forces were established (jumbo only in the Rhodesian context) with two k-Cars and 5 G-Cars each with a para Dak (DC3) and two Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) aircraft. The second K-Car was normally what was termed and alpha-fit where insted of the 20mm cannon there were four .30 Browning MGs side mounted. The alpha-fit was actually more lethal than the 20mm cannon because when there was tree cover the rounds would explode on contact with very little resulting penetration and when the ground was soft the rounds would penetrate fractionally before exploding with the resultant limited shrapnel spread. (A 7.62mm minigun would be similar to the alpha-fit)

30mm is the soft sand is having the same problem. While wonderful for top attack on armored vehicles, a M134 would be much better for what we find ourselves doing now.