MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[SdunnyW506]

Has anyone taken a look at the paper "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer" by MAJ Thomas P. Ehrhart? From what I have heard it has caused something of a stir within the US Army. The debate over replacing US infantry weapons and marksmanship training has gone on for a little, but here someone has finally put it into a serious thesis.

If anyone has taken a serious look at it, what are opinions?

Here's the pdf link.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also, here is an abstract of his paper. Sums up the intent pretty well.

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.

Once again, any thoughts?

[Ken White]

the good Major's conclusions mirror almost exactly what the report of that test -- which recommended retaining the M-14 for worldwide service while developing a better automatic rifle version and a shortened version for airborne use and buying a few AR-15s for special purpose units -- recommended to DA. I have it on good authority that that report was forward to DoD with a recommendation for approval.

In the event DoD -- Secretary McNamara (assisted by Curtis LeMay, whose troops needed no more capable weapon) -- decided to buy the M-16 and cancel the contract with TRW for the M-14. I'm sure that the fact TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's had no bearing on that decision. It is noteworthy that the Marines objected and the Army was, as usual, acquiescent...

MAJ Ehrhart's recommendations also track with a number of studies in the 1970-2000 period that found the same problems.

In short, he's right.

[Fuchs]

I saw test results of a German small arms test in 1991 very recently (not for the first time).
It compared G3 (~M14) and AK-74. The latter (high quality Eastern German licensed copies that were later sold to Turkey) proved to be superior up to 200m, with G3 having advantages beyond that distance in great part thanks to its longer sight line (now irrelevant with standard optics).

The M14 was most likely never even close to an optimum compromise. The magazine capacity is low, recoil is strong, it's heavy, long and the cartridges are heavy & bulky as well.

Almost a hundred years of optimum cartridge finding projects have almost always yielded an optimum cartridge of 6-7 mm calibre for an (assault) rifle, with few exceptions during the 30's and 40's when assault rifle(-like) designs were seen as relatives of submachine guns and rifle-like range not required. Those optimum compromises looked similar to 7.62mmx39.

We would discuss the disadvantages of the M14 and the screwed up 7.62x51 nonsense that was a poor cartridge from the start if there had not been the AR-15 and 5.56mmx45.


Let's get over the loss of M14 and G3 and accept that the next step should be an intermediate bullet (with whatever cartridge design - there's still the telescoped stuff around, after all).

By the way, PEO soldier has launched a new carbine competition without requiring a specific calibre.

[William F. Owen]

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

[Bob's World]

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

At this point it is new TTPs more than new rifles that our soldiers need, and as usual they must be developed in-stride. There may be more value in discussing the mix of weapons at the squad level rather than the caliber. (Though I know my uncles who carried M-1 Garrands as infantrymen in the very close fighting of the South Pacific loved the punch that a 30-06 provided...).

[Firn]

In recent engagements the TB have a very high ratio of PKMs and RPGs to the size of force encountered. Meanwhile our guys are working through tighter and tighter restrictions on the use of heavy firepower, restrictions that are frankly necessary to implement the CG's guidance and change the tenor or the coalition approch in deed as well as word. I agree with what the commander is doing, but it is indeed forcing changes of the dynamics on the battlefield as well.

The article by Major Ehrhardt raises very similar points:

Operations in Afghanistan have exposed weaknesses in our small arms capability, marksmanship training, and doctrine. After-action reviews and comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage U.S forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6,000 feet.59 Current equipment, training and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.

....

The modern infantryman is burdened with excessive weight in the form of protective gear, communications equipment and weapons systems. He is fighting an enemy conditioned to the elevation and terrain. The enemy travels light and employs supporting weapons from standoff, to include mortars and medium machineguns. Faced with these conditions, the modern infantry attempts to fix the enemy with direct fire and use supporting assets to kill the enemy. Supporting assets, such as close combat attack, close air support or indirect fire, are not always available. Further, their application is often restricted when collateral damage is possible, due to the enemy’s information operations and worldwide media access.

It seems to me that the TB try mostly rather hard to reduce the risks incurring when engaging coalition troops. They can usually initiate the contact on their terms, using terrain, ROE and distance to their advantage and seem to increasingly tailor their forces, as Bob said, to suit this conditions. All those factors buffer them against a "decisive" tactical defeat. This low-risk tactics seem to work well as part of their overall strategy, as it allows them to preserve their fighting forces and still greatly impact the ability of the coalition to fulfill their missions.

A very high ratio of crew-served weapons like GPMG, mortars and RPG could allow them to get a lot more out of their limited pool of better trained men while employing the rest more effectively in their support.


Firn

[Infanteer]

Read the report. It's not a document I would cite of feel comfortable doing so.

See my response to this very debate here, in article I was asked to right for RUSI

Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true.

Je suis d'accord.

Rifles just protect the guy carrying and extra belt for the GPMG or a mortar bomb. Infact I prefer the 5.56 as it is half the weight of the larger rounds and means soldiers are lighter and:

1. Soldiers are able to carry some (more) support weapon ammo; and
2. Soldiers have more mobility, making it easier to close with the enemy and force him to either stand and die or move into a beaten zone.

[Fuchs]

Me thinks you assume too much infantry combat in open terrain, in tank or mountainous terrain.

Combat in settlements or forests leads to completely different conclusions - and these are two of the three terrain types that infantry is really needed for (urban / forest / mountain).

This expeditionary nonsense of fighting against poorly trained, equipped, supplied and supported paramilitary forces at the end of the world leads to completely wrong conclusions.

It's like the "The Boers shot at us at 800 m and did hit us (rarely)!" outcry of the early 1900's that was extremely misleading in regard to the REALLY important warfare that took place during 1912-1921 in Europe.

[Kinnison]

I wrote on this subject before the Ehrhart article was published, and I agree with him. Go to www.thefreedomcommentaries.com and read "Not Invented Here" under the Weapons category.

[Jones_RE]

I read the paper. It seems to me that with a combination of 'battle zero' and the fundamentals of marksmanship (stance, grip, sight alignment, sight picture, breath control, trigger control and follow through) you can hit a man sized target at 300m. If you are only training to hit anywhere on a 20" target at that range then you don't even need to be very good at the fundamentals - a 6" group at 100m is good enough. Because the bullet's trajectory with the rifle's basic setup will always be somewhere close enough the soldier never needs to worry about estimating range.

If you want to have a chance at hitting at 500m then not only do you need to be better at the fundamentals - a 4" group at 100m is necessary, you also need to be able to estimate the range to the target, understand the trajectory of the bullet and adjust accordingly. Also, you're going to have to learn to take into account wind and elevation - and this is with a stationary target!

I read the author as recommending a weapon with better long range capability and teaching soldiers to use more than the most basic fundamentals. I can't think of a sufficient reason not to do both immediately.

[William F. Owen]

I read the author as recommending a weapon with better long range capability and teaching soldiers to use more than the most basic fundamentals. I can't think of a sufficient reason not to do both immediately.

Vast cost for no proven increase in effectiveness is the best reason not to do it.
I do not doubt you can find better rounds than 5.56mm, but so what? A platoon mix of 5.56mm and 7.62mm is proven to work.
What's wrong with M262-5.56mm and M118-7.62mm?
Better than an M877 and M80 mix? OK - so there's an improvement right there, and the weapons all stay the same.

[kaur]

Jones RE said:

I read the author as recommending a weapon with better long range capability and teaching soldiers to use more than the most basic fundamentals. I can't think of a sufficient reason not to do both immediately.

I think that US military knows how to train sharpshooters. To improve situation this means that every soldier must pass Squad Sharpshooter program. This adds 1 week to training if I understand correctly.
For a long time there was available "Squad Sharpshooter Concept" in internet by Michael R Harris http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/smallarms/Harris.pdf It has disappeared now

About ammo and calibre. For some period I used very often Soviet ammo 5,45x39 (brain child of Soviet engineers that figured out that US new M-16 is "better" than AK-47) and 7,62x39. You can make just one test to compare the effectiveness. Arrange night shooting with tracers on the filed where grass is above the waist. With 5,45x39 you can see nice vertical rocket show in the sky with few holes. With 7,62 the picture is much more horizontal. I presume that you can see the same picture if you test 5,56x45 vs 6,5/6,8.

[Fuchs]

I recall an exercise in about '96.

We were walking in squad column for just a few hundred metres when suddenly a referee declared us to be dead. 100 m to the left was another squad in ambush - we didn't seem them.

Similarly, I didn't spot well-camouflaged soldiers as close as 20 m at times and most often when someone reported to me that they were expecting an attack I was usually not confident to spot attackers earlier than at 25-100 m due to the terrain.

The emphasis on scoped rifles and such is fine, but let's not fool ourselves; competent opponents would not expose themselves at 200, 300, 400, 500 or 600 m unless they were unaware of our proximity. It would be easy to score a 600 m hit during the very first days of combat against green opponents and also in rather chaotic situations (such as when your Bn was overrun and you're suddenly in the enemy's rear).

Other than that, I expect rifles and scopes to serve you well thanks to their ability to repulse.
Infantry weapons are 99.999% about minimizing the enemy's options in your proximity and 0.001% about actually hitting enemies. The age of rifles ended with rifled, quick loading artillery back in the late 19th century.

I'm not thinking of only suppression here. The mere ability to shoot someone at 400 m will motivate him to avoid any exposure at 400 m (after a few unlucky green soldiers got shot). He won't voluntarily cross open areas that serve as your killing zone - at least not without much support (such as smoke or IFV).


The effect of marksmanship at 200 m is therefore very little more than a mere "keep them away" upgrade to a weapon really meant for the close fight.
The actual mission, no matter what it is - hold or take terrain, make prisoners, kill & wound - would only marginally affected by a difference between two and ten weapons in a squad being capable of effective fire beyond 300 m.

In fact, I like rifles (~G3) more for their ability to penetrate indoor walls and trees than for their sharpshooting suitability.
I do also like scopes (3x - 4x) more for the confidence and target ID capability they give than for their actual advantage in long-range shooting.

It's all quite difficult and different in open mountainous areas. The problem with these is that infantry wouldn't cut it there against a powerful enemy no matter what kind of rifle it uses. Mountain warfare against powerful opposition requires much, much more - and the small arms design plays a very minor role in that orchestra.


The matter is completely different if the opposition lacks
* accurate mortar teams with good mortar ammunition supply,
* single shot firing range training and hunting experience
* body armour (even soft one becomes quite relevant at long range)
* medical support
* artillery
* camouflage equipment and training
* tactically educated & trained leaders



By the way; I'd like to offer a very short & concise summary of how I would write infantry doctrine:
Avoid being seen unless it's necessary for mission accomplishment and change your position ASAP if you assume that your position is compromised. Passive protection and movement techniques won't offer enough survivability. Survivability is the most important precondition for mission accomplishment.

[carl]

About ammo and calibre. For some period I used very often Soviet ammo 5,45x39 (brain child of Soviet engineers that figured out that US new M-16 is "better" than AK-47) and 7,62x39. You can make just one test to compare the effectiveness. Arrange night shooting with tracers on the filed where grass is above the waist. With 5,45x39 you can see nice vertical rocket show in the sky with few holes. With 7,62 the picture is much more horizontal. I presume that you can see the same picture if you test 5,56x45 vs 6,5/6,8.

Kaur, forgive me but I don't quite understand what you mean by this.

Also, I am interested in opinions in how the XM-25 will or won't help with the problem outlined by MAJ Ehrhart.

[William F. Owen]

I wrote on this subject before the Ehrhart article was published, and I agree with him. Go to www.thefreedomcommentaries.com and read "Not Invented Here" under the Weapons category.

Quote said article:

But the “really fast little bullet” school’s theory that a high-velocity .22 caliber bullet would reliably do the job of dropping an enemy combatant with one round at standard engagement ranges has been proven wrong in the most important laboratory of all, the battlefield.

The aim of SCVH is to reduce hand held dispersion and increase hits. - which it does.
No bullet was ever predicated on "dropping an enemy combatant with one round at standard engagement ranges." That's a pop-fallacy.
The Battlefield does not produce reliable data and therefore is in no way a laboratory. Ops Analysis does produce data. - and there is none I have ever on 5.56mm lethality - or on any "bullet" for that matter for pretty obvious reasons.
Complaints about 5.56mm are almost unique to US Forces, and have been for 40 years. The recent UK issues were not to do with lethality, but range, and based on yet another false set of premises.
All summarised in my article here

[JMA]

30 odd years late it is a case of better late than never...

http://www.defencetalk.com/army-issu...16s-m4s-26507/

Good to see that the soldiers were starting to do it anyway without waiting for permission or instructions. One really needs to get behind the mindset where fancy camo gear is being issued yet a black weapon with straight lines has been acceptable without question.

The last hurdle in this will be from the armies where they just must have blacks weapons for ceremonial drill that the fieldcraft considerations take a poor second place.

[Ken White]

The Little Black Rifle started being issued in Viet Nam in 1965-6. It was black not due to a parade ground prettiness desire but because the technology of the time could not provide a paint or tape that could take the heat -- jungle or generated. There were several attempts to produce green furniture but none were durable enough to take combat treatment. Still, troops even back then did paint, tape and modify and folks in combat have done so many times and in many places since then. Occasionally units directed it, many just allowed it while some idiots refused to allow it.

I agree with your sentiment. The US in particular has significant problems with that parade ground -- actually, it's an over active control and uniformity issue -- mentality and it really needs to go. That is shown by the fact that the Army elected to issue a technical order to uniformly do what most thinking troops were doing in varied fashions anyway (until confronted with those should be retired CSMs who were overly into 'uniformity.' ).

The US Army Troop test in 1964 that preceded the adoption of the M16 shot a lot of Pigs in the course of the tests; the lethality and range problems of the 5.56 round were quite apparent and were well documented. The result of the tests were that the Army recommended keeping the M-14 in 7.62 for world wide service (to include shortened Jungle, even shorter Parachute and a better automatic rifle versions) and buying a just few then Colt AR-15s for special purpose units (The USAF Air Police and Special Forces wanted the little rifle and light ammo). In the event, the Army was overruled and the US political decision by DoD and the White House was to buy the Colt rifle. The fact that Colt had contributed to the serving Administration's political campaigns I'm sure had little to do with that decision...

A lot of any soldier's objections to things that impede effectiveness are to politically and societally driven decisions. Not a darn thing one can do about it (lacking an existential war -- those get the Mothers to hush a bit and the Politicians to focus).

[Firn]

The Little Black Rifle started being issued in Viet Nam in 1965-6. It was black not due to a parade ground prettiness desire but because the technology of the time could not provide a paint or tape that could take the heat -- jungle or generated. There were several attempts to produce green furniture but none were durable enough to take combat treatment. Still, troops even back then did paint, tape and modify and folks in combat have done so many times and in many places since then. Occasionally units directed it, many just allowed it while some idiots refused to allow it.

I agree with your sentiment. The US in particular has significant problems with that parade ground -- actually, it's an over active control and uniformity issue -- mentality and it really needs to go. That is shown by the fact that the Army elected to issue a technical order to uniformly do what most thinking troops were doing in varied fashions anyway (until confronted with those should be retired CSMs who were overly into 'uniformity.' ).

Not only the US. Indeed looking good while marching is a peace time bench mark which sadly beats a lot of a bit more relevant factors. In the Italian army over the arc of the last 20-30 years a lot lot more weapons were cleaned to death than shot out. And it is of course far from the only one.

In the last years of conscription you got recruits in infantry mountain units (Alpini) which never did one single forced mountain march, a single camp outdoor and which had to volunteer to get a real shot off. This is very sadly no joke. Even more sad is the fact that nothing happened to the responibles, at least from what I know. Still their marches through the cities went well, everybody cheered and was happy. I will leave my rant there.

Technology is very important indeed but it always starts with good leadership and training and we always come back to it.


Firn

[Kriegs]

For anyone interested, request for better ammo was denied.

[Schmedlap]

For anyone interested, request for better ammo was denied.

When I was an XO, the ODA in our AOR had gobs of the 5.56 MK 262. We traded with them because, like you, we couldn't get it through the supply chain.