MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[120mm]

The US Army Troop test in 1964 that preceded the adoption of the M16 shot a lot of Pigs in the course of the tests; the lethality and range problems of the 5.56 round were quite apparent and were well documented. The result of the tests were that the Army recommended keeping the M-14 in 7.62 for world wide service (to include shortened Jungle, even shorter Parachute and a better automatic rifle versions) and buying a just few then Colt AR-15s for special purpose units (The USAF Air Police and Special Forces wanted the little rifle and light ammo). In the event, the Army was overruled and the US political decision by DoD and the White House was to buy the Colt rifle. The fact that Colt had contributed to the serving Administration's political campaigns I'm sure had little to do with that decision...

Actually, the US military rigged those tests to make the M14 look better. In reality, the M16 of the time was much more reliable and just as lethal as the M80 shooting M14. Kind of the reverse of what you just said.

Let me look for the actual test data; I used to keep it on my netbook, but it got fried last month.

[Fuchs]

The old U.S. 7.62mmx51 was (or is?) actually relatively wimpy in gelatine tests.

[Ken White]

Actually, the US military rigged those tests to make the M14 look better. In reality, the M16 of the time was much more reliable and just as lethal as the M80 shooting M14. Kind of the reverse of what you just said.

Let me look for the actual test data; I used to keep it on my netbook, but it got fried last month.

I was in the unit that ran the troop test -- not the Aberdeen foolishness -- and we shot a whole bunch of pigs for the Oscar Mayer plant in Fayetteville. Among other things it was noted that the 5.56 round was easily deflected by vegetation, bone or cartilage and that the 7.62 rarely had those problems. I know what that troop test reported to DA, I do not know precisely what Ordnance said or what DA sent to DoD but I do recall what the rumor mill said at the time. I also know that TRW had the M14 contract and was selling them to the Army for $90.00 apiece -- $4.00 less than the nominal cost of an M1 at the time and that contract was cancelled in midstream with a whopping penalty to buy the M16 ala my comment on the political contributions.

I also was in the first unit to be issued with the M-16 and used it in combat on three tours. Your statement that it was more reliable than the M14 is simply incorrect. It had teething and digestion problems as do most new products...

FWIW, I'm neither an M14 or M16 fan, there were and are better weapons out there but any comparison of combat capability that rates the M16 over the M14 in terms of either wounding / stopping / killing capability or of reliability is more than questionable. Handiness, ease of training and other factors give the M16 an edge but it flat loses on stopping power and reliability (for the early editions).

In any event, this was the point of post from which you extracted that comment:

"A lot of any soldier's objections to things that impede effectiveness are to politically and societally driven decisions. Not a darn thing one can do about it (lacking an existential war -- those get the Mothers to hush a bit and the Politicians to focus)."

[120mm]

Really, there were/are only two reliability issues with the AR series of arms.

First, there was the decision to go to the cheaper, more available ball powder. Second, there was/is the lack of training on how to make the system work.

The AR works quite well when dirty, despite mythology to the otherwise, but it does like lubrication. The AR does not like worn out or damaged magazines. It's ergonomics are phenomenal in comparison to the M14.

The M14 was an unergonomic, poorly designed, poorly executed, unreliable piece of junk which has somehow gained a halo of perfection by those who used it "once upon a time". It's open action, tinker-toy magazine link-up and awful stock makes it a crappy weapon. The weapons procurement system succeeded in shoving it down the throats of the military after it accepted the FN-FAL as the superior rifle, and almost succeeded after the military accepted the M16 as a superior rifle.

The M16 in all it's guises is far superior in reliability by any objective measure. And it has sufficient and even superior lethality, provided the user does his/her job.

[Pete]

If I recall correctly the M14 test that is said to have been rigged by U.S. Army Ordnance was the competitive shoot-off between it and the Fabrique Nationale 7.62mm self-loader. McNamara thought private industry could supply small arms more cheaply than Ordnance's several small arms depots, which was one of the reasons he closed Springfield Armory. In all fairness the Ordnance depots had done a good job rebuilding M1 rifles and carbines, and Springfield had developed two legendary rifles, the M1903 and the M1.

[Ken White]

Really, there were/are only two reliability issues...Second, there was/is the lack of training on how to make the system work.

though I'd say three issues with the third being the bolt closure device. Failure to train and over maintenance are still with us...

All that said re: the weapon, the capabilities of the ammunition are the major problem and that has always been true.

The AR works quite well when dirty, despite mythology to the otherwise, but it does like lubrication. The AR does not like worn out or damaged magazines. It's ergonomics are phenomenal in comparison to the M14.

All true and as I said, "...Handiness, ease of training and other factors give the M16 an edge but it flat loses on stopping power and reliability (for the early editions)." Handiness equating to ergonomics but not to phenomenal. Ease of training not equating to what actually occurs -- and that, too, is part of the reliability and lethality capability problems.

The M14 was an unergonomic, poorly designed, poorly executed, unreliable piece of junk which has somehow gained a halo of perfection by those who used it "once upon a time". It's open action, tinker-toy magazine link-up and awful stock makes it a crappy weapon.

A little hyperbolic but I broadly agree. It was not a great weapon on several counts but I do not nor do I know of anyone who awards it "a halo of perfection." It was a tool, it was adequate, no more. The FAL would have been a better choice -- though it also had some problems. Nor is the M16 / M4 series particularly good.

The weapons procurement system succeeded in shoving it down the throats of the military after it accepted the FN-FAL as the superior rifle, and almost succeeded after the military accepted the M16 as a superior rifle.

Same guys that tried to kill the Sharps, Spencer and Gatling. They also, at the same time they foisted the M14 selected the M60 over both the MG3 and the MAG. Unfortunately given all the current day machinations, it appears they're still alive.

The M16 in all it's guises is far superior in reliability by any objective measure. And it has sufficient and even superior lethality, provided the user does his/her job.

We can disagree on that. The various improvements over the past 45 years have made the gross reliability of the 16 family about on par with the M14. The basic problem with lethality is one of practical range capability exacerbated by the fact that the user is sometimes unable to do his or her job properly in combat. The M16 / M4 series are adequate. IMO, that's not good enough.

[120mm]

We can disagree on that. The various improvements over the past 45 years have made the gross reliability of the 16 family about on par with the M14. The basic problem with lethality is one of practical range capability exacerbated by the fact that the user is sometimes unable to do his or her job properly in combat. The M16 / M4 series are adequate. IMO, that's not good enough.

Meh, we can "disagree" but I am right on reliability.

1958....

March: Ten AR-15 rifles chambered in .222 Special are delivered to Fort Benning for the Infantry Board field trials. Due to the changes required for the new .224E2 Winchester cartridge, the Winchester LWMR is not ready. However, a number of new T44E4 (pre-production M14) rifles are included as a control. Stoner is allowed to participate since no instruction manuals are yet available for the AR-15. Embarrassingly, the T44E4 rifles turn in a malfunction rate of 16 per 1000rds. In contrast, the AR-15 displays a malfunction rate of 6.1/1000. Oddly, after all of the trouble to coordinate the development of the competing cartridges, the .224E2 Winchester still fails the 500 yard helmet penetration requirement. The tests are re-run with the .222 Special, which succeeds.

July: Winchester finally delivers their LWMR to Fort Benning for testing.

During rain tests at Aberdeen, examples of both the AR-15 and the LWMR experience burst barrels. The combination of water in the bore and the heavily fluted barrels used by both candidate rifles prove too much. Both manufacturers respond by providing unfluted barrels for subsequent prototypes. Seizing upon the issue, Dr. Carten begins a campaign to support development of an alternate .256 SCHV (6.35mm) cartridge. (The eventual pair of .256/6.35mm alternates are based on the .25 Remington case.)

August: A supplemental Infantry Board trial is held using AR-15 rifles with modifications based on the earlier Fort Benning and Aberdeen trials.

September: CONARC releases the final report of the Infantry Board's tests: "Evaluation of Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifles." The AR-15 is judged to be superior to the M14 and the Winchester LWMR. However, both SCHV candidates are faulted on their burst barrels during rain testing, among other issues. Still, the report recommends that both manufactures be allowed to submit 16 rifles each for further testing by the Infantry Board and the Arctic Test Board.

December: The Army's Combat Development Experimentation Center (CDEC) begins mock combat trials of the AR-15, Winchester LWMR, and the M14. Conducted at Fort Ord, California, the tests cover the effects of the new weapons on squad tactics and organization.

1959....

May: The final report of the CDEC trials, "Rifle Squad Armed with a Lightweight High-Velocity Rifle," is released. It projects that a 5-7 man squad armed with AR-15 rifles would have a higher number of hits and kills than the then current 11 man squad armed with M14 rifles. The report particularly praises the reliability of the tested AR-15 rifles, and suggests that a SCHV design such as the AR-15 or LWMR should be further developed as a replacement for the M14.

1960....

September: Dr. Carten is ordered to provide testing of the Colt AR-15 for the USAF. Ironically, the testing is requested to coincide with Ordnance testing of Dutch-production AR-10 rifles. Moreover, General LeMay and other high ranking officers from the USAF and Army will be in attendance for part of the testing.

November: Ordnance releases the Aberdeen D&PS test results on the AR-10 and AR-15 in separate reports. Once again, Laurence Moore's recommendations and conclusions are missing. However, the remaining data is encouraging. For instance, the Colt AR-15 displays a malfunction rate of 2.5/1000 rounds (less than half of the 1958 Fort Benning tests).

1961...

USAF testing at Lackland AFB continues, pitting the Colt AR-15 versus the M2 Carbine and the M14 rifle. 43% of the AR-15 users score "Expert" in marksmanship qualifications versus 22% of the M14 users. General LeMay requests authority to purchase 80,000 rifles over several years to begin replacement of the M2 Carbine.

1962....

February: Project AGILE begins operational testing of the AR-15 in Vietnam.

May: The USAF's third request for the procurement of 8,500 AR-15 rifles is approved. The rifle and its cartridge are officially adopted for USAF issue. The USAF also plays with prototypes of what becomes known as the M7 Bayonet.

July: Operational testing of the AR-15 in Vietnam ends. ARPA releases "Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15, Report of Task 13A." The report concludes that the AR-15 is superior to the M2 Carbine, and better suited for Vietnamese soldiers than the M1 Garand, the M1918 BAR, and the Thompson SMG. Vietnamese troops and their US advisors reportedly considered the AR-15 "the best 'all around' shoulder weapon" then in use. The report also includes graphic details of the .223 Remington's terminal effects. The results are typically described as "explosive." ARPA recommends that the AR-15 be adopted as the basic weapon for all South Vietnamese forces.

Summer: The commander of the US advisor group in Vietnam requests 20,000 AR-15 rifles for implementation of the Project AGILE recommendations.

The US Navy orders a small quantity of AR-15 rifles for use by its SEAL teams.

September: The Systems Analysis Directorate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) finishes a history of intermediate service rifle cartridges and related theory from the .276 Pedersen up to the current AR-15. Known as the Hitch Report (named for Charles Hitch, OSD Comptroller), the study concludes that the AR-15 is superior to the M14 and AK-47. AR-15 equipped squads are theoretically credited with the potential to inflict up to five times more enemy causalities to those issued the M14. The AR-15 is also credited with being more reliable and durable than the M14. The report further suggests that the M14 is inferior to the AK-47 and even the M1 Garand.

October: Pressured by McNamara and Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, a series of tactical and technical tests of the relative merits of the M14, AR-15, and AK-47 are ordered by General Earl Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff. Testing was to be performed at bases in the US, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Arctic.

November: President Kennedy is also briefed on the Hitch Report. General Wheeler is given a deadline of January 31, 1963.

1963...

January: Aberdeen's Human Engineering Laboratory releases the report "Summary of Studies Conducted with the AR-15."

General Wheeler reports "The AR-15 is not now acceptable for the Army for universal use." Supporting arguments included that adoption of the .223 Remington cartridge would violate NATO standardization, that the M14 was superior at ranges over 400m, and that the AR-15 design was not completely debugged or reliable. In the trials, the AR-15 suffered a malfunction rate 8 times higher than that of the control M14 rifles. In addition, testing at Aberdeen and Edgewood Arsenal could not duplicate the terminal results reported by ARPA's Project AGILE.

Secretary Vance orders the Inspector General of the Army to review the Army's conduct of the testing. Some questionable decisions and outright skullduggery surfaced. For instance, the AR-15 was judged against M1 Garand-era requirements such as aimed fire out to 800m. The AR-15 rifles were required to fire full automatic, while the M14 rifles were allowed to remain on semi-auto. For comparison testing, the Infantry Board even brought out prototype match rifles and squad automatic versions of the M14 such as the M14(USAIB) (AKA: the M14E2 or M14A1). Most damning was a quote from an Infantry Board memorandum:

"The US Army Infantry Board will conduct only those tests that will reflect adversely on the AR-15..."

Admittedly, some of the AR-15's problems in testing were real, the result of rushed production of the rifles and their ammunition for the rifle trials. The biggest problem experienced was primers blown out of the case upon firing.

In a report to the OSD, Secretary Vance recommends the following: 1) Procure enough rifles converted to the M14(USAIB) standard for issue as automatic rifles to all infantry squads; 2) Procure 50,000-100,00 AR-15 for issue to Air Assault, Airborne, and Special Forces units; 3) Production of standard M14 rifles is to be reduced; and 4) The SPIW program will be scheduled to provide a "follow-on" replacement for the M14 by the end of Fiscal Year 1965. In response, McNamara announces the cancellation of M14 production, with existing contracts to end by the Fall of 1963. A "one-time" purchase of 85,000 AR-15 rifles for the Army is proposed. It is intended as a stopgap measure until the SPIW is ready for fielding.

The USAF type-classifies the .223 Remington as "Cartridge, 5.64 Millimeter Ball MLU-26/P." It also releases the report "Exterior Ballistics of the AR-15 Rifle." The results of cold chamber testing at Eglin Air Force Base indicate that the ammunition cannot meet accuracy requirements in subzero temperatures. A change in the rate of twist from 1-in-14" to 1-in-12" is noted as solving the problem.

http://gunzone.sccltd.net/556dw.html

[120mm]

From the same source:

1963 cont.....

March: The "Office of Project Manager for AR-15 Rifle Activities" is established. Lt. Colonel Harold Yount is appointed Project Manager. The OSD orders the military services to draft a joint set of requirements for the AR-15 and its ammunition. The number and cost of any improvements and modifications are ordered to be kept to a minimum.

Frankford Arsenal is assigned oversight of the procurement of .223 Remington ammunition. William C. Davis is assigned as "AR-15 Project Director" and is directed to prepare a technical data package.

The Inspector General's findings are released as a six volume report titled: "IG Rifle Evaluation."

April: The "Technical Coordinating Committee" (TCC) is formed, comprised of members of each service branch, LTC Yount, and representatives from the OSD: the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Weapons Acquisition and Industrial Readiness and a program analyst from the Directorate of Major Items, Materiel, Installations and Logistics. While LTC Yount is the titular chair of the committee, the OSD representatives have veto power over any decision made by the TCC. Within the next few months, over 130 changes are proposed for the rifle and ammunition. One of Army recommendations vetoed by the OSD is for chrome plating of the bore and chamber.

Remington is contracted to provide 600,000 rounds of .223 Remington. In addition, Remington is to provide Frankford Arsenal with the Technical Data Package (TDP) for the cartridge. It is discovered that IMR 4475 cannot reliably achieve the quoted muzzle velocity of 3,300fps within the accepted maximum chamber pressure specs.

Aberdeen's D&PS releases the report "Evaluation Test of the Rate of Rifling Twist in Rifle, Caliber .223, AR-15."

Production of Ball ammo with IMR 4475 ends at Remington.

June: William C. Davis files the report "Investigation of Test-Weapon Chamber Configuration." It is found that Colt's chamber tolerances do not mesh with Remington's dimensional specifications for the cartridge. Another report, "Investigation of Bullet Configuration," indicates that Remington is no longer using the original 7-caliber ogive bullet design. Instead, they have switched to a less aerodynamic 5.5-caliber ogive design. The replacement design is claimed to be easier for the company to mass-produce.

July: Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick issues a directive to the TCC to speed up the procurement. Quality control, parts interchangeability, and acceptance standards are to be relaxed as necessary.

McNamara signs off on the change of rifling twist from 1-in-14" to 1-in-12."

Summer: The USAF requests an additional 19,000 AR-15.

TCC progress breaks down, as the Army demands a bolt closure device. The USAF strongly objects, while the Navy and Marines consider it "non-essential" but are willing to accept it. Colt and Springfield Armory submit various prototypes. Gene Stoner prefers Springfield's first prototype, as it would only add two parts to the design. The Army prefers Colt second design devised by Colt's Foster E. Sturtevant.

August: The TCC formally approves the change in the AR-15's rate of twist.

September: "Cartridge, 5.56mm Ball, M193" is officially type-classified. Pushed by OSD over the objections of the TCC, it specifies the Remington-designed projectile, a muzzle velocity of 3,250fps, IMR 4475 powder, and the existing average 52,000psi pressure limit. Remington, Olin, and Federal Cartridge all refuse to offer bids.

October: Colt threatens to dismantle the AR-15 production line due to the lack of an official contract for further orders. McNamara allows the Army to order their rifles with the Sturtevant bolt closure device if necessary. The USAF can continue to order their rifles without the device.

The USAF orders 19 million rounds of MLU-26/P from Remington.

November: The Army finally awards Colt with an official contract for 104,000 rifles. DA-11-199-AMC-508 includes the 19,000 M16 ordered by the USAF and 85,000 XM16E1 for the Army and Marines. Eleven modifications are made to the rifle design prior to the start of production. These include the change to black furniture, 1-in-12" rifling, a modified firing pin, the bolt closure device, revised chamber dimensions, the switch from a triangular changing handle to the current T-shape, and the transition from steel to aluminum magazines. (Ironically, this "one-time" buy will be amended fifteen times over the next two years from 104,000 to a grand total of 201,045 rifles.)

1964....

January: M193 specs are given a temporary waiver. The average chamber pressure limit was increased to 53,000psi, with individual rounds allowed to test as high as 60,000psi. Remington and Olin contract to supply 500,000 cartridges apiece under this waiver. Frankford Arsenal receives permission to test production lots of 25,000rds loaded with alternative powders. Candidates include DuPont's CR 8136, Hercules' HPC-10, and Olin's WC846. (The latter was then in use by Olin for military production of 7.62x51mm ammunition, just as Remington had once done with IMR 4475.)

March: Remington and DuPont withdraw IMR 4475 from future use in 5.56mm ammunition.

The first 300 M16-marked rifles are delivered to the USAF.

Colt discovers that six out of 10 XM16E1 rifles will exceed the 650-850rpm cyclic rate requirements when tested with ammunition loaded with WC846. Colt asks that the maximum cyclic rate limit for the XM16E1 be raised to 900rpm. (The USAF has already done so for their M16 rifles, as they had already accepted production lots of ammo from Olin loaded with WC846.)

April: The TCC grants a monthly waiver of the cyclic rate maximum to 900rpm. In an internal company report, "Chamber and Gas Port Pressures," Colt's Foster Sturtevant notes an increase in pressure at the gas port when using WC846 versus IMR 4475. However, this is seen as a potential benefit for reliable function of the rifle.

The USAF rejects a lot of ammunition because it fails to meet their 500yd penetration requirements (0.135" of mild steel). The USAF is urged to reduce the plate penetration requirement to 450 yards.

May: William C. Davis and C.E. Schindler release the report "Investigation of Alternate Propellants For Use in 5.56mm M193 Ball Ammunition." CR 8136 and WC846 are recommended for use. However, they also note that these powders exhibit slightly higher pressure levels at the AR-15's gas port than did IMR 4475. HPC-10 is declined due to excessive pressures at extremely low (Artic) temperatures and previous issues of bore erosion with tubular grain propellants. Before the report is even released, the two recommended powders are approved for use in M193 production. The suggested "None Fire/All Fire" primer tolerance of 12 to 48 inch-ounces is also included in the technical data package, despite Colt's transition to a lighter firing pin.

The Army begins issue of XM16E1 rifles. CONARC and the Combat Developments Command each deny responsibility for developing related training materials.

Colt unveils their "CAR-15 5.56mm Military Weapons System" to Army brass, including General Wheeler. The projected CAR-15 family includes a pair of AR15-HBAR light machineguns (the other magazine-fed M1 and the belt-fed M2), a 15" barreled carbine, a 10" barreled SMG, and a stripped down "survival rifle" for aircrews. The earliest prototypes of the CAR-15 SMG and carbine use cut-down M16 triangular forearms and buttstocks. As an added feature, the chopped buttstock of the SMG has a latch recessed in the buttplate, which allows the buttstock to be extended or retracted. These models retain the early AR15 Model 01's open flashhiders. Colt also introduces the belt-fed "Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-1." However, the CGL-4 40mm grenade launcher, designed Robert E. Roy and Karl R. Lewis, attracts the most favorable attention, particularly from General Wheeler. This official interest starts the ball rolling again for an add-on grenade launcher for the XM16E1, and the Colt CGL-4 is soon pitted against a launcher from the Ford Motor Company and another from Springfield Armory.

June: The first documented incidents of case head separations and rim pull-through are recorded.

August: Remington delivers M193 cartridges loaded with DuPont CR 8136. Testing at Colt results in lower cyclic rates. The monthly acceptance waiver on maximum cyclic rate is rescinded.

September: The 5th Special Forces Airborne Group submit their first monthly field report on the XM16E1. They recommend that the fragile M11 cleaning rod be replaced and that a brush for cleaning the chamber and lug recesses be issued.

October: After Colt once again warns of the termination of rifle production, the option clause of contract "508" is invoked to include an additional 33,500 M16 rifles for the USAF, 240 for the Navy, and 82 for the Coast Guard.

Aberdeen's D&PS releases "Final Report of Comparison Test of Rifle, 5.56mm M16." While only based on a sample of five rifles, it notes that malfunctions tend to occur after 1,000rds are fired with cleaning and lubrication. It also suggests that special brushes be issued for cleaning the chamber, lug recesses, and the inside of the bolt carrier.

December: Remington and DuPont withdraw CR 8136 due to the inability to maintain pressure limits from lot to lot. Remington asks and is granted permission to finish their production run using WC846. XM16E1 acceptance testing at Colt continues with remaining stocks of CR 8136-loaded ammunition.

1965...

February: The TCC requests new sources of powder for the M193 cartridge from DuPont and Hercules. The submitted powders are EX 8208-4 and HPC-11, respectively.

[120mm]

And finally:

March: The 173rd Airborne Division deploys to Vietnam with XM16E1 rifles.

May: William C. Davis is temporarily assigned to Colt as the "XM16E Engineering Project Manager." On Colt's request, Davis designs the 68 grain GX-6235 projectile. The projectile features a 10-caliber secant ogive. This bullet requires a 1-in-9" twist; however, it shows excessive fouling when tested in a 1-in-7" twist barrel.

May-June: Colt's supply of CR 8136-loaded ammunition runs out. Acceptance testing continues with WC846 loaded cartridges. As result, Colt requests reinstatement of the maximum cyclic rate wavier. The TCC refuses. In response, Colt suspends production of the XM16E1. M16 production for the USAF continues.

June: Olin declines to submit a new powder.

In the report "Study of Current Primer-Sensitivity Criteria for 5.56MM Ammunition," Frankford Arsenal notes that the restrictive primer sensitivity requirements are having the predicted results, causing high rejection rates of primer lots by manufacturers.

July: Commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland asks Army Material Command to examine the issues necessary to issue M16/XM16E1 rifles to all US troops in Vietnam.

The USAF orders an additional 36,682 M16 rifles.

August: Reports of the XM16E1 bolt and bolt carrier seizing begin to surface from Vietnam.

September: C.E. Schindler releases a report titled "Investigation of Alternate Propellants For Use in 5.56mm Ball and Tracer Ammunition." DuPont's EX 8208-4 is shown to have moderate fouling, but records higher gas port pressures than WC846. Hercules HPC-11 shows the least visible fouling, but further examination shows that heavy fouling has constricted the gas tube. The report recommends that EX 8208-4 be approved for use in M193 Ball and M196 tracer cartridges, that CR 8136 and IMR 4475 be withdrawn, and that Hercules and Olin reduce the fouling characteristics of their respective powders. However, unlike WC846, HPC-11 is not approved for current use.

October: Colt's military sales manager, James B. Hall, informs General Westmoreland's staff that Colt would stop producing XM16E1 rifles in January if no further orders were made.

At Colt, William C. Davis releases the report "Effect of Ammunition Variables on Acceptance testing of XM16E1 Rifles." It notes that half of the XM16E1s accepted with CR 8136-loaded cartridges would fail when tested with WC846-loaded cartridges. It is suggested that the maximum acceptable cyclic rate might need to be raised as high as 1,000rpm. It is also noted that bolt failures and malfunctions are more likely to occur at higher cyclic rates.

December: Bypassing Army chain of command, Westmoreland uses USAF communication assets to contact Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Westmoreland requests an additional 100,000 XM16E1 rifles. After Sen. Russell applies pressure on Secretary McNamara, a letter contract for the requested rifles is placed with Colt.

Initial testing in the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) trials also indicates that XM16E1 rifles are more likely to foul, exhibit high cyclic rates, and suffer more malfunctions as a result when using cartridges loaded with WC846 versus CR 8136.

1966...

Federal begins to offer a 68 grain 5.56mm Ball cartridge.

General Electric designs a tungsten core 5.56mm AP bullet for ArmaLite. FN also produces a tungsten core AP projectile; the cartridge is later designated the P96.

January: Colt presents the TCC with Foster Sturtevant's latest development: the "Buffer Assembly Having a Plurality of Inertial Masses Acting in Delayed Sequence to Oppose Bolt Rebound". While intended primarily to prevent light strike misfires due to bolt bounce in automatic fire, Sturtevant's new buffer unwittingly saves the day on a second front. Since the new buffer weighs roughly three times more than Stoner's original design, it reduces the overall cyclic rate to acceptable levels.

Procurement is authorized for 2,050 CAR-15 "Submachine guns."

The Army's CDC establishes a requirement for 30 round magazines. Ideally, all future production M16-type rifles will come equipped with these. However, Colt has difficulties with their first few designs. Made with a continuous curve, the magazines would not fit properly in some mag wells given the machining tolerances in the lower receiver. (The current straight-then-curved 30 round mag design will not be ready for production until late 1968/early 1969.)

February: The requirement for the Colt CAR-15 "Commando" is increased by 765.

April: In a document titled "Improved Performance of Ammunition for the M16 Rifle," G.A. Gustafson recommends that the 68 grain .224" homologue to the .30 M1 Ball be revived for use in the 5.56mm cartridge. Gustafson suggests that 50,000 bullets of this design be purchased from Sierra for constructing test ammunition. He also recommends using test rifles with both 1-in-12" and 1-in-9" twist barrels. (At the time, Gustafson is assigned to Aberdeen's Test Analysis and Operations Office.)

June: Contract DAAF03-66-C-0018 is signed with Colt for 403,905 XM16E1 rifles. The Army will receive 213,405 (including Westmoreland's request for 100,000). Another 114,000 are earmarked for Military Assistance for the South Vietnamese, and the final 76,500 will go to the USMC. The contract will be amended 256 times before it is complete. One of the first is for an additional 15,372 rifles for the USMC.

Separate contracts for 2,815 Colt Commandos and 19,236 XM148 grenade launchers are also signed.

M193 and M196 cartridges loaded with DuPont EX 8208-4 begin to arrive for issue.

During the Infantry Rifle Unit Study (IRUS), an XM16E1 suffers a casehead rupture, extensively damaging the rifle. This is the third incident recorded during the history of the M16/XM16E1 program. Use of Federal Cartridge lot FC1830 and FC1831 is suspended. Case hardness tolerances are suspected.

July: A casehead rupture damages a fourth rifle, this time with Remington ammo (Lot No. 5189).

August: All US Army units in Vietnam have been issued the XM16E1.

September: The closed-end "birdcage" flash hider is approved to replace the open three-prong model. The latter was prone to snagging and breakage, and was also suspected in assisting the capillary movement of water into the bore.

Rock Island Arsenal releases the Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual (POMM 9-1005-294-14) for the "Submachine Gun 5.56mm, CAR-15." Colt introduces multiple improvements including a smaller telescoping stock/buffer assembly, redesigned round handguards, which were held in place with a wedge-shaped slip ring, and the "noise and flash suppressor." The suppressor incorporates multiple expansion chambers to slow and cool the propellant gases, thus reducing the muzzle blast from the short barrel. This is particularly important as safety certification was previously withheld due to the high sound levels recorded during testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. (However, the same device is later ruled to be a NFA-restricted "silencer" by the BATF.)

October: After widespread reports of stoppages and other malfunctions, General Westmoreland requests technical assistance. A team including Colonel Yount's assistant LTC Underwood, representatives from WECOM, and Colt are sent to Vietnam to investigate. A near total lack of maintenance and cleaning is blamed. Underwood is so appalled that he insists that Colonel Yount come to Vietnam to witness the conditions himself. Yount complies with the request. Colt's Robert Freemont is sent to Rock Island to examine rifles returned from Vietnam.

Colt reports to the TCC on the issue of reverting to 1-in-14" twist barrels. Colt indicates that existing rifle barrels already have a 10% rejection rate due to tested accuracy, despite meeting physical machining specs. Colt states that a change to the slower rate of twist would require relaxed accuracy standards.

November: The State Department's Office of Munitions Control approves the export sale of 18,000 AR-15 and 2,300 AR-15 HBAR M1 by Colt to the Republic of Singapore. This creates a political firestorm when news of the sale becomes public. While Colt claimed that the export rifles would come from expanded production quotas, this not only angered those who thought these rifles should go to US troops, but also US allies with troops stationed in Vietnam. For instance, South Korean, Philippine, and Thai troops in South Vietnam were all armed with surplus M1 Garands.

General Electric's Chemical Materials Department proposes a disposable polymer-bodied magazine for the M16.

The ACS announces the Army's intent to adopt the XM16E1 for standardization and issue for all US troops stationed outside of Europe.

December: Colt begins equipping new production rifles with Sturtevant's improved buffer. Retrofit of older rifles will not be complete for nearly a year.

Frankford and Rock Island Arsenals report that they cannot find a cause of the reported "blow-ups." Only cartridges loaded with inappropriate powders (handgun or shotgun-type) caused the same level of damage during testing.

The final results of the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) program are released. While the XM16E1 rifles exhibit one of the highest malfunction rates of the rifles tested (10.6 per 1,000rds), it is deemed superior for Army use. The Stoner 63 is considered attractive, but the report concludes that it does not offer enough of an advantage to warrant current adoption.

[Ken White]

Meh, we can "disagree" but I am right on reliability.

I will point out that you posted three pages of fluff, none of which mentioned the results of the Troop Test -- really strange that, it was the most exhaustive test, running for almost six months using Joe instead of selected shooters (and overseers) and was the basis for Vance's recommendation to OSD which differed little from the recommendation submitted by Division to DA. It is perhaps notable the only time the world reliability appears is at this:

1959...

May: The final report of the CDEC trials, "Rifle Squad Armed with a Lightweight High-Velocity Rifle," is released. It projects that a 5-7 man squad armed with AR-15 rifles would have a higher number of hits and kills than the then current 11 man squad armed with M14 rifles. The report particularly praises the reliability of the tested AR-15 rifles, and suggests that a SCHV design such as the AR-15 or LWMR should be further developed as a replacement for the M14.

While they lauded reliability, they also said it should be further developed. I think that equates to the Scots court verdict of 'Not Proven.'

Nor is it likely ever to be. We should be able to disagree on a subjective judgment on an issue that cannot really be proven due to skews of data and events provided by the vagaries of time and place much less ammunition lot differences and user capability and competence.

CDEC was a fan of the weapon but refused to take any responsibility for it after it was fielded. CONARC took the politically astute position it wasn't their job and thus they had no comment. Benning was not a fan (Benning was and is rarely a fan of much of anything with the word 'change' involved... ). That may be why USAIS did such a poor job of fielding the training on the weapon.

That one bit of praise for reliability is also sort of overruled by the last paragraph quoted in your posts:

The final results of the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) program are released. While the XM16E1 rifles exhibit one of the highest malfunction rates of the rifles tested (10.6 per 1,000rds), it is deemed superior for Army use. The Stoner 63 is considered attractive, but the report concludes that it does not offer enough of an advantage to warrant current adoption.

All this is really sorta irrelevant but your posts above do illustrate the politicization, in and outside the Army, of the process -- which was my point.

[SethB]

The modern rifles are very reliable. And cheaper than the M14, FAL, etc. by thousands of dollars.

They also accessorize more easily, and are significantly lighter.

I'd say that you'd have a hell of a time finding a better rifle COTS, and if you further developed it (as the DoD has refused to do for many years) you can improve on what already exists.

The M16A2, M16A4 and M4 all had their genesis in non-DoD projects. The Army in particular is disinterested in change. It took twenty years to upgrade the extractor spring buffer in the M4 because the bean counters didn't want to reduce the parts commonality between the rifles.

Metrics...