MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[120mm]

Really, there were/are only two reliability issues with the AR series of arms.

First, there was the decision to go to the cheaper, more available ball powder. Second, there was/is the lack of training on how to make the system work.

The AR works quite well when dirty, despite mythology to the otherwise, but it does like lubrication. The AR does not like worn out or damaged magazines. It's ergonomics are phenomenal in comparison to the M14.

The M14 was an unergonomic, poorly designed, poorly executed, unreliable piece of junk which has somehow gained a halo of perfection by those who used it "once upon a time". It's open action, tinker-toy magazine link-up and awful stock makes it a crappy weapon. The weapons procurement system succeeded in shoving it down the throats of the military after it accepted the FN-FAL as the superior rifle, and almost succeeded after the military accepted the M16 as a superior rifle.

The M16 in all it's guises is far superior in reliability by any objective measure. And it has sufficient and even superior lethality, provided the user does his/her job.

[Pete]

If I recall correctly the M14 test that is said to have been rigged by U.S. Army Ordnance was the competitive shoot-off between it and the Fabrique Nationale 7.62mm self-loader. McNamara thought private industry could supply small arms more cheaply than Ordnance's several small arms depots, which was one of the reasons he closed Springfield Armory. In all fairness the Ordnance depots had done a good job rebuilding M1 rifles and carbines, and Springfield had developed two legendary rifles, the M1903 and the M1.

[Ken White]

Really, there were/are only two reliability issues...Second, there was/is the lack of training on how to make the system work.

though I'd say three issues with the third being the bolt closure device. Failure to train and over maintenance are still with us...

All that said re: the weapon, the capabilities of the ammunition are the major problem and that has always been true.

The AR works quite well when dirty, despite mythology to the otherwise, but it does like lubrication. The AR does not like worn out or damaged magazines. It's ergonomics are phenomenal in comparison to the M14.

All true and as I said, "...Handiness, ease of training and other factors give the M16 an edge but it flat loses on stopping power and reliability (for the early editions)." Handiness equating to ergonomics but not to phenomenal. Ease of training not equating to what actually occurs -- and that, too, is part of the reliability and lethality capability problems.

The M14 was an unergonomic, poorly designed, poorly executed, unreliable piece of junk which has somehow gained a halo of perfection by those who used it "once upon a time". It's open action, tinker-toy magazine link-up and awful stock makes it a crappy weapon.

A little hyperbolic but I broadly agree. It was not a great weapon on several counts but I do not nor do I know of anyone who awards it "a halo of perfection." It was a tool, it was adequate, no more. The FAL would have been a better choice -- though it also had some problems. Nor is the M16 / M4 series particularly good.

The weapons procurement system succeeded in shoving it down the throats of the military after it accepted the FN-FAL as the superior rifle, and almost succeeded after the military accepted the M16 as a superior rifle.

Same guys that tried to kill the Sharps, Spencer and Gatling. They also, at the same time they foisted the M14 selected the M60 over both the MG3 and the MAG. Unfortunately given all the current day machinations, it appears they're still alive.

The M16 in all it's guises is far superior in reliability by any objective measure. And it has sufficient and even superior lethality, provided the user does his/her job.

We can disagree on that. The various improvements over the past 45 years have made the gross reliability of the 16 family about on par with the M14. The basic problem with lethality is one of practical range capability exacerbated by the fact that the user is sometimes unable to do his or her job properly in combat. The M16 / M4 series are adequate. IMO, that's not good enough.

[120mm]

We can disagree on that. The various improvements over the past 45 years have made the gross reliability of the 16 family about on par with the M14. The basic problem with lethality is one of practical range capability exacerbated by the fact that the user is sometimes unable to do his or her job properly in combat. The M16 / M4 series are adequate. IMO, that's not good enough.

Meh, we can "disagree" but I am right on reliability.

1958....

March: Ten AR-15 rifles chambered in .222 Special are delivered to Fort Benning for the Infantry Board field trials. Due to the changes required for the new .224E2 Winchester cartridge, the Winchester LWMR is not ready. However, a number of new T44E4 (pre-production M14) rifles are included as a control. Stoner is allowed to participate since no instruction manuals are yet available for the AR-15. Embarrassingly, the T44E4 rifles turn in a malfunction rate of 16 per 1000rds. In contrast, the AR-15 displays a malfunction rate of 6.1/1000. Oddly, after all of the trouble to coordinate the development of the competing cartridges, the .224E2 Winchester still fails the 500 yard helmet penetration requirement. The tests are re-run with the .222 Special, which succeeds.

July: Winchester finally delivers their LWMR to Fort Benning for testing.

During rain tests at Aberdeen, examples of both the AR-15 and the LWMR experience burst barrels. The combination of water in the bore and the heavily fluted barrels used by both candidate rifles prove too much. Both manufacturers respond by providing unfluted barrels for subsequent prototypes. Seizing upon the issue, Dr. Carten begins a campaign to support development of an alternate .256 SCHV (6.35mm) cartridge. (The eventual pair of .256/6.35mm alternates are based on the .25 Remington case.)

August: A supplemental Infantry Board trial is held using AR-15 rifles with modifications based on the earlier Fort Benning and Aberdeen trials.

September: CONARC releases the final report of the Infantry Board's tests: "Evaluation of Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifles." The AR-15 is judged to be superior to the M14 and the Winchester LWMR. However, both SCHV candidates are faulted on their burst barrels during rain testing, among other issues. Still, the report recommends that both manufactures be allowed to submit 16 rifles each for further testing by the Infantry Board and the Arctic Test Board.

December: The Army's Combat Development Experimentation Center (CDEC) begins mock combat trials of the AR-15, Winchester LWMR, and the M14. Conducted at Fort Ord, California, the tests cover the effects of the new weapons on squad tactics and organization.

1959....

May: The final report of the CDEC trials, "Rifle Squad Armed with a Lightweight High-Velocity Rifle," is released. It projects that a 5-7 man squad armed with AR-15 rifles would have a higher number of hits and kills than the then current 11 man squad armed with M14 rifles. The report particularly praises the reliability of the tested AR-15 rifles, and suggests that a SCHV design such as the AR-15 or LWMR should be further developed as a replacement for the M14.

1960....

September: Dr. Carten is ordered to provide testing of the Colt AR-15 for the USAF. Ironically, the testing is requested to coincide with Ordnance testing of Dutch-production AR-10 rifles. Moreover, General LeMay and other high ranking officers from the USAF and Army will be in attendance for part of the testing.

November: Ordnance releases the Aberdeen D&PS test results on the AR-10 and AR-15 in separate reports. Once again, Laurence Moore's recommendations and conclusions are missing. However, the remaining data is encouraging. For instance, the Colt AR-15 displays a malfunction rate of 2.5/1000 rounds (less than half of the 1958 Fort Benning tests).

1961...

USAF testing at Lackland AFB continues, pitting the Colt AR-15 versus the M2 Carbine and the M14 rifle. 43% of the AR-15 users score "Expert" in marksmanship qualifications versus 22% of the M14 users. General LeMay requests authority to purchase 80,000 rifles over several years to begin replacement of the M2 Carbine.

1962....

February: Project AGILE begins operational testing of the AR-15 in Vietnam.

May: The USAF's third request for the procurement of 8,500 AR-15 rifles is approved. The rifle and its cartridge are officially adopted for USAF issue. The USAF also plays with prototypes of what becomes known as the M7 Bayonet.

July: Operational testing of the AR-15 in Vietnam ends. ARPA releases "Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15, Report of Task 13A." The report concludes that the AR-15 is superior to the M2 Carbine, and better suited for Vietnamese soldiers than the M1 Garand, the M1918 BAR, and the Thompson SMG. Vietnamese troops and their US advisors reportedly considered the AR-15 "the best 'all around' shoulder weapon" then in use. The report also includes graphic details of the .223 Remington's terminal effects. The results are typically described as "explosive." ARPA recommends that the AR-15 be adopted as the basic weapon for all South Vietnamese forces.

Summer: The commander of the US advisor group in Vietnam requests 20,000 AR-15 rifles for implementation of the Project AGILE recommendations.

The US Navy orders a small quantity of AR-15 rifles for use by its SEAL teams.

September: The Systems Analysis Directorate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) finishes a history of intermediate service rifle cartridges and related theory from the .276 Pedersen up to the current AR-15. Known as the Hitch Report (named for Charles Hitch, OSD Comptroller), the study concludes that the AR-15 is superior to the M14 and AK-47. AR-15 equipped squads are theoretically credited with the potential to inflict up to five times more enemy causalities to those issued the M14. The AR-15 is also credited with being more reliable and durable than the M14. The report further suggests that the M14 is inferior to the AK-47 and even the M1 Garand.

October: Pressured by McNamara and Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, a series of tactical and technical tests of the relative merits of the M14, AR-15, and AK-47 are ordered by General Earl Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff. Testing was to be performed at bases in the US, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Arctic.

November: President Kennedy is also briefed on the Hitch Report. General Wheeler is given a deadline of January 31, 1963.

1963...

January: Aberdeen's Human Engineering Laboratory releases the report "Summary of Studies Conducted with the AR-15."

General Wheeler reports "The AR-15 is not now acceptable for the Army for universal use." Supporting arguments included that adoption of the .223 Remington cartridge would violate NATO standardization, that the M14 was superior at ranges over 400m, and that the AR-15 design was not completely debugged or reliable. In the trials, the AR-15 suffered a malfunction rate 8 times higher than that of the control M14 rifles. In addition, testing at Aberdeen and Edgewood Arsenal could not duplicate the terminal results reported by ARPA's Project AGILE.

Secretary Vance orders the Inspector General of the Army to review the Army's conduct of the testing. Some questionable decisions and outright skullduggery surfaced. For instance, the AR-15 was judged against M1 Garand-era requirements such as aimed fire out to 800m. The AR-15 rifles were required to fire full automatic, while the M14 rifles were allowed to remain on semi-auto. For comparison testing, the Infantry Board even brought out prototype match rifles and squad automatic versions of the M14 such as the M14(USAIB) (AKA: the M14E2 or M14A1). Most damning was a quote from an Infantry Board memorandum:

"The US Army Infantry Board will conduct only those tests that will reflect adversely on the AR-15..."

Admittedly, some of the AR-15's problems in testing were real, the result of rushed production of the rifles and their ammunition for the rifle trials. The biggest problem experienced was primers blown out of the case upon firing.

In a report to the OSD, Secretary Vance recommends the following: 1) Procure enough rifles converted to the M14(USAIB) standard for issue as automatic rifles to all infantry squads; 2) Procure 50,000-100,00 AR-15 for issue to Air Assault, Airborne, and Special Forces units; 3) Production of standard M14 rifles is to be reduced; and 4) The SPIW program will be scheduled to provide a "follow-on" replacement for the M14 by the end of Fiscal Year 1965. In response, McNamara announces the cancellation of M14 production, with existing contracts to end by the Fall of 1963. A "one-time" purchase of 85,000 AR-15 rifles for the Army is proposed. It is intended as a stopgap measure until the SPIW is ready for fielding.

The USAF type-classifies the .223 Remington as "Cartridge, 5.64 Millimeter Ball MLU-26/P." It also releases the report "Exterior Ballistics of the AR-15 Rifle." The results of cold chamber testing at Eglin Air Force Base indicate that the ammunition cannot meet accuracy requirements in subzero temperatures. A change in the rate of twist from 1-in-14" to 1-in-12" is noted as solving the problem.

http://gunzone.sccltd.net/556dw.html

[120mm]

From the same source:

1963 cont.....

March: The "Office of Project Manager for AR-15 Rifle Activities" is established. Lt. Colonel Harold Yount is appointed Project Manager. The OSD orders the military services to draft a joint set of requirements for the AR-15 and its ammunition. The number and cost of any improvements and modifications are ordered to be kept to a minimum.

Frankford Arsenal is assigned oversight of the procurement of .223 Remington ammunition. William C. Davis is assigned as "AR-15 Project Director" and is directed to prepare a technical data package.

The Inspector General's findings are released as a six volume report titled: "IG Rifle Evaluation."

April: The "Technical Coordinating Committee" (TCC) is formed, comprised of members of each service branch, LTC Yount, and representatives from the OSD: the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Weapons Acquisition and Industrial Readiness and a program analyst from the Directorate of Major Items, Materiel, Installations and Logistics. While LTC Yount is the titular chair of the committee, the OSD representatives have veto power over any decision made by the TCC. Within the next few months, over 130 changes are proposed for the rifle and ammunition. One of Army recommendations vetoed by the OSD is for chrome plating of the bore and chamber.

Remington is contracted to provide 600,000 rounds of .223 Remington. In addition, Remington is to provide Frankford Arsenal with the Technical Data Package (TDP) for the cartridge. It is discovered that IMR 4475 cannot reliably achieve the quoted muzzle velocity of 3,300fps within the accepted maximum chamber pressure specs.

Aberdeen's D&PS releases the report "Evaluation Test of the Rate of Rifling Twist in Rifle, Caliber .223, AR-15."

Production of Ball ammo with IMR 4475 ends at Remington.

June: William C. Davis files the report "Investigation of Test-Weapon Chamber Configuration." It is found that Colt's chamber tolerances do not mesh with Remington's dimensional specifications for the cartridge. Another report, "Investigation of Bullet Configuration," indicates that Remington is no longer using the original 7-caliber ogive bullet design. Instead, they have switched to a less aerodynamic 5.5-caliber ogive design. The replacement design is claimed to be easier for the company to mass-produce.

July: Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick issues a directive to the TCC to speed up the procurement. Quality control, parts interchangeability, and acceptance standards are to be relaxed as necessary.

McNamara signs off on the change of rifling twist from 1-in-14" to 1-in-12."

Summer: The USAF requests an additional 19,000 AR-15.

TCC progress breaks down, as the Army demands a bolt closure device. The USAF strongly objects, while the Navy and Marines consider it "non-essential" but are willing to accept it. Colt and Springfield Armory submit various prototypes. Gene Stoner prefers Springfield's first prototype, as it would only add two parts to the design. The Army prefers Colt second design devised by Colt's Foster E. Sturtevant.

August: The TCC formally approves the change in the AR-15's rate of twist.

September: "Cartridge, 5.56mm Ball, M193" is officially type-classified. Pushed by OSD over the objections of the TCC, it specifies the Remington-designed projectile, a muzzle velocity of 3,250fps, IMR 4475 powder, and the existing average 52,000psi pressure limit. Remington, Olin, and Federal Cartridge all refuse to offer bids.

October: Colt threatens to dismantle the AR-15 production line due to the lack of an official contract for further orders. McNamara allows the Army to order their rifles with the Sturtevant bolt closure device if necessary. The USAF can continue to order their rifles without the device.

The USAF orders 19 million rounds of MLU-26/P from Remington.

November: The Army finally awards Colt with an official contract for 104,000 rifles. DA-11-199-AMC-508 includes the 19,000 M16 ordered by the USAF and 85,000 XM16E1 for the Army and Marines. Eleven modifications are made to the rifle design prior to the start of production. These include the change to black furniture, 1-in-12" rifling, a modified firing pin, the bolt closure device, revised chamber dimensions, the switch from a triangular changing handle to the current T-shape, and the transition from steel to aluminum magazines. (Ironically, this "one-time" buy will be amended fifteen times over the next two years from 104,000 to a grand total of 201,045 rifles.)

1964....

January: M193 specs are given a temporary waiver. The average chamber pressure limit was increased to 53,000psi, with individual rounds allowed to test as high as 60,000psi. Remington and Olin contract to supply 500,000 cartridges apiece under this waiver. Frankford Arsenal receives permission to test production lots of 25,000rds loaded with alternative powders. Candidates include DuPont's CR 8136, Hercules' HPC-10, and Olin's WC846. (The latter was then in use by Olin for military production of 7.62x51mm ammunition, just as Remington had once done with IMR 4475.)

March: Remington and DuPont withdraw IMR 4475 from future use in 5.56mm ammunition.

The first 300 M16-marked rifles are delivered to the USAF.

Colt discovers that six out of 10 XM16E1 rifles will exceed the 650-850rpm cyclic rate requirements when tested with ammunition loaded with WC846. Colt asks that the maximum cyclic rate limit for the XM16E1 be raised to 900rpm. (The USAF has already done so for their M16 rifles, as they had already accepted production lots of ammo from Olin loaded with WC846.)

April: The TCC grants a monthly waiver of the cyclic rate maximum to 900rpm. In an internal company report, "Chamber and Gas Port Pressures," Colt's Foster Sturtevant notes an increase in pressure at the gas port when using WC846 versus IMR 4475. However, this is seen as a potential benefit for reliable function of the rifle.

The USAF rejects a lot of ammunition because it fails to meet their 500yd penetration requirements (0.135" of mild steel). The USAF is urged to reduce the plate penetration requirement to 450 yards.

May: William C. Davis and C.E. Schindler release the report "Investigation of Alternate Propellants For Use in 5.56mm M193 Ball Ammunition." CR 8136 and WC846 are recommended for use. However, they also note that these powders exhibit slightly higher pressure levels at the AR-15's gas port than did IMR 4475. HPC-10 is declined due to excessive pressures at extremely low (Artic) temperatures and previous issues of bore erosion with tubular grain propellants. Before the report is even released, the two recommended powders are approved for use in M193 production. The suggested "None Fire/All Fire" primer tolerance of 12 to 48 inch-ounces is also included in the technical data package, despite Colt's transition to a lighter firing pin.

The Army begins issue of XM16E1 rifles. CONARC and the Combat Developments Command each deny responsibility for developing related training materials.

Colt unveils their "CAR-15 5.56mm Military Weapons System" to Army brass, including General Wheeler. The projected CAR-15 family includes a pair of AR15-HBAR light machineguns (the other magazine-fed M1 and the belt-fed M2), a 15" barreled carbine, a 10" barreled SMG, and a stripped down "survival rifle" for aircrews. The earliest prototypes of the CAR-15 SMG and carbine use cut-down M16 triangular forearms and buttstocks. As an added feature, the chopped buttstock of the SMG has a latch recessed in the buttplate, which allows the buttstock to be extended or retracted. These models retain the early AR15 Model 01's open flashhiders. Colt also introduces the belt-fed "Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-1." However, the CGL-4 40mm grenade launcher, designed Robert E. Roy and Karl R. Lewis, attracts the most favorable attention, particularly from General Wheeler. This official interest starts the ball rolling again for an add-on grenade launcher for the XM16E1, and the Colt CGL-4 is soon pitted against a launcher from the Ford Motor Company and another from Springfield Armory.

June: The first documented incidents of case head separations and rim pull-through are recorded.

August: Remington delivers M193 cartridges loaded with DuPont CR 8136. Testing at Colt results in lower cyclic rates. The monthly acceptance waiver on maximum cyclic rate is rescinded.

September: The 5th Special Forces Airborne Group submit their first monthly field report on the XM16E1. They recommend that the fragile M11 cleaning rod be replaced and that a brush for cleaning the chamber and lug recesses be issued.

October: After Colt once again warns of the termination of rifle production, the option clause of contract "508" is invoked to include an additional 33,500 M16 rifles for the USAF, 240 for the Navy, and 82 for the Coast Guard.

Aberdeen's D&PS releases "Final Report of Comparison Test of Rifle, 5.56mm M16." While only based on a sample of five rifles, it notes that malfunctions tend to occur after 1,000rds are fired with cleaning and lubrication. It also suggests that special brushes be issued for cleaning the chamber, lug recesses, and the inside of the bolt carrier.

December: Remington and DuPont withdraw CR 8136 due to the inability to maintain pressure limits from lot to lot. Remington asks and is granted permission to finish their production run using WC846. XM16E1 acceptance testing at Colt continues with remaining stocks of CR 8136-loaded ammunition.

1965...

February: The TCC requests new sources of powder for the M193 cartridge from DuPont and Hercules. The submitted powders are EX 8208-4 and HPC-11, respectively.

[120mm]

And finally:

March: The 173rd Airborne Division deploys to Vietnam with XM16E1 rifles.

May: William C. Davis is temporarily assigned to Colt as the "XM16E Engineering Project Manager." On Colt's request, Davis designs the 68 grain GX-6235 projectile. The projectile features a 10-caliber secant ogive. This bullet requires a 1-in-9" twist; however, it shows excessive fouling when tested in a 1-in-7" twist barrel.

May-June: Colt's supply of CR 8136-loaded ammunition runs out. Acceptance testing continues with WC846 loaded cartridges. As result, Colt requests reinstatement of the maximum cyclic rate wavier. The TCC refuses. In response, Colt suspends production of the XM16E1. M16 production for the USAF continues.

June: Olin declines to submit a new powder.

In the report "Study of Current Primer-Sensitivity Criteria for 5.56MM Ammunition," Frankford Arsenal notes that the restrictive primer sensitivity requirements are having the predicted results, causing high rejection rates of primer lots by manufacturers.

July: Commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland asks Army Material Command to examine the issues necessary to issue M16/XM16E1 rifles to all US troops in Vietnam.

The USAF orders an additional 36,682 M16 rifles.

August: Reports of the XM16E1 bolt and bolt carrier seizing begin to surface from Vietnam.

September: C.E. Schindler releases a report titled "Investigation of Alternate Propellants For Use in 5.56mm Ball and Tracer Ammunition." DuPont's EX 8208-4 is shown to have moderate fouling, but records higher gas port pressures than WC846. Hercules HPC-11 shows the least visible fouling, but further examination shows that heavy fouling has constricted the gas tube. The report recommends that EX 8208-4 be approved for use in M193 Ball and M196 tracer cartridges, that CR 8136 and IMR 4475 be withdrawn, and that Hercules and Olin reduce the fouling characteristics of their respective powders. However, unlike WC846, HPC-11 is not approved for current use.

October: Colt's military sales manager, James B. Hall, informs General Westmoreland's staff that Colt would stop producing XM16E1 rifles in January if no further orders were made.

At Colt, William C. Davis releases the report "Effect of Ammunition Variables on Acceptance testing of XM16E1 Rifles." It notes that half of the XM16E1s accepted with CR 8136-loaded cartridges would fail when tested with WC846-loaded cartridges. It is suggested that the maximum acceptable cyclic rate might need to be raised as high as 1,000rpm. It is also noted that bolt failures and malfunctions are more likely to occur at higher cyclic rates.

December: Bypassing Army chain of command, Westmoreland uses USAF communication assets to contact Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Westmoreland requests an additional 100,000 XM16E1 rifles. After Sen. Russell applies pressure on Secretary McNamara, a letter contract for the requested rifles is placed with Colt.

Initial testing in the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) trials also indicates that XM16E1 rifles are more likely to foul, exhibit high cyclic rates, and suffer more malfunctions as a result when using cartridges loaded with WC846 versus CR 8136.

1966...

Federal begins to offer a 68 grain 5.56mm Ball cartridge.

General Electric designs a tungsten core 5.56mm AP bullet for ArmaLite. FN also produces a tungsten core AP projectile; the cartridge is later designated the P96.

January: Colt presents the TCC with Foster Sturtevant's latest development: the "Buffer Assembly Having a Plurality of Inertial Masses Acting in Delayed Sequence to Oppose Bolt Rebound". While intended primarily to prevent light strike misfires due to bolt bounce in automatic fire, Sturtevant's new buffer unwittingly saves the day on a second front. Since the new buffer weighs roughly three times more than Stoner's original design, it reduces the overall cyclic rate to acceptable levels.

Procurement is authorized for 2,050 CAR-15 "Submachine guns."

The Army's CDC establishes a requirement for 30 round magazines. Ideally, all future production M16-type rifles will come equipped with these. However, Colt has difficulties with their first few designs. Made with a continuous curve, the magazines would not fit properly in some mag wells given the machining tolerances in the lower receiver. (The current straight-then-curved 30 round mag design will not be ready for production until late 1968/early 1969.)

February: The requirement for the Colt CAR-15 "Commando" is increased by 765.

April: In a document titled "Improved Performance of Ammunition for the M16 Rifle," G.A. Gustafson recommends that the 68 grain .224" homologue to the .30 M1 Ball be revived for use in the 5.56mm cartridge. Gustafson suggests that 50,000 bullets of this design be purchased from Sierra for constructing test ammunition. He also recommends using test rifles with both 1-in-12" and 1-in-9" twist barrels. (At the time, Gustafson is assigned to Aberdeen's Test Analysis and Operations Office.)

June: Contract DAAF03-66-C-0018 is signed with Colt for 403,905 XM16E1 rifles. The Army will receive 213,405 (including Westmoreland's request for 100,000). Another 114,000 are earmarked for Military Assistance for the South Vietnamese, and the final 76,500 will go to the USMC. The contract will be amended 256 times before it is complete. One of the first is for an additional 15,372 rifles for the USMC.

Separate contracts for 2,815 Colt Commandos and 19,236 XM148 grenade launchers are also signed.

M193 and M196 cartridges loaded with DuPont EX 8208-4 begin to arrive for issue.

During the Infantry Rifle Unit Study (IRUS), an XM16E1 suffers a casehead rupture, extensively damaging the rifle. This is the third incident recorded during the history of the M16/XM16E1 program. Use of Federal Cartridge lot FC1830 and FC1831 is suspended. Case hardness tolerances are suspected.

July: A casehead rupture damages a fourth rifle, this time with Remington ammo (Lot No. 5189).

August: All US Army units in Vietnam have been issued the XM16E1.

September: The closed-end "birdcage" flash hider is approved to replace the open three-prong model. The latter was prone to snagging and breakage, and was also suspected in assisting the capillary movement of water into the bore.

Rock Island Arsenal releases the Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual (POMM 9-1005-294-14) for the "Submachine Gun 5.56mm, CAR-15." Colt introduces multiple improvements including a smaller telescoping stock/buffer assembly, redesigned round handguards, which were held in place with a wedge-shaped slip ring, and the "noise and flash suppressor." The suppressor incorporates multiple expansion chambers to slow and cool the propellant gases, thus reducing the muzzle blast from the short barrel. This is particularly important as safety certification was previously withheld due to the high sound levels recorded during testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. (However, the same device is later ruled to be a NFA-restricted "silencer" by the BATF.)

October: After widespread reports of stoppages and other malfunctions, General Westmoreland requests technical assistance. A team including Colonel Yount's assistant LTC Underwood, representatives from WECOM, and Colt are sent to Vietnam to investigate. A near total lack of maintenance and cleaning is blamed. Underwood is so appalled that he insists that Colonel Yount come to Vietnam to witness the conditions himself. Yount complies with the request. Colt's Robert Freemont is sent to Rock Island to examine rifles returned from Vietnam.

Colt reports to the TCC on the issue of reverting to 1-in-14" twist barrels. Colt indicates that existing rifle barrels already have a 10% rejection rate due to tested accuracy, despite meeting physical machining specs. Colt states that a change to the slower rate of twist would require relaxed accuracy standards.

November: The State Department's Office of Munitions Control approves the export sale of 18,000 AR-15 and 2,300 AR-15 HBAR M1 by Colt to the Republic of Singapore. This creates a political firestorm when news of the sale becomes public. While Colt claimed that the export rifles would come from expanded production quotas, this not only angered those who thought these rifles should go to US troops, but also US allies with troops stationed in Vietnam. For instance, South Korean, Philippine, and Thai troops in South Vietnam were all armed with surplus M1 Garands.

General Electric's Chemical Materials Department proposes a disposable polymer-bodied magazine for the M16.

The ACS announces the Army's intent to adopt the XM16E1 for standardization and issue for all US troops stationed outside of Europe.

December: Colt begins equipping new production rifles with Sturtevant's improved buffer. Retrofit of older rifles will not be complete for nearly a year.

Frankford and Rock Island Arsenals report that they cannot find a cause of the reported "blow-ups." Only cartridges loaded with inappropriate powders (handgun or shotgun-type) caused the same level of damage during testing.

The final results of the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) program are released. While the XM16E1 rifles exhibit one of the highest malfunction rates of the rifles tested (10.6 per 1,000rds), it is deemed superior for Army use. The Stoner 63 is considered attractive, but the report concludes that it does not offer enough of an advantage to warrant current adoption.

[Ken White]

Meh, we can "disagree" but I am right on reliability.

I will point out that you posted three pages of fluff, none of which mentioned the results of the Troop Test -- really strange that, it was the most exhaustive test, running for almost six months using Joe instead of selected shooters (and overseers) and was the basis for Vance's recommendation to OSD which differed little from the recommendation submitted by Division to DA. It is perhaps notable the only time the world reliability appears is at this:

1959...

May: The final report of the CDEC trials, "Rifle Squad Armed with a Lightweight High-Velocity Rifle," is released. It projects that a 5-7 man squad armed with AR-15 rifles would have a higher number of hits and kills than the then current 11 man squad armed with M14 rifles. The report particularly praises the reliability of the tested AR-15 rifles, and suggests that a SCHV design such as the AR-15 or LWMR should be further developed as a replacement for the M14.

While they lauded reliability, they also said it should be further developed. I think that equates to the Scots court verdict of 'Not Proven.'

Nor is it likely ever to be. We should be able to disagree on a subjective judgment on an issue that cannot really be proven due to skews of data and events provided by the vagaries of time and place much less ammunition lot differences and user capability and competence.

CDEC was a fan of the weapon but refused to take any responsibility for it after it was fielded. CONARC took the politically astute position it wasn't their job and thus they had no comment. Benning was not a fan (Benning was and is rarely a fan of much of anything with the word 'change' involved... ). That may be why USAIS did such a poor job of fielding the training on the weapon.

That one bit of praise for reliability is also sort of overruled by the last paragraph quoted in your posts:

The final results of the Small Arms Weapon Systems (SAWS) program are released. While the XM16E1 rifles exhibit one of the highest malfunction rates of the rifles tested (10.6 per 1,000rds), it is deemed superior for Army use. The Stoner 63 is considered attractive, but the report concludes that it does not offer enough of an advantage to warrant current adoption.

All this is really sorta irrelevant but your posts above do illustrate the politicization, in and outside the Army, of the process -- which was my point.

[SethB]

The modern rifles are very reliable. And cheaper than the M14, FAL, etc. by thousands of dollars.

They also accessorize more easily, and are significantly lighter.

I'd say that you'd have a hell of a time finding a better rifle COTS, and if you further developed it (as the DoD has refused to do for many years) you can improve on what already exists.

The M16A2, M16A4 and M4 all had their genesis in non-DoD projects. The Army in particular is disinterested in change. It took twenty years to upgrade the extractor spring buffer in the M4 because the bean counters didn't want to reduce the parts commonality between the rifles.

Metrics...

[Pete]

"The Saga of the M16" by Dick Culver (Major, USMC, Ret) can be read at this link. One of Major Culver's last assignments in the Corps was running the Sniper School at Quantico.

[SethB]

There are details in that story that are either wrong or overstated.

I don't doubt that the initial run of weapons didn't work well, but almost every part in the rifle was changed in some substantial way by 1970. The rifle today has a handful of parts that are the same as the initial runs.

This is simply a story of a rifle that was fielded too soon.

As for the complaints about the rim on the cartridge, those are quite valid. The rim should be thicker.

As it stands, I've run up to 3,500 rounds between cleanings before experiencing a malfunction.

Another thing to point out. When the barrel, gas system, spring and buffer were shortened the magazine was not upgraded. Using a modern magazine from Magpul or SAW allows the weapon to feed at cyclic rates that the old magazines can't touch.

The amount of design work that has been done in the last ten years (when I bought my first AR15) is incredible.

ETA: Here is some food for thought. The author is a retired USMC CW5 and NYPD cop. He keeps a very accurate gun book and photographs parts breakages and keeps a book of pictures that illustrate the common failings of the design.

[Ken White]

The modern rifles are very reliable. And cheaper than the M14, FAL, etc. by thousands of dollars.

Imbel FALs sell for about 900 bucks today. TRW's $90 would be about 900 today and the M4s are running about 2K. So I doubt the cost comment is very accurate.

They are reliable today but all the arguments praising the M16 still overlook the real problem -- the cartridge and it's effective range.

They also accessorize more easily, and are significantly lighter.

Define significant -- and do the accessories count?

I'd say that you'd have a hell of a time finding a better rifle COTS, and if you further developed it (as the DoD has refused to do for many years) you can improve on what already exists.

Either the Stoner 63 or the AR-18 say Gene stoner doesn't agree with you...

It's adequate, there are better rifles out there but they are not mo' better to the point that the cost of change is justified. Changing the cartridge is far easier and there's no excuse for not having done that.

Disabling the full auto capability would help save money and provide an incentive to shoot better....

[SethB]

Imbel FALs sell for about 900 bucks today. TRW's $90 would be about 900 today and the M4s are running about 2K. So I doubt the cost comment is very accurate.

You can't extrapolate costs from 50 years ago. All of those rifles took a lot more hand fitting than newer designs do. For instance, the FAL requires that the headspace be set, then the barrel removed and the extractor groove cut in, and the barrel reinstalled. I'm not sure where in the process it is chromed, but that would add another step. Those IMBEL rifles are actually kits, which means that someone took the hit already. They don't reflect the real cost. A DSA FAL costs thousands.

Someone at DoD apparently asked for prices on a new M14. Apparently they would cost somewhere in the $3,000 range.

In comparison, the M16 series has gotten cheaper to make over the years because machining has gotten a lot cheaper with the proliferation of advanced machine tools.

They are reliable today but all the arguments praising the M16 still overlook the real problem -- the cartridge and it's effective range.Define significant -- and do the accessories count? Either the Stoner 63 or the AR-18 say Gene stoner doesn't agree with you...

The Stoner 63 was never fully finished. Stoner worked on it for most of the rest of his life. The AR 18 was developed to make a more cost effective rifle; the major downside is that he couldn't use the direct impingement system that he'd already sold to Colt, and the receiver requires welding which adds a step. Neither would support the proliferation of tubes that are so common on modern American rifles.

As for the weight, an M16 is 2.5 pounds lighter than an M14. Once you add an ACOG and a rail for a light and an IR laser you are into the four pound range. The FAL will be slightly heavier.

It's adequate, there are better rifles out there but they are not mo' better to the point that the cost of change is justified. Changing the cartridge is far easier and there's no excuse for not having done that.

Agreed. I've told you before that I think we ought to move from 5.56 and 7.62 to 6x35 and 7x46. Of course, you have more experience in that area than I ever will, and my opinion is worth what you paid! But that would mean that we can make something smaller and lighter for leadership and support types and still get the range that Infantry can use.

Disabling the full auto capability would help save money and provide an incentive to shoot better....

I agree. As well as simplifying the trigger group. The current burst trigger is horrendous.

As for shooting better, that is a huge issue all on its own...

[Rifleman]

It's adequate, there are better rifles out there but they are not mo' better to the point that the cost of change is justified.

I like the idea of the HK416 because it's essentially an M16 with a gas piston and operating rod. It has the advantage of having much in common with the rifle troops have already been trained on but should be even more reliable. But you're probably right that the improvement isn't worth the cost.

Changing the cartridge is far easier and there's no excuse for not having done that.

6.5, 6.8 or something else?

[Ken White]

6.5, 6.8 or something else?

But the same crowd (or, actually, mentality...) that orchestrated the M14 and messed up the AR-15 and its cartridge and ran the recent test debacle (LINK)was responsible for killing that cartridge. It had a lot of potential but the initial trial versions developed at Frankford Arsenal did great, 1,000m tracer burn, penetration almost equal to the 7.62x51, only slightly heavier than the 5.56, solid 5-600m effective range from short barrels and up to 1,000m in longer (as in SAW) barrels. It wasn't perfect but it was good, better than the 5.56 in all iterations to date.

Both some of the 6.5 / 6.8 mods are okay as well -- even the 5.56 could be tweaked a bit as the Mk 262 shows -- the basic 5.56 prob however is pill size, it's just a hair to small in all dimensions for effective use against humans in all conditions with marginally trained troops. It's a good cheap peacetime cartridge and adequate for most, not all, combat in the hands of well trained, capable users. It is simply a poor combat cartridge for every Joe and Jane, the most common users.

[Ken White]

for over 50 years...

You can't extrapolate costs from 50 years ago.

Of course you can if you do it fairly and as objectively as possible. -- which you inadvetently aren't doing. Can't compare small scale civilian sales and large military contract costs.

All of those rifles took a lot more hand fitting than newer designs do.

Not so much newer designs, the FAL, M14 and M16 series are all the same age. The lack of hand fitting now is due to manufacturing improvements, specifically computerized machining. Apply those techniques to the other designs and you'd get cost reductions.

For instance, the FAL requires that the headspace be set, then the barrel removed and the extractor groove cut in, and the barrel reinstalled.

And that's just one of its problems -- however, that one could be eliminated with CNC manufacturing.

Those IMBEL rifles are actually kits, which means that someone took the hit already. They don't reflect the real cost. A DSA FAL costs thousands.

In reverse order, DSA is using Austrian tooling from the Stg58 and adds a lot of new techniques and makes a few weapons in exotic mods to be sold to civilian buyers who can afford to indulge themselves with classy toys. If they were to get a military contract, the volume would bring cost reductions. The Imbel rifles of which I spoke were not the kits imported by some here in the States and of which I'm aware but the complete weapon made by Imbel in Brazil for the Brazilian Armed forces (Their 5.56 variant is a good design with a bad cartridge... ). You cannot equate civilian arms with military contract arms -- two different markets, two different levels of quality (usually), two different prices.

Someone at DoD apparently asked for prices on a new M14. Apparently they would cost somewhere in the $3,000 range.

You got a source for that? I'm dubious. Not on the cost, everything DoD buys is vastly overpriced initially because some Congroid is pushing it and trying to take care of his constituent. Once the initial buy is made, the haggling begins and the acquisition guys get prices down to sensible levels. The M14 is a good example, Springfield Armory (the original) built 'em for an undisclosed cost but the first commercial contract, to Winchester ran about 200 bucks a rifle thanks to the Connecticut Congroids. Harrington and Richardson got the second contract at about $120 a rifle and TRW got the final contract at an average $90 a weapon. Don't know what the current M4A1 cost is but IIRC, when FN got the contract away from Colt briefly back in 1988, it was $420 a copy -- allowing for inflation, that'd be about 8-900 today.

I simply do not know why anyone in recent years would suggest buying M-14s; there are better 7.62mm weapons out there and the Mk 11 and M110 would seem to make buying the M14 a really dumb idea. Hmm. That may mean you're apparent story is correct...

In comparison, the M16 series has gotten cheaper to make over the years because machining has gotten a lot cheaper with the proliferation of advanced machine tools.

Uh-huh -- and the same thing would apply to the other rifles were they still in production.

The Stoner 63 was never fully finished. Stoner worked on it for most of the rest of his life. The AR 18 was developed to make a more cost effective rifle; the major downside is that he couldn't use the direct impingement system that he'd already sold to Colt, and the receiver requires welding which adds a step. Neither would support the proliferation of tubes that are so common on modern American rifles.

We can disagree. The Stoner system was indeed a work in progress and it too would have benefitted from 40 years of manufacturing porgress. It also used a piston, perhaps because of Colt, perhaps because Stoner realized that every infantryman is not really a Rifleman (capital 'R'). IMO, use of a piston is not a downside, it is an upside. It provides a positive mechanical reliability improvement and eases maintenance. Most piston weapons can be fired dry because the piston (long stroke, short stroke is little better than impingement) provide far more energy than does a direct gas spurt. That's an advantage in the Arctic, really cold weather (as in northern Europe or Korea, in the Afghan mountains in winter), extremely dusty areas (ala both current theaters) or in tropical rain forests (ala earlier theaters or the Philippines) where water gets into everything...

Either way, both were improvements in most respects, not least reliability, over over the M16 in my opinion and I've shot all three.

Agreed. I've told you before that I think we ought to move from 5.56 and 7.62 to 6x35 and 7x46. Of course, you have more experience in that area than I ever will, and my opinion is worth what you paid! But that would mean that we can make something smaller and lighter for leadership and support types and still get the range that Infantry can use.

I'd go for a single caliber, PDWs are not really viable in intense long term combat. Like the Mk 46 and Mk 48 MGs, they may be okay for the SOF types who get extra training and do not do sustained combat but they aren't durable enough for sustained, day in - day out combat use by Joe and Jane. Plus you increase the log burden for no good reason for a marginal stopping power weapon with limited uses.

As for shooting better, that is a huge issue all on its own...

True -- and it's unlikely to improve much -- and that is the problem with weapons selection. A combat weapon should be selected based on worst case scenarios and use by marginally trained or even poorly trained troops. Reliability in really poor conditions is the most important factor with stopping power a close second. Go for a higher plateau (or a lighter one, as happened with the M16) and you'll have trouble. There should also be planned, phased upgrading and replacement instead of waiting for problems to occur.

I realize you're an M16 fan. Good for you, nothing wrong with that and in fact there's a lot to be said for it. However, the rifle -- M16, M4 or any other -- is a tool, that's all that it is. I spent a lot of years salivating over all kinds of exotic weapons and wanted all the toys I could afford. Then I realized they're simply tools, no less and no more. I can admire many of them but selecting the right tool for the planned job is important and admiration isn't an issue.

[SethB]

for over 50 years... Of course you can if you do it fairly and as objectively as possible. -- which you inadvetently aren't doing.

Inadvertent is correct. It's hard to get reliable numbers sometimes, and contract price can very. The current M4s are coming equipped with M68s and RAS, or so I hear, which means that you can't really compare them.

Can't compare small scale civilian sales and large military contract costs.

Agreed, although often I can get something for less as a civilian because I am not getting the package.

Not so much newer designs, the FAL, M14 and M16 series are all the same age.

The M14 is largely (but not entirely) derivative of a design that dated back to the '20s. The FAL was of course much newer. The M16 came about a few years after the FAL in the form of the AR10. The actual AR15 was at least a decade behind the FAL, although the original FAL was much, much different than the production version.

I'd like to have one of the original FALs but I am looking for a transferable BAR at the moment.

The lack of hand fitting now is due to manufacturing improvements, specifically computerized machining. Apply those techniques to the other designs and you'd get cost reductions.And that's just one of its problems -- however, that one could be eliminated with CNC manufacturing.

Some things can't really be made better with CNC tooling. Colt 1911s still require handfitting that an M&P doesn't. And it will always be like that. It's a design feature from a time when skilled labor was cheaper than machines.

My AI AW can take any barrel ever made for that rifle because it was held to a tolerance. A Remington does not have the same advantage, although both were made using computerized tooling.

In reverse order, DSA is using Austrian tooling from the Stg58 and adds a lot of new techniques and makes a few weapons in exotic mods to be sold to civilian buyers who can afford to indulge themselves with classy toys. If they were to get a military contract, the volume would bring cost reductions. The Imbel rifles of which I spoke were not the kits imported by some here in the States and of which I'm aware but the complete weapon made by Imbel in Brazil for the Brazilian Armed forces (Their 5.56 variant is a good design with a bad cartridge... ). You cannot equate civilian arms with military contract arms -- two different markets, two different levels of quality (usually), two different prices.

You are correct and I shouldn't have been so cavalier with those numbers. As for the FAL in 5.56, the tilting bolt design should work better with the thin rim but I can't say that with experience.

You got a source for that? I'm dubious. Not on the cost, everything DoD buys is vastly overpriced initially because some Congroid is pushing it and trying to take care of his constituent. Once the initial buy is made, the haggling begins and the acquisition guys get prices down to sensible levels. The M14 is a good example, Springfield Armory (the original) built 'em for an undisclosed cost but the first commercial contract, to Winchester ran about 200 bucks a rifle thanks to the Connecticut Congroids. Harrington and Richardson got the second contract at about $120 a rifle and TRW got the final contract at an average $90 a weapon. Don't know what the current M4A1 cost is but IIRC, when FN got the contract away from Colt briefly back in 1988, it was $420 a copy -- allowing for inflation, that'd be about 8-900 today.

I don't have a source. I know that they are buying spare parts for the M14 that cost almost as much as a new M4...

As for the M4 price, I think you are about $100 low but again it is hard to compare across the board.

I simply do not know why anyone in recent years would suggest buying M-14s; there are better 7.62mm weapons out there and the Mk 11 and M110 would seem to make buying the M14 a really dumb idea. Hmm. That may mean you're apparent story is correct...

Those rifles have had all manner of problems over the years. That and they are extremely expensive. The new EMC is supposed to solve a lot of the issues, and the PMAG 20LR reduces magazine prices and weight.

Uh-huh -- and the same thing would apply to the other rifles were they still in production.We can disagree. The Stoner system was indeed a work in progress and it too would have benefitted from 40 years of manufacturing porgress.

Interestingly enough, the Navy has a ton of Stoner LMGs sitting at NSWC Crane. In the box...

It also used a piston, perhaps because of Colt, perhaps because Stoner realized that every infantryman is not really a Rifleman (capital 'R'). IMO, use of a piston is not a downside, it is an upside. It provides a positive mechanical reliability improvement and eases maintenance. Most piston weapons can be fired dry because the piston (long stroke, short stroke is little better than impingement) provide far more energy than does a direct gas spurt. That's an advantage in the Arctic, really cold weather (as in northern Europe or Korea, in the Afghan mountains in winter), extremely dusty areas (ala both current theaters) or in tropical rain forests (ala earlier theaters or the Philippines) where water gets into everything...

While I don't think that the current gas system is necessarily a problem, the long stroke system has advantages. The short stroke AR systems are a joke and add problems. Most of the benefits and costs of the AR have to do with the unique rotating bolt. Having only 22.5º to turn, the receiver is shorter, but that short stroke means that the turn is accomplished much more quickly than in a Kalashnikov, where the 90º turn slows extraction. That is accomplished at the cost of receiver length. Trade offs. Pretty sure we've all heard about that one.

Either way, both were improvements in most respects, not least reliability, over over the M16 in my opinion and I've shot all three.

The Bushmaster ACR is an attempt to package the AR18 into something that has modern ergonomics and accessory mounting capability. Time will tell if it will work... But I don't see a high degree of success so far.

I'd go for a single caliber, PDWs are not really viable in intense long term combat. Like the Mk 46 and Mk 48 MGs, they may be okay for the SOF types who get extra training and do not do sustained combat but they aren't durable enough for sustained, day in - day out combat use by Joe and Jane. Plus you increase the log burden for no good reason for a marginal stopping power weapon with limited uses.True -- and it's unlikely to improve much -- and that is the problem with weapons selection. A combat weapon should be selected based on worst case scenarios and use by marginally trained or even poorly trained troops. Reliability in really poor conditions is the most important factor with stopping power a close second. Go for a higher plateau (or a lighter one, as happened with the M16) and you'll have trouble. There should also be planned, phased upgrading and replacement instead of waiting for problems to occur.

Agree with all of those things save one, with my usual caveats about my experience. I don't think the caliber issue is that great an issue. After you issued all of your soft skills, artillerists, weapons crews, support personnel and leadership with a small, light weapon you'd actually have about five times as many guys using the smaller weapon. This was shown to be true already in the Second World War when production of the M1 Carbine was greater than that of the M1 Rifle, not counting the numbers of SMGs that were produced as well. Your ammunition consumption rates would be higher for the larger caliber, I suspect, especially if your belt feds were chambered for it.

Maintenance of weapons is a joke. It doesn't happen. A round counter would be helpful, but there are always people who would use it too literally... But we do a bad job of diagnosing basic problems. Most Soldiers don't know, for instance, that their springs have a service life...

I realize you're an M16 fan. Good for you, nothing wrong with that and in fact there's a lot to be said for it. However, the rifle -- M16, M4 or any other -- is a tool, that's all that it is. I spent a lot of years salivating over all kinds of exotic weapons and wanted all the toys I could afford. Then I realized they're simply tools, no less and no more. I can admire many of them but selecting the right tool for the planned job is important and admiration isn't an issue.

I agree with you entirely. I just find that the AR15/M16 has worked for those jobs that I've so far encountered.

[Ken White]

The M14 is largely (but not entirely) derivative of a design that dated back to the '20s. The FAL was of course much newer.

In part. It owes a lot to the 1918-ish BAR...

Still, the production versions all appeared about the same time. I was not in the unit in the 101st that ran the Troop Test on the M14, but was in a neighboring unit and IIRC, they had a number of problems with the FAL that were later traced to a flawed metric / inch conversion. They also had a couple of AR-10s, didn't get to shoot one there but did in the Dominican Republic when we captured a couple of ex-Batista NWM made AR-10s in 1965. It had a bad gas in the face problem...

Those rifles have had all manner of problems over the years. That and they are extremely expensive. The new EMC is supposed to solve a lot of the issues, and the PMAG 20LR reduces magazine prices and weight.

Of course they've had problems, they're new and with no major, existential war on, there's no pressure to get it fixed quickly. They suffer from low procurement quantities which drives up the price. I'll also point out that they stem from the same flawed (IMO) AR-10 / M16 design...

Interestingly enough, the Navy has a ton of Stoner LMGs sitting at NSWC Crane. In the box...

Yep, availability doesn't solve the cartridge / rifling problem...

... Having only 22.5º to turn, the receiver is shorter, but that short stroke means that the turn is accomplished much more quickly than in a Kalashnikov, where the 90º turn slows extraction. That is accomplished at the cost of receiver length. Trade offs. Pretty sure we've all heard about that one.

Lack of slow initial extraction has always been a killer for firearms, it is perhaps the greatest flaw in the Stoner design -- though there are others. Trade offs are always necessary, there is and will be no perfect weapon. The issue to me is who decides what trade offs will be made -- and too often, the decision maker is someone with an excess of rank and a distinct lack of practical real world user experience. Those kinds of folks opt for the jazzy instead of practicality.

That's how we got the M16. Interestingly, TRW the last M14 contractor came up with perhaps the best combat rifle to date but did it at a bad time and in the wrong (5.56) caliber. (LINK). It wasn't perfect but had development potential -- we rarely get the best product right out of the design hall. It could've been easily modified to fire single shots (though the cyclic rate was low enough to allow that with trigger manipulation) and fire from a closed bolt. Note they had to hang a useless bayonet on the weapon to satisfy the Primal Ooze in the Ordnance Corpse.

The Bushmaster ACR is an attempt to package the AR18 into something that has modern ergonomics and accessory mounting capability. Time will tell if it will work... But I don't see a high degree of success so far.

It does have potential and we will see, though I'm inclined to believe the Robinson XCR probably has more potential. As an aside, for extended combat, the accessorizing trend -- as a substitutet for better training in too many cases -- just might be getting out of hand.

Agree with all of those things save one, with my usual caveats about my experience. I don't think the caliber issue is that great an issue. After you issued all of your soft skills, artillerists, weapons crews, support personnel and leadership with a small, light weapon you'd actually have about five times as many guys using the smaller weapon. This was shown to be true already in the Second World War when production of the M1 Carbine was greater than that of the M1 Rifle, not counting the numbers of SMGs that were produced as well. Your ammunition consumption rates would be higher for the larger caliber, I suspect, especially if your belt feds were chambered for it.

Remind me again why the M1 and follow on Carbines are not still issued...

The fact that there are more of the types you mention than there are infantrymen is the reason there were more carbines produced. I'm not sure the fact that there are more people who want a light, handy weapon to avoid the weight and hassle of a full scale piece is adequate justification for issuing a marginally performing firearm to people who just might have to shoot back. Those people, I'll point out, are the ones most likely to need a tech solution (i.e. adequate power) to sub for skill.

Maintenance of weapons is a joke. It doesn't happen.

That's because the Army does not train it. We teach it but we don't train it. The Marines used to train it, don't know if they still do. Training means embedding the skill so it's automatic, not showing someone how and telling them they need to do it. That's easily changed -- but it does require NCOs and Officers in training units to do a little more work.

A round counter would be helpful, but there are always people who would use it too literally...

It also adds a bit of complexity, something that should always be avoided. Simple is lifesaving.

But we do a bad job of diagnosing basic problems. Most Soldiers don't know, for instance, that their springs have a service life...

Interesting -- and a training flaw induced by that atrocious Task, Condition Standard show and tell stupidity. Back in the dark ages when I was a Joe, most in Infantry units knew that. Then again, they also knew to count their shots so they didn't get caught having to change mags at a bad time and offload mags and all springs routinely when they could...

Progress is not necessarily our most important product.

[Fuchs]

It also adds a bit of complexity, something that should always be avoided. Simple is lifesaving.

The international consensus seems to be that a translucent back side of the magazine is a good compromise.

[SethB]

It had a bad gas in the face problem...

Easy fix. The Mk 12 has a Gas Buster charging handle.

Lack of slow initial extraction has always been a killer for firearms, it is perhaps the greatest flaw in the Stoner design -- though there are others.

Agreed.

That's how we got the M16. Interestingly, TRW the last M14 contractor came up with perhaps the best combat rifle to date but did it at a bad time and in the wrong (5.56) caliber. (LINK). It wasn't perfect but had development potential -- we rarely get the best product right out of the design hall. It could've been easily modified to fire single shots (though the cyclic rate was low enough to allow that with trigger manipulation) and fire from a closed bolt.

Interesting. Never seen that one before.

I'm inclined to believe the Robinson XCR probably has more potential.

The XCR is a good concept poorly executed...

As an aside, for extended combat, the accessorizing trend -- as a substitutet for better training in too many cases -- just might be getting out of hand.

I can't answer that. But I can see the utility to improvements in sights, which is primarily what is added.

Remind me again why the M1 and follow on Carbines are not still issued...

I would assume that a large part of that is because we have lighter, smaller weapons with three times the range close at hand already. But I'd like to hear what your experience was.

The fact that there are more of the types you mention than there are infantrymen is the reason there were more carbines produced. I'm not sure the fact that there are more people who want a light, handy weapon to avoid the weight and hassle of a full scale piece is adequate justification for issuing a marginally performing firearm to people who just might have to shoot back. Those people, I'll point out, are the ones most likely to need a tech solution (i.e. adequate power) to sub for skill.

Speaking from my perspective, we have a lot of crew served weapons on our MTOE, including Mk-19s, M240s, M249s and M2s. If we get down to IWs we will be at spitting distance.

That's because the Army does not train it. We teach it but we don't train it. The Marines used to train it, don't know if they still do. Training means embedding the skill so it's automatic, not showing someone how and telling them they need to do it. That's easily changed -- but it does require NCOs and Officers in training units to do a little more work.It also adds a bit of complexity, something that should always be avoided. Simple is lifesaving.Interesting -- and a training flaw induced by that atrocious Task, Condition Standard show and tell stupidity. Back in the dark ages when I was a Joe, most in Infantry units knew that. Then again, they also knew to count their shots so they didn't get caught having to change mags at a bad time and offload mags and all springs routinely when they could...

Progress is not necessarily our most important product.

Ideally Soldiers would be able to replace basic parts themselves, but at this point even the armorers can't do that...

[SethB]

The international consensus seems to be that a translucent back side of the magazine is a good compromise.

Clear polymers are weaker than colored ones. Black is the strongest. I'll take my magazines in FDE, thank you, and in fact I have. I have eight of them sitting behind me at the dinner table.

When I refer to round counters I am talking about accelerometers for determining service intervals, not for the purpose of maintaining a loaded weapon.