MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Schmedlap]

gute,

Of my 3 OIF deployments, my second in 2005 was the longest and entailed more small unit fighting than the other two combined. The overwhelming majority of our missions were fire team level. I think that our doctrine says that shouldn't happen (my memory is fading). It was the norm for us and I know it was also the norm for several other units in other locations.

Regarding barrel length, I never understood that complaint. Shorter barrel has so little impact on long-distance accuracy as to be a non-issue and the shorter barrel is much more preferable in restrictive terrain, whether it be thick vegetation or inside buildings.

Regarding reorganization into 9-man squads and one weapons squad - there is no reason that a platoon cannot task organize this way if the mission and situation dictate it. But even when you have a weapons squad, it is really just adding a WSL to keep track of the guns. Not a huge difference. The guns are still dispersed throughout the platoon formation and will generally only coalesce when placed in a SBF or if the platoon manages to establish a large base of fire on chance contact.

I'm a bit wary of the assertion that squads should not be used for base of fire + assault. I don't think our doctrine accepts that, given the squad attack battle drill. I've seen it occur to great success and mission requirements are often not going to accommodate more than a squad-sized patrol.

[jcustis]

So for some of the more knowledgable members/readers how about re-organizing the U.S. Army platoon and Marine Corps rifle platoons into two 9-man maneuver squads and one 9-man weapons squad? The manuever squad would have IWs, M32s, M72s, DMs, and IARs, and the weapons squad would have two M240s and a mortar. Question: Would a company commander be better off with three platoons of 40-45 or four platoons of 30 (not including weapons platoons) or does it not matter?

There are already a metric you-know-what ton of threads that pose similar questions in the Trigger Puller room.

[William F. Owen]

In Attack State Red (follows the Anglican Battalion in Helmand Province in 2007) most the kills by the Brits were from mortar, GPMG and snipers. When Taliban was killed in close it was with IW or grenades.

Has been true since WW1.

At the end of WWII the U.S. Army did a study about the performance of U.S. infantry in WWII and concluded that squads should be no bigger then 9-10 and a squad should solely be a maneuver element or a base of fire, but not both. There were similar conclusions at the end of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Treat such assertions with extreme caution. How big should the squad be is not a sensible question.

Question: Would a company commander be better off with three platoons of 40-45 or four platoons of 30 (not including weapons platoons) or does it not matter?

IMO, it doesn't really matter. Training and leadership matters more. The good guys would be able to use either organisation as and when it mattered.

[kaur]

Well, Conway pulled a little "I told you so" on us today in describing the success of the M16A4 in the Afghan theater and his continued advocacy for the platform as the standard for most Marines.

Marines like that M4 carbine because it looks cool. And I've had some Marines complain to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying 'you know, the officers are getting these things, but we're still having to carry this rifle.' Well, the Marine Corps will always be a rifle Marine Corps. The carbine is an extension of the pistol, not a reduction of a rifle. And in the Afghanistan scenario where you're shooting long distances you gotta be able to reach out and touch 'em. And a carbine is just not designed to do that.

Except the M4 carbine has a max effective range of 500 meters on point targets, according to the books, as does the M16A4. But we all know the longer-barrelled M16 is better at longer ranges (and the Army admits that too).

So it looks like it's end zone dance time for the Corps in their decision to keep the long rifle. Though if we go back to urban warrens like Ramadi and Fallujah, I'm sure we'll hear the same complaints again.

http://kitup.military.com/2010/03/to...-standard.html

[gute]

There are already a metric you-know-what ton of threads that pose similar questions in the Trigger Puller room.

I know, I've read em.

[Schmedlap]

The carbine, practically speaking, is no more an extension of the pistol than the Javelin is an extension of the hand grenade.

And in the Afghanistan scenario where you're shooting long distances you gotta be able to reach out and touch 'em. And a carbine is just not designed to do that. Except the M4 carbine has a max effective range of 500 meters on point targets, according to the books, as does the M16A4. But we all know the longer-barrelled M16 is better at longer ranges (and the Army admits that too).

First off, this illustrates the absurdity of characterizing the carbine as an extension of the pistol. Second, how often are we taking 500 meter shots at people with M4 or M16 with the intent and expectation of killing rather than suppressing? Third, if you're concerned about range, give the squad an M240 and/or attach a sniper team.

[SethB]

The bullet used in M855 has a ballistic coefficient of .304.

With a muzzle velocity of 3,110 feet per second and a zero at 50M, the bullet is all but dead on at 100M, drops by about 14 inches at 300M and drops a whopping 65 inches at 500M.

In comparison, the same bullet at 2,970 from an M4 drops two inches more at 300M and 10 inches more at 500M.

These things always look different with numbers attached...

[Schmedlap]

At 300 plus meters, does wind have a significantly greater effect on the round fired from the M4?

Do we have similar comparisons for the 72-grain with the hollow tip fired from each weapon?

[Ken White]

First off, this illustrates the absurdity of characterizing the carbine as an extension of the pistol.

I agree, it's a shortened rifle, not an extended pistol (that's what those dippy PDWs are...). Issue is not what it is, it's what it is not. It isn't a rifle...

Second, how often are we taking 500 meter shots at people with M4 or M16 with the intent and expectation of killing rather than suppressing?

Probably not often. However suppression against people who know what they're doing is a myth -- and a waste of time. Killing is not mythical and has a far greater deterrent effect than 'suppression.'

The question in Afghanistan as opposed to Iraq is how may shots are not taken due to that range limitation? The follow on question is do the bad guys realize this?

Third, if you're concerned about range, give the squad an M240 and/or attach a sniper team.

The 240 is a heavy hump to get a capability that an M14 can provide at a third the weight. Plus I doubt there are enough 240s or Snipers to give each Squad one -- or the other. Nor are more Snipers needed, the DM process works.

That lack of an effective weapon is one reason why more Squads are not kicked out on patrols and missions, not only is the lack of training conducive to distrust, so is the known lack of weapon effect capability...

You and I both know that the Army wouldn't be doing this (LINK) unless there were valid needs.

(And it's probably overkill for the job, an issue M-14 would be adequate; this mod weighs half as much as a 240; not smart...)

[jcustis]

The EBR is catching a lot of flak from members at another board I frequent. They ask the simple question of why the USA did not simply invest in procuring a weapon with the ergonomics of the AR-series, and go for something that simply had a better center of gravity and handled more easily.

I haven't had a M14 since I was a Security Forces DM many moons ago, and I haven't handled the other possible battle rifle options out there, but I've wondered if the EBR is simply around because we have so many receivers and components still in stores.

[Ken White]

I've wondered if the EBR is simply around because we have so many receivers and components still in stores.

Big part of it. 'Turf' issues also; can't have a grungy dirty leg Grunt DM carrying the same weepon a highly trained SOF Dude or even a Bn Sniper might have... .

[SethB]

At 300 plus meters, does wind have a significantly greater effect on the round fired from the M4?

Do we have similar comparisons for the 72-grain with the hollow tip fired from each weapon?

At 300M the difference is all of 7/10ths of an inch, assuming a full value 10 MPH wind.

Issuing the M14 in any flavor won't really increase range if M80 is used. But ammunition is whole different story.

The best way to compare ballistics is to use a calculator. I use the JBM. You'll need to know the MV and BC of a projectile.

[Schmedlap]

The 240 is a heavy hump to get a capability that an M14 can provide at a third the weight.

Yeah, but it's a two-fer of range and more firepower. And it's a weapon already organic to the platoon.

You and I both know that the Army wouldn't be doing this (LINK) unless there were valid needs.

I never assume a logical nexus between a need and a solution when we're talking about initiatives by the Army.

The SDM, I believe, began with Iraq. It was not so much a desire for accuracy at long distances as it was just a general desire for accuracy when operating in an area teeming with civilians. Our original SDM rifles were modified M16A4 rifles that were supposed to use the 72-grain ammo (that's how we got it). Incidentally, my unit never saw a need for them. If you can't hit a human being at 200 meters or less with an M4, then the weapon isn't your problem. But we appreciated the bipods and the (albeit small) authorization for the good ammo.

[Ken White]

Yeah, but it's a two-fer of range and more firepower.

frequently -- no; most often -- wasted on the firepower side? You have to remember, I'm a "belt feds only at Company level" guy. Machine guns are important and have a purpose, going on patrols with them is not smart.

And it's a weapon already organic to the platoon.

So's the EBR -- now. As you've long said the 5.56 problem is the ammo -- always has been. I realize the M4 is light and handy but it also is a defensive weapon and cannot replace a rifle. The cartridge problem just adds to the shortfall.

I never assume a logical nexus between a need and a solution when we're talking about initiatives by the Army.

Quite wise. Me too. I think in this case it's really a pre-emptive move to keep Coburn quiet when they decide to keep the M4 as the primary issue weapon after the next contract is awarded. I think that's very ill advised but they're unlikely to care what I think...

The SDM, I believe, began with Iraq.

OEF 2 in Afghanistan, 2002, when the M4 shortfalls were driven home with typical engagement ranges running 4-800m. You can hunt White tails in Maine with a .30-30; go to Colorado for the elusive Wapiti and you'll need something with more range and punch. Mountain fighting has to be expereinced to be appreciated. METT-TC yet again...

If you can't hit a human being at 200 meters or less with an M4, then the weapon isn't your problem.

True but if you cannot sensibly fire at one at something more than 300m away, it is your problem. Bad guys may be bad but they ain't dumb.

[GI Zhou]

From my readings the issue of a full power 7.62mm light machine gun in the section/squad is as old as the first working light machine gun. The Australian Army in the Malayan Emergency and in Vietnam and afterwards had a section/squad with a two man scout group, a four man rifle group and a three man machine gun group with a Bren in Malaya and a M60 in Vietnam and a rifle group (with a M79 in Vietnam). The siuation is very fluid at the moment regarding weapons inside the section, and depends on the situation, if they are motorised or mechanised and what support weapons are available.

In the early 1980s, the PLA went from two or three fire teams (depending on the unit) to a section/squad with a rifle group wth an RPG, a machine gun group witnh a Type 56 RPD and in the jungle a scout group. They have gone back to two three-man fire teams and a three man HQ group with an RPG, although mechanised units have only seven or eight personnel, and the section commander may stay in the vehicle to direct the vehicle's fire.

All have worked in combat although the US Marine Corps 13-man squad had tactical advantages and the new Australia platoon may end up being near 40 as well. I myself favour four section platoons, especially mechanised, for the flexibility it brings.

Having shot all the 7.62 x 51mm pistol grip weapons, but not a M-14 which I rectify one day, they are all heavy and accurate although the Mk110/SR-25 is in a league of its own. I have shot the old AR-10 and it was beautiful to fire. I understand the EBR was selected because the components were in store and thus quicker to field.

Cheers

[Schmedlap]

You have to remember, I'm a "belt feds only at Company level" guy. Machine guns are important and have a purpose, going on patrols with them is not smart.

We'll have to agree to disagree there. I can count the number of company level operations that I've done since 2003 on two hands. The rest was platoon or below and I can't imagine going without the 240s. Fire team missions - perhaps our most common - yeah, I can see leaving the 240 at the PB.

I realize the M4 is light and handy but it also is a defensive weapon and cannot replace a rifle.

Again, I suspect we'll agree to disagree. There were very few occasions when anyone I knew was on the defense. On most of those occasions, their 240s were the defensive weapon. The vast majority of our missions were offensive and M4s did the honors more often than not.

OEF 2 in Afghanistan, 2002, when the M4 shortfalls were driven home with typical engagement ranges running 4-800m... if you cannot sensibly fire at one at something more than 300m away, it is your problem. Bad guys may be bad but they ain't dumb.

Well, if that is the case, then so be it. If they think they need M16 rather than M4, or 7.62 rather than 5.56, give it to 'em. I'm not one to second guess why they're doing what they're doing, but I am genuinely curious how these engagements are unfolding. On the rare occasion that we were shot at from 400 meters or more, there wasn't much thought given to hunting down the perpetrators - even on flat terrain. Our view was that as soon as we start moving in that direction, they're going to disappear. We'd make a cautious bound forward into 40mm range, lob a few rounds (if reasonable METT-TC), and go back to what we were doing. I don't think we would have operated differently if we were packing M16s, M14s, and M24s.

Frankly, I think we've got a knack for invading the wrong types of countries. We need to invade some caribbean island where our primary weapons will be squirt guns, and instead of sitting down for three cups of chai we do jello shots.

[Ken White]

...The rest was platoon or below and I can't imagine going without the 240s. Fire team missions - perhaps our most common - yeah, I can see leaving the 240 at the PB.

Wars differ, it's that METT thing again. Iraq was one war, Afghanistan is yet another.

That said, you're a Mech guy, no Weapons Squad with two MGs and two Javelins. Different ball game when you have to hump everything. Operating 50 clicks from resupply and on foot or by hoptiflopter insertion is also different than was the practice in Iraq.

...The vast majority of our missions were offensive and M4s did the honors more often than not.

Of course it did -- it was all you had. That does not change the fact that the weapon was designed to provide a lighter, handier defensive weapon for troops who were not expected to need the more powerful rifle as those troops were not expected to do offensive missions and that for that job a 200 meter true effective range was adequate.

For offensive movement on foot in a mountainous or desert area not totally flat a little more power and range is helpful. The fact that Building 4 and Barry McCaffery screwed up royally and made the M4 the Army weapon doesn't change the designed purpose, it merely changes the usage. We got away with it in Iraq; they are not getting away with it in Afghanistan -- as could have been and was predicted...

On the rare occasion that we were shot at from 400 meters or more, there wasn't much thought given to hunting down the perpetrators - even on flat terrain.

Different war, different fighters. The Talibs and their allies are not Iraqis.

I'll forgo commenting on how you handled contacts 'cause I wasn't there. I will suggest though that your method as you describe it against a determined and trained enemy would seem to me to be slightly more than dangerous. I also suspect that if that 400m shooter used an AK, he was even less accurate than an M4 shooter. If, OTOH he used a PKM or an old .303 Enfield or a Nagant and you knew he wasn't a random shooter who got paid to fire off a magazine but was a member of a group of indeterminate size and unknown goals, you might have handled it differently.

GI Zhou:

From my readings the issue of a full power 7.62mm light machine gun in the section/squad is as old as the first working light machine gun. The Australian Army in the Malayan Emergency and in Vietnam and afterwards had a section/squad with a two man scout group, a four man rifle group and a three man machine gun group with a Bren in Malaya and a M60 in Vietnam and a rifle group (with a M79 in Vietnam). The siuation is very fluid at the moment regarding weapons inside the section, and depends on the situation, if they are motorised or mechanised and what support weapons are available.

A Bren was and is not a LMG, it's an automatic rifle (AR) -- that's not semantic, it's important. I totally agree with an AR or two or three per Squad / Patrol but a far heavier belt fed machine gun generally has no place in most patrols. It is too prone to malfunction (even the ultra reliable GP MAG / M240 series), ammo gets misaligned in belts too easily, most people waste a LOT of ammo when they have one, it's heavy and if it breaks you still have to carry the heavy motengator.

The Bren and the BAR as well as other magazine fed ARs had a place, adopting the M60/MAG was an effort to emulate the German theory (without the thorough German training...) and just really didn't work too well. However, since they are what's available as de facto replacements for the ARs, they logically get used -- even if they probably should not be as often as they are. Which was my point...

Your comment on motorized or mechanized folks is quite important because those guys do not have Weapons Squads, they pass the MG around and use it as needed. Dedicated gunners and Leaders in light, walking units who are reasonably well trained do things differently. As they should. METT-TC is quite important...

And those factors vary significantly from war to war and enemy to enemy; my purpose in this sub thread is to emphasize that there is no one size fits all and we should be careful to not base decisions for place C with Unit X on what we learned in place A with Unit Y...

[kaur]

I think that this picture is ok for this thread

[Kiwigrunt]

A Bren was and is not a LMG, it's an automatic rifle (AR) -- that's not semantic, it's important.

First time I've heard that.
Knowing how you think about belt feds I can see why you would say that, but I don't think you'll get much support with that opinion. The Bren not being a LMG that is, not where and when it should be employed.

[Fuchs]

This "automatic rifle" terminology à la BAR seems to be a national American thing.
I've never really seen "automatic rifle" as separate from "light machine gun" or "machine gun" in non-U.S. literature. So for roughly 5.8 billion people the Bren is a LMG if they know it at all.


Pretty much all light machineguns of the pre-RPK period were either slimmed-down belt-fed machine guns (such s MG08/18, MG34 in LMG configuration) or magazine-fed weapons with full calibre cartridges (such as BAR, Bren, SIG KE 7).