MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Ken White]

Call a Bren a LMG if you wish. I'd argue that it and the BAR did not have large capacity magazines nor were they belt fed so the AR tag seems appropriate to me and I say that in full realization that most won't agree -- and not really caring as the issue really is employment method(s), not the name.

As Kiwi Grunt says, the issue is use and I've seen way too many MG34-42-3 / M60 / MAG types have problems on patrols to consider carrying one of them unless I determined an overwhelming need would probably exist; to carry it just because it's available is the norm and it's not, IMO, all that smart.

I've also seen too many machine gunners -- and even AR men -- and ammo bearers killed or wounded because the heavy weapon and / or ammo slowed them down and was a clumsy load. Not because the weapon was a target, though that too has an impact. There is certainly a place for LMGs and some patrols may need one available -- many will not but it is habit to take it...

Accurate, killing fire suppresses -- a large volume of harmless fire does not, certainly not against people who know what they're doing. It also is not smart to think, train or operate as if all your opponents will be lesser beings.

METT is where it's at...

[Schmedlap]

... you're a Mech guy, no Weapons Squad with two MGs and two Javelins...

I did light and mech. Even when mech, most missions were dismounted patrols at night (rolling around in loud vehicles gave early warning to the enemy).

... the weapon was designed to provide a lighter, handier defensive weapon for troops who were not expected to need the more powerful rifle as those troops were not expected to do offensive missions and that for that job a 200 meter true effective range was adequate.

I guess that was where I didn't get the "defensive" thing. If you mean that is how it was designed, sure. I just don't see the use of referring to a weapon as defensive if it can be used offensively in most situations in a given theater (for example: Iraq). My Glock model 23 is defensive, but if someone steals it and goes on a killing spree, it's sufficiently lethal to get the offensive work done. I think a more useful way to look at it would be "appropriate or inappropriate for the mission." If I'm in built up areas where I'm climbing through narrow doors and windows and engagements are 200 meters or less, then I want a shorter weapon that isn't going to slow me down. If I'm in mountains or open terrain and distances are much longer, then the length of the weapon is no longer a concern in terms of my ability to move across the terrain.

I'll forgo commenting on how you handled contacts 'cause I wasn't there. I will suggest though that your method as you describe it against a determined and trained enemy would seem to me to be slightly more than dangerous.

Agreed. But the jokers we were dealing with weren't very determined or well-trained. The risk of killing civilians wasn't worth responding any other way.

[Ken White]

I did light and mech.

Or darn sure should be...

...it's sufficiently lethal to get the offensive work done.

So's a hammer but...

I think a more useful way to look at it would be "appropriate or inappropriate for the mission."...

Agree with all that, METT said a different way.

...The risk of killing civilians wasn't worth responding any other way.

Understood and I know you're too smart to not realize all enemies and situations differ and different solutions are often required. I just piggyback on your posts to emphasize that point to those who might not realize it. Mostly because I fit in a couple of wars where the major problem and reason for our less than stellar performance was poor training but the second biggest factor for our shortcomings was certainly Commanders who were NOT aware of that simple and seemingly obvious fact.

[JMA]

The article by Major Ehrhardt raises very similar points:



....




It seems to me that the TB try mostly rather hard to reduce the risks incurring when engaging coalition troops. They can usually initiate the contact on their terms, using terrain, ROE and distance to their advantage and seem to increasingly tailor their forces, as Bob said, to suit this conditions. All those factors buffer them against a "decisive" tactical defeat. This low-risk tactics seem to work well as part of their overall strategy, as it allows them to preserve their fighting forces and still greatly impact the ability of the coalition to fulfill their missions.

A very high ratio of crew-served weapons like GPMG, mortars and RPG could allow them to get a lot more out of their limited pool of better trained men while employing the rest more effectively in their support.


Firn

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges? Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover? Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place? I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

[jcustis]

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges? Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover? Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place? I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

by engaging at longer range (at least in the south) I suspect that they hope to get lucky every once in a while, or force us to maneuver and be susceptible to pressure plate IEDs along avenues of approach/withdrawal. I also suspect that they aren't comfortable closing the distance with us, where they can be susceptible to our 40mm HE fires.

[Ken White]

Why are the TB initiating contact at long ranges?

Sometimes. They have the same issues with equipment and terrain we do. They did know however that most of our weapons were not terribly effective beyond 2-300m. The Marines changed that with their M16s, good for 3-400m and the Army changed it by issuing a lot 7.62 weapons. Thus what they did do and now do are slightly different.

Are they inflicting casualties? Is the fire effective enough to warrant taking cover?

Sometimes to both. Usually not unless the friendly unit is really careless.

Why are patrol moving in the open in the first place?

Usually because there is no cover or concealment locally available. Check most of these pictures: (LINK).That and the occasional bout of carelessness.

I'm trying to understand the mind set here.

Not much to understand, the Afghans know the terrain and figured out early that a PKM or Enfield could allow them to pot at NATO patrols from beyond retaliation range. That got fixed.

What won't get fixed is their terrain knowledge versus that of most urban-suburban raised NATO troops and their eyesight which is better because they had to have great awareness to survive. The average Afghan will spot an ambush the average westerner will walk into or will with the naked eye spot a person on a distant hill that the westerner has difficulty discerning with binoculars.

That said, there is no "problem," per se just the same old kinds of factors everyone who fights has to deal with, just different enemy, different terrain...

As Jcustis said, they want to avoid closing if possible; they most always get creamed when they do that.

[GI Zhou]

Ken,

The Australians in Vietnam and afterwards used the M60 with lttle trouble as we carried an assault pack of 100 rounds, as used on the M249 SAW which itsxelf is the epitome of a belt fed assault rifle. They are heavy to carry but provide a devastating base of fire and the Australian Army used them in Vietnam and used the L7/MAG-58 afterwards. The Brits used the L7 in the Falklands and in the dirty little wars they got involved in eg Oman and employed as many they could get their hands on. The BAR isn't much lighter than a M60 and was used a base of fire in three or four man fire teams. The M60/L7 has a three man team for ammuniton, protection of the gunner, and to spread the load of carrying of it and ammo. It is a crew served weapon inside the section/squad.

[Firn]

By engaging at longer range (at least in the south) I suspect that they hope to get lucky every once in a while, or force us to maneuver and be susceptible to pressure plate IEDs along avenues of approach/withdrawal. I also suspect that they aren't comfortable closing the distance with us, where they can be susceptible to our 40mm HE fires.

Besides the reasons I and others already mentioned they might also want to give green local fighters a shot at the enemy without getting them killed too easily. This way the more experienced guys can observe their performance during their first taste of combat. It also raises morale and perhaps pay.

From their strategic point of view an indecisive firefight against Western soldiers could simply part of their delaying actions and their efforts to make our efforts more difficult, along the "you have the watches, we have the time" theme.


Firn

[Ken White]

The Australians in Vietnam and afterwards used the M60 with lttle trouble as we carried an assault pack of 100 rounds...

As did we also use the M60 at Platoon level as a super-AR. We both used it because it was there, not because it was the best tool for the job. Both 1 and 5 RAR did great work -- in spite of the not always appropriate weapon...

... as used on the M249 SAW which itsxelf is the epitome of a belt fed assault rifle.

That's a contradiction in terms if I ever saw one. . The "belt fed" is the problem that imposes most of the reliability and clumsy handling issues MGs have. Plus, the 249 is not a good weapon on several counts...

The BAR isn't much lighter than a M60 and was used a base of fire in three or four man fire teams.

Yeah, I know, I carried one in Korea. When you dumped the Bipod and the actuator and sear trip mechanism to get full and semi auto instead of the rather dumb two auto rates, the BAR weighed only about 13-14 pounds and you could fire semi auto at night without giving away the location of an automatic weapon.

The M60/L7 has a three man team for ammuniton, protection of the gunner, and to spread the load of carrying of it and ammo. It is a crew served weapon inside the section/squad.

Yes, it is -- and it takes three men to service it? Not too wise IMO, that means two people are for all practical purposes, slaves to the weapon. As a weapon on a patrol, you're adding two more people plus the gunner -- or you're not carrying enough ammo. Either way, you can adversely affect the patrol's capability for little real benefit in most cases.

I am not saying never take a belt fed MG on a patrol, I am saying it usually goes out of habit and simply because it is there, not need and that it often is unnecessary. METT-TC rules...

We do the same three man thing thing in Light Infantry units and place the guns in a Weapons Squad at Platoon level; in Mechanized units, there are no weapons squads, it's just a weapon that can be carried, mission dependent by each squad. The Marines still (last time I noticed) very wisely have their 240s / MAGs in Machine Gun Platoons at Company level. They can farm them out to Rifle Platoons when required but they also can train their MG Squads (with more than one ammo bearer per gun) in the finer arts of MG employment like indirect and plunging fire. IOW, they wisely use the weapon as it was designed to be used and as it is most effective.

[Uboat509]

I must have been really deprived when I was still in the infantry. I read about ammo bearers in the FMs. I even heard stories about other units that had them but never once in all the years that I was in the infantry did I ever see an ammo bearer. Perhaps my experience was unique or at least unusual but we never had them at platoon level. I can't imagine having them at squad level.

[Ken White]

caused by the M60 being placed here and there in the Platoon instead of staying in and with the weapons squad during that war -- the theory was that anyone could carry MG ammo, so no designated spaces were required "After all, Mech Infantry doesn't even have a Weapons Squad..." -- so those paces were available but often not filled because it 'seemed like a wasted space.' That applies to the 11 man squads that were around from the early 50s until the mid 80s. After that, with nine man Squads, the Ammo bearers were (foolishly) deleted. Peace time 'operations' will do that...

Not much sense having a weapon that does as much harm as good if it's wrongly located.

[Schmedlap]

I must have been really deprived when I was still in the infantry. I read about ammo bearers in the FMs. I even heard stories about other units that had them but never once in all the years that I was in the infantry did I ever see an ammo bearer. Perhaps my experience was unique or at least unusual but we never had them at platoon level. I can't imagine having them at squad level.

They're not in the MTOE, but we always had them on our "battle roster" (what we called the actual roster of how we actually manned the platoon). Battle roster task org had a weapons squad (there was no weapons squad in the MTOE and, thus, no WSL authorized either, but the PSGs and 1SG worked out something so there was an E6 WSL - not sure how that dope deal went down). Now that I think about it, I'm not even sure if we were authorized 3 M240Bs per platoon. If not, I don't know where the extras came from. Anyone missing some MGs?

[Kiwigrunt]

Now that I think about it, I'm not even sure if we were authorized 3 M240Bs per platoon. If not, I don't know where the extras came from. Anyone missing some MGs?

Yes, me, give it back!

[Compost]

A Bren was and is not a LMG, it's an automatic rifle (AR) -- that's not semantic, it's important. I totally agree with an AR or two or three per Squad / Patrol but a far heavier belt fed machine gun generally has no place in most patrols. It is too prone to malfunction (even the ultra reliable GP MAG / M240 series), ammo gets misaligned in belts too easily, most people waste a LOT of ammo when they have one, it's heavy and if it breaks you still have to carry the heavy motengator.

The Bren and the BAR as well as other magazine fed ARs had a place, adopting the M60/MAG was an effort to emulate the German theory (without the thorough German training...) and just really didn't work too well. However, since they are what's available as de facto replacements for the ARs, they logically get used -- even if they probably should not be as often as they are. Which was my point...

It is easy to agree with bits of the above paragraphs but other parts aggravate some of my sore spots. The Bren is not an automatic rifle, it is emphatically a light machine gun. LMGs and also belt-fed MGs are both needed by infantry platoons but such weapons have to be well designed and engineered.

That's not just semantics. It's important because - regardless of training - the potential employment of a weapon is determined by the characteristics designed and built into it.

AR automatic rifle -long barrel individual weapon, EG: FAL, M14
+ light, compact, shoulder-fired
+ magazine-fed, self-loading, selective fire
= accurate semi-auto fire to long range, less accurate auto fire at close range

HBAR heavy barrel auto rifle - long barrel individual weapon, EG: BAR, FAL-HB
(aka MR machine rifle)
+ AR modified or designed with heavy barrel and bipod
+ also possibly larger capacity box or drum magazine
= accurate short burst fire over all ranges

LMG light machine gun - light support weapon, one or two-man crew, EG: Bren, HK11
+ robust, compact, shoulder-fired
+ magazine-fed, quick change barrel (QCB), bipod
= frequent short burst fire to long range

MMG medium machine gun - support weapon, two-man crew or vehicle, EG: HK21, MAG58
+ robust
+ open bolt, belt fed
+ belt-fed, QCB or water-cooled, bipod, tripod or pintle
= sustained burst fire to long range, indirect harassing fire

GPMG hybrid LMG/MMG.

Is it difficult to agree with that list ? Well here are some relevant fragments of military history.

In the late-1950s Australia adopted the 7.62mm FAL in two versions: the L1A1 SLR with auto fire disabled weighing about 4.6kg with an empty 20-rd mag, and the L2A1 HBAR weighing about 6.3kg with empty 30-rd mag and bipod.

However the L2A1's lack of a quick change barrel (QCB) capability compounded by its rifle-type closed bolt/breech made the L2A1 liable to cook-off rounds when heated by frequent or lengthy burst fire. Also firing from a prone position with the long 30-rd mag and correspondingly long bipod resulted in a high sightline that made control difficult.

The L2A1 proved unable to supply a reliable base of fire for each infantry section. Hence infantry continued to use the .303in (7.7x56mmR) Bren.

The L2A1 was issued to some Army (mainly combat support) and also Navy units as a light support weapon (LSW). Also used as an individual weapon (usually with a cut-down barrel) by Special Air Service reconnaissance patrols.

In 1960 Australia adopted the M60A1 belt-fed GPMG to succeed the .303in Vickers belt-fed MMG and the Bren top-mounted mag feed LMG.

The M60 had numerous design faults most of which are quite well known. When hot and/or fouled with propellant residue the self-adjusting constant pressure gas and buffer system could drive the bolt carrier with excess force that broke the firing pin. Intermittently the carrier would fail to return as far as the sear resulting in a runaway gun. Both problems could be caused/aggravated by faulty reassembly as design of some parts permitted them to be installed backwards. Lack of readily replaceable belt container or container enabling extension of engaged belt. Reciprocating charge handle. Carry handle on receiver rather than barrel. Bipod on barrel rather than gas tube. Heat cover over barrel/breech interface. Non-adjustable front sight.

However the M60 was fairly compact, well balanced and hence easy to carry in ready mode. Also the barrel change problems were alleviated by the stellite lining of the chamber and lower barrel. Some of the other problems could be reduced by careful maintenance and frequent cleaning. So although widely criticised the M60 avoided becoming a total disaster.

A 1970 project to recondition M60 receivers that had been distorted by intensive use provided the operational justification (and probably also the political motivation) to address problems. As a result in 1970 the Bren was reintroduced in modified form (as developed by Britain in the 1950s) with a 7.62mm barrel and using the 30 and 20-rd mags of the L2A1 and L1A1. It was locally known as the L4A4 Bren and weighed almost 8.9kg with empty 30-rd mag. Thereafter infantry units were issued both the M60 and the L4A4 with the latter particularly employed for patrols. Some other units had their L2A1 weapons replaced by the L4A4.

In late-1982 a small initial batch of MAG58 GPMGs guns was issued to the Operational Deployment Force. In November 1984 after what was apparently an extended trial, it was announced that a further batch of 676 MAG58s were being ordered to replace some proportion of the M60s. The L4A4 Bren and also the L2A1 HBAR continued in service.

In late-1985 an order for 3,400 belt/mag-fed 5.56mm Minimi GPMG was announced as a LSW to replace some M60s and also the L4A4 and L2A1. Delivery from local production commenced in late-1989 or early 1990 and since then more than 8,000 Minimi have been delivered to Army (and also Navy and Air Force) and the L4A4 and L2A1 have been withdrawn from service.

Regardless of what the above may suggest about marketing and the politics of small arms procurement, I believe that it empirically demonstrates in respect of 7.62mm ammunition the utility of three principal weapon types - AR, LMG and MMG – and suggests that most 7.62mm HBARs and GPMGs emerge as awkward hybrids.

In that context the MAG58 is - due to the location of its feed slot well forward of the pistol grip – poorly balanced and overlong for use by light infantry but well suited for use as a MMG and weighs only 11.8kg unloaded without off-gun belt container. The MG42/MG3 is better balanced than the MAG58 but at 11.6kg unloaded is 2.3kg heavier than its nominal successor the belt-fed HK21 weighing 9.3kg unloaded. The HK21 also seems to be well balanced and continues the practice of having an attached refillable belt container where the rump of an engaged belt can be linked to a fresh belt.

The HK21 in HK11 form with underbody box mag module has a low bipod to avoid the stilt affect and normally carries a 20-rd mag. At 8.45kg with empty 20-rd mag the HK11 weighs only marginally less than the L4A4 Bren with empty 30-rd mag at about 8.85kg. Also it is likely that the Bren can be reloaded with a fresh magazine more rapidly than most other LMGs.

Overall it seems that light infantry patrols in theatres such as Afghanistan would in terms of proven 7.62 mm calibre automatic weapons be preferably equipped with the HK11 and HK21. An alternative combination would involve bringing the L4A4 Bren – possibly with a Picatinny sight rail added to each side of the receiver – back into service for use in conjunction with the MAG58. The fire from those weapons may be usefully augmented at shorter ranges by light supporting fire provided by 5.56mm LMGs and GPMGs.

Rigorous training and practice is needed to effectively employ automatic weapons and to conserve ammunition.

The 7.62mm HBAR has limited utility, and then only in unusual circumstances. In terms of weight carried a 7.62mm heavy barrel self-loading sharpshooters rifle would be more useful.

The contingency experts may anyway insist it include selective fire. Possible solutions, build-in 2-rd burst limiter or suggest a sharpshooter rifle in 8.59mm calibre as equally foolish alternatives.

Finally the GPMG concept may be usefully realizeable and realised when 7.62mm and 5.56mm ammunition for rifles (as opposed to 5.56mm for SMGs/PDWs) are succeeded by an intermediate calibre.

[Ken White]

The Bren is not an automatic rifle, it is emphatically a light machine gun.

To you and most people -- and I have no problem with that terminology even if I don't personally use it consistently.

LMGs and also belt-fed MGs are both needed by infantry platoons but such weapons have to be well designed and engineered.

Agree but I do not agree that the belt fed MG should be assigned to the infantry platoon. To the infantry Company, yes and available with minimum three man crew to the platoons on loan, yes.

the potential employment of a weapon is determined by the characteristics designed and built into it.

Totally agree and I thought I'd sorta said that...

LMG light machine gun - light support weapon, one or two-man crew, EG: Bren, HK11
+ robust, compact, shoulder-fired
+ magazine-fed, quick change barrel (QCB), bipod
= frequent short burst fire to long range {emphasis added /kw}

Agree! Or you can it an Automatic Rifle to upset Fuchs...

MMG medium machine gun - support weapon, two-man crew or vehicle, EG: HK21, MAG58
+ robust
+ open bolt, belt fed
+ belt-fed, QCB or water-cooled, bipod, tripod or pintle
= sustained burst fire to long range, indirect harassing fire

Agree!

The L2A1 proved unable to supply a reliable base of fire for each infantry section. Hence infantry continued to use the .303in (7.7x56mmR) Bren.

The Bren and its ZB 28 predecessor (and its Japanese Type 99 copy) was a great weapon and it was a vast improvement over the ZB 28s predecessor with the same toggle locking system, the BAR.

We had one was that was as almost as good in the M1944 Johnson, 30 round mag, semi on closed, full on open bolt and less than 6kg/14lbs -- but it didn't make the political cut.

The M60 had numerous design faults most of which are quite well known.

Yep. "So although widely criticised the M60 avoided becoming a total disaster." -- but only barely...

As an aside, I served on the Troop Test at Fort Campbell for the M60, we had it and the MG3 and uased the M1919A6 browning (then the issueLMG) as a baseline. We all voted for the MG3 but it wasn't invented here. So...

...I believe that it empirically demonstrates in respect of 7.62mm ammunition the utility of three principal weapon types - AR, LMG and MMG – and suggests that most 7.62mm HBARs and GPMGs emerge as awkward hybrids.

Agree.

Also it is likely that the Bren can be reloaded with a fresh magazine more rapidly than most other LMGs.

Also agree -- and the Stoner 63 system wisely copied that. Politics again intrude...

An alternative combination would involve bringing the L4A4 Bren – possibly with a Picatinny sight rail added to each side of the receiver – back into service for use in conjunction with the MAG58. The fire from those weapons may be usefully augmented at shorter ranges by light supporting fire provided by 5.56mm LMGs and GPMGs.

I totally agree. Not likely to happen, the Generals do not like to admit error...

Rigorous training and practice is needed to effectively employ automatic weapons and to conserve ammunition.

Absolutely correct -- and the US does a very lousy job of it!

Finally the GPMG concept may be usefully realizeable and realised when 7.62mm and 5.56mm ammunition for rifles (as opposed to 5.56mm for SMGs/PDWs) are succeeded by an intermediate calibre.

Agree. The 6x45 XM732 round back in the 70s had great potential...

Politics again...

[Ken White]

Now that I think about it, I'm not even sure if we were authorized 3 M240Bs per platoon. If not, I don't know where the extras came from. Anyone missing some MGs?

Each Mech Squad was authorized one, thus 3 per Mech Platoon versus two per walking infantry Platoon (plus the two Javelins). Ranger Platoons also have three guns (plus the Carl Gustaf -- which is a good deal -- and / or Javelins).

[GI Zhou]

I just spoke To WO2 Ian Kuring, former curator of the Infantry Museum who wrote the history of the Australian Infantry 'Red Cioats to Cams, and who also served in Vietnam. (He said I could quote his name)

In the Korean War, the Australians carried Bren LMGs outside the wire, as there were M1919A4s available in static positions and when behind the wire the Brens supplemented the M1919A4s. The number is not known as they were not part of the TO&E as the US Army would say.

The Australian Army infantry in Vietnam had a command scout group of section comamnder and two scouts, a three man gun group with a M60 and a four man rifle group with a M79. If the section went down to nine men as happened after Vietnam the gun group stayed at three men.

This structure lasted until the introduction of the Minimi (M249) in the late 1980s/early 1990s which by then saw the M60 replaced by an interim buy of the L7 and then later the the MAG-58.

[Fuchs]

Section commander and two scouts? Wasn't this proved to be a poor idea back in WW2?
I recall complaints that they were pinned down way too often when they were ahead.

[GI Zhou]

The two scouts went ahead and the section commander was with the rifle group, as it contained the radio operator, with a PRC-25 for those aged and decrepit amongst us. Excellent idea in the jungle to have scouts and the North Vietnamese Army also used them. One was often equipped with a RPG-2 or equivalent, which was a very effective weapon for breaking contact when surprised.

[Schmedlap]

Each Mech Squad was authorized one, thus 3 per Mech Platoon versus two per walking infantry Platoon (plus the two Javelins). Ranger Platoons also have three guns (plus the Carl Gustaf -- which is a good deal -- and / or Javelins).

Hmmm. Maybe this was another case of extra MGs, but when I was light (and I mean literally "Light" - not AASLT or ABN) we had 3 MGs. Neat thing was that we started with M60s. When we got tagged for an SFOR rotation, we were bumped up in priority for M240Bs, but nobody asked for the M60s in return. So, we were really heavy of MGs (6 per PLT!). Of course, we didn't really use them in Bosnia for anything other than training. But the older guys were happy to keep their M60s and the younger guys were happy with their new M240Bs. It was one of those rare occasions in the Army where everybody was happy. Of course, we did our best to pursue other avenues to crush their enthusiasm, and succeeded spectacularly.