The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan

[jmm99]

of Community Development Councils, as part of the National Solidarity Programme under the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, has a number of links and reports.

Regards

Milke

[Schmedlap]

JMM,

I've actually been reading a number of those specific reports (as well as others) lately and this is reinforcing my initial impression. MoP versus MoE. It's really wonderful that they're building infrastructure in small communities throughout the country. But this is a measure of performance that speaks nothing to measures of effectiveness, sustainability, improving governance, or connecting the communities to the central or provincial governments in any meaningful way other than playing along with the requirements of the NSP so long as the money continues to flow. It also says nothing about contributions to security in general or the ongoing counterinsurgency specifically. This is work that appears to be purely philanthropic and serve no larger strategic or even operational purpose (although it sure is sold as the latter, despite any evidence that I can find).

The one positive aspect, in my opinion, is that the program had developed a capability to funnel money into just about any district with a non-US conduit. Even better, it looks like this program will now be funded with CERP funds. If that translates into additional oversight by ISAF and coordination between NSP and ISAF, then this could be a very positive development. This could take a program that does something very well to no effect and synchronize it with actions of ISAF to hopefully continue doing things well, but for some effect.

[jmm99]

seem pretty candid in assessing its shortcomings (FAQs ## 13 & 14)

13. What have been the most significant obstacles encountered by NSP?

The two most significant obstacles faced by the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) are:

Security (i.e. lack of access to insecure areas): due to the ongoing conflict in four southern provinces out of 34 provinces, it has been difficult to contract Facilitating Partners and for these FPs to gain access to a number of communities. This has resulted in a slow pace of programme implementation.

Funding (the lack of timely and adequate financial resources): the process of raising government revenue and building confidence with the international community to channel international aid though the state apparatus has taken some time to achieve. Donor commitments continue to arrive well behind schedule, and as only a fraction of overall pledges made at international development forums.

The funding gaps and late disbursement by donors with varying fiscal years have led to communities obtaining external loans just to complete projects and paying back these loans when they receive their block grants.

Although NSP has flagship programme status and indisputable social and political impact at the rural community level, fund raising is of primary concern to NSP management and the Afghan government. At this stage, NSP still faces a funding gap and continued efforts are in place to address this situation.

and

14. What is the NSP's most significant remaining shortcoming?

The CDC By-Law, which defines the legal roles of the community and its representatives and recognizes CDCs as the constitutionally based, democratically elected development body at community level, was officially approved by His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in November 2006. Although the CDC By-Law offers a framework within which the CDC can legitimately operate, the greatest shortcoming of the NSP at this moment is the absence of an overall government policy to internalize CDC service provision beyond MRRD.

Consideration at the highest levels must be given to potential opportunities for incremental sustainability of CDCs through, amongst other actions, the devolution of a fiscal policy allowing CDCs access to government-generated revenue as a continued resource for funding development activities.

This would be the beginning of a reduced dependency upon external financial resources and the establishment of sustainable economic activities to further enhance rural incomes while ensuring greater coordination of appropriate service delivery at community level.

The CDCs have not been emphasized by other Astan power centers, but are included in the Karzai government's plans - e.g., 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report (p.134 pdf):

Questions remain about the sustainability of CDCs as the original NSP grant support is phased out. However, the integration of CDCs into district level planning structures under the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP), along with increased awareness of the bylaw may reinforce the legitimacy of the CDC as a community representative institution. In many areas, there are already programs to group CDCs together and provide support through other rural development programming. Longer-term questions about the relationship between CDCs and the constitutionally-mandated village councils, or the formal court system, remain unanswered but are gaining prominence.

My initial impression was that NSP-CDC seemed more the type of program beloved of folks who wear fairly expensive Western suits, speak passable English and are like "US".

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

As you start to evaluate this stuff, the question is not and cannot be: How many schools can we build?

It has to be: How many schools can they operate and sustain?

We have a lot of magical thinking going on that will all come home to roost in the near future. At our expense, millions of Afghans are in school, being trained for expectations, the nature of which are, at present, unfulfilable.

The UN points to the "ticking time bomb" of some one million graduates per year coming out of the internationally funded schools, but with no prospects for gainful employment, either in the public or private sector as it exists in Afghanistan today.

Do they all travel oversees to become auslandarbeiters sending remittances home--- the way most low-resource places work? Do they transform and revolutionize Afghanistan, and if so, how? Where is this all headed?

I remember the reality in Kirkuk in 2008, when the $28 million US-funded and built "state of the art" trash collection and waste disposal system came on line. The city was handed a proposed bill for $3-5 million per year to operate it---an amount unthinkable in Iraq, and infeasable in Kirkuk's provincial and municipal budget structure.

We have projects going everywhere, and every one has both a permanant operating cost, and the need for huge technical, logistical, operational and maintenance demands---all on some yet to be created fiscal structure.

The reason these places had few resources or services was because, to a great extent, they could not afford them, or conversely, within limited fiscal resources, they were not a relevant priority.

It is fine for us to drop "boxes" of governments, projects, and service demands all around, but, without any prospect for a sustainable fincnail and operational structure, these things are like a "dream" or a "hope" for the future, but there is no plan, and no viable economic structure to keep these things going.

First, we propose a several hundred member military/police structure that will costs billions per year just to meet payroll, let alone capital and operating budgets. Next, a complete K-12 education system, public health care, and infrastructure/utilities (water, sewer, electrical). Unless I'm mistaken, Afghanistan can not even afford the fuel costs for any of these systems, let alone the actual costs.

Behind this huge new permanent structural deficit is, perhaps, the belief that these things will create improved economic expansion, but what is needed to support this is actually an economic explosion far beyond even China's or India's growth rates. Alternately, Afghanistan is a perennial basket case and international beggar. While this may be our accidental goal, it is no guarantee of political stability in a country that values its independence, and has no real centralized societal structure.

The surrounding neighbors have huge advantages in manufacturing and export. They will swamp all serious efforts for Afghanistan from developing internal markets and opportunities except in very limited roles. Thus, Afghanistan is, at best, a supplier of low-value raw goods and agriculture to these strong neighbors. How do you sustain a huge infrastructure and social service system on that basis?

Certainly, we can believe that international aid will always be needed in Afghanistan, but that is no guarantee that it will be adequate and available.

At some point in the future, someone will change office, commitment or interest. Whether that someone is in the US or Afghanistan doesn't matter.

Once that happens, the chickens come home to roost. But there are not enough of them to either eat or sell.

The US military budget cannot and will not operate for much longer as the development funding source for Afghanistan, or its other equivalents.

The best way to test the viabiity of a development project is to pose the basic economic "scarcity" test---to do this, you must give up something else. Which is more important?

The military and foreign service stabilization and reconstruction operations do not function on economic grounds. They just don't get it.

[Christian]

Yes, Brick is quite likely right. But of you want a firm analysis backed up by a much, much bigger study you will have to wait a while for it:

http://www.nsp-ie.org/

[davidbfpo]

No other thread seemed suitable and this thread is about development and nation-building.

Subtitled:

As the Coalition forces prepare to pull out, other Brits commit to real ‘nation-building’ — educating the next generation. Mary Wakefield reports from rural Afghanistan.

The scene is Worsaj, in Takhar Province (North East Afg.) and vists the work of an expat - who has her own blog:http://sarahfane.blogspot.com/

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...ala-land.thtml