The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan

[Schmedlap]

Article: The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan

I just read this on the recommendation of Joshua Foust and found this to be a very well thought out paper on the potential of Community Development Councils in Afghanistan. It is not a short article, but it is a very quick read if you are interested in the material (36 pages of text, plus 12 pages of charts and endnotes). In doing some recent searching for information about NSP/CDCs, all that I found was glowing praise (followed by reasons why we need to spend more money on them, which is then funnelled to various NGOs, Afghan officials, and pads the discretionary accounts of various Coalition bureaucrats, and so on - often the same people praising the program or often people closely associated with them). This was the first piece that I found that did not give glowing praise. On the contrary, it gives a fairly thorough rebuke.

Under what conditions can customary organizations provide public goods? I argue that four mechanisms—separation of power among community organizations, checks and balances between organizations, the ability to raise local revenue under a hard budget constraint, and the presence of economic veto players—facilitate the provision of public goods. These four conditions provide a revenue basis and accountability mechanisms that prevent predation and promote the delivery of public services.
...
Customary organizations in Afghanistan are not the only local organizations that satisfy some these conditions... Warlords and commanders lack accountability and separation of powers. They may have the ability to tax, but they have no accountability mechanisms... Local non-customary organizations in Afghanistan, whether political parties, warlords and their command structure, development councils, lack many of the conditions outlined above, especially separation of powers and integrated checks and balances that can prevent abuse. For example, CDCs do not derive their authority from the people, despite the claims democratic elections. They are upwardly accountable not to the community but to the NGO that provides them access to funds. They submit paperwork detailing their activities not to community members or to district government officials, but to the local NGO implementing the project in the area. There are no self-enforcing accountability mechanisms present in these organizations. CDCs are also limited in their ability to raise local revenues. CDCs generally do not collect revenues from individuals. These organizations redistribute resources accumulated through non-productive sources, specifically from international financial assistance, and are thus “rentier” community organizations. They are dependent on outside sources of revenue for support. When such support is absent, as it often is, these organizations will have limited opportunities to provide public goods because they have no revenue.

Thoughts?

[ptamas]

Thoughts?

A telling study. Just read it once and I have not found the holes yet...that will likely show up later as edits to this post.

1. From an academic perspective it is a very well executed article.
2. It is very clear on its own limitations
3. It offers a pretty clear framework for understanding/assessing local governance structures
4. Uses the example of the NSP to talk about induced local governance structures in a most helpful way...diaggregates the dimensions of interaction in a manner that is structured by the framework used to explore the conditions necessary for effective forms of local governance.
5. Ends by clearly posing an entirely reasonable and very difficult question
6. It disaggregates institutions and individuals in a most helpful way
7. It is not prejudiced (romantic or critical) vis. traditional institutions

My concerns (at this point)

1. it does not discuss substantially the reliability of the data on which its quantitative analysis is taken
2. it does not offer qualitative studies that contradict the conclusions
3. it appears to be a bit mission driven

I'm sure I'll feel silly about how impressed I am by this article at some time in the future, but for now, it looks pretty good.

-peter

[Steve the Planner]

Wow.

She did a great job of articulating the holes in the strategy to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan---notably that this is not a stabilization and reconstruction effort, but one that requires a substantially transformative outcome, in a very short and unrealistic timeframe without adequate resources or planning.

Reminds me, point for point, of the issues raised by the Provincial Development Councils in Iraq---sheiks Councils---set up as a patchwork effort to bypass the flailing and ineffective early local and provincial governments after 2006.

A great "patch," but one that invariably avoided the problem, and, in so many ways, made it worse by bringing all the local "goodfellas" into control of the project money (this despite serious commitments and goodwill by some involved in the process).

My read, as with Iraq, is that we keep Learning the Lessons of the bosses and folks in organizational power in these reconstruction efforts ---everything we did was great, effective, and needs to be replicated over-and--over again as we move up the organizational ladder to new and more vexing problems. This despite the fact that any independent observer knows they didn't help in Iraq and won't help in Afghanistan.

My guess is that one of the downsides to announcing a withdrawal schedule in Afghanistan was to, in effect, underscore the need for quick, stop-gap "panaceas," in lieu of a genuine commitment to understanding serious development issues. Did I say "low-hanging fruit," and "rotational" performance measures?

At this point, we would do better to turn the whole "big picture" thing over to a handful of successful learners who've spent 2,3,4 tours out amongst the problems---ship them to the White House for an advisory meeting on "why everything you try fails," and make a new game plan from those LESSONS NOT YET LEARNED."

[Schmedlap]

The reading that I've done on CDCs suggests to me that we're all about measures of performance with no regard to measures of effectiveness. X dollars spent and Y things built. That's nice. To what end? My favorite is when people brag that the CDCs even get stuff done in insurgent territory. Great! You just gave the Taliban a generator.

[J Wolfsberger]

The reading that I've done on CDCs suggests to me that we're all about measures of performance with no regard to measures of effectiveness. X dollars spent and Y things built. That's nice. To what end?

Bingo! They are bringing the same problems extant in both private and public stateside sectors to Afghanistan. The difference is that in the US, organizations usually have a staff of "worker bees" who know how to get results in spite of the bureaucracy. That is not likely to be the case in Afghanistan.

This reminds me of a post a few weeks ago from an officer on the ground about his experience with an NGO planning meeting. They kept bringing up things that they should develop plans for, he kept saying 'we've already done that.'

[ptamas]

The reading that I've done on CDCs suggests to me that we're all about measures of performance with no regard to measures of effectiveness. X dollars spent and Y things built. That's nice. To what end? My favorite is when people brag that the CDCs even get stuff done in insurgent territory. Great! You just gave the Taliban a generator.

The measures of effectiveness bit is something most organizations I've seen struggle with. In most cases they have awful proxy indicators sometimes chased by people who don't understand their link to desired effects. Those indicators can be chased in all sorts of mutually incoherent ways none of which have much to do with realizing desired effects. The thread on the Marines here is interesting. I've seen mutually destructive incoherence from the same unit in the same theatre at the same time and in the same profession.

[J Wolfsberger]

The INCOSE METRICS GUIDEBOOK FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT provides:

1. Understanding of metrics and measurement
2. Description of the measurement process
3. Guidance for using the example metrics set
4. Guidance for tailoring the metrics to project or customer requirements
5. Guidance for defining new metrics through a step-by-step process related to goals and objectives
6. Guidance on how to build a metrics capability (from theory to application)

These apply even when the subject system is human. If anyone is interested, PM me.

[Steve the Planner]

There's a post on Abu Moqawama: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...l-centcom.html

It cites a study just done that describes how CERP funding can be directly correlated to lesser SIGACTS, therefore it was effective.

I read the study, and it actually indicated that more study was needed to go beyond the idiot analysis provided.

There sure as heck is a direct correlation between SIGACTS and the increase in patrols, which are the trailing source of CERP funds. Where do they find these people to give these waste of time grants to, then fly them to conferences in London to explain. Sounds better than working, but I would just be too embarrassed to do that kind of work.

SIGAR is just releasing investigations on 30 more US thefts of reconstruction funds (mostly bribes and kickbacks). I wonder if there is any difference in effectiveness between CERP funds stolen or wasted, and CERP funds spent for overly expensive and inefficiently provided humanitarian relief services?

Lots of studies and PR, but its mostly smoke and BS.

Steve