Iraq - A Strategic Blunder?

[Schmedlap]

It’s conventional wisdom that overthrowing Saddam’s regime and installing a new government was a strategic blunder. What is the rationale that explains why it was a blunder? I know all of the rhetoric (Bush is evil; American Soldiers are victims; we rape and torture everyone we meet, etc, etc). But what is the actual intellectual rationale for why it was a blunder? I'm sure there is one, but it's tough to find amidst all of the other nonsense.

From my naïve standpoint, I see a dictatorship replaced with a democracy, many foreign debts to Iraq forgiven, the likelihood of increased oil production benefiting all Iraqis rather than just the ruling regime, a dramatic improvement in quality of life for the Kurds, removal of sanctions on all of Iraq, a government that has established friendly relations with its neighbors, creation of security forces that are far less abusive or corrupt, and a military unlikely to attack neighbors or its own government. What am I missing? There is no perpetual state of emergency like in Egypt, no Theocracry and ridiculously mismanaged economy like in Iran, no entrenched extended families pillaging the country’s resources like in Saudi Arabia. Even if you want to assert that Iraq will be dependent upon us for years to come, I've got one word for you: Israel.

Is it really such a disaster?

[Entropy]

Personally, I think it's too early to tell, but here are some factors to consider:

- The apparent success of the Iraqi government may very well be transitory. I don't think it's too far-fetch to consider that it could all fall apart and go back to civil war.

- The long-standing balance of power in the Gulf was broken and overthrowing Saddam greatly strengthened Iran's strategic position. I think Iran received much greater benefit than we did from Saddam's overthrow. There isn't another regional power, except us, to confront Iran if needed.

- There is the continuing question of whether it was worth it on a cost-benefit basis. Again, too soon to tell for certain, but absent the threat of WMD's the benefit to US interests were questionable considering the costs in my estimation. Maybe in the future the benefits will more clearly outweigh the costs, but as it stands now, I don't think they do.

[Schmedlap]

Originally Posted by Entropy

- The long-standing balance of power in the Gulf was broken and overthrowing Saddam greatly strengthened Iran's strategic position. I think Iran received much greater benefit than we did from Saddam's overthrow. There isn't another regional power, except us, to confront Iran if needed.

My understanding of Iran's benefit is that it now has significantly more influence in Iraq (really, what kind of threat was Saddam from 91 to 03?). Wouldn't that gain evaporate if the GoI collapsed?

[Fuchs]

I wrote this in 2007:

One of the most important reasons to wage war is that people expect to win.
Well, history tells us that losing a war is statistically at least as likely as to win it, but statistics cannot reveal the true horror.

Even many victories are questionable.

So, how shall we decide whether a conflict was won or lost?
The most basic condition that needs to be fulfilled is that a won war actually improved the situation for the country that "won" it in comparison to a "defeat" or no war at all.

Well, this is remarkably difficult to fulfill. Philosophy still doesn't provide us the tools to weight variables like killed citizens, wounded citizens, money, resources other than money, influence, fame and prestige. As every war that's claimed to be "won" included both losses and gains, it's probably impossible to claim victory at all based on math. But perceptions alone as measure for victory or defeat don't help either as everyone is thoroughly manipulated in his perceptions at the end of a war.

Anyway, it cannot hold up to serious thinking that some people claim that victory or not is simply decided by mission accomplishment. To accomplish a mission doesn't tell much, as missions almost never include comprehensive cost limits.

It's certainly no victory to accomplish a small mission that benefits the own country only marginally at costs of several thousand own KIA and several ten thousand own WIA as well as some hundred billion dollars expenditure.

That's also my rationale for why it was a blunder; marginal advantages gained at very high costs.

[Entropy]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

My understanding of Iran's benefit is that it now has significantly more influence in Iraq (really, what kind of threat was Saddam from 91 to 03?). Wouldn't that gain evaporate if the GoI collapsed?

Iranian influence in Iraq is only a part of it. Before 2003, Iraq was Iran's primary threat (and vice versa). That threat is completely gone. There's no threat from Iraq WMD's, no threat from the Iraqi Army, etc. It's not coincidental the Iranians are in the midst of restructuring parts of their military.

[Fuchs]

Actually there was no threat of Iraqi WMD in 1997-2002 either.

There was no conventional Iraqi threat to Iran in 1991-2002 either, for the Iraqi military was almost disarmed in comparison to its 1990 state and the Iranian capabilities.

[Schmedlap]

I guess I should have added in one more question...

What time frame are we looking at when assessing this?

Obviously there is no way to determine this with great precision, but in general terms it seems almost self-evident that the mideast in 2030 will be significantly different as a result of this regime change than it would have been had we plodded away with sanctions that (as far as I know - though I'm no expert) showed no sign of weakening Saddam's grip on power. Do we have reason to believe that it will be more problematic for us in the long term?

Fuchs - I do agree there is a cost-benefit angle that needs to be considered. I'm trying to inquire into what the benefits were (advantageous versus disadvantageous changes in the situation). In my opinion, those are more difficult to ascertain than the costs, as it seems that most of the costs are either front-loaded (money, lives, limbs) or can be forecasted with reasonable accuracy (future military operations, future aid).

[bourbon]

Wouldn't that gain evaporate if the GoI collapsed?

Depends on how much resources Iran would commit, and how they get bogged down by it.

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Actually there was no threat of Iraqi WMD in 1997-2002 either.

However, the Iranians didn't know that. After Iraq killed 1,000,000 of their people in the 1980’s, the Iranians were going to err on the side of caution. And they did.

[Valin]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

My understanding of Iran's benefit is that it now has significantly more influence in Iraq

There are those that say that and it does appear to be true....but I'd also say the Iraqi Shiites also have influence in Iran. What I mean is the political debate going on in Iraq is broadcast into Iran. It seems to me that the Iranians have to be saying to themselves....Why can't we have that kind of open free wheeling debate here? Why do we have to have the Mullahs pick our candidates?

[Schmedlap]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

One factor that has to be considered, but which is impossible to quantify, is the degree to which the focus on Iraq diverted attention and resources from Afghanistan and from the broader effort against AQ.

As many times as that argument gets repeated, I fail to see any merit at all in it. The real deficit in Afghanistan has not been about dollars and boots. It is a deficit of appropriate knowledge and talent within the framework of an unworkable strategy. Throwing money and Soldiers at the problem won't (and wouldn't have) solve(d) that. The development of our strategy in Afghanistan has occurred in the same manner that building a home would occur if you built a room and then attempted to build the rest of the house around it, ad-libbing the blueprint along the way. As we attempt to stuff the foundation underneath the room and tack the kitchen onto the side of it, we're complaining that everything would have gone fine had we only gotten more nails and 2x4's when the project began.*

Originally Posted by Fuchs

In short: USD 100 billion war costs cost more than USD 100 billion. It's likely more close to USD 120 billion because of the additional interest.

Doesn't that assume that we wouldn't have simply spent that money on other stuff? The Bush years weren't exactly a time of frugality on non-defense spending.

[Dayuhan]

Dollars and boots aren't the only issue. Much of the talent and much of the attention that could have led to re-evaluation and strategic adjustment was directed elsewhere, which may be one reason why the gradual deterioration in Afghanistan was largely unnoticed. Again, we don't know how Afghanistan would have gone without the Iraq engagement, and the degree of impact is infinitely arguable. It may in fact be negligible, but I've always thought that starting a war that was not related to AQ at a time when we were going to war against AQ was perhaps not an ideal decision. Unless one absolutely must fight two enemies at once, is it not preferable to fight them one at a time?

[Chris jM]

Schmedlap, great topic and interesting comments thus far.

What still perplexes me was the fixation on WMD. I'm sure that the US Govt were basing their decision to invade on other considerations, and the WMD justification served only as a convenient casus belli. It's hard to judge success when the commander's intent is never stated.

One observation I would like to make is that any proactive action by a dominant power is bound to cause negativity. Stability in the world is important to many, especially in the areas of sovereignty and economics. America, being the greatest power within the system, has a lot to benefit by normalising and standardising the 'rules' she plays by. Should another entity challenge the established norms (say, Iraq invading Kuwait) the general global response is to champion a response that upholds those assumed rules of international affairs. Contrariwise, having America challenge the very norms she is expected to uphold inevitably causes destabilisation.

If one reads Stratfor, they propose that the Iraq undertaking was to force policy changes onto Saudi Arabia and Iran without directly intervening in their affairs. If that's the case, then judging relative success/failure will be a very, very subjective affair.

As a parting thought: if during the paranoia that reigned post Sept 11 it was outlined to the US Govt that in order to prevent any further (substantial) terrorist attacks occurring on her territory for the next decade, two foreign wars were required in Iraq and Afghanistan for the cost paid to date, would Bush have accepted the course he did? I suspect that American (and by extension the liberal world) homeland security has benefitted, however indirectly, from the interventions. I just think it's tragic that the policy was not enacted in a better, smarter way - thus reducing the human cost that has had to be borne by many different nations, Iraq included.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

Doesn't that assume that we wouldn't have simply spent that money on other stuff? The Bush years weren't exactly a time of frugality on non-defense spending.

You can assume that, but then you need to incorporate the benefits of that spending into the (non-)equation, on the side of peace.
It's easier to keep it simple and stick to the already mobnetarised vaiable including the effect of discounted interest.

[Uboat509]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

My understanding of Iran's benefit is that it now has significantly more influence in Iraq (really, what kind of threat was Saddam from 91 to 03?). Wouldn't that gain evaporate if the GoI collapsed?

Be careful that you don't overstate Iran's influence in Iraq. There is a tendency in some circles to assume that now that the Shia are much more dominant in Iraq that the Shia dominated state of Iran will have much more influence and this is true to a point. Some of the Shia will accept all manner of Iranian help and certainly Iran has more influence than before but there is one important factor to consider. The Iranians are not Arabs and that matters a lot more than I think a lot of westerners realize. The Iraqi Shia may accept Iranian help and will accept Iranian influence but, by and large, they will not accept being dominated by non-Arabs. That will put limitations on just how much influence Iran has in Iraq.

[Seabee]

Originally Posted by Entropy

Personally, I think it's too early to tell, but here are some factors to consider:

- The apparent success of the Iraqi government may very well be transitory. I don't think it's too far-fetch to consider that it could all fall apart and go back to civil war.

.

indeed... the lesson in Zimbabwe...

"One man, one vote!"

became

"One man, one vote, once!"

Democracy is only interesting where a nation can make it work for a longer period of time.

I was once in a mountain top village in the mountains in Peru. We were in a small shop, not a lot for sale. In one corner there were 4 or 5 large cartons gathering dust... marked outside was the info that the contents were a certain feminen hygiene product that amongst hill people and Llamas had zero value. Sanitary pads for women wearing string Tangas. (I swear, that is true).

Somehow the shop keeper had ordered wrong.... and probably invested a lot of his capital in a product that noone in the area needed....

He probably should have burned them and cut his losses.... but pride and a desire not to loose his investment made him keep them, taking up space and gathering dust...

IMHO trying to bring democracy to certain regions is the same as importing string tanga sanitary pads to that village...

:-)

[AmericanPride]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

From my nave standpoint, I see a dictatorship replaced with a democracy, many foreign debts to Iraq forgiven, the likelihood of increased oil production benefiting all Iraqis rather than just the ruling regime, a dramatic improvement in quality of life for the Kurds, removal of sanctions on all of Iraq, a government that has established friendly relations with its neighbors, creation of security forces that are far less abusive or corrupt, and a military unlikely to attack neighbors or its own government. What am I missing?

I understand this post originated a few years ago. However, it is interesting to note that the original post asks the question "How was Iraq a strategic blunder" and then proceeds to discuss the positive outcomes for Iraq without once mentioning any benefits for the United States. The continued low-level violence in Iraq is not an indicator of failure in my opinion; nor is the unfolding political drama in Iraq's government. The concern is what enduring economic or political advantage has the United States gained from the war. The failure therefore is not in the haphazard execution of the war or even its outcome but the purpose for it in the first place.