If you've ever been to the ghan, read this.

[SFAT]

When I read the following Article it made me sick to my stomach. I have so much to write on this subject. Curious what kind of feedback this article will receive in this forum.....

SFAT

GARDEZ, Afghanistan — They say their M16s are dust-prone antiques. Their boots fall apart after a couple of months, they complain, and many of their helmets are cracked and patched. Yet they set out on patrol.

They are the men of the Afghan National Army, the critical part of the huge machine being built to protect Afghanistan’s security after the NATO alliance is gone in less than three years.

With Afghanistan topping the agenda at a gathering of NATO leaders in Chicago on Sunday and Monday, an Associated Press reporter and photographer traveling with Afghan army forces in Logar and Paktia provinces are hearing a mix of messages from dozens of officers and enlisted men.

The foreign forces are leaving too soon, the men say. Why then are attacks by Afghan soldiers on NATO forces increasing, killing 35 last year and 22 so far this year? Because the Afghans feel disrespected, the soldiers say. Handing out inferior equipment is disrespectful; burning Korans, however accidental, is disrespectful; urinating on dead bodies, even Taliban, as video that emerged in January showed U.S. troops doing, is disrespectful.

Washington spent more than $20 billion in 2010-2011 on training and equipping a 352,000 strong army and police force — one of the costliest projects ever undertaken by the Pentagon.

Yet the footsoldiers don’t have night-vision goggles to go after the Taliban under cover of darkness.

At the rock-strewn firing range of the 203 Thunder Corps in Paktia province, Sgt. Said Aga recalled his M16 jamming in the middle of a fierce firefight with the Taliban, and grimaced as his young charges aired their gripes about the Vietnam-era firearm.

“The Americans have really much better equipment than us,” he said. “Our vehicles and weapons are very weak compared to theirs.”

A soldier named Abdul Karim said he’d prefer a 30-year-old Russian-made Kalashnikov to an M16. The Americans “are giving us old weapons and try to make them look new with polish and paint. We don’t want their throwaways,” he said.

In Kabul, Lt. Col. Timothy M. Stauffer, U. S. Army Director, Public Affairs, rejected the complaints about aging weapons, saying the Afghans get basically the same firearms that U.S. soldiers have. “I am not sure their complaints are valid,” he said. “The equipment they are asking for and are being issued is sufficient to meet the current threat.”

Most American troops in Afghanistan carry the M4, a shorter version of the M16. Both models have been criticized by some in the military for jamming in harsh conditions and requiring greater maintenance. The Kalashnikov is known as an easier-upkeep, all-conditions weapon, fueling its popularity in the developing world.

At the firing range, the complaints flew thick and fast. Col. Abdul Haleem Noori grabbed a young recruit’s foot to show a gash in the heel of his boot.

“It’s only two months old and it is falling apart, and we are told it is supposed to last one year,” he said. The footwear was made by a manufacturer under contract to the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

Even the 3-year-old army band bemoans their equipment, including soldered trumpets dating back to the 1970s.

The conversation with Aga, the firing range instructor, shifted from poor equipment to the disturbingly high number of so-called “green-on-blue” attacks, a U.S. military term for Afghan soldiers killing their NATO counterparts.

Aga, a squat man with piercing brown eyes, gave off a strange mix of resentment, envy and appreciation. He didn’t want the international soldiers to leave. “We still need them to bring peace,” he said.

Then he explained the issue of respect.

When foreign forces patrol with Afghan forces, “they don’t respect us. When we see that they don’t have respect we get angry. Even myself, I have seen how they behave in Afghanistan. They have sometimes been cruel. I saw in operations they have entered mosques, I have seen this myself.”

Another complaint: The foreigners don’t let civilians drive in front of their convoys even if they are rushing a sick person to treatment, referring to the heavy security measures U.S. troops impose around their vehicles.

Col. Ahmed Jan Ahmedzai said incidents like the mistaken burning of Korans at Bagram Air Base makes recruits susceptible to Taliban overtures. New recruits are watched carefully for signs of sympathy for the Taliban, he said.

Because of the attacks, international soldiers are no longer present at firing ranges, said Col. Asif Khan Saburi, in charge of recruit training in five provinces.

“When we have shooting practice I have to look at two things: How my soldier is shooting and that he doesn’t fire at the U.S. soldiers,” he said.

The U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force in Kabul did not respond to several requests by The Associated Press for comment on the Afghan perception of a lack of respect.

In May last year, a U.S. Army team led by a behavioral scientist released a 70-page survey that revealed both Afghan and American soldiers hold disturbingly negative perceptions of the other.

According to the survey, many Afghan security personnel found U.S. troops “extremely arrogant, bullying and unwilling to listen to their advice” and sometimes lacking concern about Afghans’ safety in combat. They accused the Americans of ignoring female privacy and using denigrating names for Afghans.

U.S. troops, in turn, often accused Afghan troops and police of “pervasive illicit drug use, massive thievery, personal instability, dishonesty, no integrity,” the survey said.

Cobbling together an army in a nation at war for more than 30 years is daunting, said Saburi. Education has been stunted, ethnic divisions have hardened and the country is awash with weapons. At corps and brigade headquarters, soldiers are barred from carrying weapons because any altercation might explode into gunfire.

Communication is hampered by the fact that many Afghan recruits are illiterate villagers, he said.

A career officer, Saburi was less critical than others of the quality of weapons. He was satisfied with the heavy machine guns and sniper rifles being distributed to the army. But he said the rank and file were stuck with old M16s, instead of Kalashnikovs which he said are more suited to Afghan conditions. The army needs much more, he said: medevac helicopters, gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks.

NATO and the U.S. shouldn’t leave in 2014, he said. “I think we need more time.”

Meanwhile, the slow grind of daily patrolling never stops. In Logar Province, troops fan out along the hills, looking for Taliban and demonstrating their presence to the villagers. One of the soldiers, Mohammed Zaman, has written a little love poem to his country on the scratched surface of his helmet.

The men are fearless, says Col. Abdul Wakil Warzajy, a commander. They have taken hundreds of battle casualties, but good men alone don’t make a good army, he says, adding: “An army is an army that is completely equipped.”

Update.

From author via moderator: This article appeared on armytimes.com but not currently id'd fully. Id'd as an AP article two days ago:http://ap.stripes.com/dynamic/storie...05-20-12-45-29

[Morgan]

Agreed....the M-16 is not the preferred weapon for ANA. While I believe we are giving them decent M-16s, it requires far too much maintenance and the average "sarboz" won't do it. The AK is better suited to the men of ANSF.

As for the issue of "green-on-blue" and lack of trust, not sure how US/ coalition troops are disrespecting the Afghans but I can imagine. Much of this could likely be mitigated by getting closer to the ANSF VS moving further away from them. Not only will getting closer help break down some of the feelings of mistrust and generate greater familiarity but it also puts ANSF in the line of fire when some turd decides to shoot at US troops.....we'll be standing right next to ANSF bubbas.

[Bob's World]

What I hear is:

"We really don't care much about the Taliban, certainly not as much as you Americans do. We even compare our equipment to yours rather than to them. But even though our cultural divide is huge, and individuals of both sides of this alliance often upset each other, we want you to stay and continue to pump Billions of dollars into this corrupt system that enriches so many, to include myself as a Colonel in the ANA, and to do the lion's share of the fighting as well."

This is not a news flash, this has always been the case and it has also always been at least as much our fault as is the Afghans. We have attempted to define this problem in our terms and solve it in our way from the very beginning and we need to own that reality.

I have to believe that locally recruited and trained decentralized militias working for District and Provincial Governors that are actually selected through a local Shura process would be far more effective in providing appropriate Afghan-style security than the current centralized mess.

But then the current centralized mess was not designed to defeat or deter some foreign threat, but rather to consolidate the centralized control of the Northern Alliance over the remainder of the land and people of Afghanistan.

We are a victim of our own fears and lack of understanding, and our desire to control a particular political outcome for Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance has played those fears and lack of understanding and the knowledge that they are perceived as the "right answer" for that political outcome like the New York Philharmonic.

Fact is that we do not need to "win" in Afghanistan to deny AQ sanctuary in Afghanistan.

AQ feeds on populaces that are dissatisfied to the point of suppressed or active revolution with their own governments, who feel equally that the US and the West with their century of manipulation of the governance of the region are a major contributing factor to the current situation. What have we done in Afghanistan to reduce that perception across the greater Middle East? Not much, I think. What have we done in Afghanistan to increase that perception in South Asia and elsewhere? Very much indeed.

To paraphrase a movie about the last time we got into this type of quandary: "Every minute we stay in Afghanistan, we get weaker, and every minute Charlie squats in the bush, he gets stronger."

[J Wolfsberger]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

We have attempted to define this problem in our terms and solve it in our way from the very beginning and we need to own that reality.

Bob, I've thought for some time that our approach to Afghanistan (and Iraq) has been to "nation build" mini-me versions of the United States. Is that you're point?

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

Bob, I've thought for some time that our approach to Afghanistan (and Iraq) has been to "nation build" mini-me versions of the United States. Is that you're point?

Not just in form of governance, but in form of security as well.

The United States has become so ideological that we over-react anytime we face a competitor that adheres to any belief system different than our own. So much so that we have woven it into our National Security Strategy and declared it as a vital interest. So if we can convert those governments not like ours to be more like ours, that must make us safer. ( This misses the key point of "if we convert." This 'logic' makes sense if these governments all come to this decision of their own free will and with a broad consensus from their own populaces; but falls apart rapidly when such conversions are forced through openings made by our military and executed by governments of our own adoption or making).

Second, our Military is so full of its own "rightness" as the best way to do things that we set out, at least on the conventional side, to create security forces that largely mirror our own. Never mind that the security threat in Afghanistan frustrated both the Soviet and NATO militaries, thereby proving as conclusively as we can prove anything that a lesser, mini-me version would have no hope of dealing with the same. The security situation in Afghanistan calls for an Afghan approach. First, remove the causation of the Western solution for governance and security and allow an appropirate local model for both to emerge, then simply work with whatever that is to help it be as succssful as possible within the culture and economy of their own system.

But, we are a captive of our fears; and those fears are exaggerated by our miscasting of the nature of both the threat and the nature of what provides that threat sanctuary.

On a larger scale, the US enjoyed a brief window of hegemony. Congratulations, but please, such conditions are always temporary. Yet now we flail at any and everything that appears to facilitate the natural rebalancing to a world made up of many regional powers, each with its own spheres of influence, their own interests, and own ideological approaches to how they do business. Rather than expend ourself attempting to keep everyone else down, we'd be better served by conserving our strength and influence while simply working to shape that rebalancing so that it does not errupt into a major drama such as happened with WWI or II. And in that larger scale, Afghanistan and AQ really are not all that important.

[Mark O'Neill]

Well stated Bob!

[Bob's World]

I have a bad habit of saying what I think is going on and what I think needs to be done about it; rather than what I think people want to hear.

We all need to appreciate that there is tremendous energy and inertia from a wide range of physical as well as psychological forces that keep the policies of a powerful nation such as the US on a certain current path. I certainly do, though admittedly, I am frequently surprised as the range of stakeholders dedicated to preserving the status quo, even when voicing loudly the need for change.

I have heard that a single man could stand in front of a vast herd of stampeding North American Bison, and that the herd would split naturally, thundering by leaving said man unharmed. Perhaps this happened on occasion, but I suspect most were simply trampled into a mash of muddy dust.

[ganulv]

Originally Posted by SFAT

U.S. troops, in turn, often accused Afghan troops and police of “pervasive illicit drug use, massive thievery, personal instability, dishonesty, no integrity,” the survey said.

FWIW I am friends with a young man from Kabul who has said similar to me about the ANA and ANP. He told me it was not uncommon for members of the ANP to stomp around market stalls and demand, I mean request, food from the vendors.

Originally Posted by SFAT

At the firing range, the complaints flew thick and fast. Col. Abdul Haleem Noori grabbed a young recruit’s foot to show a gash in the heel of his boot.

“It’s only two months old and it is falling apart, and we are told it is supposed to last one year,” he said. The footwear was made by a manufacturer under contract to the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

Which probably means that the U.S. Government contracted with someone who pocketed most of the money and used what was left to subcontract for the boots, right?

[SFAT]

Originally Posted by ganulv

FWIW I am friends with a young man from Kabul who has said similar to me about the ANA and ANP. He told me it was not uncommon for members of the ANP to stomp around market stalls and demand, I mean request, food from the vendors.



Which probably means that the U.S. Government contracted with someone who pocketed most of the money and used what was left to subcontract for the boots, right?

Precisely…. Or Hesco barriers that are provided to the AUP and ANA for fortification of their Check points and COPs, which oddly end up in the Bazaar the following day.

[kilgore_nobiz]

Something this article overlooks is how often we give the ANA or ANP new equipment, only to see them turn around and sell it, usually to the Taliban. Anyone who spent a significant amount of time with them over there will tell you we had to resist the urge to give them new gear every time they begged for it because of this very reason. I have a hard time recalling all the occasions we were told they were being overrun in some village and needed new supplies, only to fly a Predator over the village and see nothing. It was a scam. This article smacks of the same thing. Bitch and whine about not being equipped properly to get more gear to sell off. Sorry, I'm not buying it.

[jcustis]

Col Jones, why aren't you working on the National Security Advisory team by now?

[tomkinton]

http://www.amazon.com/Funding-Enemy-...7706713&sr=8-1