Iraq fails to take over U.S. projects

[tequila]

Iraq fails to take over U.S. projects - LATIMES, 30 July.

Iraq's central government has refused to take possession of more than 2,300 completed reconstruction projects financed with billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars, according to the latest quarterly report by the U.S. agency that oversees the rebuilding effort.

As a result, many projects are being turned over to local entities that cannot adequately support them or are being run with continued U.S. funding, according to the report by Stuart W. Bowen Jr., special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The report, to be released today, says the U.S. government has overseen completion of 2,797 projects at a cost of $5.8 billion. The central government has taken over 435 of them, worth $501 million.

No project has been turned over to the central government since July 2006, two months after Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's government was installed and the Finance Ministry "changed the … conditions on the asset transfer process," the report says.

But even the Iraqi government's acceptance of projects does not mean they will be adequately funded or maintained, the report says, citing problems with the Dora power station, which services Baghdad.

The rebuilt units were transferred to the Electricity Ministry in the spring of 2006. But in August, workers removed parts from one unit, taking it off-line, to keep the other functioning after it failed because of poor maintenance. That second unit failed again, says the report, which notes that "the ministry has operated ineffectively or has insufficiently maintained equipment" at the power station ...

[Beelzebubalicious]

What's the story with this IG Bowen? If you only see things in black and white, then you miss the full spectrum....

[Mike Spight]

I dont' think there is a "story" concerning the SIGIR...he or rather his agency...doesn't have a dog in the HCA and reconstruction fight as to whether or not projects succeed or fail--unlike DOS, USAID, DOD, etc.

SIGIR reports the good (white) with the bad (black) and is doing what congress has mandated that they do. If you're remotely interested, go to www.sigir.mil you can read the report, dated 30 July 07.

It is what it is...

[Beelzebubalicious]

I understand what you're saying, but there is a story as to how you evaluate what's going on in Iraq. It relates to the context and the reality. It comes down to what constitutes success. I haven't read the report, but am curious to know what SIGIR uses as measures and how they evaluate the good vs. the bad.

Then, you have the media, like LA Times, pick up on only certain negative aspects reported. Well, that's another story.

I'll read the report...

[Mike Spight]

That is the thing to do; think in terms of the projects planned, coordinated and executed AND in terms of what was the overall intent...

Think about Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)...did it achieve a particular effect...like less Muj trying to kill us...lower infant fatality rates, higher employment rates, etc. and contrast with mere Measures of Performance (MOP)..."we said we were gonna build 25 new public health clinics in Anbar, turn em over to the indig, and by God we did just that"!

[tequila]

Troops Confront Waste in Iraq Reconstruction - Washington Post, 25 Aug.

Maj. Craig Whiteside's anger grew as he walked through the sprawling school where U.S. military commanders had invested money and hope. Portions of the workshop's ceiling were cracked or curved. The cafeteria floor had a gaping hole and concrete chunks. The auditorium was unfinished, with cracked floors and poorly painted walls peppered with holes.

Whiteside blamed the school director for not monitoring the renovation. The director retorted that the military should have had better oversight. The contract shows the Iraqi contractor was paid $679,000.

The story of the Vo-Tech Iskandariyah Industrial School illustrates the challenges of rebuilding Iraq. It also raises questions about how the military is managing hundreds of millions of dollars to fund such reconstruction, part of the effort to stabilize the country.

Senior officers and commanders insist cases like the Vo-Tech are isolated and are quickly addressed. But in this turbulent patch of Iraq south of Baghdad, ground commanders and civil affairs officers say the system is marked by inefficiency and waste and is vulnerable to corruption. Many Iraqi contractors are slow and unreliable. Some are dishonest. Meanwhile, inexperienced soldiers do their best to scrutinize millions of dollars in contracts and monitor projects they don't fully comprehend ...