Retooling the Artilleryman

[Jedburgh]

Fires Bulletin, Sep-Dec 07: Retooling the Artilleryman

The 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (2-17 FA), Steel, had returned from Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005 for only a few months when chatter started within the ranks about another deployment. For the Artillerymen of Steel, the talk about when Steel would return to Iraq seemed less important as to how it would return. Training is vital to every battalion, but 2-17 FA had not completed its transformation from a 155-mm Paladin unit into a 105-mm howitzer unit yet. The question was obvious: Train as infantry, train as Artillery or train as both?

The battalion commander attacked the problem by preparing the Redlegs for both missions—and not with 50 percent effort into each—ensuring Steel would be a multifunctional battalion able to accomplish FA as well as infantry missions. The battalion received essential support from the brigade commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, to ensure the Soldiers were “kitted out” like infantry.....

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have had this discussion with an Artillery officer I know. I have proposed to him that the Artillery MUST be able to transition to infantry, or better yet, MPs, upon transition to stability operations. He argues passionately that they cannot do both mission.

The bottom line is that once an Army Brigade Combat Team transitions to stability operations, the Artillery is poorly suited for that mission. They become a drag on resources unless they can transition. I could argue that in a BCT, somewhere between one-third and one-half of the soldiers in the unit are not suitable for stability operations depending on the type of BCT.

The Army has built a leaner, more lethal force that is not capable of performing the missions that is has been given.

Seems to me you have two choices (given that we cannot turn down missions). One, we look at expanding training for artillery, armor, ADA, and any other pure combat force so that they can perform MP, not infantry, missions to allow them to be relevant in stability operations, or you build and field a specific division/brigade designed for stability operations.

[Rob Thornton]

but she can cook.", is a euphemism that comes to mind. Artillery units, and other specialties have proven up to the task of doing both - as have many other specialized units and MOSs. There are consequences, and they may not be optimized in education, MTO&E, etc. - but they are doing it. The enabler has been leadership at all levels, it has proven the lever by which FA units (and others) have reorganized for stability related tasks.

Keep in mind that many FSOs and FECs are working non traditional roles within HQs and staffs to good measure. FSOs are often being called on to be Intel officers at the company level (I don't mean as in graduates from the MI ADV Course - but as analysts asking the "so what is the enemy trying to do questions based on new and existing information). FSNCOs are also being tasked to put their gray matter to other tasks as well such as IO or Intel (we re-rolled ours to good effect).

The GPF of today are capable of reorganizing to meet the tasks that grow out of METT-TC - they are both bright and adaptable. Will other tasks atrophy some - yes. That is the risk - and resources will have to be applied on the back end to really address them, however units are also mitigating this some by conducting training in theater - mortar and FA shoots for example, or in some cases they are asked t perform more traditional tasks in support of larger stability type missions - firing illum over large graveyards to prevent insurgents from caching IED materials and arms/equipment in those "sacred" type places during LIMVIS.

My personal observation is that FA units have provided a source of manpower and leadership in an existing, homogeneous organization to successfully complete a number of missions in a variety of conditions. They have met the challenge and shown what soldiers and leaders are capable of. We will probably never be resourced to be fully optimized for the range of military operations across the full spectrum of war, but we do have the human capitol required to adapt relatively quickly to meet them, and we are capable of resourcing and delivering the material and equipment they require to do so.

Best regards, Rob

[slapout9]

One of the benefits with Artillery is their concept of Targeting. All the confusion about some of the complexities of EBO concepts just melt away whne you begin to look at it from the standpoint of D3A. That should become the new holy mantra of the Army in my humble opinon. Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess. That is some Strategic Stuff there. all in 4 little words with big effects both leathal and non-leathal and anything in between.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve, good point - the targeting cycle has been around for a long time - since when people had to make choices about what (and how) to attack/influence, where and when to do it, again with how best given resources, and then if they were successful enough not to have to go after it again. I think that has been some of the unspoken thinking - we've been doing EBO stuff for a long time - we just did not need to obfuscate it with seemingly complex processes. I don't mind that we've written down how we might think about it, but the problem with doing so is that if you put it down into a Joint doctrine there is enough disparity and culture generated by the means and ways of doing it that it can create some real arguments as to how it plays out.

The other thing I'd say is that it also gets at something Steve Blair wrote me the other day about the dichotomy in war - "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult - dead Prussian theorist." There is allot of friction that goes into D3A as it plays out on the ground, not the least of which are the unintended consequences generated from action in a complex and interactive environment charged with fog, friction and chance. I think that is the reason that as a mantra you'll find "Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess" more culturally acceptable in the USAF and USN then the USA. That is not to slight our other services, but it does recognize that there are some unique conditions in which ground forces, air forces, and naval forces predominately operate in.

Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, I agree about the friction part. Friction is most likley to reveal itself on the ground IMO. It is not something that the AF or USN would see or have to deal with like the Army would. From their world friction is almost none exsistant... fly a plane..drop bomb....go home...check if you hit it. Meanwhile the army sees that there is a ton of rubble blocking a road so a food shipment can't get through or an ambulance or whatever. The Army has to deal with that right now. "The Remore Control Services" just kind of wonder what the problem is. The final effect is best understood from a "Ground Assessment" before you start the cycle over again. Again just my opinion.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

but she can cook.", is a euphemism that comes to mind. Artillery units, and other specialties have proven up to the task of doing both - as have many other specialized units and MOSs. There are consequences, and they may not be optimized in education, MTO&E, etc. - but they are doing it. The enabler has been leadership at all levels, it has proven the lever by which FA units (and others) have reorganized for stability related tasks.

We accept all missions. We do not have the luxury of saying "no, that is not my job". You hit on some key points regarding utilizing any unit outside thier normal specialty. 1) Training - Do they have the training (and the doctrine) to be able to competentaly accomplish the mission. 2) MTOE - do they come to the fight with the right equipment for the job. Did they have that equipment to train-up with prior to getting into theater.

Full Spectrum operations requires specialized training and equipment. We are learning on the fly. I think to simply say "don't worry, you guys are good, you can handle it" is denying the problem.

We will get through this because we have to. But if we don't recognize the problem and make the appropriate changes to our training, MTOEs, and Doctrine, then we will just repeat this mistake agian in the future.

[Rob Thornton]

I agree with you up to a point:

We will get through this because we have to. But if we don't recognize the problem and make the appropriate changes to our training, MTOEs, and Doctrine, then we will just repeat this mistake agian in the future.

But the requirements of being all to end all probably guarantee that we will always have a learning curve - the best we might do is adapt faster then the enemy.

The MTO&Es are not going to change too much - again it goes back to be structured to be the GPF to meet the full spectrum workload outlined as our responsibility - relevant and ready landvpower. The best we might hope for is recognition the full spectrum tasks require full spectrum MTO&Es and an expanded METL for those units which justify maintaining equipment and justifying resources.

The doctrine I believe will be most helpful is the capstone stuff and its supporting doctrine -ex. the new 3-0 justifies 3-24, etc. It will help leaders recognize and adapt faster to changes in conditions.

However, reading what SWC member Ken White (who really has been around since Jesus was a Pvt.) has penned here over time has led me to consider my own 22 years differently. Why do we seem to have to constantly relearn things? I'm beginning to think its more a condition then a problem. We're never going to be resourced in time, personnel, equipment, etc. to be prepared for all the military situations which might confront us - nor do I think we've ever been (although there have been time where by virtue of preparing for one thing, we were better prepared for another). As soon as you sink resources into the type of war you fought, or think you fought, or in this case are fighting, but want to conclude, somebody who has been watching you fight and who is concerned you are going to come to their neighborhood decides how to fight you differently enough to where you are not as prepared. Its the nature of an interactive, thinking enemy.

That is why we do the GPF boogaloo - aka the "Golden Mean". It provides us enough operational and strategic depth (fleshed out by some specialized capabilities like SOF) from which to out adapt our enemies across the spectrum and ROMO. It means the guys and gals who go first are going to incur a harsh damned penalty for playing the "away" game, but it provides us the flexibility to gather the needed resources to prevail.

I'd say that is also why the best military doctrine and writing are the stuff that helps you to think about war, vs. spelling out what to do. Its not easy, there are no well resourced low hanging fruit to be had for those of us living in GPF land - but through a well organized Institution we can develop leaders who can meet those challenges and better overcome the enduring fog, friction and chance and the differences in conditions we see in each new war we fight (or an evolution of the same war).

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

The recent terminology shift from GPF to Multipurpose Forces (MPF) is a good harbinger, I think.

The Marines could be ahead of the power curve and effectively leverage the old MRU(SOC) into an MEU(COIN); I submit the Army can do the same thing.

The key is the doctrine. We did not train on COIN or ID for over 30 years because the doctrine lay dormant and we didn't want to play. We have no choice in whether we play or not; we have got to be prepared to play and play the total spectrum of warfare whenever the civilian heirarchy says "Go out and play in the traffic..."

We will not get to choose whether that traffic is comprised of fleets of 18 wheelers or a dozen baby buggies or whatever in between; we've got to be prepared to f do it all. We owe that much to the Nation, to the troops and even to the institutions themselves. Competence is justification to the max...

If the Doctrine says that FA Bns should be prepared to function as MPs in the post attack phase (Great idea, BTW) and the Spt Bn has to guard its own compounds and convoys, then we will resource, train for and be able to do that. If it says that Light Infantry will do the foot mobile missions, that the Stryker BCTs will do the Mech AND foot mobile missions and that Armor Bns will be able to provide Armor elements OR wheel vehicle mounted patrols OnO or any of dozens of potential variations on that theme -- then we'll do that.

If the Doctrine says that Cat I units are authorized 10% overstrength, stabilized, fully resourced and trained and equipped for both primary and alternate (and even supplemental) missions, then we will do that. If that Doctrine says that CAT II units will be at strength, train and be resourced for their primary mission and be capable of receiving an equipment set and training for an alternate (or even also a supplementary) mission in 60 days, then we will do that. Cat II units get 80% fill and 90 days...

We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.

The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...

Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.

The very sad thing is that our very excessive branch parochiality, our tendency to adopt fads, our rejection of anything our predecessors did, our rejection of any good ideas until they become our ideas causes the effect that as new brooms move in and sweep out the old, they always do the baby - bathwater bit...

P.S.

That competence? It also goes a long way toward making bad guys think twice before they mess with you in any venue...

Lot of advantages to that...