A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War

[SWJED]

A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War by LTC Gian Gentile at SWJ Blog.

I propose a consideration to adjust the Principles of War as accepted by the American military since J.F.C. Fuller first came out with them in the early 1920s and the American Army’s use of them in the majority of its major doctrinal manuals. I do not propose radically new principles of war like Lieutenant Commander Christopher Van Avery did in a recent summer Armed Forces Journal article. His proposal of very different Principles seemed too “new-ageish” for me and in my mind wrongly assumed that the information revolution of the 1990s produced a concomitant revolution in military affairs (a still debated and contested notion by scholars). Too, with regard to Avery, I do not accept his historical premise of now as the time to radically adjust the Principles of War because of the so called recent RMA; one could easily make the argument that we should have produced new Principles of War shortly after August 1945 and the advent of atomic war and Bernard Brodie’s classic The Absolute Weapon...

[Norfolk]

I perceive that the intended message here (I may well be imagining this) in LtCol Gentile's proposal to modestly but purposefully modify the Principles of War is as much to get Students of War to think a little more about how War Theory may turn out in reality than in the abstract. The Principles of War, like most elements of Doctrine, are useful guides to thinking, learning, and practicing war. They are not elements of a formula that may be simply applied in the abstract to a real situation and be expected thus to lead to a general probability of success. They are guides to helping one develop and apply judgement; they are not its substitute. Col. Gentiles' revision of the Principles of War appears designed to shake its readers out of "complacent contemplation".

Again, I hope that I wasn't reading something into something that was not intended to be there.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by Norfolk

I perceive that the intended message here (I may well be imagining this) in LtCol Gentile's proposal to modestly but purposefully modify the Principles of War is as much to get Students of War to think a little more about how War Theory may turn out in reality than in the abstract. The Principles of War, like most elements of Doctrine, are useful guides to thinking, learning, and practicing war. They are not elements of a formula that may be simply applied in the abstract to a real situation and be expected thus to lead to a general probability of success. They are guides to helping one develop and apply judgement; they are not its substitute. Col. Gentiles' revision of the Principles of War appears designed to shake its readers out of "complacent contemplation".

Again, I hope that I wasn't reading something into something that was not intended to be there.

Dear Norfolk:

You are spot-on as usual with your postings. Of course Principles are really only true in the eyes of their beholders. I do not see them in any way as transcendent over time. I wrote this short piece as you state to probe into the nature of contemporary war and how we understand it and where we think it will be in the future. Colin Gray's article really got me to thinking about it along with postings from Steve Metz and Ken White. There was a slight bit of tongue-in-cheek intended with this short piece based on my critique of FM 3-24 in "Eating Soup with a Spoon." But i am dead serious about trying to understand the nature of war today as are the other SWC members and that is why i posted it.

I am going to disagree (which is no surprise to anyone who knows me). My reason is simple, COIN is not war, at least as it is used in the principles of war.

Curmudgeon's quote here is a good example of why i am interested in this problem. He states that Coin is not war at least in terms of Principles, so then if that is the case then perhaps we should recommend to the writers currently working on FM3-0 to ditch the Principles all together and not include Coin in its discussion of full spectrum operations.

Also, I defer to Steve's knowledge on the literature on "Principles of War." My knowledge of it is not that deep and some of what i say in this thread may have already been covered in other works. Still i thought it a worthy topic for discussion on this great blog.

thanks for your comments and thoughts.

gian

[Sargent]

I was originally going to post this to the Dishonest Doctrine thread, but really it's a response to your blog piece.

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

I will be involved in it; but not the day-to-day running of it like when you were here. Yeah, that was a great experience; I especially liked the staff ride to Saratoga when we made Simon Frasier's line "Oh Fatal Ambition" as our motto. That was my favorite tee-shirt too until my son absconded with it.

Ah, Saratoga -- Hall was impressive, and it made all of the history of the Northeast just jump out at me, and it's been in big, bold type (so to speak) since then. I owe you guys one. Ref. your son's sticky fingers, that's why I bought a second one for my husband from the get go.

Reminiscing aside, I bring up your reference to Saratoga here because I have always found it ironic to have had that lesson* of the Rev War -- the French won't get involved unless the Continentals can prove they are willing and able to fight the Brits -- brought up in the shadow of OIF. I've been living in the shadow of Rochambeau -- literally, his statue -- the last few years here in Newport, and it's a lesson I think about a lot. (My slightly more strange interaction with Rochambeau was my son, for most of the time he was 3, shouting his name as we'd walk the dog past the statue.) How one intervenes in the domestic affairs of another state/entity matters.

Maybe this ought to be principle Minus 1 for wars of the sort likely to require COIN -- that is, don't even bother with the rest if you can't nail down this part.

And I disagree with the Curmudgeon that COIN is not "war." Perhaps Fuller's Principles of War ought to be renamed Principles of 20th C Conventional War, but the concept that war itself is only encompassed at the most high-explosives, internal combustion engine end of the spectrum is far too limited. The pinnacle of the most perfectly executed war, according to Sun Tzu, is the one which need not be fought because the weaker side realizes the futility of bothering to fight, putting it at the "no intensity" end of the spectrum. I don't cotton with the habit of labelling any significant effort a
"war," but neither do I think it is useful to exclude from the definition legitimate forms.

Cheers,
Jill


* Yes, there's debate as to the actual importance of the outcome of the battle, but even with a tinge of apocrypha the lesson itself has merit. If you look further at how the French intervened -- subordinating their army forces to Washington's command (happily and willingly, it seems, at least from Rochambeau and Chastellux's commentaries, which recount very good impressions of the General and his officers) is a big one in my mind -- I think there's even more that can be gleaned from the case.

[Ken White]

"Rabble rouser."

However, Norfolk beat me to it and publicly. Good job, Norfolk.

At the risk of being unintellectual and exposing my laziness, I see no problem in adapting the Principles to COIN operations as written, all it takes is a little thought.

I suggest COIN is war -- and not as some say the Graduate level -- it's more like 7th Grade; full of angst, raging hormones one knows nothing about and constantly shifting loyalties, likes and dislikes compounded by hatreds one knows not from what cause and frustrated and confusing parental 'guidance.' Plus an aging an imperfect infrastructure. Bad teachers, too...

Those Principles are just that, Principles. They simply give structure to planning and the goal of planning is to conduct successful operations at minimum cost to own forces. Thus the Principles are simply an outline and the plan is the body of work.

I've lived with those principles for a long time, they aren't perfect and not all apply in all situations but basically, they're pretty good and cover most situations I've seen in several levels of war.

I have, however long contended that Mass should be changed to Nathan. As in Nathan Bedford Forrest -- a simple reminder to get "thar fustest with the mostest." Those of a more formal bent may prefer Local superiority or even Schwerpunkt or any other term that connotes skill and agility and downplays Mass -- which should never have been first in the first place....

Well, that's semi serious. Seriously, I have an alternative list that I've been packing around in my head for almost 40 years; I contend it is applicable to everything from life to all levels of war:

1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security

Thus it was written in the gospel according to KW. Who by the way also points out that this version or the classic or Gian's should be viewed as readily shiftable in order, situation dependent but that the order shown will cover most situations. Yes, I know but people do tend to look at lists and consider the items in order -- particularly if there's an acronym to go with it. MOOSEMUSS = Mass; the American way of war...

Very seriously, excellent piece that deserves thought.

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by Ken White

"Rabble rouser."

I suggest COIN is war -- and not as some say the Graduate level -- it's more like 7th Grade; full of angst, raging hormones one knows nothing about and constantly shifting loyalties, likes and dislikes compounded by hatreds one knows not from what cause and frustrated and confusing parental 'guidance.' Plus an aging an imperfect infrastructure. Bad teachers, too...

In agreement here

Originally Posted by Ken White

Well, that's semi serious. Seriously, I have an alternative list that I've been packing around in my head for almost 40 years; I contend it is applicable to everything from life to all levels of war:

1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security

I really like the simplicity part, somes of uss need things kept rather simple in order for us to keep up.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by Ken White

...I suggest COIN is war -- and not as some say the Graduate level -- it's more like 7th Grade...

Thanks for saying this; The arrogance of some to suggest that Coin is the "graduate" level, or that Coin is more difficult than conventional war has always seemed over the top to me. What do such statements imply; that conventional war is the undergraduate level? I mean i have not experienced conventional war, only coin, but are we to say that then Colonel George C Marshall as Pershing's Chief of Staff as he shuffled hundreds of thousands of troops from one front to another to take part in the Meuse Argonne operated at the undergraduate level? Or a Russian tank battalion commander at the battle of Kursk, was he at the undergraduate level too. And just one more to throw in there; consider Frederick the Great as he masterfully shifted his army using a central position and interior lines at Rossbach and Leuthen to defeat the French then Austrians in sequence, he was a Junior in college while the 101st in Mosul in 2003 was writing their dissertation? Don’t want to sound mean but let’s just call all forms of war difficult in their own way. And we can always use St Carl's classic line: Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is very difficult."

Agree with your point on Principles; your list looks good to me. I wrote the post because i found the idea of wrestling in one's head what they should be a good way to get at the deeper problem of defining the nature of war as we know it today and in the future.

gian

[Norfolk]

Originally Posted by Ken White

"Rabble rouser."

However, Norfolk beat me to it and publicly. Good job, Norfolk.

That's what my dad calls me, lovingly of course!

I've lived with those principles for a long time, they aren't perfect and not all apply in all situations but basically, they're pretty good and cover most situations I've seen in several levels of war.

I have, however long contended that Mass should be changed to Nathan. As in Nathan Bedford Forrest -- a simple reminder to get "thar fustest with the mostest." Those of a more formal bent may prefer Local superiority or even Schwerpunkt or any other term that connotes skill and agility and downplays Mass -- which should never have been first in the first place....

Well, that's semi serious. Seriously, I have an alternative list that I've been packing around in my head for almost 40 years; I contend it is applicable to everything from life to all levels of war:

1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security


[]Very seriously, excellent piece that deserves thought.

I have long considered Nathan Bedford Forest to be perhaps the finest battlefield general this Continent has ever produced (sorry about Galusha, Ken). And I put him right up there with Sherman (but not side-by-side).

Yep, as long as we've got smart Colonels like Gian, the Army has hope for the future. As for one or two Air Force officers that seem to want to replace the Principles of War either with a list as long as your arm, or with one that seems too abstract to stick to anything, reading that stuff just tends to confuse me and make my head hurt. Nine clear principles is good; let's think about them and stick to them (but not out of force-of-habit).

Gian: In the Commonwealth, we've always kind of looked at Colonial Wars/COIN/Small Wars as the place to start off, honing one's individual and sub-unit skills before moving on up the spectrum ladder; for us, HIC Combined Arms operations is Graduate level!

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

":

1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security

1. Surprise - what is your definition of surprise?
2. Local dominance - so what distribution?
3. Agility - do you mean the ability to change direction quickly?
4. Initiative - initiate means to start, so why is starting something a principle?
5. Simplicity - meaning only do something simple? Comparative to what?
6. Objective - what about freedom of action?
7. Execution - meaning what?
8. Economy of force - relative to what and meaning what?
9. Security - what about activity?

I am in no way looking to be dismissive of your list, but I would ask what such a list is supposed to achieve? How does having such principles or even being aware of them help the practice of operations?

The challenges to each principle are derived from Leonhard.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Dear Norfolk:



Curmudgeon's quote here is a good example of why i am interested in this problem. He states that Coin is not war at least in terms of Principles, so then if that is the case then perhaps we should recommend to the writers currently working on FM3-0 to ditch the Principles all together and not include Coin in its discussion of full spectrum operations.

gian

Sir,

First, I would like to clear up one misunderstanding; I did not mean to infer that COIN is not war, although along the spectrum included in full spectrum operations there are a number of things that are not conflict. When someone blows up a vehicle in your convoy, engages you in a running gun battle while you try to recover your vehicle, you have to call in CAS and you take prisoners, I would agree that is war, even if all we were trying to do was build a road.

Second, as professionals, I think we are capable of recognizing that different problems have different solutions. That there are general guidelines we can follow but that not every one applies in every situation. Rather than the engineering example, I will use a doctor and a patient. You examine the patient, determine the disease, determine the appropriate treatment, treat, monitor to ensure the treatment is working, and if not adjust.

So if you treat a cold different than cancer, why not treat COIN different than Nation-State conflicts. Why do we always feel the need to beat that square peg into that round hole?

I would also like to throw out there that there are different insurgencies. That you should treat an external insurgency (AQ) different than an internal insurgency (Sunni). That you should destroy one while you might want to co-opt the other.

[SteveMetz]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

Sir,

First, I would like to clear up one misunderstanding; I did not mean to infer that COIN is not war, although along the spectrum included in full spectrum operations there are a number of things that are not conflict. When someone blows up a vehicle in your convoy, engages you in a running gun battle while you try to recover your vehicle, you have to call in CAS and you take prisoners, I would agree that is war, even if all we were trying to do was build a road.

Second, as professionals, I think we are capable of recognizing that different problems have different solutions. That there are general guidelines we can follow but that not every one applies in every situation. Rather than the engineering example, I will use a doctor and a patient. You examine the patient, determine the disease, determine the appropriate treatment, treat, monitor to ensure the treatment is working, and if not adjust.

So if you treat a cold different than cancer, why not treat COIN different than Nation-State conflicts. Why do we always feel the need to beat that square peg into that round hole?

I would also like to throw out there that there are different insurgencies. That you should treat an external insurgency (AQ) different than an internal insurgency (Sunni). That you should destroy one while you might want to co-opt the other.

I'm actually commenting on Gian's post that you quoted--I just can't find it.

I think the logic is kind of off. 3-0 is about military operations, not war. Counterinsurgency includes military operations. Just because the authors of 3-0 elect to include what are normally called the "principles of war" does not mean that all military operations become war.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

Sir...First, I would like to clear up one misunderstanding; I did not mean to infer that COIN is not war, although along the spectrum included in full spectrum operations there are a number of things that are not conflict.

Thanks so much but please if you would call me Gian, blogs are by nature very democratic. They follow the democratic tradition of leveling where what matters most is words and ideas and not rank and priveledge.

Yeah, I appreciate and understood what you were getting at in terms of Principles, defining the nature of war, and Coin. I think what i am seeing developing on this thread via the most thoughtful postings by SWC members is that most of us still define the nature of war generally in the same way; albeit with different words and different literal definitions of those words as we use them to define the nature of war. No one has come up on the Net and said yes, yes, we should use "protection of the people" as a Principle of War since it is a fundamental Principle in Coin. And to tell you the truth when i wrote this short piece as primer I really did not expect to get any agreement with my "proposed" changes. What this reinforces to me is that as an Army we do need to consider the dominance that Coin thinking, operating, and doctrine is having on us because that dominance is out of synch--based on at least the postings to this thread--the way most understand the nature of modern war; if that makes any sense.

thanks

gian

[Global Scout]

If there is no theory to underpin the profession of arms then it is not a true profession, as in medicine, engineering or law. Its just a job, like being a hairdresser or shop assistant. You just need to be trained. You don't have to be able to reason. - and as it is a true profession, I submit that sound theory is vital - otherwise you just have opinions. You don't see engineers having "opinions" about single span bridges.

I think this statement contradicts itself in many ways, and clearly points out the divide between at least two schools of thought. For sake of argument I'll define the argument above as traditionalists and counter-arguments as evolutionary.

If there is no theory to underpin the profession of arms then it is not a true profession, as in medicine, engineering or law. Its just a job, like being a hairdresser or shop assistant. You just need to be trained. You don't have to be able to reason. - and as it is a true profession, I submit that sound theory is vital - otherwise you just have opinions. You don't see engineers having "opinions" about single span bridges.

The professions of medicine and engineering would have froze in time if their practitioners had a St. Clausewitz. Instead each true professional continued to evolve his science by challenging assumptions, developing new ideas, and most importantly submitting old and new concepts to rigorous tests to confirm or deny their validity. Now we have medical mircles and engineering marvels. Blindly accepting our doctrine, which many traditionists do (not all, some actually make, or try to make, logical arguments to defend it) prohibits one from reasoning. I personally don't see the link between being able to reason and having doctrine? Numerous successful insurgent leaders around the world didn't have our doctrine, but developed their own ideas based on observation and developed a reasoned strategy. I would argue that our doctrine limits our ability to reason, and I know I'll get stoned for that one.

Are ideas generated outside of doctrine just opinions? I think some of these opinions come closer to theory than our actual doctrine, because by definition theory should have been validated by a certain degree of testing, it is the highest level of validity next to a law, which has been validated. The traditionalists don't validate their doctrine through experiments and observation, but gradually change the meaning of the definitions to fit different scenarios to the point where the definitions make no sense at all.

I would like to see the original definitions for each principle of war as they were written circa 1920, and then see where we're at today. I think that would be helpful.

If mass is no longer required, then when a J-TAC calls in a combined Fast Air, NGF and Atry strike on a high value target, is he not concentrating mass in time and space?

If mass is no longer required, what is the opposite of mass, that we should be emphasising?

I guess everytime we shot someone we were massing our concentration and front sight on the enemy for a split second, but is that what the principle really means? If it is, then what value is it? It goes back to you need to shoot that SOB before he shoots you, at least that makes sense and has some utility in training and operations.

Just because mass is not always required doesn't mean we need its opposite. That assumes that our scenarios require mass or the opposite of the mass.

[Sargent]

Originally Posted by Global Scout

The professions of medicine and engineering would have froze in time if their practitioners had a St. Clausewitz. Instead each true professional continued to evolve his science by challenging assumptions, developing new ideas, and most importantly submitting old and new concepts to rigorous tests to confirm or deny their validity. Now we have medical miracles and engineering marvels. Blindly accepting our doctrine, which many traditionists do (not all, some actually make, or try to make, logical arguments to defend it) prohibits one from reasoning. I personally don't see the link between being able to reason and having doctrine? Numerous successful insurgent leaders around the world didn't have our doctrine, but developed their own ideas based on observation and developed a reasoned strategy. I would argue that our doctrine limits our ability to reason, and I know I'll get stoned for that one.

Fields like engineering and medicine and so forth do not have legions of historians who study their pasts. While this untethers them from a slavish devotion to their pasts, it also creates the illusion that everything new is better and progress.

Consider an analogy: if you look, say, at home building in the US, the quality of the product has actually deteriorated in the last 50 years. I live in a cottage, built for turn-of-the-century laborers, and I would submit that despite its old age it will likely outlast any McMansion currently under construction. (That's why the words "pre-war" mean so much to a New Yorker hunting for a quality piece of real estate.) While there are many factors that have influenced this development, part of it is due to a culture of neophilia.

I agree that the military institutions ought not to be slaves to their pasts, that it is folly to never question anything that a particular "saint" of the history has ever said or done. However, I think that the opposite course is equally problematic, and just as likely to get a person in trouble or create a bad outcome.

Ultimately, what I am suggesting is that we don't trade vice for another.

Cheers,
Jill

[Sean Osborne]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

I would also like to throw out there that there are different insurgencies. That you should treat an external insurgency (AQ) different than an internal insurgency (Sunni). That you should destroy one while you might want to co-opt the other.

I agree with the sum of the entire post the above excerpt is taken from.

Having read every post within this thread, I had a nagging set of questions buffeting me the entire way to this point. The above quote prods me to post the following and I'll try to present them as best I can.

I'll lead my question with a couple of observations which may or may not be correct, but will assume for the moment are correct.

Observation 1: COIN is a strictly OCONUS military operation.

Observation 2: With respect to CONUS and what some identifiy as an active Islamist insurgency within CONUS (such as described by LTC Joseph C Myers).

(Active Insurgency being defined as 2/93 or WTC-1, OKC, and 9/11, and as identified in the recent NYPD treatise, as well as anticipated future terrorist insurgent events) :

Question 1: Why is it that America conducts COIN operations with military force in OCONUS theaters yet within CONUS it is only a matter of or for law enforcement (Posse Comitatus notwithstanding) involving the Justice Department?

Question 2: What about CONUS insurgent activity and subsequent action with respect to the disputed details Able Danger is reported to have detected and the specific application of E.O. 12333?

Question 3: Are Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah (or others) somehow different in OCONUS theaters than they are here in CONUS? Even with respect given to foreign state sponsorship which smacks of an 'Act of War'?

[Penta]

Originally Posted by Sean Osborne

Question 1: Why is it that America conducts COIN operations with military force in OCONUS theaters yet within CONUS it is only a matter of or for law enforcement (Posse Comitatus notwithstanding) involving the Justice Department?

I'm scared Question 1 is even a question. Seriously, I am.

Why do we do it that way...? Hmm, because we like our Constitution, maybe, and doing it your way is like the Dark Side of the Force: Easy, seductive, simple...

...And, in this case, it leads to military dictatorship before you even realize it.

Seriously, it is a good thing that uniforms get stares in America. COIN or any type of combat operations on domestic soil means soldiers deployed among the citizenry.

Probably for a long time.

And once having soldiers on street corners becomes a regular feature of the landscape, once uniforms stop getting stares, how much would it take before it goes unremarked to see uniformed soldiers in all sorts of normally-civilian roles?

Yes, I'm being vehement. Vigor in response seems required, lest anybody get the idea in their head that the idea is at all desirable.

[SteveMetz]

I'm wondering how this lashes up with the essays that Hammes, Hoffman and I did for the 2005 book entitled Rethinking the Principles of War that OSD/OFT sponsored?

[TheCurmudgeon]

8. Security; Here I propose replacing the Principle of “Security” with a new Principle, “Protection of the People.” Since so much of our operations today are COIN based and we know as our doctrine tells us that through protecting the people our own security will emerge out of that protection, then it seems to me that we no longer need Security as a Principle of War because if we protect the people accordingly security will come in due course.

9. Maneuver; I propose replacing this Principle of War with “Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing.” Obviously this new Principle is taken directly from the Paradoxes of the new COIN manual, FM 3-24. Since in modern war as we experience it today and in the future our soldiers all need to be “strategic corporals” then we should indoctrinate our Army to understand that tactics in and of themselves mean nothing as the paradox tells us. Maneuver as a Principle in the original list had to do primarily with the maneuvering of military forces in the field at the tactical and operational levels of war. Since one of the bedrocks of “maneuver” was tactics, and since the COIN paradox tells us that tactics in and of themselves are not that important unless they are linked to other lines of operations and higher objectives then replacing Maneuver with that paradox eliminates deadwood, so to speak, from the original Principles list.

I am going to disagree (which is no surprise to anyone who knows me). My reason is simple, COIN is not war, at least as it is used in the principles of war.

War as used in the principals of war is a conflict carried on by force of arms, as between nations. It involves a clash between large, organized forces. The principles of war work fine for that type of battle. Where you have clear centers of gravity and lines of operation that are tangible and can be destroyed.

COIN is a fight for the hearts and minds of the people. Its center of gravity is intangible: an idea that binds a group together in a common purpose.

I would agree that you can create a completely separate principles of COIN, but I don’t think we should adjust the current principles for COIN.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

COIN is a fight for the hearts and minds of the people. Its center of gravity is intangible: an idea that binds a group together in a common purpose.

I would agree that you can create a completely separate principles of COIN, but I don’t think we should adjust the current principles for COIN.

Very important point here. As I have said so often in the past the Strategic framework of Ends ,Ways and Means is the problem...it should be changed to Motives,Methods and Opportunities. You must understand the motive or movtives if you are ever going to accomplish anything.

[Global Scout]

I love these conversations where those indoctrinated at CGSC in pseudo-intellectual theories of war rally around Clausewitz and Army doctrine that frequently isn’t worth the paper it is written on. Anyone who dares questions this sacred doctrine is subject to heresy trails and is excommunicated. Of course there is no obligation on the true believers’ part to justify their hypotheses. I argue these so called “principles” are not based on objective observation, but simply faith and indoctrination.

They are called principles of war. A principle in the military generally means it should never be violated. In another forum we couldn’t agree on the definition of war, but simply agreed you know what it is when you’re in it. We generally agree we’re at war now, so what level of war do these so called principles apply to: strategic, operational, or tactical, or all of them? I will only argue a couple of the principles.

1. Mass is no longer required to prevail at the tactical, operational or strategic levels. Whether we call it a level of war (LIC, MIC, or HIC), 4GW (I don’t like the term either), or something else, desired effects can be achieved without mass. Al Qaeda achieved an impressive tactical/strategic short to mid-term victory on 9/11 without the use of mass. Numerous insurgents have achieved their desired end state using infiltration and selected acts of terror without the use of mass. With our superior training and technology we can achieve tactical and operational success without mass also. We didn’t need mass for our Air Force to conduct a raid on Libya. We didn’t need mass to prepare to drop a nuclear weapon on Moscow if our other forms of defense didn’t work. Of course I have seen mass defined at least five different ways in an attempt to force this principle to fit to various scenarios. I have seen more time wasted in planning groups trying to defend this nonsense than actually determining what needs to be done. We need a Martin Luther in the U.S. Army to formalize the divide that I know exists between those who are trying to determine how to win, and those who are simply trying to defend their traditional education. Traditionalists should be forced to defend themselves with logical arguments instead of faith based arguments.

2. Surprise is not “always” required, especially if you have absolute advantage (that doesn’t mean mass). At the tactical level surprise is generally desired, but at the strategic level we may very well want to advertise our intent (threaten our foes to comply and if they don’t, then follow through, e.g. weapons inspections in Iraq). The utility of surprise for COIN operations is generally limited to the tactical level.

The list goes on, each principle can be challenged, which in effect means it is not a principle. Sometimes they apply, and sometimes they don’t, which really makes me wonder what the “so what” factor is. Are these supposed to be criteria we use to evaluate courses of action? How do they help the war fighter? Furthermore, how can we simply assume that these so called principles of war apply to COIN? Conventional wars are focused on an enemy’s military and irregular conflicts are focused on the population. The two types of conflicts are not the same. These principles were developed for conventional conflicts between peer competitors. These principles made perfect sense for the type of war they were designed for, but they make little sense today.