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#1 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,058
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Interesting Op-Ed at the LINK.
Michael Scheuer may be a little extreme for the tastes of some but he has been there and, I think, makes a statement that bears some thought. My purpose in posting this article is to highlight these items from it: Quote:
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#2 |
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Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
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I have to say, I am in broad agreement. The Language and detail are problematic, but I am becoming more convinced about the efficacy of Classical Military Power. If Clausewitz didn't say it, don't do it. Victory is when you are standing on the other guys neck, using his bathroom when you feel like it, and his wife and kids are cleaning your vehicles.
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Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#3 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Camp Pendleton, CA
Posts: 304
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Seems like this is the overriding strategic question of the "GWOT"/Long War: massive conventional warfare or special forces, intelligence, and a law enforcement approach to terrorism? Obviously it's not entirely either/or, but I think we do have to make a decision about what our military is going to be used for. Personally, I'm far more persuaded by Mike Vickers and the "indirect approach" than I am by Scheurer and the folks calling for World War III (or IV, per lunatic Podhoretz).
Massive U.S./coalition ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tremendously expensive, politically contentious, and are still years if not decades from achieving success. Given how much it costs us, economically and, maybe more importantly, in the state of our military, I don't see how this kind of model is sustainable. I suppose Scheurer would argue that we need to take the gloves off and employ Roman methods of pacification, but in a post-Enlightenment, modern media age, I don't think people would go for that, absent maybe a nuked New York. And, at the risk of dragging this thread in another direction, I can't be the only Christian in America who finds "make a desert and call it peace" morally questionable. |
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#4 | |
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Council Member
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Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
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Quote:
...but I think military force has to be applied in an unambiguous way that most effectively achieves the desired aim. The only time military force is useful is when the will of an opponent needs to be broken. To paraphrase Delbruk that breaking should be "annihilation and/or exhaustion."
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Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#5 | ||
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Council Member
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,058
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and I'm not totally sure that they're in much disagreement. Scheuer, in particular, has seen the specific threat up close and realizes that the probability of dissipating that threat to an acceptable degree is going to take more than law enforcement, more than covert action and that there will be some military involvement. I don't see him as rejecting an indirect appraoch, merely as -- hyperbolically, to be sure -- saying that it isn't going to be cheap or easy.
Granite State says: Quote:
Essentially there are two major factors. The first is that a lack of knowledge of the Middle East and the ME way of war deluded four successive Presidents into attempting to be nice guys when confronted with challenges from the area. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred in that way and the Fly-in at the WTC and the Pentagon resulted. So, one factor and reason for our present situation is that we've hopefully learned that appeasement or whatever one wishes to call it -- in any event a sensible western reaction to a non-western insensible series of actions in western terms -- wil not work with some of those folks. Scheuer has pointed out elsewhere that sweetness and light allied with a hopo of moderate Islam reining in the bad guys is doomed to fail. I strongly agree with that. The second factor is that in an ideal world or nation, the civilian leadership would select the best people to run their Armed Forces and would then provide control for their employment. The Armed forces (and, here, I'll also include the Non-defense Intelligence Community) are or should be proficient in the precise as possible management of violence to achieve national aims. As Wilf says: Quote:
Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either. Thus the system has built in inefficiencies. Add to that the third failure, the Army's intransigence in ignoring COIN work against all indications of the probability and we had a problem waiting to happen. It happened. I think Scheuer is -- again hyperbolically -- trying to get people to wake up, no more. I do not see him advocating the Roman method; merely pointing out that it's going to take a national commitment to turn around what we invited by being unprepared and not responding properly to a number of indications... And by trying to play nice. In a world that just is not nice, no matter how much we want it to be... |
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#6 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2007
Posts: 568
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Serious question. Has anyone ever done that without deliberately attacking and terrorizing civilians? I can't think of any examples, but there certainly could be examples that I don't know about.
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#7 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Kansas
Posts: 1,097
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I think the public awareness and acceptance of the facts about what it takes to really win wars is valid. One need only look as far as any example of someone being shot and killed by police for walking around pointing a real looking gun at night in a dangerous part of town.
We are not wrong for wanting to do anything we can to keep this to a minimum but it is important that the public responsibilities and thus expectations be relatively closer to reality than they are right now. One would think if those small lessons were learned the larger ones pretty much follow accordingly. |
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#8 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2005
Posts: 489
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Some problems here:
1. Is the threat existential or not? Have to answer that question first. 2. What is the real definition of victory and what is the endstate? The National Security Strategies of 04-06 do not list out credible and acheivable goals. 3. The current admin has zero credibility. Have to wait until after the next admin for any real change and that's up in the air...
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"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!" The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland |
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#9 |
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Council Member
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,058
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1. In whose definition or opinion? Our system, probably mostly correctly, allows one person to make that determination. It does require a simple majority of 535 not terribly learned folks to agree or not to one extent or another but by and large your opinion and mine count for little.
2. Generally undefinable -- or indefinite. No enunciated strategy will ever be credible in any sense, the statement of it removes the uncertainty and thus starts the ebb of credibility The Powell / Weinberger doctrines (and the Monroe doctrine, among others, for that matter...) weren't credible either. An endstate in any war will always be unknown to at least some extent. See Korea or Kosovo... 3. May I say again: ""Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either."" (Emphasis added / kw) No intent to be snarky, Ski, just an old cynics take on your reasonable and intelligent questions / statements -- and that last item, BTW, is also applicable to the other two items. ![]() Oh, and R.A.: Next to none if any -- wars are messy like that. That's why they're all dumb and immoral. Even if some are necessary. Which ones are necessary? See Ski's problems and my responses... ![]() Ron: I agree but reality is offensive to some. ![]() Ain't life grand, Guys? People have more fun than monkeys...
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#10 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
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Can't think of any good examples, but I was trying to make another point. The Enemy has to fear loss, and harm. The problem with many avant-garde concepts like EBO and MW is that then denigrate the actual and symbolic need to take and hold, as in conflict in a physical dimension. While my example may have been clumsy and even crass, it would stand by it, in that it clearly demonstrates unambiguous victory.
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Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#11 | |
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Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Montreal
Posts: 1,568
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..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.
Quote:
Did overwhelming Soviet force--which left one million or more dead, far more injured, and 7 million refugees and IDPs (one third of the population)--intimidate the Afghans into submission? Of course, Pakistani/Saudi/US/UK/etc material support to the mujahiddin helped a great deal, but the essential point was that it was an enabler in the context of a population whose will was unbroken despite quasi-Roman pacification methods. There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results. |
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#12 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: DeRidder LA
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Quote:
My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight. Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience. What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me. Best Tom |
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#13 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Bristol, Tennessee
Posts: 146
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Quote:
For posterity’s sake, he elaborated on this approach in a speech to SS officers in Posen on October 6, 1943.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posen_speech "Most of you know what it means when a hundred corpses are lying side by side, or five hundred, or a thousand. To have stuck it out, and at the same time to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history, which has never been written and is never to be written. We had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this people which wanted to destroy us One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the S.S. men. We must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and nobody else. What happens to a Russian and a Czech does not interest me in the least. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our culture: otherwise it is of no interest to me. Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We, Germans, who are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody comes up to me and says: 'I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,' then I have to say: 'You are the murderer of your own blood, because if the anti-tank ditch is not dug German soldiers will die, and they are the sons of German mothers. They are our own blood....' Our concern, our duty, is our people and our blood. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the S.S. to adopt this attitude towards the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, especially Russians.... " As Rex Byrnen already posted, just who are we supposed to unleash this overwhelming military force against? Since there isn't an army in the field opposing us, that seems to leave the civilian population. Doesn't sound much different than what Himmler was saying. Old wine in a new bottle.
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#14 |
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As I explained, I am not advocating this is in literal terms. What I am saying is that when military force is legitimately, discriminatingly and proportionally applied it should be done so in a way that confirms an unambiguous decision on the enemy. That means creating a reality of defeat that the enemy understands and fears.
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Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#15 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2007
Posts: 568
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Quote:
The Sunnis in Iraq are a good example. They never surrendered. They forced us to offer them a deal. Which goes back to my original point. Unless you start killing women and children in retaliation for not surrendering, ""legitimate, discriminate, poportional force doesn't produce unambigious results. (As before, I'm open to counter examples that prove I'm wrong.) Actually, I guess I should add "without the support of the population." If you accept that the objective of the first gulf war was to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait, we had Kuwaiti support and a definitive victory. If you had broader objectives, the results were more ambiguous. |
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#16 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
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Quote:
The IRA never surrendered, but they gave up the armed struggle. Communists in Malaya are also an example.
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Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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