British COIN (merged thread)

[Strickland]

Moderator's Note

I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)


Is anyone familiar with the British C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism) Theory/Doctrine? If anyone has this document or is familiar with the idea, please help.

[slapout9]

Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

[Tom Odom]

Adam,

I have a full CD on Brit OPTAG materials on COIN including the N. Ireland Bluebook I can send to you snal mail: need a military address sent by email (you have mine)

we have also uused some of this in our company level SOSO series of handbooks you can see on the CALL gateway.

Tom

[Strickland]

I have the Brit Bluebook for N. Ireland, but was of the impression that this C-DICT was something new. Is it the same?

[Strickland]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

Thank you.

oneknievelfan@msn.com
adam.strickland@usmc.mil

[Wagram]

British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent? Ashley Jackson British Army Review

Accurate assessment of British counter-insurgency successes requires abandonment of certain myths relating to military prowess in the application of 'minimum force' and recognition of essential contributions made by non-military agencies using unorthodox means to intimidate insurgents.

"In particular, it is argued that past counter-insurgency campaigns were won not by the British Army on its own, but by an array of security organizations, and that the threat of maximum force and methods of dubious legality were the keys to counter-insurgency success" (p12).

It is essential not to let such myths (for example, that COIN policy aimed to achieve an orderly path to independence rather than to resist decolonization altogether) shape current doctrine: "doctrinal publications must guard against elevating contested historical interpretations to the status of base-line truths" (p13).

From: http://www.mpr.co.uk/archive/schedule/BAR.HTM

This is an excellent article. Highly recommended and refreshing research which goes deeper than "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

[Tom Odom]

Very good post and one with a lesson that I try and pass on: Brit COIN TTPs are the result of trial, successes, and ERRORS over quite a span of colonial and post-colonial episodes. Brit officers I have worked with are generally quite intellectually honest in stating the same thing.

Bottom line: yes, Brit COIN lessons are useful as are Brit COIN TTPs, as long as one goes beyond as Wagram says,

"we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

Best

Tom

[Norfolk]

Zombie Thread...Arise!

The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges, by I.A. Rigden (USAWC Strategy Research Project, 15 March, 2008):

Modern British doctrine is founded on both myth and historical collective and regimental experience. Considered in the broader context of the total imperial experience a more comprehensive appreciation of counter-insurgency emerges. The realities of the British experience therefore become the premises for a counterinsurgency theory. What the study of the literature and experience suggest is a more general and inclusive list of realties that better define the basis for a comprehensive approach for the twenty-first century. It reveals at least 16 overarching premises that validate the current British principles and highlight areas not currently addressed in the AFM. Taken together these 16 premises constitute a British theory of counterinsurgency.

Most of what this paper has to offer is not news to many students, let alone practioners, of COIN. But it is a good read, clear and concise, and we speed readers can digest it in about half an hour without missing anything. If one does not have to time or inclination to read Galula, Trinquiere, et al., this paper might be a worthwhile semi-substitute.

Colonel Rigden's 16 Premises for COIN (abbreviated extracts):

1. The first premise is that insurgency is war. War is a political act that requires an active decision to initiate it and a clear declaration of intent.

2. The second premise is that every campaign is unique and the nature of the conflict must be understood. It takes time to fully understand the nature of the problem faced and to develop the lines of operation to deal with it.

3. The third first premise is envisioning the long-term post-conflict end-state. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote: “The object of the counter-insurgency war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”

4. The fourth premise is that geography matters. World geography and the geography of a particular region is one of the most important factors when trying to understand the nature of the conflict and how to conduct a counter-insurgency. Geography does affect the mindset of the insurgent and the population.

5. The fifth premise is do not fight a war or campaign that you cannot win. There is a potential decision point in the planning or conduct of every war or campaign in which the astute leader may conclude that the costs of success or risks of failure far outweighs the benefits of any success.

6. The sixth premise is the requirement for a clear plan. This is one of Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles and is based on his experience in helping to formulate the Briggs Plan.41 It is an essential factor for success. The plan must, however, be tailored to the peculiar and unique circumstances of the insurgency.

7. The seventh premise is that there is always a learning stage at the beginning of each campaign and that it is vitally important to learn from mistakes quickly. It takes time to understand the nature of each campaign and, in the process of doing so, it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made. [Note: I would not agree with the invocation of Boyd's OODA Loop here].

8. The eighth premise is that politics is the focal point. Politics and war are social phenomena. One key to countering insurgency is therefore to understand the context and nature of the social environment. It is essential to understand what the people’s issues are and what can make them better.

9. The ninth premise is that hearts follow minds in counter-insurgency. In Hanoi in 1956, paraphrasing Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh stated that “The people are like the fish in the sea, they swim with the current.”
Making the people swim in the right direction, the legitimate authority’s current, is the key to winning in counter-insurgency. It is essential to alter their minds to reject the insurgents and accept the justness and legitimacy of the counter-insurgent’s cause and to concurrently win their hearts.

10. The tenth premise is that the requirement for a coordinated multi-agency government approach is paramount to success. This is true for governments externally intervening and for existing internal governments. The overall strategy and ensuing plans must be collaborative and involve multi-agencies and actors using all of the elements of national power of both the supported and supporting governments. In doing this the activities have to be coordinated and synchronized so that they work together and not against one another.

11. The eleventh premise is that it is essential to work within the rule of law. Rule of law is the visible symbol of moral justification. The aim must be to restore the civilian authority and police primacy if it does not already exist. Where it does not exist, the military must shoulder the burden until such time as the relevant civilian and police capabilities can be trained to fulfil their role.

12. The twelfth premise is that counter-insurgents must only use the appropriate force necessary for the situation faced. The appropriate use of force is the minimum amount of force required to achieve a particular legitimate objective. This can range from full scale warfighting against an insurgent base deep in the jungle to the single arrest of an insurgent in an urban area. The British military has relied heavily on flexible Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that only the minimum force necessary is used for each situation. Force must be proportionate and justified and the intent to use force clearly understood.

13. The thirteenth premise is that campaigns must be appropriately resourced to be truly effective. Like all conflicts where fighting is likely, counter-insurgency campaigns are expensive in term of “blood and treasure.” It is, however, the “treasure” element of this equation that is often the most lacking in counter-insurgency campaigns. Such campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and they generally take longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude.

14. The fourteenth premise is that accurate and timely information and intelligence are essential to success. Insurgency and counter-insurgency both work in the same strategic environment and the currency is intelligence that can be used to act.

15. The fifteenth premise is that the use of indigenous forces is essential to building a an enduring peace for the country concerned. In all British campaigns local indigenous forces have played an important role. They have acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering, police forces and the local military.

16. The sixteenth premise is that every new campaign will face increasing constraints and less freedom in the conduct of operations. The world of the twenty-first century is very different from fifty years ago. The Malayan campaign and Kenya were fought largely out of the glare of the media whereas Iraq and Afghanistan have twenty-four hour news coverage. Conflicts in the nineteenth century were reported weeks later. If history is our guide, this will only become worse and is a significant factor when considering undertaking a counter-insurgency or conducting a counter-insurgency campaign.

[davidbfpo]

Excellent find. A light reading over breakfast and maybe read again later - when printed. Interesting that this article by a British Army officer, studying in the USA and published in the USA. I wonder if it will be re-printed here, perhaps in British Army Review?

I cannot think of an equivalent review of the British experience in counter-terrorism, where the police / law enforcement / intelligence agencies have primacy. An experience with several different strands: Northern Ireland, domestic or mainland (not exclusively Irish) and overseas (e.g. Greece).

Perhaps others (Slap ?) know of a review of the American (inc. Canadian) CT experience?

From my armchair and not being a soldier I cannot comment on whether the military will gain from this. Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

davidbfpo

PS Not sure if Wagram still visits SWC, so will email him to look again.

[wm]

Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.

A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.

[MattC86]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

I sense there's a strong revisionist current in the US "COIN community" (for abject lack of a better term) claiming the British aren't so good at COIN after all - and pointing to Basra as the proof. Abu Muqawama was talking about that a few weeks ago. That's part of the whole "patting ourselves on the back" phenomenon I find so aggravating among many American commentators.

To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .

Definitely an interesting read, Norfolk. Thanks.

Regards,

Matt

[Jim Rodgers]

I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

[SteveMetz]

Originally Posted by Jim Rodgers

I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

Alex Alderson has been participating here; I'm sure he'll fix you up. I'll send him an email on it.

[Alex Alderson]

The reference is slightly off the mark but it matters not. You are looking for Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10, published in July 2001. Written by Brig (Retd) Gavin Bulloch, the British Army's pre-eminent doctrine writer, it served its purpose and held out until a full review was put in place nearly a year ago. That review is nearly complete and has hit the mark with the internal market, taking on the problems of interventionist COIN, raising the issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, reassessing principles and establishing a new view of the Thompson approach of Engage-Secure-Develop. There are one or two final hurdles to clear and no doubt the challenging views of the Small Wars cogniscenti will hit on things we'd wished we had included but... One of the most obvious and important points I have made is to pick up on Steve Metz's view, again obvious, that insurgency is a strategy. Why important? If you are to counter it, you also need a strategy, not just a presence: being there is not a strategy. And military prowess is, as many contributors have made clear, not enough. If you have access to the Royal United Services Institute website or its August 2007 journal, you can read more about what my team has been up to.

[davidbfpo]

Post Ten refers to the 2001 edition being updated and in May 2012 a link was found on the BBC News website to the 2009 edition, but has now disappeared.

This was the link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/h...rmy_manual.pdf

I did note the document has no official markers and was found on a BBC website, so I assumed it is for public use. Today May 12th 2012 a SWC member has drawn attention to the copyright notice, which also proclaims it was an official document and not for public use. Maybe someone noticed thirty months later it was in the public domain?

Moderator's Note

I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)

[davidbfpo]

Not to overlook the impact on British COIN of the Malayan experience, well explained IMO in this SWJ article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...arts-and-minds

With a comment added today that refers to an AFJ March 2011 'Slow learners: How Iraq and Afghanistan forced Britain to rethink COIN', which I don't think has been caught on SWC before and is very good:http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/11/6292362

It ends with:

The British military’s experience in contemporary COIN operations elicited an unfortunate smugness and complacency in an organization that thought that it “got it.” Successful experiences in the past gave it a false sense of security in its approaches to Iraq and Afghanistan, and it suffered the consequences. Officers within the organization identified these shortcomings, but also began to point out failures in adaptation, while the U.S. seemed to embrace change. Though the early misperceptions may have delayed the response, the British military — especially the Army — eventually experienced very similar dynamics as its U.S. counterpart in its approaches to counterinsurgency.

With older threads Managing COIN: Lessons from Malaya:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2900

[William F. Owen]

I have just acquired an original 1958 copy of the "Conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya."

It's brilliantly written and complete antidote to the sort of FM3-24 stuff we see today.

What is more, stuffed in the back of the manual was 4 pages of a typed interview with FM Gerald Templer, hand corrected by someone unknown. I have no idea of how authentic it is, but it is extremely interesting and concerns his view pertaining to the US in Vietnam. It may well be un-published.

I think the interview date is about 1966/7, and it rather stresses the differences, rather than the similarities between Malaya and Vietnam.

He also refers to "hearts and Minds" as a "nauseating phrase"

[William F. Owen]

The CATOM manual bears the name of "Lt Col P.G. Fleming, MA Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry"

Doing some "Googling" I found this,

http://koyli.com/remembrance/ltcolfleming.htm

This seems to be the man, who owned the manual. He only died recently.

[Jedburgh]

Great find, Wilf! Beyond the inherent value of the content itself and the added value of the enclosed interview, the provenance of previous ownership is very interesting.

[Fuchs]

Wasn't the insurgency in Malaya a very unique case with little to tell about other small wars?

The population situation, the de-colonialization context, the ideological dimension - it looks to me as if that war is only good for good anecdotes (like that the CVR/T) family was allegedly designed to be not too wide to pass the natural rubber plantation's trees in Malaya - those trees were planted orderly in a specific spacing).