We should attribute this to a translation problem. 389 was poorly translated. The earlier chapters of TF are general, later ones rather specific. 389 was a quite specific paragraph that got unduly generalized in the English translation.
Tell me if you ever see "Entscheidende Stelle" instead of "entscheidende Stelle", for the Capital E (except at the very beginning of a sentence) would indicate a use as one term instead of merely two words used together.
- - - - -
And again, German armed services do not and did not use "Doktrin" as a term. It's a rather negative word in German. The approach is different anyway.
One example: It was customary to write "Kein Schema!" (no schematic!) on almost all graphics till about the 50's. The content of ZDv and HDv field manuals was (probably still is) less a holy writing than for foreign armies.
Very few maxims and de-facto principles are being treated like written in stone and immune to debate (and some of them should not be!).
Am I correct that "Entscheidende Stelle" means "crucial place/location"Originally Posted by Fuchs
I agree with the sentiment, but armies are based on teachings and learning. Without it, you have nothing.And again, German armed services do not and did not use "Doktrin" as a term. It's a rather negative word in German. The approach is different anyway.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&lan...h=entscheidend
http://dict.leo.org/ende?lp=ende&lan...&search=Stelle
There's a difference between capital E and normal e.
A capital E would indicate a use as a defined term.
Btw, neither was used in TF paragraph 389 !
What about paragraph 123 and 323?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The text isn't written for greatest grammer, and my translation will be close and therefore even worse grammar...
"For the reconnaissance service are not more troops to be used than the purpose requires.123. Für den Aufklärungsdienst sind nicht mehr Kräfte zu verwenden, als es der Zweck verlangt.
Die Aufklärungskräfte sind beizeiten in der wichtigsten Richtung zusammenzufassen, besonders wenn mit überlegenen feindlichen Aufklärungskräften zu rechnen ist. In Nebenrichtungen ist nur das Notwendigste einzusetzen.
Anzustreben ist, die Aufklärung je nach der Lage aus zurückgehaltenen Aufklärungskräften jederzeit zu verdichten, erweitern oder, wenn notwendig, auch in neuer Richtung ansetzen zu können.
The reconnaissance troops shall be timely concentrated on the most important direction, especially if superior enemy reconnaisance forces are to be expected. Only the minimum (most necessary) shall be allocated for secondary directions.
It is to strive that the reconnaissance according to the situation be densified with held back reconnaissance forces at any time, expanded (enlarged, extended) or, if necessary, also to be sent into a new direction."
(my emphasis)323. Jeder Angriff bedarf einheitlicher Führung; er darf nicht in Einzelangriffe zerfallen.
Die Hauptkraft und die Masse der Munition sind an der entscheidenden Stelle anzusetzen. (...)
Ist die entscheidende Stelle nicht von vornherein zu erkennen, so muß der Schwerpunkt ins Ungewisse gebildet und erforderlichenfalls nachher verlegtwerden, oder er wird erst später gebildet.
Tritt der Erfolg während des Angriffs an einer anderen Stelle ein wie da, wo er erwartet oder beabsichtigt war, so ist er entschlossen auszunutzen. Soll der Schwerpunkt verlegt oder später gebildet werden, so müssen ausreichende Reserven vorhanden sein, starke Wirkung aller Waffen muß in der neuen Richtung vereinigt werden können.
(...)
"Every attack requires a unified leadership; it must not degenerate (break down) into individual attacks.
The main force and the larger part (mass) of the munition are to be allocated to the decisive point. (...)
If the decisive point is not recognizable in advance, so the Schwerpunkt needs to be created in uncertainty or if necessary later moved, or it is being created only later on.
If the success happens during the attack at another point than there where it is being expected or intended, so it is to be exploited resolutely. If the Schwerpunkt shall be moved or created only later on, then sufficient reserves need to be available, it needs to be possible to unite strong effect of all weapons in the new direction.
(...)"
Emphasis: No capital "E", therefore the two words have no extraordinary meaning, no general definition as one term.
Page 12 Editors' Introduction of my book.
It is written as one word with a capitol E like this "Entscheidungsstelle" does that make a differance?
On page 187 of “Not mentioned in dispatches” Schwerpunkt is translated as ‘focus of energy’.
The equivalent of the German term Schwerpunkt, which translates as focal point, centre of gravity, thrust point, main effort etc; the centre of critical activity in an operation. This may be a place or, more likely, a part of one’s force, or an activity, or a combination of these. The focus of energy is where one applies one’s most important efforts in order to fulfil the mission, usually to maximise the effect one may create upon the enemy. The focus of energy is a concept for focussing one’s efforts on achieving concentration of strength against relative weakness, probably repeatedly at temporary focal points, conducive to maximising the physical and psychic power of one’s force relative to the enemy’s. Skilful focussing and refocusing can allow a materially weaker force to annihilate a stronger one by repeatedly achieving local superiority and by maximising the effects of manoeuvre.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
That's basically the same as "Entscheidende Stelle".
The word ist awkward and strange. Today's civilian would almost certainly prefer "Ort der Entscheidung"; "Entscheidungsstelle" sounds like taken from a management organigram. I've never read it before.
Primarily for Fuchs
How does this article rate on the accurate-inaccurate scale re: German language, German military usage and German military history ?
Clausewitz's Schwerpunkt: mistranslated from German - Misunderstood in English, Military Review, Jan-Feb, 2007 by Milan Vego.
Regards
Mike
Surprised!!
This article in Marine Gazette surprised me greatly because of their "tongue in cheek" approach. See! Even today the "discussions" continue.
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/a...nist-letters-3
Never put a lot of faith in most of the Gazette stuff, even being a Marine...but now I need to go back and find #1 and #2.
That will take a while.
USMC Fundamentals Of Tactics Series 1998
Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.
http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf
Thanks. This actually explains how a lot of the errors crept in! - but 1998 is kind of late. Weren't all the pamphlets in place by 1991?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I am not sure of the time line, could very well have been since the book itself is from the late 1980's.
According to my trusty harddrive,
Gentlemen (and I use that term loosely),
MCDP 1 Warfighting was in place in 1989 and revised in 1997 under Chuck Krulak - his comment (20 June 1997):
So spake the oracle of that time.Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication. Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy contained in Warfighting. Our philosophy of warfighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoniously with the other Services.
That said, I believe Warfighting can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It is in this spirit that Warfighting has been revised, and this publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. I have several goals for this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the nature of war — for example, to emphasize war’s complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for modern conflict’s expanding forms. Another goal is to clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability. It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and essential message of the original.
Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.
Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2 derives a theory about war from that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy, MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and MCDP 1-3 Tactics were 1997 publications - MCDP 6 Command & Control was a 1996 publication - all under GEN Krulak's imprimatur.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 07-08-2010 at 12:37 PM.
jmm99,Seems close enough for guvmint work. I have the 1997 PDF of Warfighting. Do you know of any major chnages from the original?
Here's ...
my backgrounder and question, Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare; and here is Polarbear's answer, Oh remembering the Battles!:
I'd consider the Magnus Albus Ursus to be pretty much definitive; unless Chuck Krulak waltzes out of the woodwork with something different.Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.
I found a little difference in chap. 4 (1989 vs 1997); but didn't really do a good comparison on chaps 1-3. You do.
Cheers
Mike
I sometimes … maybe... get a tad cynical
In a book by Winford Holland, “Red Zone Management: Changing the Rules for Pivotal Times”, the author states that there are six phases to any major project:
1. Enthusiasm
2. Disillusionment
3. Panic & Hysteria
4. Search for the Guilty
5. Punishment of the innocent, and
6. Praise and Honor for the non-participants
Having watched many outstanding comrades go through phase 4 and 5, IMHO, because of the 1998 date, this is part of Phase 6. It is hard to tell for sure because of all the background noise of lips smacking upon butts.
Lost Boyd Tapes
I have seen and participated in a lot of debates concerning the Boyd Theory (Maneuver Warfare) on this blog. I have seen the Boyd briefings on two separate occasions (Amphibious Warfare School - 1981 and USMC Command and Staff College in 1989). When I sat through the first brief (Patterns of Conflict) I received a copy of the slides. Months later when I went through the slides again I realized that a major portion of the brief was missing. The missing part being the Boyd narrative…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours. I became convinced that in order to fully understand the brief you needed both the slides and the narrative.
Realizing my mistake and returning to C&S, when I got to listen to Col Boyd for the second time, I taped the Col’s “Discourse on Winning and Losing” that contains his discussions on “Patterns of Conflict”, “Organic Design for Command and Control”, and “The Strategic Game of ? and ?”. I also remember a number of other recorders on the table besides mine. I recently realized during a discussion on this blog that few if any of those recordings exist today.
I managed to find my cassettes (8 – 90 minute tapes) and made a decision to convert them to CDs. If anyone is interested I have establish a way for you to get a copy of those now 8 CDs (10-12 hours). I need to add a disclaimer here that this is a recording I made with a small old portable cassette player over multiple meetings that was sitting in the middle of a conference room table. The quality is not the best but the discussion can be heard. There is considerable back ground noise and Col Boyd was never one to stand still. In any event, if you are interested in obtaining a set please contact me (polarbear1605) with your email address and I will get the particulars to you. I will also be a this weeks Boyd Conference in Quantico if you want addition information about the CDs. Thanks, Polarbear
This may just be a nuisance to readers here, but I want to tell you what this reminded me of:
A film director once said that it's not good directing if you need more than 90 minutes duration for a story.
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