slapout9,Originally Posted by slapout9
On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about. Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful. Therefore, UBL's strategies, operations and tactics have to be (perceived to be) consistent with Islam. For instance, UBL has conducted terrorist attacks in Saoudi Arabia (the Khobar Towers bombing). This attack was possible because it was directed against foreigners. However, it would be impossible for UBL to conduct a terrorist attack in Mecca during the Hajj, even if this would result into a much higher number of victims.
I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.
Marc
I agree that he said it and I am sure he meant it but Is that quote from the most recent article? I don't seem to be able to find it in there. Within the context of Muslims attacking Muslims yes UBL has restraints but within the context of Muslims attacking infidels what restraints does he have? So because of that I don't see how a Strategist could come up with a solution.
Your enemy's restraint is your strength.
http://books.google.be/books?id=uTHj...ed=0CCkQ6AEwAA
Warden's original article starts at page 351. You can find the quote on page 353.
The answer to that one is simple: if UBL only has restraints within the context of Muslims, you have to find a way to alienate Muslims from UBL and make them do the fighting for you. That was the whole rationale behind the "Sons of Iraq" strategy against Al Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Got it thanks I will re-read it tonight. I have a copy of a letter to the editor of our newspaper that Warden wrote in 2003 about what a mistake it was to disband the Iraqi Army because they would be needed for security on the ground.
I disagree that you have to have a huge ground force. Ground observers help, but the information you are referring to shouldn't be beyond the capabilities of the CIA, DIA, State, etc.
What you are talking about is definitely a part of Warden's 5 rings, and obviously the first step in just about any conflict - see the Libya thread for the most current example.Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
That said, it's tough to keep a runway out of commission permanently, and you can't be sure that the other guy doesn't have some aux fields you missed - hence why air to air is important even after you've killed the runways.
V/R,
Cliff
USAF is not huge...
Let's clarify... we do not have a huge USAF. The USN (227) and Army (236) are both buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF is (114)... we have a small USAF that is getting smaller.
Additionally, the B-2s could not have done what they did without the support of a lot of other aircraft- including fighters. B-2s are not invisible - meaning they are vulnerable to fighters.
Finally, Libya's IADS was not modern, nor was it robust... additionally, a lot of folks are trying to buy the same capabilities the US has, meaning they won't be asymmetric for much longer.
Northern Watch and Southern Watch DID suppress ground operations... or do you have an example of Kurdistan or the Shiite south being attacked while they were actually in effect? Finally, the goal of ONW and OSW was never to replace Saddam.. it was to protect the Kurds and Shiites from Saddam... it did a pretty good job.In addition, we see Admiral Mullen saying that Qaddafi's overthrow is not the objective. So guess my question is how is this different than the last Northern Watch/Southern Watch that lasted a decade without ousting Hussein or suppressing ground operations?
Folks may not have liked ONW and OSW based on the policy, but they accomplished their objectives.
V/R,
Cliff
You assume UBL actually cares what the people think. I would argue that the actions of AQI are a good example of AQ being perfectly willing to break some eggs making their caliphate omlette.
You assume that the strategist and the politician are different. Again, this is not the case in our system. Politicians are the strategists. Our system intentionally separates the military from the other levers of national power, unifying them only within civilians that control the executive branch. This means that strategy is ultimately decided by politicians and their close advisors. This does mean, however, that our strategists have to adhere to political restrictions - because they are usually running for re-election.I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.
Marc
Not all systems are constrained - again, restraint assumes a rational actor, and as pvebber has pointed out, people are not always rational.
V/R,
Cliff
No problem as usual Airpower is the answer.
http://www.fantastic-plastic.com/Con...atalogPage.htm
Have the CIA/DIA/State Dept found Bin Laden since 2001?
They don't have a good track record, and in the case of State, once the balloon goes up, they are not much help in providing intelligence.
There are too few CIA/DIA with the requisite language skills and area expertise, and technical intelligence and high altitude or space ISR are not all-seeing or all-weather. In places like China, North Korea, Lebanon, Iran, and Venezuela our CIA/DIA presence is no doubt small, the targets, area, and system is large, and terrain and underground facilities are not always conducive to high altitude and space ISR.
The only part of the 5 rings it appears are being attacked are military targets, as of now. General Ham says we are not targeting Qaddafi...the Brits and French have their own ideas but fewer cruise missiles and fighters than we do. We have many cruise missiles fired from as few as four former nuclear missile subs and others from destroyers. Wouldn't the same missiles function equally well against China or Russia, particularly if stealth is added and munitions such as JASSM-ER? New long range stealth bombers also are planned.What you are talking about is definitely a part of Warden's 5 rings, and obviously the first step in just about any conflict - see the Libya thread for the most current example.
Why spend a fortune defending conventionally against threats we are highly unlikely to fight due to economic interdependence and MAD? We have more than ample air and seapower for any other threat...and still more than enough for China with planned systems not requiring radical shifts in funding priorities.
Don't buy that in Iran, North Korea and definitely not Libya or Lebanon. China might be tougher considering how fast industrious personnel rebuilt bridges etc, in Vietnam.That said, it's tough to keep a runway out of commission permanently, and you can't be sure that the other guy doesn't have some aux fields you missed - hence why air to air is important even after you've killed the runways.
But with stealth bombers escorted by F-22, stealth JASSM-ER and cruise missiles, and future unmanned attack aircraft you can't hide an airfield from repeated attacks and soon fewer aircraft are there to launch. AWACS would rapidly identify other launch locations, and it is harder to move large fuel supplies and ordnance/maintenance facilities.
The mobile TBM able to take out OUR Pacific airfields are a much tougher target. What would we be doing now in Libya if Italy and others were not providing land airfields or if Libya had China's, Iran's, or North Korea's TBMs?
Because adjusted for inflation, a F-4 bought today would cost $13 million, not $140 million and counting with planned upgrades coming for F-22. Plus, AH-64Ds save lives daily in two conflicts. Have yet to hear of an F-22 providing CAS in Afghanistan or Iraq...or Libya. Perhaps the fact that they fly at 60,000 feet and have no EO/IR targeting capability is part of the explanation, not to mention maintenance expense in a desert environment.
With such capable and expensive aircraft, few threat nations can buy more than a few dozen less capable, and less stealthy Russian and Chinese attempts at stealth. In terms of annual defense budget, with the exception of China and Russia deterred by MAD, go all the way to Iran at 23rd to find the first potential foe, with a sub $10 billion annual defense budget and sanctions in place prohibiting them from buying modern aircraft. Ditto for North Korea with a similarly small defense budget. Libya's air force WAS a joke and doubt much remains. Twenty of the top 22 defense budgets are allies or ourselves to help deter Russia and China.
How long would it take Iran or North Korea to buy 180+ Russian or Chinese "stealth" aircraft at nearly $100 million each? 18 years if they could finance 10 per year at a billion a year...highly unlikely during which time we and allies also field thousands of stealthy F-35s, bombers, and unmanned aircraft.
Flying at night with F-22 and F-35 escorts, what are the odds of Chinese or Russian "stealth" aircraft even finding our aircraft let alone fighting air-to-air? Stealth cruise missiles and JASSM-ER fired from B-52H and B-1B don't need an escort.Additionally, the B-2s could not have done what they did without the support of a lot of other aircraft- including fighters. B-2s are not invisible - meaning they are vulnerable to fighters.
And again, you can argue all you want about not having a crystal ball but defense budgets don't lie. All realistic threats spend well under $10 billion a year which will never fund either a large air force, naval response, or IADS. We have ample air and seapower planned and programmed. You could easily argue that one or two less CVNs (6 of which typically sit vulnerable in just two U.S. ports) would finance the additional air and seapower without cannibalizing the Army.Finally, Libya's IADS was not modern, nor was it robust... additionally, a lot of folks are trying to buy the same capabilities the US has, meaning they won't be asymmetric for much longer.
I heard an analyst/General admit that Northern Watch was more effective than Southern Watch. Shiites were targeted with WMD and remained oppressed. The Oil for Food program robbed the world of an oil source, just as the Libya no fly zone may eventually. It may have satisfied a stated objective. It did not solve the primary problem.Northern Watch and Southern Watch DID suppress ground operations... or do you have an example of Kurdistan or the Shiite south being attacked while they were actually in effect? Finally, the goal of ONW and OSW was never to replace Saddam.. it was to protect the Kurds and Shiites from Saddam... it did a pretty good job.
Folks may not have liked ONW and OSW based on the policy, but they accomplished their objectives.
Cliff,
I do not assume anything. I say that ALL power systems have political restraints to worry about. I think that I can state as a fact (not an assumption) that Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful and that therefore they have to worry about the political restraint not to act in an unislamic manner (like indiscriminately attacking Muslims). Whether UBL is rational enough to take this restraint into acount or not is a totally different matter. Restraint does NOT assume a rational actor. A rational strategist will take restraints and constraints into account and have a good chance to be successful. A strategist that is not rational will probably not take restraints into account and will probably be unsuccessful. In Iraq, Al Zarqawi did not take restraints into account, attacked Muslims indiscriminately, and suffered the consequences. Iraqi Sunnis turned against him and the Jordanian intelligence services did whatever they could to help the Americans find him.
Politicians decide about stategy, but they are not strategists. I think it would be an insult to General Petraeus' doctrinal and strategic efforts to say that the American strategy in Iraq after 2007 was developed by politicians. Because strategists develop strategy and politicians decide about strategy, it is necessary to organize an open and fruitful discourse between politicians and strategists. Examples of good discourses are Powell-Bush Sr and Petraeus-Bush Jr. There is plenty of literature about bad discourses. I've got two excellent examples if you're interested.
Marc,
I re-read the paper last night and yes I agree with you. But he is talking about our (US) system not the enemies. In fact all his writings have consistently said that you must focus on the physical side (physical restraints) because that is the only thing you can actually have some predictable effect on. Mental concepts such as laws,rules,ethics are subject to change and usually will (the holy man will receive a vision from God to change things) once the physical threat of destruction is brought into play. But just to be safe I am going to ask him. May not be this week and it will depend on his schedule but I am pretty sure what he is going to say, he even teaches it this way in his SMART Wars/SMART Strategies class.
It was supposed to be an Illustration of the evolution of Airpower. It has progressed a great deal since the original Rings/Wheel concept of mass area bombardment has it not ? And if we(US) keep at at it Airpower can and needs to advance further, the article is essentially about what Airpower needs to become.
I hope I answered this in he above response.
I agree it is controversial, but so was going to the Moon, but we did it.
You are reading to much into the implication, Airpower is the delivery of people,things and information through the Air. In the sense of sending Air Soldiers to seize in tact some vital installation or person like a presidential palace or the president/king himself, so called ground forces will be vital.
I hope I answered this in the above statement.
LCAC's are technically Airpower.How do paratroopers and marines take CoGs without battle? OR is it that we must redefine battle as we have redefined airpower (The joke in MC02 was that the Air Force wanted submarines to put torpedo shots on the ATO because they were launched with compressed air)
Answered this on a separate post. But Helicopter Gunships are Airpower part of the point he is trying to make. I don't think tanks are a problem for them.
So why is it Warden's fault or invalidates any of his theories because the DOD budget process is messed up?
He learned them very well alot of people don't know this but for awhile he was a FAC(Forward Air Controller) assigned to the First Air Cav in Vietnam. His experiences in Vietnam had alot to do with him with coming up with better ways to think about Strategy.
We are waiting your return.
He doesn't really like the Coercion theory, he thinks it is to unpredictable, I think I posted an article about that some time back.
Last edited by slapout9; 03-28-2011 at 07:41 AM. Reason: stuff
I will recast my parting olive branch post as I think it gets to the main issues that we seem to keep talking past each other on...
Warden's theory at its root is about improving the use of CoGs and a systems thinking framework to make military operations shorter, more efficient and more effective. It assumes that faster more parallel operations are better than a protracted series of battles.
Working back systematically from a singular desired endstate is the strategic method. It is assumed that the information necessary to accomplish this is available through observation of the system.
There are circumstances where this is the preferred approach. In these situations "airpower" is the supported arm.
An alternative theory suggests that some classes of military problems are not fully understood by observation from a distance. To fully understand the nature of some problems you must "grab the tarbaby" and engage in a serial "probing" of the system you are trying to understand/affect along a number of lines of operation that are iterative, heuristic, and unpredictable in their outcome.
There will never be sufficient information about a system to mechanically "work backwards" from a single desired end-state. Evolving solutions over time to favorably shape a wide potential set of endstates is the strategic method.
There are circumstances where this is the preferred problem approach. In these circumstances "landpower" is the supported arm.
Would Warden support that construct and a "why can't we all just get along" approach and accept that the two approaches have their preferred problem sets, both are necessary but insufficient to address the complete range of possible military operations and need to be integrated rather than in competition?
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
The Libya Dilemma: The limits of Airpower
Is this a case where Warden would say we should not have gotten involved becasue airpower can't be used in a decisive fashion?
Or is this a case of not using airpower "as it should"? Is so how should it have been used?
What is the "desired endstate" to be worked back from in the case of a coalition with distinctly different national interests? Whose end-sate do we work back from?
How does Warden's "new model Airpower" solve the dilemma?In this scenario, the West will ultimately confront the same dilemmas that arose before Sept. 11. How long can Western leaders continue an apparently indecisive air campaign in the face of pleas for escalation from allies on the ground? In Kosovo, NATO was on the verge of a divisive debate over escalating to a ground invasion when Slobodan Milosevic delivered the alliance from its crisis by folding unexpectedly. Will Gaddafi stand fast longer? If so, what then? Nothing in the ostensibly new Obama doctrine offers an escape from this underlying issue. Multilateral burden-sharing might make a stalemate look cheaper, but it cannot transform a stalemate into painless victory.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.
The Crony Attack
How to get Daffy and his thugs.
Also shows how Slobodan Milosevic did not just mysteriously collapse, it was done with Airpower.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
That doesn't answer the question.Exactly, as the article points we should elevate the End to level we keep elevating the Means. Without a clearly defined Political Objective there is no way to properly organize your response, there is no way to properly choose which means(Air,Ground,Sea) to use.
When you have multiple competing end states among coalition partners, who gets to pick the "right" one?
In this case it seemd the "means" to impose a no-fly zone is a no brainer. But what is the braoder "end"?
Is it simply protecting cvilians without choosing sides?
Is it regime change?
Is it avoidence of an iraq-like on-going pro Gaddafi insurgency after his government falls?
Is it a "reboot" of the political state so oil and gas contracts can be re-negotiated?
Is it ensuring a democratic government replaces Gaddafi (meaning the current rebels may not be who what to ultimately win?)
Its easy to say the "strategy should be what you start with, but how do you actually do that in a complex real-world situation like this?
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
I agree it doesn't answer the question which is why the Libya situation is probably not going to end well. We just jumped in with Airpower and think this will make it OK, probably want. Which again is Warden's point Strategy has to come first before you decide on the means, whatever it may be. We have never defined what we (US) really want except for Daffy to be gone, whatever that means. Until that is clearly defined it dosen't matter how good your Airpower,Groundpower,or Seapower is, it is a mission with no end. Which from the most recent reports I have seen is exactly what it is turning into.
Let me try one more time...
Rewind to before we decided that using airpower as a means to establish a no-fly zone was the proper course of action regardles of where it lead...
What SHOULD have been done to try to reconcile the competing desired end-states the various participants had (have)? Is it the US gets to pick becasue we have the most toys? Should Italy becasue Libya used to be Italy's? France because its "neutral"?
What if there is no singular desired end-state but a range of possible outcomes that can all have a pro-adversary tint to them or a pro- good guys tint to them?
Do you acknowledge a dichotmy in strategic method MIGHT exist?
Again the issue is not airpowers importance or effectiveness. I read Col Owens book on Deliberate Force. The take away was that it took WAY longer and was WAYYY more expensive than the Air Force predicted, but Airpower (with a little bit of pressure from a marginally effective KLA ground force...) did come through in the end.Also shows how Slobodan Milosevic did not just mysteriously collapse, it was done with Airpower.
You kep inserting things in the discussion that we are not disagreeing on in response to what we do disagree on.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks