"Non Cents"

[SWJED]

22 May Small Wars Journal Blog - "Non Cents" by Frank Hoffman.

Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, a respected but frequently provocative author, has critiqued the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual in a commentary titled “We have a COIN shortage” in the May Naval Institute Proceedings. I would have normally dismissed General Dunlap’s observations as a rare but poor example of discourse, as I have a lot of respect for him personally. But this commentary reflected more than just an inadequate grasp of irregular warfare. Having recently returned from a counterinsurgency symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, it is clear that a broader misunderstanding exists about the nature of irregular conflict and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 that needs to be cleared up...

As always, appreciate comments on the blog as well as here - thanks!

Dave

[Sargent]

Great commentary. I loved the "the people live on the ground" line. Made me laugh out loud.

I would say this: USAF, as an institution, is not interested to see airpower operate as a support element. I worked USAF QDR in 2001, and I remember getting the stink-eye when, in a brain-storming session of things we could suggest to them as pieces for their report, I suggested various ways that extant platforms could be used to support the ground element. (Note, I didn't _mean_ to work the air side, it just happened that that was the project I got put on -- distinctly difficult for this ground-centric, airpower as a great supporting element gal.) I remember putting together a slide (from open source materials) that showed the air elements over Afghanistan once OEF kicked off -- it was insane what it took to put together that effort. And all I could think was, gee, look at all those targets. Try it one day, but be prepared for head spinning insanity.

Another thing that bothers me is this notion that we can depopulate the battlespace of our people and fight wars without loss. The enemy won't allow it. If our troops aren't there, then they will just come here to get them -- or the civilians. You can't fight -- let alone win -- a war without putting people at risk. It's the sad reality of war.

[TROUFION]

I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T

[Sargent]

I was listening to a NPR report yesterday of Airmen training in infantry squad tactics at McQuire AFB NJ. The commentator made an interesting final comment: paraphrased-the pentagon sees 350k airmen as a pool of trained personel in uniform capable of supplementing the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commentator had no military background, he was stating what appeared to be an obvious conclusion. I see articles like the one by MGen Dunlap as a direct reaction to this type of thought in the general US (and particularly Congress) population. It is an unfortunate byproduct of the war that the AF is relegated to a supporting role. The USAF is great, they can destroy just about anything anywhere and they want the lead in all things warlike and budgetary. But you can't shake hands and drink chai with a Mayor or Sheik from 30k ft. Maybe you could air deliver a VTC set and a generator, it could even be self deploying and unmanned, if done right it could have an automatic coffee maker and cigarette dispenser until then ya gotta be proud to support the guy on the ground in Small Wars. -T

I've actually thought that, at least as an interim solution, the Army could "draft" folks who had enlisted in the AF. But I don't mean having USAF folks TAD to the Army, I mean make them soldiers. They signed up, after all, and there is an element of "you'll go where we need you" included in that. They're taking individual augments from the Navy and putting them on the ground in a number of functions.

It's crazy -- back in the summer of 01 they thought they were going to own the world. The opening phase of OEF was a tease, but Tora Bora was the first nail in the coffin. Even "shock and awe" was... not. Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrow...5Usw&user=&pw=

It's been downhill ever since.

[Jimbo]

sergeant,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

[Sargent]

sargent,

Uh, NO!!!!! I have plenty of time working with airmen in ground tours, beyond the usual ETAC types, and no way. It is kind of like teaching a first time shooter. It is better to deal with raw material than those who have already developed "bad habits". I have worked with some great airmen and such, but I would rather deal raw recruits from the street than and airman that was mandatorially reclssed into the Army.

You wouldn't even be able to break them down in recruit training? Alternatively, you could just take every other person who enlists and just divert them. Akin to how the Marine Corps would take "volunteers" out of the Army draftees.

In any case, it's not a long term solution, and it's mostly a comment on the USAF role in OIF. But wouldn't it be better reduce the tension on the Army now with an emergency stop gap rather than continuing to grind it down? Is it better to get recruits via a reduction in the enlistment standards? Where are you going to get a large mass of people fast? A tactical retreat is often difficult to swallow, but sometimes it's the thing you need to do to get some breathing room to regroup and organize for an effective counter-assault. So yes, it's a suboptimal solution, but the Army is in a suboptimal situation.

[Tom Odom]

Well if the good MG feels that the FM is too ground centric and not Dr. Strangelove enough, he would really like my article on civilian casualties in COIN. That he would even surface strikes in Somalia as related to COIN shows where he is coming from.

Best

Tom

[PhilR]

Another Marine (then LtCol Phillip Ridderhof) wrote this piece, which was quite good.

...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

[jcustis]

Bravo Zulu to Frank Hoffman. What is the USAF thinking?

[Steve Blair]

They were reacting in their standard fashion. You see this any time the AF senses a "threat" to its traditional positions or roles.

There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

[J Wolfsberger]

What is the USAF thinking?

In fairness, I think the AF is looking at cuts to their procurement programs and thinking "How the hell can we do our job if they won't buy us the tools?"

The problem, for the AF, is that COIN IS "protracted, costly, manpower intensive, and inherently a 'traditional land component solution.' " However much they may hate it, their role will be recon, surveillance, and the occasional strike when the insurgents are obliging enough to concentrate in meaningfull numbers. Unless and until they can develop a precision munition that takes out the insurgent when he's surrounded by women and children, and NOT mess up the civilians hair or disturb their sleep, the AF will be in a support role.

I also hate to have to add this, but we have a similar problem on the ground side of things: the large number of people who persistantly fail to distinguish between MOUT and COIN. But that's for another time and thread...

[sullygoarmy]

I think the biggest problem is the Air Force failing to realize as Mr. Hoffman mentions that COIN is all about winning over the population. The Air Force will always have an important role in supporting the COIN fight with not only direct support for troops in contact but the rapid moving of humanitarian supplies, medical evacuations and other lift capabilities no other force in the world can accomplish. As a ground pounder, I LOVE knowing we've got big brother in the sky to help us out if a fight gets too ugly. A pair of A-10s or F16s is the ultimate equalizer in a COIN fight. That being said, the fighting in COIN should be limited in both scale and frequency, especially once the COIN forces are well established on the ground.

While disappointed in the comments of the AF general and their overall attitude, I'm not surprised. All the services lash out when they feel their budgets may be threatened and rapidly try and justify their primacy regardless of the actual situation. The air force will always be both needed and greatly appreciated by the ground pounders...but they just can't win a COIN fight on their own. Neither can the Army or Marines. It requires an entire team effort. But while the air force may be the "special teams" its the guys on the ground interacting with the population every day who are the main players on the field.

[Sargent]

...And I thought nobody read those things. Its still LtCol USMC. Heading to MNF-I Strategy and Plans in a month. I've spent the last 3 years on the III MEF staff in Okinawa and I've been in numerous joint and combined exercises. Airpower is great, but the impression I'm getting is that the Air Force considers it a parallel campaign, not an integral part of the overall campaign. In the Tsunami Relief operation of 2005, the JFACC, which remained firmly emplaced in Hawaii, was sure it was in a better positioned to coordinate the helo sorties from a Navy carrier and the daily C-17 flight into the small airfield in Banda Aceh Indonesia--Of course all of the NGOs and other nations with their many types aircraft were doing the daily coordination in a shack at the airfield--it ended up being best run by a South African Air Force BrigGen "on loan" to the UN who wore shorts and flip-flops. Just another case where personal presence and human interaction mattered more than technical capability.
On Dunlap, he wrote a piece with similar sentiments a few months ago in Armed Forces Journal. The key thought that caught my eye was his assertion that the US shouldn't even involve itself in wars that can't be won by precision fires. As if we have the luxury...

Perhaps I'm biased, as an H-Warrior myself, but of course your message was widely read! The piece stuck out in my mind, as it came right back to me when I read the initial article in this thread. Of course, I take a certain perverse pleasure in works that knock at the big airpower myths, so they're easily remembered.

Our paths keep crossing ... I believe that it was with you that I exchanged phone calls back in 01 or 02 while you were at HQMC, about a new-style regimental team the Marine Corps was considering putting together (I think, but it's hard to remember those days as a consultant -- I think too much powerpoint causes the brain to freeze up), and exchanged some emails over Centers of Gravity (H-War) and the CAP. (I only know that because I am mildly obsessive compulsive about keeping emails and happened to notice them in my contacts folder while I was trying to find the Shock not Awe message.)

By the way, you must have passed my husband on his way out of Okinawa -- he left in June of 04. He's made it back to the Fleet -- amazingly, he will spend the majority of his time as a Major in the Fleet -- and is CO of a MiTT in OIF. A vast change from normal O-4 experience.

Anyway, good to run into you again.

Jill R.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I really couldn't let this one pass .

There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.

Yup. Sounds like some Anthropologists I could name .

You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.

Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

[Jimbo]

Sergeant,

Once again I stick with no!!!. I have dealt with the AF at the tactical and operational levels. NO, NO, NO. We can talk about AF Security Police serving as MiTT's to Iraqi Base Defense Units (Base defense is a core competency fro AFSP's, good fit in theory nightmare execution complete with phrases like Title 10 USC states). The Army accepts volunteers from the AF and Navy these days, and have nothing wrong with volunteers, but to pull from them (which implies involuntary) no the cultures between the two are too different.

[Steve Blair]

Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).

Marc

I understand that all institutions are founded on myth, but in the case of the AF they appear all too often to allow those myths to clog their perception of what's really going on. I tend to compare them to the Army during Vietnam in that sense (the Army as an institution, not individual segments that adapted well).

Another factor with the AF is the legacy of both the breakaway from the Army and the dominance of Curtis LeMay and SAC for many years within their own organizational structure. This left them wedded (at least in terms of presentation) to high tech and certain mantras (if you will). I'm not sure why they have proven so unable to tweak their own myths (as the navy managed to do with steam power, the carrier, and so on), unless it's part of their short history as an organization and limited leadership "generations" that they can draw from, but it's really going to end up doing them more harm than good in the long run.

The call for joint doctrine isn't surprising, either, considering that there are segments within the AF who are convinced that they are the only service that "gets" joint warfare. It will be interesting to see what community ends up dominating their leadership corps once the current fighter generals disappear. That might be what it takes to break their public rhetoric in COIN.

And as an aside to Jimbo's post, I would fall into the NO category here as well. People join the services for different reasons, and each attracts a certain personality type in many cases. Just as some of the folks who join the Army would go nuts in the AF, there are some who join the AF that aren't suited for other work. We have some here who are on the officer track that I wouldn't trust with an M-16 if my life depended on it. And that's not what they join for. So it would be a bad fit all around.

[Rob Thornton]

Does his (MG Dunlap's) view show service culture or service parochialism? I think picking up something Marc's comment hit on is worthwhile:

The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs. carriers (or COIN vs. "real combat" in the Army).

Why is the AF not looking at their changing role and making bold adjustments, one could argue that the other services are also having a tough time, but necessity being the mother of re-invention..... Are we (in my case the Army) doing enough re-evaluation of the role of land power and making changes fast enough to provide advantages? If not, why? Is rapid change always possible; if so is it always wise?

I think MG Dunlap's comments are just the latest (amplified) version of public cultural bias we see in some leaders (military and political - active or retired). We all have it - sometimes its a good thing (since I believe it grows out of experience as much as environment).

What could be bad though would be a senior leader who is unaware of the impacts of his bias, or worse does not care. It takes us back to LTC Yingling's article and the focus of our leadership - what matters to them most? Is it solutions or distractions?

It may not be sexy to discuss the lift requirements or the number of sorties flown in support as much as kinetic targeting, but its certainly relevant. The USAF plays a large role in our ability to conduct COIN in a given location for a protracted period of time. In addition to actively flying men and materials (how'd all that stuff get over there anyway?), bombing (includes the AC 130 kinetics), shows of force, reconnaissance, they (and the navy) also provide deterrence in the region, and keep open the LOCs for projected forces. Their is some significant overhead associated with those missions. Its also worth mentioning their growing contribution to specialty jobs on the ground - lots of BOS guys out there from other services - filling OGA and backfilling DA jobs.

If part of our current strategy is one of employing limited means in limited wars to a political end, then certainly the USAF plays a vital role in that, two important questions are: do they understand it, and are they willing to accept it?

[SWJED]

To "Non Cents" in the comments section...

[Steve Blair]

More of the same, it seems.

[TROUFION]

"It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat."
Theodore Roosevelt,
"Citizenship in a Republic,"
Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910

I say one thing here to the MGEN and to the rest of the USAF, with all do respect, get in the game or go home. The current fight is in Iraq and in Afghanistan and around the globe, the AF has a role, it may be a lead it may be in support. But if you have a suggestion let's hear it. Critique time is over, weigh in and get your hands dirty.