Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

SOFREP.com has published an article 'How to Create American Selous Scouts', which aims to be:

a study of speculative counterinsurgency kinetic tactics, not strategy.....These kinetic tactics make up the miniscule amount of counterinsurgency warfare that is dedicated to decimating the enemy.

Link:http://sofrep.com/38775/bush-war-tac...#ixzz3LndknDNw

I misses a number of points made here - to say the least. Alas you have to subscribe to comment, so I have added to my post.

Dangerously it assumes in the American context such a unit could be created using Americans, so ignoring the fact that the Selous Scouts were mainly a black African unit and a good number (never quantified) were "turned" nationalist fighters. Survival aside, the Scouts offered very high cash rewards for those it KIA.

The Scouts had an integral police intelligence unit, from the BSAP Special Branch; some consider their value diminished as the war went on, as the SB's informer network was eliminated.

Psuedo-Ops was one speciality, infiltration along guerilla supply routes and in areas suspected to be loyal to the guerillas.

Spotting guerilla movements, from fixed, covert OPs and calling in (later) 'Fireforce' to do the killing - was their main role. JMA posted a rare statistic: 66% of all internal kills were due to spotting by the Scouts and 'Fireforce' follow-up' in comparison the SAS - in ambushes I expect - claimed 13% of kills in the 'Malayan Emergency'.

If SOFREP wants a model to learn from, for combat overseas, there is more to learn I would contend from the RAR.

[flagg]

SOFREP.com has published an article 'How to Create American Selous Scouts', which aims to be:
Link:http://sofrep.com/38775/bush-war-tac...#ixzz3LndknDNw

I misses a number of points made here - to say the least.

Dangerously it assumes in the American context such a unit could be created using Americans, so ignoring the fact that the Selous Scouts were mainly a black African unit and a good number (never quantified) were "turned" nationalist fighters.

I posted similar concerns in the comments on that article.

I would think that IF the US were to develop pseudo capabilities, they would need a number of isolated "silos" for each unique AO.

An ethnic Ethiopian, with the right training, might be able to work effectively in Somalia.

An ethnic Omani, with the right training, might be able to work effectively in Yemen.

But neither of them would be effective, regardless of training, in Lagos.

I reckon there's current and future needs for both Rhodesian Selous Scouts-like and Israel's Duvdevan-like capabilities.

And while there would be a lot of common foundation, I would think each AO would have very high specificity.

Even the Israelis had two distinct units for it's undercover operations in Gaza(Shimson) and West Bank(Duvdevan) as an indicator of the "ultra-local" nature of the task I suppose.

Duvedevan can't work in Tehran and 14Int would not have been able to work in Iraq.

For the likes of Iraq/IS, I would think a "translation layer" would be needed...such as Jordanian SF/GID to partner with relevant US forces.

As I understand it, when operating in a pseudo infiltration role, the white Selous Scouts fellas overwatched from kopjes with the black badged fellas conducting the meet and greets.

So where will the 100 ethnic Ethiopian/Somali US citizens come from to join the services, then volunteer, in order to get 1-2 qualified personnel for the unique Somali AO?

Then rinse and repeat for every other AO.

And isn't there also a Title 10/Title 50 problem that means unless solved, such an effort would fall under CIA?

Trusted local/regional proxy partners(acting the role of badged black Selous Scouts) would almost certainly be required wouldn't they?

[davidbfpo]

I have consolidated four RFI threads into this:All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

A lot of information sits in the main thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI) and the recently published book: Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI (Now in Historians arena).

As the war in Rhodesia was within a region wracked by conflict it is worth checking another thread: South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola and COIN in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974 (Now in Historians arena).

A debate over the Rhodesian tactic 'Fireforce' is found in the Afghan context: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

A general search finds Rhodesia / Rhodesian appears in over a hundred threads, often in book lists for example.

I have copied this to the main thread.

[davidbfpo]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-w...decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-eur...na-warson.html

From the outset, French arms were vital to counterinsurgency efforts led by the Rhodesian Security Forces, with at least 50 French-manufactured Alouettes in the service of the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) between 1965 and 1980. The Rhodesians also had access to Mirage FI planes and Maxtra rocket launchers, leading one Zambian press report from 1977 to conclude that 22 per cent of all military material used by the RhAF was of French origin.

I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.

[davidbfpo]

Bloggers use each other's material, so hat tip to this other site for assembling a set of video links to Rhodesian footage, in particular an American who served as an officer with the RAR (3yrs 1976-1979):http://www.smallwars.com/forum/analy...esian-bush-war

There's also, a so far unread MA dissertation by a Kings War Studies student, 'An Embarrassment of Riches? - Britain's Lost Lessons from the Thodesian Counterinsurgency War', 71 pgs:http://www.smallwars.com/articles/91...-adam-robinson


The Abstract:

The counterinsurgency war fought in Rhodesia has a particular resonance for Britain. The Rhodesian Forces fought a protracted war using largely British equipment and British tactics, learnt from a shared experience of counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Aden. When Rhodesia declared independence in 1965, the two countries went their separate ways and subsequent lessons from Rhodesia have generally gone unheeded by Britain. This paper will address the lessons that were presented by this war that could have been learnt and adopted by Britain during its subsequent counterinsurgencies of Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. The paper will go on to analyse why some of those lessons were not addressed or, if they were, whether it was from the experiences in Rhodesia or from the UK’s own experiences. The fundamental questions of how Britain learns its counterinsurgency lessons and whether there was a conscious decision, because of Rhodesian secession, to ignore any experiences from Rhodesia will be answered. By using academic sources, direct contact with those involved in the Rhodesian counterinsurgency and by reference to contemporary and current doctrine, this paper will conclude that there are several lessons from Rhodesia that the UK could have learnt, and even some that are still to be heeded. It will conclude that the UK has had, until recently, a poor history of studying and codifying counterinsurgencies, that it has always been introspective when examining counterinsurgency lessons, and that it was because of this, and no other reason, that Rhodesia is not taught as a counterinsurgency case-study.

[rhodtpr]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-w...decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-eur...na-warson.html



I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.

According to Petter-Bowyers "Winds of Destruction" (30 degrees South - 2005) the Rhodesian AF owned 8 Alouette III helicopters by late 1960-early 1970;

"We had only eight helicopters and could ill afford a slow turn around and the physical stresses that repeated refueling induced during intense operations." (P.102).

On page 107 of the same book Petter-Bower states that the Sud Aviation of France provided 3 more Alouette hellicopters after UDI in 1965 (to compliment the 5 in service at the time of UDI) in exchange for the RhAF newly designed and developed "pressure-refueling pump".

The SAAF provided men and equipment (Op Polo) from the mid-1970's in order to provide their aircrews with operational experience. A SAAF liason officer posting was permanently attached to RhAF HQ (P.239).

Through this relationship Rhodesia was able to employ South African aircrew and aircraft in the Bush War effectively sidestepping international sanctions that were in place against the country since UDI in 1965.

In 1976 a shipment of 18 Cessna 337's were flown directly from Reims in France to Rhodesia in two ferry moves...the planes were disguised as Malagasy fisheries aircraft and registered to a false company in Spain. The Rhodesian pilots were accompanied by a French pilot who handled all the communications and logistics involved in the move. (P.253-259)

Operation Sand involved the training of RhAF pilots and aircrew via attachment to the SAAF on all SAAF aircraft which included RhAF pilots manning a squadron of Mirage III aircraft (p.266).

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by a recent discussion I have added two lengthy quotes. The first is from an interview of a Selous Scouts intelligence officer conducted thirty years ago and a more recent commentary on that interview.

The Scouts activities have been controversial, but is the tactical mix they developed that intrigues me. In particular the ability to "turn" captured Nationalist guerillas and have them fighting their comrades within days. Above all they were a reconnaissance unit or recce in the mainly African countryside, who identified targets for others to follow-up.

[davidbfpo]

Below are my interview notes and I have added in italics some comments. The officer was genuine and had been recommended to me by a Rhodesian Army officer who knew his role.

1. Around 1977 moral doubts started, as did the corruption
2. We were not prepared to win, our terms of reference dictated that in the last eight or nine years. Referred to Taber’s ‘War of the Flea’.
3. Politically, including Ian Smith, majority rule was not ruled out – they were searching for a suitable black role. But they did not understand the African mind, the majority will always support the violent man and unless you are tough you will lose.
4. They (the guerrillas) never needed to win a contact, the economic aspect of the war, which accounted for 50%, was lost they just keep on coming in and spread us about, thereby increasing the costs.
5. The Africans knew that somebody was always watching them.
6. We, the Rhodesians, just did not realise the signs were there. The choice was quite literally to win make the country a desert.
7. Reid-Daly’s concept was a stroke of genius, a fusion of brains and brawn. He was an ideal W.O.1, but he believed he was an “all rounder”. The brains were provided by Chief Superintendent Mac McGuiness, with about seven others, of the (Police) Special Branch who formed S.B.S.S. (A Google search found the SB officers were called Liaison Officers). It was devised as a tracking unit and became one to terrorise the other side.
8. The unit was 60% captures in the field, about 800 Africans, who were turned within a week and put on operations. There was total trust between us; I personally can recall one “fire fight” where I was the only one with ammunition left, they stayed and did not run. The entire staff at Inkomo Barracks (Google shows this as 40km from Harare near Darwindale) were similar in composition, but they were not combat fit. (This is the only reference I can easily find to the extent of recruitment from captured guerrillas, an interesting topic in itself).
9. (Their motivation?) Sometimes they perceived as the strong guys, but most were dupes really only concerned with their living conditions.
10. Such was the terror we instilled our main camp was never attacked (Google refers to Inkomo Camp as a major ammunition dump was sabotaged in 1981 by the South Africans and ex-Rhodesians).
11. What happened was that our credibility failed, I remember articled clerks at Price & Waterhouse (multi-national and global accountancy practice) saying in 1977-78 ‘All you’ve got to do is win the war”.
12. Our primary role was an intelligence gathering unit – 80% of our time was devoted to reconnaissance. I was a de-briefing officer for all returning “sticks” from each contact.
13. We adapted the ‘Supersonic’ radio so scouts could speak into the speakers (I think this implies the users were covert and within the population. This radio was in widespread use in the TTL or communal areas and would not stand out).
14. We did our job so well, in a professional manner – when we went into the “bush” de-bussing, back tracking and remaining stationary once in place. So much so that the Air Force had near total confidence in targeting a “Fire Force” without our actual seeing opponents. It was applied behavioural science, why did an old lady go for a “pee” at 0900hrs and counting kraal usage (This is lost on me now and I suspect refers to unusual behaviour being spotted).
15. There was a $50 per head reward; many of the regiment became quite wealthy.
16. For our opponents it was the “life of Riley”, drinking beer, getting girls from the kraals, the occasional shooting – let alone a “contact”.
17. Personally I weighed up the balance for Rhodesia, debits and credits – it was overwhelmingly in favour.
18. I personally was driven mad by the rejection that we should paralyse neighbouring economies; remember Mao’s dictum “Maximise the enemies losses, minimise yours”. We needed a “handle” on their sources of supply and finance. For example we distributed ultra-violet marked bank notes and with the banks help established relationships.
19. The cross-border operations i.e. attacking camps was not in the national interest.
20. We infiltrated their supply chain. I’m not saying who did this though. Their clothing was poisoned or defective equipment introduced, for examples half-second grenade fuses or plastic explosive AK47 rounds. All this had a potent effect the guys who were poisoned would attack those who had last fed them!

(Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for example view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html )

1. A shocking blind spot in our effort was counter-intelligence; given the fact any African could be a spy. For example in the attack on Chimoio we found sheaf’s of papers and plans of the Armoured Car Regiment Barracks – what they could not believe was that the ammunition was stored in a squash court, they thought it was behind the rifle butts.
2. I began to doubt whether personal sacrifice was warranted and started to ensure my personal safety.
3. The attitude evolved that politicians were not to be trusted and especially since we knew any war-winning strategy was unacceptable.

[davidbfpo]

The comments were made many years after my interview:

One of the keys to understanding why many terrorists were turned so easily is found in their cultural make up.


The answer may also be found within your notes, where in effect your source suggested that the African will follow those who show themselves to be strong (for this read "more ruthless, more violent, more powerful" etc), and will as a general rule vote for them. Setting the tribal niceties aside, mentally the captured terrorists often fell from their perceived positions of power i.e. God with an AK47 who commanded all he wanted - beer and women etc, to a frightened, defeated nobody on his way to see a Judge and a rope. In the African mindset, having been captured, bettered and effectively defeated by "his own people" would, I have little doubt, have been a particularly sobering psychological experience. (I am not sure if this means Rhodesians, of whatever colour, or black Rhodesians).

The Selous Scout upper command were also very careful not to promote any suggestion that they were fighting for "Rhodesia" or "Smith" or any other institute that the terrorists would have a disliking for, or been taught to hate. The Scouts slogan "Pamwe Chete" effectively means "Together Only" and conveys the idea of brothers fighting for each other, not for a system.


For a captured terrorist to be offered the chance to join a unit with an extremely fearsome (i.e. strong) reputation, carefully cultivated via propaganda, enabled the African to avoid the Judge, and regain his position of power once again. (For sometime the Rhodesian COIN included criminal prosecutions, with the death penalty and I suspect this time-consuming practice lessened as the war expanded).


I know of instances where terrorists captured in the morning were handed their AK47`s back to them in the afternoon (after a carefully orchestrated chat and assessment), and off they went happily hunting down their old friends as a member of the "strong." It probably seems bizarre to a westernised mindset, and I’m afraid it does not portray the African in a particularly favourable light, but the turning methods frequently worked. I know of only one incident where an "ex" terrorist turned on his new associates, and this was his intention all along.

It should be added that the intelligence community frequently used the terrorist propaganda against them. The terrorist High Command would spend as much time, if not more, pushing propaganda into the heads of their men as they did on military training. (Hence the frequent comments that ZANLA were poorly trained compared to ZAPU).


Consequently your average terrorist was expecting all sorts of nasty things to occur if they were captured. The Scouts, as part of the turning technique, made certain that the captive was treated respectfully, and provided with any medical assistance he required (delivered by pretty African nurses).

Basically he was treated the absolute opposite as to how he had been told he would be, without the fact that he was still deep in trouble going away. The effect of this was to add to their confusion, and in the end self preservation will swing the person for you.

The Scouts were effectively the armed wing of a larger intelligence organisation. As the interviewee suggests the entire exercise was intelligence driven, and as an Intelligence Officer his liaison with SB (Rhodesian Police Special Branch) would have been frequent. It perhaps could be argued that he was more SB than Scout. It is certain that in some quarters the line between SB and Scouts would have blurred.


Usually SB men were involved in the investigation of incidents, i.e. weapons collection (for forensic examination where the weapon would be traced to various previous activities etc); and all the other intelligence gathering methods.

On the issue of dirty tricks, discovered ammunition dumps were frequently sabotaged so that the AK47 rounds would explode in the barrels. Grenades were certainly tampered with in terms of fuse timing, and RPG7 rockets were rigged to detonate on triggering, as this weapon was usually the first fired in ambush situations. The detonation obviously killed the launcher and his nearby associates, and gave away the ambush position.


I also know of Scouts who attacked Rhodesian targets in order to "prove" their credentials to the real terrorists.


The radios, manufactured by the Rhodesian Company Supersonic (one of our answers to sanctions) could be rigged in a number of ways. The first was to have it blow up after a number of activations (15?), and these would be passed on through various contacts within the tribal areas to the guerrillas who would be interested in listening to propaganda broadcasts from Mozambique etc. Another use was to have the radio emit a beacon that a “Fire Force” helicopter could home in on. There was suggestion that this beacon transmitted when the radio was actually turned off, as once the Lynx or Trojan spotter (the first stage of a “Fire Force” operation) was airborne the terrorists would switch the radio off to listen to the air activity, thus effectively giving their position away.


There is a lot of stuff on the web about the heroics of the Selous Scouts. They are (were) a particularly tough bunch, but it remains true that while it was their job to find the terrorists, it was the RLI who killed them.

The poisoning allegations; it appears however that someone, or rather some group within SB may have in fact gone down this road as a progression from sending out dodgy radios etc. For obvious reasons it is not really likely that anyone will confess to involvement in operations of this kind particularly in today’s world.


I am certain however that there was South African (intelligence) involvement in the process, and this has been aired during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings after the change down there.


To be blunt, the general consensus from those I have discussed the matter with over the years was, "a dead terrorist is a dead terrorist." They do not regard the supply of poisoned camouflage uniforms to terrorists, as anything remotely approaching the deliberate and indiscriminate use of chemical/or other weapons on a civilian population. It should also be added that we frequently used Frantan (Napalm) and white phosphorus grenades/bombs on terrorist targets, and when a four man “stick” are challenging anything up to thirty opponents, a phosphorous grenade was frequently a life saver.

Could the turning techniques used in Rhodesia be used in our war today with Moslem extremists? Perhaps there are similarities in the extremists poor self esteem, driven by anger to fight against a powerful opponent that always "wins" (beginning with the Crusades.) I believe the sense of power it gives these deluded individuals, to be part of a system fighting "unbelievers" with guarantees of heaven etc as a reward, makes them an interesting opponent. Does their penchant for feeling "strong" come from plotting against and killing the innocent?

[davidbfpo]

Flagg,

Good catch there! Which was posted on a new thread on Rhodesian Chemical & Biological Warfare.

Peter Baxter's hitherto unknown - to me - website has plenty to read. I have emailed him to ask for details of the 2017 Rhodesian Military History & Tactics speaking tour with Chris Cocks and him - which I know will be of interest here. See:http://peterbaxterafrica.com/

His Amazon bio:

Peter Baxter is an author, amateur historian and African field, mountain and heritage travel guide. Born in Kenya and educated in Zimbabwe, he has lived and travelled over much of southern and central Africa. He has guided in all the major mountain ranges south of the equator, helping develop the concept of sustainable travel, and the touring of battlefield and heritage sites in East Africa. Peter lives in Oregon, USA, working on the marketing of African heritage travel as well as a variety of book projects. His interests include British Imperial history in Africa and the East Africa campaign of the First World War in particular. His first book was Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire; he has written several books in the Africa@War series, including France in Centrafrique, Selous Scouts, Mau Mau, SAAF's Border War and Somalia: US Intervention, 1992-1994.

In the recent Selous Scouts thread I added two references to the use of poisoned clothing: Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for examples view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html

[davidbfpo]

Watching an email exchange between former BSAP members I came across some comments on the war, as the police rarely publicly remember I've added them anonymously.

1)

I do agree we suffered an insurgency and our efforts were that of a counter-insurgency… if one has to label it a war… then perhaps best described as a small war, but an insurgency is more appropriate.
The introduction of Ground Coverage to the BSA Police circa the time of the Mau Mau insurgency placed ground roots intelligence in the forefront of information gathering concerning the impending insurgency and concentrated its efforts on the labour movement and the nationalists. The battle for the hearts and minds of the labour force/people was well established in the early 1960’s, if not slightly earlier, and this is well chronicled. Many will remember the activities of Benjamin Borombo and how the nationalist subverted his struggle for the labour movement into the nationalist/political struggle of blacks.

Imperial powers might well have been stuck up with organisation and structure at the expenses of knowing its subjects, a good many of whom were beginning to demonstrate their disloyalty in the late 1950s – police intelligence was aware of the threats and changes taking place in Africa and had a good insight into grass roots activism of the time.

The early days of the insurgency were marred, for the insurgents that is, since their ranks had been so very well infiltrated by Rhodesian spies and agents… Most incursion intentions were know well in advance of them occurring and most if not all of them were pretty well wrapped up within days, at worst weeks, of them occurring.

2)

The imperialist ego was so deluded by 1965 that intelligence such as it was did not even know that the battle for hearts and minds was taking place under our noses including on the football terraces of Bulawayo. Imperial power which had boiled down to meticulous organisation of a wasting resource namely "loyal" manpower, never had a chance against the grass roots impulse of freedom.

If the intelligence was available it was not used by Field Commanders effectively and anyway they were always in and then going deeper into a situation where the availability of manpower could never meet the demand remember vast swathes of the TTL/Communal land was lost to rebel control by the ceasefire.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a pointer on the BSAP Regimental Association (History Group) for a book published in 2015: 'The Rhodesian Command Dakota' by Laurence Hill (privately published) and a few lines of description:

A little-known fact of the Rhodesian War was the use of a Rhodesian Air Force DC3 as a flying command and communications post. This book offers a rare insight to the personnel and workings of this remarkable aircraft.

A few reviews here:https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/cka/Rhode...Command+Dakota

In the USA only available as a Kindle, with a few reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Rhodesian-Com...Command+Dakota

I would query 'a little known fact', perhaps it is the detail within that is new?

[davidbfpo]

In 2014 on another thread there was a very slight mention by JMA (a former member):

Group Captain Petter-Bowyer has published an extremely interesting autobiography - "Winds of Destruction". See Post 64 which refers to forward air control or ground air control:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=3407&page=4

Only possible in a very small airforce 'PB' was involved in most of the developments in the Rhodesian Air force and the war - importantly the home grown weapons development.

Today I was reminded in a BSAP History Group email and there is a glimpse of the book on the link, with the contents and introduction. PLus a lot of the book! Link:https://books.google.co.za/books?id=...ntions&f=false

There are five* reviews, but it is expensive US$251 (paperback) - maybe as it was published in 2005:https://www.amazon.com/Winds-Destruc...=9780958489034

There are similar five* reviews for a cheaper purchase in the UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Winds-Destr...=petter-bowyer

[davidbfpo]

This story how a BSAP (police) officer encountered murders and the changing loyalties of the African population - after terrorism was used.

As it is five pages long I have added it as an attachment.

It appears as a vignette in Nick Russell and Hugh Phillips’ “Blue & Old Gold: The History of the British South Africa Police 1889-1980”, published in 2009.
See:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blue-Old-Go...e+%26+Old+Gold

See:https://www.amazon.com/Blue-Old-Gold...e+%26+Old+Gold

[davidbfpo]

Long ago I read this book, so was surprised today to see it was republished in 2015 and has been reviewed in the latest 'Perspectives on Terrorism' (a free, online journal):

Jakkie Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia [Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and Insurgency,
Volume 4] (New York, NY: 1985/2015), 284 pp., US $ 112.00 [Hardcover], US $ 36.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-138-88789-3.

This is a highly systematic account of the Rhodesian government’s counter-insurgency campaign during the war’s crucial period of 1972 to 1979. It begins with a history of the period from 1890 to 1979, with
successive chapters examining the Rhodesian security forces command and control management of the campaign; how their forces approached the concept of protecting and consolidating control over the country’s villages; conducting border minefield clearing operations; engaging in psychological operations to gain population support; conducting external military operations against insurgent base areas, including against insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring countries; and the role of intelligence in penetrating insurgency forces and gaining situational information advantage against them. The author concludes that when the war for Zimbabwe officially ended on December 21, 1979, despite the execution by the Rhodesian Security Forces of their counter-insurgency strategy, “very few of these had in fact proved successful.” (p. 243). One of the problems, the author explains, is that a “racial preconception …permeated all levels of white/black interaction, specifically in rural areas. Counter-insurgent operations were conducted to the exclusion rather than the support of environmental improvement. Population and resources control, a means to the end of regaining and re-establishing government control, became an end in itself: the object simply being to facilitate counter-insurgent operations” (p. 246). Above all, “At no stage was attention at high level seriously directed towards redressing grievances exploited by the insurgents to justify their criticism of the existing white administration” (246). This important book was originally published in 1985, but its approach and findings continue to be pertinent to the current period, with unresolved insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and elsewhere.
The author is Chairman of the Board and Head of African Futures & Innovation at Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/.../view/612/1210

The books appears on Amazon minus any review on .com & .uk websites.

[davidbfpo]

A well produced paperback (358 pgs) from UK-based Helion & Company:http://www.helion.co.uk/bandit-menta...-a-memoir.html

This is a refreshingly honest account by a New Zealander who volunteered to serve in Rhodesia’s British South African Police Support Unit, as the insurgency gained momentum 1976-1980. The Support Unit was the still largely civilian police’s para-military unit (1200 strong), with black African other ranks & NCOs and officered by regular, white police officers and those whites doing National Service.

What motivated him to serve? Simply ‘a selfish love of combat and life with a complete lack of routine…I was hooked on the adrenalin rush…adventure for the sake of adventure’ (Pg.267). Plus the opportunity between six week tours in the bush to drink, party and relax. By 1978 even with his experience no-one bothered to persuade him to stay, so the author left and ended up as an adviser to newly recruited UANC fighters, known as security force auxiliaries.

Little has been written about the ordinary black African role in Rhodesia’s insurgency; I exclude the Selous Scouts who were mainly turned ex-guerrillas. Loyalties were not fixed, the author recounts in the autumn of 1976 a captured guerrilla recruit claimed to be a serving policeman’s wife (Pg.79). Their motives were mixed, paid employment, revenge for some; they were loyal to the Support Unit and the BSAP – who ‘watched over them’ and like the French Foreign Legion ‘gave solid service in return’ (Pg.172).

The stance of the majority, rural African population in the Tribal Trust Lands facing violence from the guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces was to steadily change. The Africans would claim ignorance of the guerrilla’s presence to actively supporting them. A good illustration at a Rhodesian firepower demonstration from an old African man asking ‘He said that if we are so powerful, why are there so many CTs in the bush? A good question’ (Pg.80).

Counterinsurgency warfare success is based on the security forces protecting the civilians from the insurgents; Rhodesia simply had extremely limited spending power, let alone forces able to live with the rural Africans and protect them (Pg.132). Personally I doubt the white Rhodesian government had the motivation to ever protect "their Africans", an attiude that hardened as the war developed.

This is a book which rightly concentrates on hunting insurgents, although criticisms of the Rhodesian approach abound, for example the lack of any briefing and debriefing (Pg.289). It helps to explain why Rhodesia failed to survive as the numbers of disaffected Africans grew, with so many leaving to join the nationalist guerrillas the security forces could not “hold the line”.

Worth reading, in part for the author's recollections and what can be learnt today. "Holding the line" is an appropriate phrase, yes a negotiated settlement was reached in 1979, but the "line" was simply full of holes and lacked after the Portuguese exit in 1974 strong foundations.

*Copied to Rhodesian COIN thread*.

[davidbfpo]

There is a separate thread on a book on Rhodesia's use of CBW, with 10k plus views and perhaps one day it will be merged here. See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=24515

[davidbfpo]

One of the grimmer stories about the war was the discovery post-1980 of disused mine shafts, IIRC in the north east in 2011, with hundreds of bodies and the indication they had been killed, then dumped there.

A "lurker" talked about this story, quantifying the numbers were as high as five thousand and that they had been prisoners in custody awaiting trial. The pressures were immense and eventually a senior police officer, now deceased, came up with a "solution". The prisoners were shot by the police and dumped in the mine shafts.

Sadly there are rumours that Zimbabwe in the Super-Zapu insurgency in Matabeleland also resorted to such harsh measures.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" has pointed out that next month Mike Borlace's paperback book is published; it is called 'Spider Zero Seven'.

From Amazon:

Mike Borlace is considered to be one of the most experienced combat helicopter pilots of recent times. Now he collates his experiences in this compelling wartime memoir set against the backdrop of the civil war fought in Rhodesia during the 1970s.....Out of the 1096 days he served as a pilot in 7 Squadron, Borlace spent 739 days on combat operations. During his 149 contacts with the enemy he was shot down five times and wounded twice.

Link:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Spider-Zero...s=mike+burlace

[davidbfpo]

Found via a BSAP History Group email as his medals are due for auction next month, a fascinating and rare account of a black African member of the Selous Scouts. The account opens with:

An extremely rare and important Silver Cross of Rhodesia group of four awarded to Sergeant, later Major, Martin Chikondo, a ‘Selous Scouts legend in the art of close-in reconnaissance,’ who was one of the early pioneers of the Selous Scouts and pseudo-warfare. He helped Reid-Daly implement his initial training programme and selection course for the Selous Scouts, prior to being one of the original members of the Recce Troop, Selous Scouts, with his mentor Chris Schulenburg.

Chikondo ‘had carried out countless missions deep in enemy territory with the master of close recce Captain Chris Schulenburg’, and accounted for innumerable terrorists during those missions and earlier operations for the Selous Scouts. Well versed in ‘long-range external reconnaissance operations in the form of two-man call signs, covering approximately 200 kilometres into enemy territory; introducing and executing last-light as well as night free-fall operations, using a separate provisions box under its own parachute; using World War II techniques for train derailments by command detonation, with slab as well as plastic explosives; external enemy telephone-line tapping; enemy target marking by the use of flares for off-set night bombing; and waterborne operations’, Chikondo went on to gain a commission and make the crossover into the army of Zimbabwe after the change of government in 1980.

Once again a pioneer, Chikondo was one of the first officers of the newly formed Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion. Subsequently serving with those he had fought against, despite most of the Selous Scouts moving en masse to South Africa with the change of regime, he went on to serve with distinction until his retirement from the Army in 1991.

Link: https://www.dnw.co.uk/auction-archive/past-catalogues/lot.php?auction_id=476&lot_id=311388

The account refers to the original Scouts formation:

The course commenced with about 120 African volunteers and eight Europeans....Psuedo operations and close-in recce...

Plus him visiting the UK in 1980, to explain what had happened to the Parachute Brigade; "kith & kin" at work.