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Thread: What is the "Surge?"

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    Council Member MSG Proctor's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso View Post
    Without question, it is my observation one of the most critical elements was Petraeus coming in and cleaning out the FOBs and getting the line units on the streets and in the neighborhoods. He employed this wildly successful strategy in Mosul in '03 and it was an absolutely blessing when he applied it to the entire theater. It has been great tactically and for also for morale.
    Bingo! After MCO, most (not all) of the armored/mechanized formations in the invasion force quite naturally holed up in large bases (usually a palace remodeled by the USAF). The airborne/air assault forces did what we do - disperse maneuver companies and platoons in order to hold key terrain on foot. When people talk about the "new strategy" of GEN Petraeus, I just shrug. Our BCT assumed this exact posture in southern Baghdad in 2003 with the same results as the 101 in Mosul. I recall thinking the war must be over if they're consolidating us ground pounders into FOBs.

    "I attribute our company’s success to several things. First, our squad leaders and platoon sergeants led by example throughout the deployment. Secondly, we maintained a vigilance and steadfast belief that we were making a difference in people’s lives. Last, we submerged ourselves into the Iraqi communities rather than sitting behind the walls of one of the many huge base camps that you see in Iraq today. We were capable of knowing the fine details of every road and back ally in our area of responsibility because we lived among these people on a daily basis. Developing friendships while compiling knowledge from our local informants, we were able to maintain a stable environment and growing economy for the citizens of Mosul that became the model for other cities around Iraq."

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    From The Long Hard Road: NCO experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq published by USASMA
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    As I seem to recall, the "Surge" was defined at the time (read - this is what the media tended to express it as) as the flow of more combat troops into Iraq. Cav Guy, MikeF, and others have pointed out the more nuanced aspects of it, but most of that didn't make it into mainstream (or more generalized) discussions of it. The "Surge" simply came down to more boots on the ground.

    Granted that's a massive oversimplification, but I do tend to think that's how ma and pa back on the couch watching TV saw it (or had it explained to them).
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    Post While I would agree with all the other points made here

    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
    While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.
    It would seem that Phil has it right in that the greatest overall change took place in the perspectives of the people within Iraq, their leaders, and foreign interests; and what they were willing and ready to do about it.

    The point at which the HN proactively begins to work towards change large scale will always be decisive. And General P with the surge forces and associated use of them was able to provide the conditions for that to happen.

    Ultimately the locals have to win the local war and our soldiers helped and are helping to get them there.

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    Default Imho

    The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

    I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default I agree with a caveat

    Clearly its easy to get several different events confused (vis'a'vis chicken or egg)... In defference to the context in which this thread grew (political volleyball) the "Surge" is commonly perceived as an increase in troops (BOG)

    Was Petraeus part of the "Surge"... no but he helped develop the concept, and he sold it as a necessary capability to enable the "new" strategy - create security conditions that enable the space for Iraqi political progress.

    Was the "Surge" the critical element that enabled MNC-I to string together a series of tactical successes that resulted in operational/strategic effects - near total collapse of AQI? Mostly no, some yes... Biggest factor was that MNC-I Staff evolved its thinking in terms of correctly defining the problem and developed a strategy to operate a tempo inside AQI's ability to adapt. That said, the inflow of increased combat capability was crucial to their ability to implement the strategy

    "Surge" relationship to Petraeus strategy and Anbar Awakening? Anbar was first by all accounts, but then again Mosel in 2003 preceeded Anbar (tomatoo - tomatoe that's what its all about). Point is pockets and pools of smart people can arrive at similar conclusions - significance is that "Surge" strategy (secure population - JSPs - etc) became the norm rather than the exception.

    These and several other related factors (see MikeF posting earlier) has led to a better situation in Iraq.

    So what does it all mean? I don't know, but let me take a shot....

    - III Corps (MNC-I), by virtue of others experiences and their own, got it right in terms of understanding the problem and developing an operational approach that made sense.

    - GEN Petraeus and Ordierno were the right leaders at the right time

    - The shift to offensive operations (really taking it to AQI, militias and other bad guys) had the same type of disorienting effect on our opponents as we tend to see in well executed conventional fights, hmmm.... might be a lesson there

    - Can't do all this without adequate BOG so that oeprational commanders have the tools to implement.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    The "surge" was a shorthand term designed by politicians for the media.

    I'm not sure that I've heard serious theorists or practictioners use it in any other context. What evolved in Iraq beginning in fall 2006 cannot be described by simply counting BOG.
    I'd have to say that I agree. Further it short changes all the hard work everybody involved did. "The Surge" is a term that should be mocked.
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    Default A different look at the surge

    I'm brand new to the board ( I posted in the introduction forum)

    I look at the surge from the micro level. I was there, and extended for 4 months (16 total) due to the surge, as a team leader of a Tactical HUMINT Team. Serving in a Shia area owned by the Mahdi Army, the surge didn't mean much. I believe the surge is working militarily in the short term, but I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from. Last I knew, the Sadrist Current still has 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament. The Sadrist MP in our area has a PSD who were also members of JAM, involved in mafia activities. She provided political cover to an extent that the ISF in the province were paralyzed. Judges refused to issue warrants. JAM members could and did kill ISF and coalition forces with impunity, using Iranian trained and supplied action team members, who had official MOD identification cards, etc. JAM would murder a policeman in her city, and the next day the JAM commander would be publicly drinking Chai tea with the Chief of police at the station. I was in the room to hear a US state department rep say that this Sadrist MP had immunity because she's a politician. I observed the frustration of senior ISF at this statement; one of whom has since been assassinated by the very people he was prevented from going after. Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

    These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

    I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 07-30-2008 at 08:21 PM.

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    Default for Alsultani

    In early 2007, Fred Kagan published two reports setting out his "surge" vision.

    Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
    Phase I Report
    By Frederick W. Kagan
    Posted: Friday, January 5, 2007
    PAPERS AND STUDIES
    AEI Online
    Publication Date: January 5, 2007
    link to .pdf file in link below
    http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp

    Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq
    Phase II Report
    By Frederick W. Kagan
    Posted: Wednesday, April 25, 2007
    PAPERS AND STUDIES
    AEI Online
    Publication Date: April 25, 2007
    link to .pdf file in link below
    http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp

    The first of them (dealing with things military) caught most comment.

    I'm interested in your comments (who's been der, done dat) on the second report (dealing with things political); to set the palette:

    1. Were any of Kagan's recommendations initiated in your jurisdiction ("microlevel") ?

    2. If initiated, were they carried through ?

    3. Were they successful ?

    4. If not, your thoughts on why not ?

    5. Any other thoughts re: Kagan's second report ?

    Above subject to all security caveats which apply to you - so, only to the extent you can.

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    Council Member MSG Proctor's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Alsultani View Post
    Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

    These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

    I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?
    Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

    Your assessment that the governor is beholden to SICI (they have publicly removed the "R" for revolution but I know what you mean) indicates the religious chain of command is at work, regardless of the formal political network as recognized in the Parliament. Shia are obligated to obey the fatwas of their Marja until the Ayatollah/Hojat al Islam dies. This is 180 degrees the opposite of Sunnaism which recognizes no formal clergy heirarchy, is dependent on scholarship and consensus, and utilizes no religious chain of command. Moreover, it is religion that cements the ties between Iraq's Shia and the Iranian revolutionary council.

    I share your frustration with this thorny problem and agree that there is not much external military forces can bring to bear to untangle this corruption. However the government of Iraq will have to confront the issue (as they did in Bosra) of cleric-run militias under Iranian influence without creating 'martyrs' and inflaming fanatics. One must take into account that the majority of Shia believe that we are living in the End Times just before the appearing of Imam al Mahdi, the Shiite Savior. This apocalyptic furor is instrumentalized by many clerics as explicit justification for political and military action. Few CF INTEL/IO/PSYOP planners are fluent in these dynamics and may be operating in the dark in that regard.
    Last edited by MSG Proctor; 07-30-2008 at 08:25 AM.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Alsultani View Post
    I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?
    Alsultani--Welcome. Your experience and opinions will be much appreciated here. Your thoughts and insights into Iraqi politics are unique, but certainly not unfamiliar to many of us. The unfortunate reality of the Surge and our Operations in Iraq is that many unpleasant and unsavory characters will gain power and wealth. It irks me as much as you, trust me. Most people would like to focus on the tactical portion of the Surge, but the political aspect is actually what matters, in regards to many of the "benchmarks" our leaders set for the Iraqi leadership. The bottom line is that Iraqi leaders, starting with Maliki on down, will determine their own destiny. Who they choose to lead and grant power too is ultimately up to Iraqis, not us. Although, I've seen U.S. favored actors gain power and perform miserably (as far as acting in the interest of their represented population) I also believe that Shia factions tied to JAM and Iran are certainly the most dangerous and unpredictable. You highlight many good points, there. Your question is a hard one to answer, but is actually one of the most crucial, outside of security gains met because of the tactical part of the Surge.
    Sir, what the hell are we doing?

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Couple of thoughts.

    Quote Originally Posted by Alsultani View Post
    These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.
    Are they? Or is the 'surge' (really silly term...) working to provide some stability to ALL Iraqis insofar as is possible? While those clowns try to game the process as is in their genes...

    Being the ME, there will be no all encompassing stability; that area is going to change only slowly. My guess, having spent a couple of years there some time ago, is that lacking the invasion of Iraq (Afghanistan is not in the ME and occurrences there do not affect the ME...), it would have taken five generations for much change to be effected there. I believe the invasion and subsequent actions will speed that up to possibly as little as two generations. Will that be true and will the result have been worth it? I think so but only time will tell us for certain.
    I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?
    I suggest they are two different things; the political reality is the ME, raw and as it has been for at least 800 years since Islam, once at the forefront of human knowledge, turned inward. The 'surge' -- it is really much more than that and encompasses a lot of things -- is opening a window for the ME to hop out and breathe some fresh air. We can't drag them outside, it's up to them; they can stay inside and stifle or come out that window. There will be internal and external pressures both ways. What will occur is in the hands of the fates.

    The probability is that it will work but if it does not, at least we tried.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Alsultani View Post
    I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from.

    Thanks for the excellent comments and insight. I suggest that we have a great deal of influence over the definition of success. There's no reason we can't declare supporting an Iraqi government until it asks us to leave a roaring success. I realize Obama is just a senator, but if he and Maliki can work out a withdrawal timetable, there's no reason that Maliki and a president can't. (The British haven't spent a lot of time worrying about what's happened to Malaysia since they left.) The Middle East is obviously more strategical important than Malaysia but no one is even think about abandoning our military presence in the Middle East.
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    Very interesting and informative responses all around. And to think I was a bit hesitant about broaching the topic because of the political implications!

    I've done a bit of research and it looks like several terms in addition to "surge" were used in the early months. Maybe a lesson-learned in all of this is to pick a catch-phrase for a strategy at the beginning, define it clearly and use it consistently from there on out. Much less confusing for the unitiated not to mention it provides less room for those with political agendas to make their own definition.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    it provides less room for those with political agendas to make their own definition.
    Unfortuntely - or fortunately depedning on your point of view - people with political agendas will always be able to change the meaning.

    I've said it before, but spin is like a gun; it can be used for good or evil.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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    Default More on Shia dynamics

    [QUOTE=MSG Proctor;53392]Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

    Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

    Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power, and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.

    One on one, many Shia on the street wish for a strong man to come back because it's the only thing that will work in Iraq. Some of them wish Saddam was back. A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

    The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.

    Moqtada Sadr has his father's name. Outside of Sadr City, with which I am umfamiliar, Shia on the street do not respect him as a religious figure or intellectual. His reputation was that he was the Playstation champion of Najaf during his house arrest. Word on the street was that he was going to be fast tracked through the Hawza, the Shia theological education process, which is basically unheard of. As of when I left, we had not declared the Mahdi Army as a hostile force. The moniker of "special group" was created to distance Sadr from the activities of his worst and most effective insurgents. Believe me, he put minimal effort, if any at all, into reigning these guys in. What it did was give him deniability.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Thanks for the excellent comments and insight. I suggest that we have a great deal of influence over the definition of success. There's no reason we can't declare supporting an Iraqi government until it asks us to leave a roaring success. I realize Obama is just a senator, but if he and Maliki can work out a withdrawal timetable, there's no reason that Maliki and a president can't. (The British haven't spent a lot of time worrying about what's happened to Malaysia since they left.) The Middle East is obviously more strategical important than Malaysia but no one is even think about abandoning our military presence in the Middle East.
    At one level I agree with you. (although the Brit veterans who were on the ground in Malaysia no doubt did spend a lot of time thinking about it) Will simply leaving and declaring the mission a success because there is "an" Iraqi government in place satisfy me? I would wonder if it was worth all the blood my unit and others have shed. I have a hard time looking at the current Iraqi government and thinking of the word "success." In my opinion they haven't deserved the blood and treasure we have spent.

    However, I don't want to digress into all my personal issues. Perhaps if a thread is created called "Horror stories of the systemic complicity, corruption and incompetence of Iraq power holders," I will have more to say. I have to confess that my finding of this website was due to the recent coverage of Small Wars Journal's own David Kilcunnen and his comment on the Iraq war, as quoted by Spencer Ackerman in the Washington Independent. This led to my reading of his response on this site.

    As I indicated, I'm new to the site, and just now embarking on formal study of strategic considerations in counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare, so please be patient with my micro perspective. I look forward to learning from you all.
    Last edited by Alsultani; 07-30-2008 at 09:47 PM.

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    Not much new in this, but a useful brief summary of the polling data:


    Iraqi Public Opinion on the Presence of US Troops

    July 30, 2008
    Testimony of Dr. Steven Kull
    Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA),
    University of Maryland
    Director, WorldPublicOpinion.org

    July 23, 2008 - 2:00 PM

    Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight

    In closing, it is clear that the Iraqi people are quite eager for the US to lighten its military footprint in Iraq. More importantly it appears that they are eager to regain their sense of sovereignty. As long as they do not have this sense, they are likely to continue to have a fundamentally hostile attitude toward all aspects of the US presence in Iraq. However, as Iraqis gradually regain this sense that their country belongs to them, they will likely move toward wanting some ongoing relationship with the US, both economic and military, to help them find their way out of this troubled period of their long history.

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    Council Member MSG Proctor's Avatar
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    [QUOTE=Alsultani;53433]
    Quote Originally Posted by MSG Proctor View Post
    Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

    A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

    The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.
    Alsultani, excellent insights and riveting to read. I am encouraged to hear you mention Shia eschatology, a concept I have rarely heard mentioned outside theological/chaplain circles. Until one grasps the role of the Mahdi in contemporary Shia thought and action, the Shia remain mysterious and incomprehensible. There is a good deal of religious conceptualizing required to appreciate what the Shia think of as relevant, and it comes rather slowly to those who have not comitted to unraveling the various layers of Shia tradition and history. Blessings upon you!

    I am also heartened to hear Dr. Alawi's name is being bandied about on the Shia street. If anyone has the right values, character, experience and vision, its Iyad Alawi. And he is a Shia, but is not an Islamist. Would to God his influence would increase in Baghdad!

    I understand that Moqtada al Sadr was on the 'fast track' to becoming an Ayatollah - something that in reality cannot be done. Titles may be conferred on him by some, but real gravitas as a Shiite holy man require decades of preparation and experience as a cleric. Sistani is still the primary Ayatollah in Iraq. He's 80. He's a traditional quietist and not at all in step with his neighbors to the east.

    I appreciate your incredible insights and I am glad you posted here for the benfit of this community of interest.
    Last edited by MSG Proctor; 07-31-2008 at 01:51 AM.
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    Council Member MSG Proctor's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Alsultani;[B
    53433Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power[/B], and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.
    Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

    CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.
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    Quote Originally Posted by MSG Proctor View Post
    Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

    CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.
    Very good discussions here friends. I see several new advantages to the escalation as I call it.

    I find the term "surge" a bit inappropriate, I respectfully protest that a surge in western parlance applies more to electrical power than military power.

    I feel the main stream media loved the term because it served to dehumanize the Troops. So extension or escalation is a superior term.

    Yesterday & other days our C-in-c used the term so it does pass into history. I wonder who will be identified most with it in history; McCain, Petraeus, Bush, Pelosi ???

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