Seems to me that both these definitions require an understanding of the intent of the opponents to the Coalition in AF. We also have the problem of deciding whether the current ruling elite in AF is a sovereign or constituted government. In other words, before we can decide whether AF is an insurgency, we must first decide whether the Karzai leadership is a legitimate AF government. Of course, who makes that call is also important. The US and other NATO nations may view Karzai and company as legit, but is that who really counts? I suspect the Taleban would not think so.
Kind of hard, from a logical and linguistic perspective to do so.If it's not an insurgency, then can the belligerents by typified as insurgents?
I am inclined to say they are largely petty crooks and displaced power-mongers seeking to regain their lost power, but that is just an opinion. I suspect it does matter greatly what the world as a whole decides regarding what they are--otherwise we find ourselves with issues like the problems with those folks currently confined at Gitmo and what kinds of legally, morally, and politically acceptable action may be taken against them.If they are not insurgents, then what are they? Could they be a range of things? Does it matter and why?
I suspect my point above about deciding the legitimacy of the current rulers applies as part of the answer here.Does the possibility exist that while possibly not being an insurgency, it could become one? What would it take, and do we think there are those trying to make it one -e.g. is the Taliban attempting to build a political movement in the remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the purpose of challenging one or both of those governments? How do we know?
Hanging the name COIN TTP on an activity does not restrict its application to COIN. I can slalom on a ski slope, in a race car, or with a canoe/kayak--very different procedures for "completing a zig-zag course." Deciding what COIN thinking will/will not work is, I think, pretty much a matter of trial and error, particularly in AF where the idea that one has a uniform nation state is largely a myth. Maybe the HTT efforts will provide some better info upon which to make COA/TTP decisions.If its not an insurgency, then do counter-insurgency principals apply (some or all), and will COIN TTP (some or all) work? If so, which?
What about the situation is like an insurgency, and what is unlike an insurgency? What COIN thinking can be adapted to work, and what cannot?
AMENWe may have imposed self constraints on our ability to discuss this by putting qualifiers like global onto so many things, i.e. terror, guerrillas and insurgency. There is a danger in that because we tend to infer like properties on things and group them due to geography, religion, culture & language, association by timing or event, recent experiences, etc. rather then consider them as unique and distinct. Its a natural tendency that should be resisted because it facilitates bias. I'm involved in a couple of other projects where the out of hand COAs were based on assumptions that were only applicable elsewhere. We've got to be careful less we wind up solving exactly the wrong problem(s).
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