When people talk about "winning" and "losing" in Afghanistan I always wonder what they mean. I guess "losing" is clear enough: if the Taliban end up in control with AQ having free run of the place, that's a loss. But what would be "winning"? I think most of us would agree that if "winning" means withdrawal with a tidy western-style liberal democracy in place, the war is unwinnable. But if not that, then what? What - realistically - is the desired end state? I sometimes get the uncomfortable feeling that those in charge aren't quite sure.
It's not entirely a matter of semantics either. It's hard to accomplish objectives if you don't know what they are. I've long felt that much of the frustration and sense of failure that accompanies public perceptions of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan derives from unclear or excessively optimistic objectives. Of course if you expected that we'd toss Saddam, install a modern democracy - as if it were a light bulb or spare tire - and withdraw from Iraq, the campaign would look like a failure. But really, is the inability to achieve that objective a consequence of operational failure or was the objective unreasonable from the start? If we'd gone in with the assumption that achieving basic security and stability could easily take a decade and a functional government could need another, we'd be right on schedule.
We're constantly reminded that the campaign in Afghanistan has already taken longer than WW2... but given the realities of Afghanistan, who would have expected anything else?
If anyone has a concise description of what a "win" in Afghanistan would look like, you're one up on me... and I'd love to hear it!
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