First U.S. Official Resigns Over Afghan War

[Ken White]

Aside from the inappropriate and uncalled for branch off into the PTSD issue, no one really knocked him. One guy did say he disagreed with him and another, a FSO with a year in country, did comment that Hoh would not have time to gather a tremendous amount of knowledge of the country. That's an opinion and not a knock. You can say 'the complexities of Afghanistan' are getting old but they are there, they're not going away because some don't think they are...

Several of us asked why that letter is surfacing at this time -- that is not a reflection on Mr. Hoh at all but rather on the Washington Post and politics inside the beltway.

You said you aren't going to say whether you agree or disagree with him. I'm not bashful; I agree with his thrust but not with some facets of his rationale. That, practically speaking, means I agree with his position.

However, I'm still concerned with Winken's location...

[wm]

that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...True.Also true...

Ken,
I would be very hesitant to apply the term "nation" to the area we happen to call Afghanistan. I submit that the first order of business to getting on with business in that part of the world is to recognize that the place is nothing like a nation as Western Europeans understand that term. As I've previously posted, the closest thing to it that we might use as a basis for understanding is the amalgamation of efforts by ancient Greek city states in response to the Persian invasions or to the perceived slight against Menelaus of Sparta when Helen left for Troy with Paris.

Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

To make a military analogy about the State Department reaction: suppose Mr. Hoh was a Company Commander in the 2nd MEB in Helmand and decided that the war sucked and notified his chain of command that he was going to resign. He then gets called up to Kabul for a meeting with GEN McChrystal, who offers him a promotion to Colonel and a job on the ISAF HQ staff. When that doesn't work, he gets flown to Tampa for a meeting with GEN Petraeus and an offer of a position (again as a Colonel or maybe even BG) on the CENTCOM staff. Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Finally, I have to go back to my point in a previous post that Afghanistan is an extremely complicated issue that defies easy understanding or comprehension. Maybe it's a generational issue, but my gut reaction is that Mr. Hoh is naive and/or egotistical for having the moral certainty to not only resign but also publicly speak out against USG policy in Afghanistan. (In the WaPo article he states that "I want people in Iowa, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, Listen, I don't think this is right.") I can accept resignation for disagreement with policy, but taking a public position against policy when he hasn't been around long enough to understand all of the nuances is something that I feel to be close to a betrayal of his oath as a commissioned officer in the Foreign Service. But then again, to offer a criticism of Mr. Hoh - and I'd argue that he is now fair game for criticism since he has entered the political arena - it doesn't look to me like he was a Foreign Service Officer long enough to understand the ethos of the Foreign Service nor the messy and ambiguous realities of foreign policy formulation and execution.

[Tom Odom]

To make a military analogy about the State Department reaction: suppose Mr. Hoh was a Company Commander in the 2nd MEB in Helmand and decided that the war sucked and notified his chain of command that he was going to resign. He then gets called up to Kabul for a meeting with GEN McChrystal, who offers him a promotion to Colonel and a job on the ISAF HQ staff. When that doesn't work, he gets flown to Tampa for a meeting with GEN Petraeus and an offer of a position (again as a Colonel or maybe even BG) on the CENTCOM staff. Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Finally, I have to go back to my point in a previous post that Afghanistan is an extremely complicated issue that defies easy understanding or comprehension. Maybe it's a generational issue, but my gut reaction is that Mr. Hoh is naive and/or egotistical for having the moral certainty to not only resign but also publicly speak out against USG policy in Afghanistan. (In the WaPo article he states that "I want people in Iowa, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, Listen, I don't think this is right.") I can accept resignation for disagreement with policy, but taking a public position against policy when he hasn't been around long enough to understand all of the nuances is something that I feel to be close to a betrayal of his oath as a commissioned officer in the Foreign Service. But then again, to offer a criticism of Mr. Hoh - and I'd argue that he is now fair game for criticism since he has entered the political arena - it doesn't look to me like he was a Foreign Service Officer long enough to understand the ethos of the Foreign Service nor the messy and ambiguous realities of foreign policy formulation and execution.

Well said,

Tom

[Bob's World]

This guy appears to have performed his duty with honor.

When he couldn't square what he was being told to do with his own personal assessment and values, he risigned when he found his personal and professional honor in conflict. Sadly Afghanistan is a political hot button right now, mostly for reasons that have little to do with either Afghanistan, GWOT, or the larger security concerns of the US, so such statements will be used as fodder in that game of political power between the Dems and Reps.

I see no news here. Hopefully those working on policy for this don't just dismiss this guy for disagreeing, and take a moment to step back and conisder if there are other options than approaches currently on the table for debate. They probably won't though.

Worth remembering is that American interests and security concerns are global and multi-facted, and to keep Afghanistan as whole, as well as the US role there in the proper perspective.

[Steve the Planner]

PolMil:

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Actually, as the story emerges, I'm amending my speculation.

First, there are a few online sources, including his online resume:

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/matthew-hoh/4/920/712

and a few articles which suggest that, while a riveting piece of journalism, it does not tell the whole story of who he is or what his role was:

http://washingtonindependent.com/653...ervice-officer

Ranging from "Senior US civilian" to Iraq Hero to mid-level temporary appointee, with four months on the ground in Zabul

Andrew Exum explains that Zabul is one of those uniquely God forsaken places (where "rural" is too urban a term) from which the ability to apply it's Biblical-age lessons to broad strategic assessments of Afghanistan is limited. He suggests that Hoh was beaten down by the experience.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...too-urban.html

One Examiner story I read suggested instead, after citing interviews with some of his Marine colleagues, suggested that he was, in fact, a political aspirant, but that the letter looked to be soemthing written by someone else for him.

From all that, I can only conclude that there is much more going on than meets the eye with this fellow and his message. We will probably learn more once he sells the rights... or as most suggest, declares for office.

As for the contents of the message, I, too, scratch my head as to how much broad strategy I could surmise about any country based on a small view of an anomalous area during a four month window.

More important to me is that his message, even if correct, was grandstanded in a way calculated to drive national political debate---this from a serving federal appointee. Had he resigned first, or waited til it expired last month, then made a statement, it probably would have been a non-event.

These kinds of grandstanded, out-of-school press events disregard the emotions and fears of relatives of serving members in a way that I personally find disrespectful. Better for the President to review these types of positions, as we all know he is, and make his determination and statement.

If Hoh was a "former" appointee, he was free to make any observation he wanted. But that was not the case.

[Cavguy]

PolMil:

"I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind")."

Actually, as the story emerges, I'm amending my speculation.

First, there are a few online sources, including his online resume:

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/matthew-hoh/4/920/712

and a few articles which suggest that, while a riveting piece of journalism, it does not tell the whole story of who he is or what his role was:

http://washingtonindependent.com/653...ervice-officer

Ranging from "Senior US civilian" to Iraq Hero to mid-level temporary appointee, with four months on the ground in Zabul

Andrew Exum explains that Zabul is one of those uniquely God forsaken places (where "rural" is too urban a term) from which the ability to apply it's Biblical-age lessons to broad strategic assessments of Afghanistan is limited. He suggests that Hoh was beaten down by the experience.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...too-urban.html

One Examiner story I read suggested instead, after citing interviews with some of his Marine colleagues, suggested that he was, in fact, a political aspirant, but that the letter looked to be soemthing written by someone else for him.

From all that, I can only conclude that there is much more going on than meets the eye with this fellow and his message. We will probably learn more once he sells the rights... or as most suggest, declares for office.

As for the contents of the message, I, too, scratch my head as to how much broad strategy I could surmise about any country based on a small view of an anomalous area during a four month window.

More important to me is that his message, even if correct, was grandstanded in a way calculated to drive national political debate---this from a serving federal appointee. Had he resigned first, or waited til it expired last month, then made a statement, it probably would have been a non-event.

These kinds of grandstanded, out-of-school press events disregard the emotions and fears of relatives of serving members in a way that I personally find disrespectful. Better for the President to review these types of positions, as we all know he is, and make his determination and statement.

If Hoh was a "former" appointee, he was free to make any observation he wanted. But that was not the case.

1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

2) Memo was dated Sept 10, 2009

3) My understanding is he already left his job a few weeks ago, therefore is not a fed employee.

[Steve the Planner]

Cavguy:

1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

2) Memo was dated Sept 10, 2009

3) My understanding is he already left his job a few weeks ago, therefore is not a fed employee.

Good points. Learning more as it goes along.

Still trying to figure out from press reports whether he contacted them or they contacted him. (Small point?)

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

All said and done, I agree with the comments from a recent Guardian post which cites Tom Friedman's latest:

Friedman added a salutary word about priorities for wobblers in Washington and London. "Remember: transform Iraq and it will impact the whole Arab-Muslim world. Change Afghanistan and you just change Afghanistan.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...-us-withdrawal

So where does the US prioritize? For the President and Congress to decide, but, no doubt, with substantial input from very broad, and sometimes international (NATO?) public.

Steve

[Fuchs]

Was this really the first resigning U.S. official in regard to Afghanistan? I doubt it.

The British had already several high-profile guys giving up (especially diplomats) on Afghanistan.

[Entropy]

Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

It sure did with me. However, that doesn't tell us anything about Mr. Hoh, but sure tells us a lot about how our system deals with dissidents in the ranks. My WTF was in reaction how the upper echelons saw his resignation as primarily a political problem to be solved by attempting to turn him into a made man. That doesn't reflect well on Mr. Hoh's superiors, frankly.

The results of this are pretty clear though - anyone who wants to similarly resign now knows their resignation will be publicly exposed and all sorts of people who disagree with the reasoning will make assumptions and engage in ad hominem arguments. I suspect any others out there will now resign quietly because of "family" reasons and not mention policy. Mr. Hoh's career in public service is probably over - who wants to hire someone who, intentionally or not, publicly rocked the boat?

The only thing I want to know about Mr. Hoh is if he just up and resigned or made an attempt to pass his analysis up the chain. If the former, then shame on him, but if the latter....

[pjmunson]

Maybe I'm upset because I think that instead of continuing to debate this guy, his credibility, and his motives, the supposed professionals here should actually speak to the issue. I don't give a hoot about the ethos of the foreign service and, whether they like it or not, I think that an educated military officer with DoD civilian time can figure out enough about DoS to write a letter about national strategy (not DoS PRT policy) when he's had enough. He's had much more than a few months in the overall foreign policy instrument of the government when you combine DoD and DoS time. And I do understand that Afghanistan is a very complex place. I don't disagree. I do believe that has become a vehicle to dismiss any argument people don't like though. "Oh, he's wrong because he doesn't understand the complexities of Afghanistan." Unstated: "I know better."

Again, where is the debate over his message, rather than him? Or maybe that is "generational"? One of the reasons why this country is politically where it is at right now is because we don't really consider issues anymore. We just attack the messenger. It does piss me off. Maybe I have PTSD.

[Schmedlap]

1) Hoh did not leak the memo.

Who leaked it?

Added:
Just saw this in the comment section at Kings of War: a commenter under the name of Joshua Foust (whom I suspect is the real one), wrote:

You know, he’s not actually an FSO or even really a U.S. official, but a one-year contract employee. Just to be clear; not a single career FSO has resigned over Afghanistan, despite there being many hundreds there.

[Steve Blair]

Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

This is why I've been contending for some time that our own experiences in Arizona are perhaps a touch more germane to discussions about Afghanistan than the oh-so-common Vietnam analogies. Even Hoh tried to drag out the Vietnam skeleton (poorly, in my view). All of our major post-CW Indian conflicts were against loose tribal confederations (and the emphasis in that line is on loose, not confederation), and many took place in difficult terrain. Most of the major Apache campaigns took place in rugged, mountainous country and required some major changes in the standard operational templates used at the time. The Modoc campaign was difficult for a number of reasons, terrain being one and poor leadership in the early stages on the part of the Army being another. And there are even similarities in the policy conflicts we're seeing now.

[Tom Odom]

Some thoughts.

First of all I am sure most here have heard (read) me lament the cultural and professional gaps between Defense and other agencies (but in particular State) when it comes to larger strategy and security planning. The creation of a civilian response corps is supposed to help address what I would call the lack of an expeditionary mindset among my fellow civilian travelers, regardless of agency.

Deployment on a PRT or as a civilian with a unit is not just another posting to another embassy. It is voluntary on the front end; it is not voluntary in the middle. The bottom line in places like Iraq or Afghanistan or other garden spots is this: when you take the King's coin, you do the King's bidding until your tour is done. Barring medical condition or injury, you serve your tour. Otherwise those around you cannot count on you. If you cannot do that, don't take the coin.

From the above, resignation couched in the name of others or against a policy (or both) is quitting. You just quit. Period. Those whom you cite as your justification did not quit. To begin with, they can't and in 99.9% of the cases, they would not if they could because of the folks around them. Citing them as a reason only serves your decision to quit.

If at the end of your tour, you still feel the policy is untenable, the strategy is broke, or whatever, then resign. Go public if you wish. Your call. I will salute your moral stance and understand where you are coming from. But don't take the King's coin and then quit because the King's men and women depend on one another.

Tom

[Steve the Planner]

pj:

Agree with a lot of what you are saying, but, if he was actually a senior civilian official with, say, a tour or two in Afghanistan, and enough visibility to the big picture, I would be more comfortable with both the press attention and the message.

I only spent a year in Iraq, but was probably one of the most well-traveled civilians in Northern Iraq doing a lot of intensive research. Having said that, my research was in a particular field and a particular region in which I still, at best, know enough to know what I don't know.

To project that limited knowledge (especially the amount gleaned from four months into my tour) into a strategic view of the entire national, international, civilian and military effort, would, in my opinion, be quite an unreasonable stretch.

Notwithstanding, there are plenty of folks on this site who know that my opinion of the civilian side of these efforts is less than optimum, and justifies substantial critique and evolution. So, in that context, his criticisms, applicable to the levels he experienced are actually pretty consistent with many things I believe.

One of the bigger debates that I beleive should raise concerns to higher ups is in fact the question of how DoS selects, deploys, supports, and interacts with "so-called" contractors, who are actually supposed to be subject mater and specialty skills experts brought in to fill knowledge and resource gaps in the civilian effort. They are special federal appointees, not contractors, nor foreihgn service officers.

This affair really raises the issue of whether they (or he as an individual within that class) are being properly recruited, deployed, supported, and engaged to the civilian mission.

Maybe I am wrong, but if the civilian surge was actually intended to connect experienced civilians (not ex-military and foreign service officers) to the mission of expanding the reach and capacity of government to its people, what was this guy doing there?

If the answer is that the civilian surge was not able to be staffed in the manner as advertised (thus the facade of military dual-hatting versus actual civilians), then we need to re-examine that surge, not conceal it by alternate military staffing.

The UN, by comparison, in Iraq used a lot of different techniques to drive adequate civilian staffing. One example was to use civilian experts who had an on-going and deep knowledge of the area, but came and went over a longer period: three to six month per year on the ground over five years. Another was to anchor the operation in Jordan, a safe country nearby, from which civilians rotated in for three weeks at a time.

Most civilian experts on that kind of an assignment (known as hotelling) could actually get more done at the anchor (better internet, freer movement, more resources like CAD engineering), and use the on=ground time to research, contact and deliver. As a civilian "expert" I was always taught to leave enough downtime to "think" about a problem (plan twice, build once), than to just push a fast, expedient answer in as is more appropriate, and necessary to a military battle tempo on the ground.

Anyone familiar with routine local/regional government processes understands that a County Executive or Public Works manager may routinely initiate a "cycle" of scoping, evaluation, preliminary design, public or organizational review and feedback, then, and only then, proceed to retain design strategies (whether engineering or systems) from which final design action programs may start (final engineering/construction, bids for computer systems implementation, etc...). These things happen over months and years using appropriate experts sequencing in and out of projects over their course.

If we can't understand how to effectively plan around, staff, and deliver routine civilian processes, then there is something fundamentally wrong with our civilian surge process. How do we deal with that?

Perhaps, if the answer is that security precludes civilian effectiveness, we should acknowledge that, and not pretend to Clear, Hold and Build, but just Clear, Clear and Clear, without pretending that clear is a step to something else that we are not delivering.

Instead, I fear we have the worst of all worlds right now on the civilian side. Short-term assignees (Yes, one year is a short-term for civilian projects of note in a field where most real solutions might take five years to plan and implement), often not qualified in the designated subject areas, with no structured process or support, or plan to align effective civilian consultative and a capacity building processes in a competent and effective manner.

So, does the Hoh affair raise important issues for me? Yes. But that phase of the debate was not brought to the table yet.

Steve

[Schmedlap]

I suspect that this letter was leaked to the media because Hoh's "biography" is convenient. Someone apparently thought that his background would make this opinion more important than opinions of other people whose opinions might have been formed with far more information and understanding of the situation.

This is standard procedure in American politics, so I'm not decrying the tactic. But it does amaze me that we fall for it every time.

[jkm_101_fso]

I suspect that this letter was leaked to the media because Hoh's "biography" is convenient.

That was my thought...he was the "perfect" candidate for political fodder.

This is standard procedure in American politics, so I'm not decrying the tactic. But it does amaze me that we fall for it every time.

You're right. I'm guilty.

[jkm_101_fso]

Abu M. weighs in on apparent inaccuracies in the original WaPo article

Looks like Schmed might be right...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

To me Mr. Hoh’s resignation and statement do not meet the “so what” test. So what? A DoS contractor quits, back in September no less, after four months in the field and decides our efforts in Astan are not worth it. So what, there are dozens of pundits saying similar things right now, many of whom have spent nearly zero time in Astan. Also, there are advocates for our continuing our efforts in Astan, many of whom have spent nearly zero time in Astan. So Mr. Hoh is not offering any Earth shattering revelations.

I’m with Schmedlap: Why is the Post touting this now? At the very same time that the President in pondering the next moves in Astan and an election runoff is soon to occur there.

I say the Post is merely acting the agent provocateur in an attempt to steer debate on Astan a certain way and using Mr. Hoh’s resignation as some sort of indication that the Obama team has lost the strategic ball.