In reference to both Wilf and Rhodesian on the expense/ capability debate (expressed in regards to aircraft, but I imagine it applies equally to AFVs and even the lowest-level infantry capability) - there is substantial benefit to platforms based off the environment we are in. A turbo-prop aircraft, ala a A-1 Skyraider or even an old Mosquito type of WW2 vintage, would be more beneficial in delivering CAS than an F15E, and far cheaper to procure and easier to maintain than the likes of the F-15s or AH-64s.

Inevitably the opportunity cost for a force fielding equipment intended for low-intensity conflict (i.e. a turboprop meant to hammer enemy positions 'low and slow' that is unable to deal with enemy AD or enemy aircraft) will not be as effective in fielding a high-tech force intended to fight against an equivalent force.

Perhaps the answer, then, is that the effort should be on creating an Afghani air arm able to fight their war, the way it suits them. Instead of creating a RAF or USAF air-wing-lite, as we seem to be doing in focussing on their rotary wing capability, we should be worrying about their ability to beat the Taliban their way (not that I'm being original here, this is obviously Kilcullen's 23rd article - Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves). Do we need the ANA to be able to conduct expensive helo ops, or is it better for us and for them if they were able to sustain economical infantry/ light armour operations with effective fire support from a suitable CAS air wing?

We don't have to field and deploy the COIN-specific platforms ourselves. We can procure and deploy them to the host nation forces, thus getting the best of both worlds.