For moving this discussion quickly beyond a theological exposition of Huntington et al. I don't want to suggest that there's nothing useful there, but we need to get a sense of what our problem is before we go looking for answers.
But, your answers seem curious to me for a couple reasons:
First, you say that:
There might be a few problems here. For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place. On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well. Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party. If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.
Your second observation seems better to me.
However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?
Regards,
Bob
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