Dear all,
Some of you may have been aware that I've been writing a PhD on the reconstruction of armies in partner states following a peace accord. (Added link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10049 ).
The thesis has been completely focused on countries where an international force arrives and has to had over to a replacement partner army.
Field case was Liberia; desk cases have included
*armies formed by merger: Zimbabwe, S Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan (the JIUs, not the SPLA), DR Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal.
*armies formed by institutionalizing a rebel force: East Timor, Kosovo
*armies rebuilt from scratch: Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia
My conclusions are as follows:
*This is a thesis focused on weak states. Very hard to build strong armies in weak states. Examples abound, especially ANA.
*Non-state security forces are the dominant provider of both security and insecurity for virtually all post-peace accord states.
*If armies and state security forces are to be relevant, they must be
able to 'plug-and-play' with non-state security providers. Need to
fiddle with that wording
*On the demand side, only way to build sustainable armies is
consensus through national dialogue.
*On the supply side, a reconsideration of approach by US/British
Armies to reflect Scheye's SSD USIP paper (http://www.usip.org/publications/rea...or-development) considerations should be considered. Perhaps best way of putting this into effect is by promoting and disseminating the Brit doctrine paper (Joint Doctrine Note 07/16 Building Indigenous Armies) much more widely, which appears to reflects political considerations / on ground reality much better than US FM 3.07-1
*The elephant in the room, not actually part of the research question, is how we can build strong armies. It is not possible to build strong armies in weak states; they are intrinsically linked. Must build strong states. Herbst (2000) demonstrates that freezing the boundaries in Africa as per 1964 Cairo declaration etc makes it very hard for the only known way of building strong states, evolution through war, to take place.
*Is it morally justifiable to recommend loosening the fixed boundaries so as to build stronger states, meaning millions more will die in addition to the millions lost during the post-45 period? This is a much wider matter than armies alone, and can only be decided in a wider audience. It is beyond the scope of a PhD thesis.
Now I've had relatively little time in the field compared to many of you, and this all has a very academic slant. I would very much appreciate comments and violent disagreement... what have I got right? what have I got wrong, what have I not included that I should have?
Best regards to all
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