I could have a lot of fun with the phrase "COIN experts" but that would be penny ante...
Agree. As I do with this:Absolutely. On this next one, though, I have a comment:My only caveat to this is that most experts on cultures know very little about insurgency, which leads to equally flawed assessments of how things might play out.I agree with the statement but would add that our (the Army's) ineptitude due to lack of doctrine and, more importantly, lack of training and acts of indiscipline in early days in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan were partly due to the two factors you cite but were mostly simply the result of inadequate training and education on the part of most element -- of all components, branches and commands; everyone involved in decision making capacities. The cultural and the COIN mavens did not help, indeed, they possibly in some cases did more harm than good.Too much of our current flawed approach to the war on terrorism is that we have relied too much on "cultural experts" who have made it far too much about religion; and on CT and COIN experts who have made far too much about a couple different families of tactics for addressing particular aspects of a problem, but not very good at addressing the larger drivers of the real problem.True. It is worrisome that too many in high places fail to understand that. Really worrisome.It is not a pursuit for "the answer" is the pursuit for a more effective context. Counter culture, counter terror, and colonial intervention models dressed up as COIN just are not working. What amazes me is how many assume that they should.Also agree.As I have stated elsewhere, I believe these are the factors that contributed most to the enduring stability of that nation and are what are missing in so many Middle Eastern nations that are flaring up today.)
It does seem the Administration is finally starting to find its feet with respect to Egypt, I note multiple and synchronized calls for 'an orderly transition.'
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