Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
It sounds a lot like a message "See, they are also our enemies (thus we aren't their ally by definition)!"
Fuchs, if you are implying that the army did it to convince the US about its anti-jihadi bonafides, then I think you are wrong.
Stick to Uncle Occam's razor. The obvious story is probably true:
1. Jihadis have had free reign in Pakistan for decades. Dozens of training camps, half a million trained terrorists, links with intelligence agencies, a network of madressahs to supply recruits and sanctuaries, a network of supporters and funders. Sympathizers in the armed forces and political parties organized to support them "above ground" (primarily, the Jamat e Islami in educated areas, the JUI in the western region).
2. The top brass calculated that fighting against the US was not a good idea and decided to become allies. But they had neither the ability nor the inclination to take on the jihadist network in a full-frontal assault. More to the point, they have not been able to build up such an ability over time because most of them did not get the full implications of what was being attempted. Getting through the current crisis with minimum damage has been the priority but the goofiness extends in every direction. Even that job has not been done well.The top brass are incompetent (for the most part..i believe General Kiyani is a relative exception, but only relatively speaking) and do not have access to an intellectual foundation for anti-jihadism. They are not the sort of peple who could see that this turn away from Jihadism would have to extend to a turn away from the ideological narrative that supported jihad.
3. Terrorists wanting to make a spectacular strike picked this target because it was easy. Its a large base in the middle of a crowded city. I have seen the aircraft parked there from the road passing by the base. Whether it was naval aviation or air force or army aviation probably made little difference. As in ANY large base, they probably had a few sympathizers in the base. That made the details easier.
4. Only four terrorists seem to have gone in. Maybe 6. The response was as much as the base could manage. No conspiracy is needed to mess up a response in Pakistan or India. A conspiracy well above our abilities would be needed to deliberately prolong anything.
The terrorist networks can do this sort of thing anytime. THAT may have been the main intended message.