Alliance isn't only a function of common values. Common interests come into it as well, and those with whom we have interests in common aren't necessarily progressive. Those alliances - like all alliances - are not absolute, and we obviously have to consider the extent of our commitment at any given point... but common interests do exist.
I've often heard it said that the US "supported the Saudis" when they were threatened by Saddam. This is to some extent true, but it's a highly distorted view. We did not act to protect the Saudis, we acted to protect ourselves. The US can't allow the Gulf oil supplies to be controlled or dominated by a hostile power that would use oil as a weapon. We would fight again if Iran threatened to control those oil supplies. Again, that has absolutely nothing to do with how we feel about the way the Saudis govern, or how progressive they are, or whether we like them. It's purely a matter of common interest.
Is our problem the way Saudi Arabia is governed, or is our problem our own addiction to oil? Both, obviously, but we might want to consider which of those is within our ability to control.Originally Posted by Bob's World
It's easy to make assumptions, and altogether too easy to act on them, but there are a few here that we need to avoid.
We're conditioned by our cold war history to see our dictatorial allies as dependents, over whom we have significant influence. We should not overestimate our influence over the Saudis and the other Gulf states.
We easily fall into the trap of oversimplifying the political dynamics of other countries. We see an autocratic government, we assume a populace uniformly seeking freedom and a "government vs populace" dynamic. It's often a great deal more complicated than that. Trying to intervene in situations we don't fully understand, or that we misinterpret by assuming that our values apply universally, can quickly bounce back and bite us no the backside.
It's also all too easy to assume that because many people in Saudi Arabia (or any number of other places) dislike their governments and resent our perceived (accurately or not) support for those governments, we can counter that resentment by openly pushing those governments to change, or by trying to somehow intervene as champion of the populace. That I think is a very dangerous delusion. Even people who detest their own governments often don't want the US trying to lecture those governments or dictate to them, or to act as the instigator of change. Our actions are typically seen as conspiratorial attempts to advance our own interests, and our active support can actually discredit a reform agenda. We do not want reformers to be seen as tools of the US.
If we're asking the old "what can we do" question, we have to ask whether we have to do anything. Supporting those who seek change is often a good thing, if we can do it subtly and without seeming to direct or take over the reform agenda (subtlety, alas, has never been one of our strong suits). Trying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.
We should remember that what fuels support for AQ is not simply US support for repressive regimes, it's western interference in the Muslim world in general. We may say that we're interfering on behalf of the people, but who will believe us? Very even for even well intentioned interference to backfire on us.
Not saying we should abandon all thought of intervention... but we need to think very, very carefully before trying to initiate political change in any other country, most especially those in the Middle East.
Our default position in managing the internal affairs of other countries, IMO, should be to stay out of it. If that default seems unsustainable, three quick questions before taking any action:
Must we?
Can we?
Should we?
All three have to be very carefully reviewed before we go sticking ourselves into other people's business.
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